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The thesis of this dissertation is that the

reconstitution of human subjectivity, theoretically and
concretely,

is necessary to adequately address the global

ecological crisis and ongoing social and political
Initial attempts to

domination and exploitation.

constitute this new ecological subject exist in the
radical ecology movement (recognized by Rudolf Bahro and

Herbert Marcuse in the 1970s)

examined here through three

primary branches of the radicalized environmental
movement: deep ecology, social ecology, and ecof eminism.

Aspects of this radical ecological subject are revealed in
a

critique based on the work of the early Frankfurt School
IV

theorists--Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, and
Herbert
Marcuse. Adorno's understanding of negative

dialectics,

or non-identity thinking,

is the primary source of

categories for the analysis.

Jurgen Habermas's critique

Adorno is rejected, and Habermas's "communicative
action" theory is also found to be inadequate for radical

ecological needs.

Adorno's use of the concept/term

"mimesis" provides

a

lever for prying open radical

ecology's treasure of insights as well as its limitations.
Each branch of radical ecology is examined with reference
to its methodology or epistemology,

its understanding of

subjectivity, and their respective politics.
Deep ecology's deep questioning method, proposed by

Arne Naess, is found to differ little from traditional

philosophy and inadequately supports its claims about
possibilities for identification with nature or the
creation of

a

political identity or agency capable of

adequately addressing ecological and social problems, this
despite the successes of its political descendants,

including Earth First! and Dave Foreman.

Social ecology,

elaborated by Murray Bookchin, expands the idea of

subjectivity beyond its ability to provide the critical
conceptual framework necessary to resolve the ecological
crisis.

Bookchin'

s

critique and interpretation of the

early Critical Theorists also fails.

Ecofeminism, a

diverse set of perspectives, must be approached cautiously
while attempting to salvage consistent theoretical
v

.

categories which, combined with critical theory's
insights,

illuminate potentials for development of

future radical ecological subject.

a

Useful categories

include "feminist standpoint theory," the "ethic
of care

psychoanalysis and other insights from the works of Luce
Irigaray, Nancy Hartsock,

Sara Ruddick and Drucilla

Cornell

vi
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INTRODUCTION

The thesis of this dissertation is
that the

reconstitution of human subjectivity, both
theoretically
and concretely, is necessary to adequately
address both
the global ecological crisis and ongoing social
and
political domination and exploitation.

Subjectivity and

its relation to the destruction of nature has been
a

central concern in the more philosophical works of
"radical ecology," a term used here to include the texts
of deep ecology,

social ecology and ecofeminism.

^

This

work will examine recent radical ecological attempts to

reconceptualize subjectivity, the methods or methodologies
used which provide the bases of the respective
conceptualizations, and the resulting claims about the

possibilities for social and political transformation.
The contrasting views of deep ecology,

social ecology,

ecofeminism and other forms of radical ecology have
developed in an atmosphere of mutual critique.

This has

resulted in

a

including

more open acknowledgment of both the many

a

steadily increasing sophistication,

differences between these views as well as their basic
agreements.

However, even including their increasing

subtlety and complexity, these attempts to develop

a

radical philosophy of ecology continue to fail to fulfill
their claims to provide an adequate philosophical basis
for radical ecological activity.

1

This dissertation attempts to
more fully engage the
tradition of critical theory, the
"Frankfurt School," with
the discourse of radical ecological
philosophy.

Specifically, the work of Theodore Adorno,
Max Horkheimer,
and Herbert Marcuse will be drawn on
to provide leverage
for a critical evaluation of the
relationship between a
radical ecological subjectivity and the
domination,

exploitation and destruction of nature.

Since there are

significant differences among these "first generation"
critical theorists as well, care must be given to

acknowledge these differences and the subsequent impacts
they may have on the critique of radical ecology.
Critical theory proceeds out of the Western philosophical
tradition,

challenging that tradition on its own terms

through "immanent critique,"

a

developed in Adorno's work.

One of the central themes of

process most fully

the early critical theorists was the development of the

concept of "the domination of nature."

The philosophical

texts of radical ecology in its various facets have

concerned themselves with many of the same themes as those
of critical theory.

In several instances Adorno,

Horkheimer and Marcuse have already been appropriated by
these more recent philosophies, although until now only

marginally.

This dissertation will argue in favor of

a

further elaboration and extension of the insights of

critical theory into radical ecology's self-understanding.
Simultaneously,

critical theory can be

it is argued,

2

developed by introducing insights from
the philosophies of
radical ecology.
This should result
in a richer

understanding of both the current system
of domination and
exploitation, and insights into possibilities
for its
social, political,

and ecological transformation.

Subjectivity and Ecology
Rudolf Bahro's work, although it does not belong
to
any of the three main categories of radical ecology

examined here, provides an opportunity to formulate some
of the central issues and concerns of radical ecology
in

the context of the actual historical engagement between

critical theory and
Bahro's

lh.e

a

contemporary ecological philosophy.

Alte rnative in Eastern Europe was described by

Herbert Marcuse as, "The most important contribution to

Marxist theory and practice to appear in several
O

decades."^-

Marcuse claimed Bahro's analysis was

applicable to both actually existing socialism

(a

much

smaller category now than in 1977) and late capitalism.

Marcuse perceived in Bahro's work the possibility of

a

fundamental shift in the understanding of Marxism: "A

decisive result is that historical materialism makes

a

genuine advance: the relationship between base and

superstructure is redefined, the focal point of the social
dynamic is shifted from objectivity of political economy
to subj ectivity

.

to consciousness as a potential material

force for radical change." 3

It is a concern for

3

reconceptualizing subjectivity that marks the
nexus of
several contemporary philosophical developments,
with an
implied consequence of providing opportunities
for the

establishment of

a

transformation.

Exploration of alternative conceptions of

new agent of social-political

subjectivity in the philosophical literature of radical
ecology may contribute significantly to the development
of
the project of social transformation.
The various branches of radical ecology develop their

respective critiques of existing society from

a

broad

range of philosophical positions. For example, individuals
who identify with the philosophy of deep ecology proceed

from traditions as diverse as Buddhism, Native American
culture,

Bookchin,

Spinoza, Heidegger, Marcuse and Foucault.

Murray

self-identified anarchist and prime-mover behind

social ecology, has frequently relied on Kropotkin's idea
of "mutual aid," while making Hegel's work a central

methodological component of his project.

Bookchin has

also claimed to have been strongly influenced by

Horkheimer and Adorno, although some of his harshest
criticisms are aimed in their direction.

Ecofeminist

positions encompass perhaps an even broader range of
traditions than either deep ecology or social ecology,

although

a

general tendency until very recently had been

for the ecofeminist debate to be split into opposing camps

on the question of "women's spirituality."

respect,

In this

ecofeminist debates echo those in feminist theory
4

generally which circulate around the
questions of female
subjectivity, embodiment, and "the feminine."
Beginning
from these diverse perspectives, these
radical ecological
philosophies attribute social and political
conflicts and
contradictions to different origins, however, they
all
recognize the "ecological crisis" as a fundamental

contemporary problem, and "nature" as
category.

a

central analytical

These analyses of existing structures of

domination, exploitation and destruction have led to

corresponding proposals for the reconstitution of the
concept of subjectivity.

The respective understandings by

these philosophies of the relationship of a transformed

subjectivity to "nature" serve as the basis for new value
systems with specific implications for ethical and

political activity. Additionally, although not always

explicitly acknowledged, this results in
specifically political subject,

a

reconstituted,

a

necessary step in the

transitional phase of any project seeking

a

"revolutionary" transformation of the existing social
structure.

What is required of critical social theory at

this historical moment is an exploration of these attempts
to constitute an "ecological subject," and the relation of

the ecological subject to social transformation.

Ecology and Methodology
One crucial aspect of any critique of the

philosophical currents of radical ecology is that of
5

s

methodology. Methodology, and epistemology,
have been a
primary concern in all attempts to
develop an adequate
philosophical understanding of present

historical/ecological conditions.

One example is the deep

ecologists' methodology-based distinction
between "deep"
and "shallow" ecology.
The deep ecology method was first

suggested by Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess,
but most
succinctly explained by deep ecologist/ecophilosopher
Warwick Fox,

"This sense of deep ecology is predicated

upon the idea of asking progressively deeper questions
about the ecological relationships of which we are

a

part.

Naess holds that this deep questioning process ultimately
reveals bedrock or end-of-the-line assumptions, which he
refers to as

f undamcntdl

/

and that deep ecological views

are derived from such fundamentals while shallow

ecological views are not

." 4

Social ecology also is based on

a

specific

methodological approach, what Murray Bookchin calls

way

a

of "thinking ecologically" which develops through

"dialectical naturalism." This is his idiosyncratic

appropriation of Hegel's dialectical method loosely
combined with the theory of evolution: "Conceived as

a

naturalistic form of thinking--as dialectical naturalism-dialectics may be distinguished from Hegel's empyrean,

basically anti-naturalistic dialectical idealism and the
wooden often scientistic dialectical materialism of
c:

orthodox Marxists."
6

Feminism has always viewed as
problematic the
relationship between epistemology,
ontology
and

methodology, and this has carried
over into ecof eminism.
Early ecofemmist arguments frequently
developed out of
anthropological research into prehistoric
societies.
It
has been extensively argued that
these societies were at
least matrilmeal, if not fully matriarchal.
Assertions
about these (perhaps) goddess worshipping
societies have
been the basis for (re) establishment of some
contemporary

goddess religions and the subsequent development
of

elaborate rituals and myths.

Ecofeminist concepts and

theories have now moved beyond

a

direct association with

goddess religions, but these origins still form an

important component of many ecofeminist practices, and

continue to attract much criticism.

Although self-

identified ecofeminists have recently introduced other
theoretical perspectives, drawn from the larger feminist
context,

(including the tradition of critical theory),

ritual and myth as methods of "woman's knowing" remain at
the heart of much of ecofeminist philosophy,

critique.

and its

Of course the concepts of myth and mimesis were

also important in the work of the first generation

critical theorists.

It is even arguable that the

relationship of reason to myth and mimesis is the very
heart of Adorno's work, including the early collaboration

with Horkheimer on the pivotal text of the Frankfurt
School,

Dialectic of Enlightenment
7

6
.

It is clear from

this brief overview of radical ecology
that questions of
philosophical method, of interpretation
and

representation, will be at the heart of
any critique of
philosophical ecology.

Questions of philosophic method were also
very much
in the forefront of Theodore Adorno's
work. Adorno

of all

the critical theorists was perhaps most
scrupulous in his

attention to philosophic method.

Adorno, not

uncritically, borrowed the form of the "constellation"
from Walter Benjamin

7

The philosophic constellation, a

.

configuration of concepts "near" the object, is assembled
to reveal what is normally concealed when concept and

object are simply equated as they are in various forms of
the "correspondence" theory of knowledge.

Correspondence,

or philosophical identification of concept with object,

repeats the process of false reconciliation of humans and

nature characteristic of idealism and positivism.

A

fundamental tenet of dialectics is that the object is not

simply

a

thing but has

a

history of development and is

always caught-up in this process.

The manner of

representing this process marks the differences between
Hegel, Marx and their philosophical descendants,

including

the early critical theorists.

Adorno's critical theory most consistently attempts
to sustain the tension between concept and object,

avoiding

a

false identification or reconciliation, thereby

creating

a

space for critical reflection. At its creative
8

best this results in the
simultaneous development of
dialectical method and awareness
of possibilities for
achieving critical or autonomous
subjectivity.
The
ecology movement has, at its best,
also attempted to
incorporate the idea of self-development
into its

political practice.

It may be philosophically
and

politically fruitful at this historical
moment to attempt
to bring these two streams of
social
theory,

critical

theory and the philosophies of radical
ecology, together
the context of their common, self-developing,

m

and

emancipatory project.

Adorno's employment of philosophic

constellations to illuminate relationships of
ongoing
importance to Western philosophy (such as those
between
concept and object, subject and object, humans and
nature,
and so on)
this work.

,

will be re-presented and developed throughout
However,

some initial indications of Adorno's

understanding of "negative dialectics" or "non-identity
thinking" will emphasize the issues surrounding the

concept of subjectivity: "Cognition of the object in its

constellation is cognition of the process stored in the
object. As a constellation, theoretical thought circles
the concept it would like to unseal, hoping that it may

fly open like the lock of a well guarded safe-deposit box:
in response, not to a single key or a single number, but
to a combination of numbers

." 8

Adorno's representation of the "constellation" in
this example may seem overburdened with metaphors of
9

things and mathematics which might
indicate the absence of
subjectivity.
But this is only one moment
in the

constellation’s formation.

He also emphasizes the

dbiectivity of the subjective dimpn<n

subjectively created context— the
readable as

a

'

elsewhere:

"The

constellation —becomes
’

sign of an objectivity: of the spiritual

substance. What resembles writing in such
constellations
is the conversion into objectivity,

by way of language, of

what has been subjectively thought and assembled." 9

Ecological Subjectivity and Green Politics
Two fundamental problems have continued to haunt the

ecology movement. First, there continues to be

a

"fundamentalist versus realist" conflict, most publicly
evident in the decade of the 1980s among the West German
Greens, but also affecting the U.S. green movement.

Fundamentalists tend to distance themselves from electoral

politics because they believe politics is "part of the

problem not the solution."
argued,

Electoral politics, it is

reinforces the prevailing tendencies toward the

acquisition and accumulation of various forms of power

which are then used in the domination and exploitation of
both humans and non-human nature. These "fundis" argue
that any involvement with electoral politics inevitably

results in contamination of principles and cooptation into
the existing system,

and therefore inadvertently

legitimates domination and exploitation. Realists on the
10

other hand, in Germany the
"realos," argue that some
participation in electoral politics
is strategically
necessary and tactically beneficial.
Participation in
electoral politics, they contend, lends
legitimacy to the
Green Movement as well as being necessary
for the

transition to an ecologically sound society.
this

f actionalization

in the U.S.

has been characterized as

"municipalism" versus "Statism" by the social
ecologists
who come from a fundamentally anarchist
tradition.
The second green political problem concerns
the

question of diversity within the movement and the

compatibility between philosophies.

Questions of

difference and commonality, unity and diversity, are
® cqnen t ly

dismissed or avoided within the radical ecology

literature by claiming that benefits and strengths may be

obtained through

a

tolerant eclecticism. Specifically and

most explicitly, deep ecology tends to pride itself on its

belief in the possibility of "many paths up the mountain."
At the political level this becomes an argument for and

about the structure and meaning of "pluralism."

What must

be questioned about this "deep" understanding of political

pluralism and philosophical eclecticism is the assumption
of a unitary,

transcendent, or metaphysical meaning

accompanying the journey of individuals toward selfunderstanding. Are the various philosophical and spiritual

traditions in fact aiming at

a

common understanding, or

are there important differences, generating not creative
11

tension but philosophical contradiction
and political
conflict? This question indicates a
need to address the

possibility of philosophical contradiction
beyond simple
adoption of a laissez faire attitude.

The acceptance of

eclecticism by deep ecology has been viewed
by its critics
as relativist, subjectivist, and nihilistic
at
best,

at worst,

and,

as one more manifestation of its
alleged

fundamentally fascist tendencies.

At

a

practical level,

radical ecology's philosophical eclecticism and
pluralist

politics conflicts with the green ideal of consensus
decision-making.

This has been a continuing stumbling

block for the U.S. green movement.

Intentions
The basic structure of this work will be to take

three major areas of radical ecology (deep ecology, social
ecology,

and ecofeminism)

and examine them in turn.

This

will occur first, on the basis of their methodology, then
on the resulting explicit or implied understanding of

subjectivity, and finally, with respect to their views of
the possibilities for social and political transformation

generated from

a

reconstituted subjectivity.

The common

direction of this radical ecological project can be viewed
as an attempt to establish a new "ecological subject."

If

the project is to be philosophically and politically

coherent,

its critical or theoretical configuration should

anticipate (as well as be informed by) its political
12

content.

Manifestation of actual social and
political
means of transforming society
should be consistent with
the idea of the ecological subject,
and the ecological
subject must be theoretically adequate
to meet the
challenges of social transformation.
The ecology
movement's actual political practice has
included a method
for representing the various aspects
of items under
consideration by the group concerned. This
practice is
what has generally become known as the
process of

consensus

(or "consensus-seeking")

simultaneously

a

.

This is

decision-making process,

a

means of

community building, and, as leading practitioner
Caroline
Estes believes,
caring,

"It is unifying,

it is non-dominant,

it is sharing,

it is empowering ." 11

it is

The

processes of consensus— seeking, and philosophic

representation through constellations, have an important
similarity: the attainment of their emancipatory goals can

only come about through
Estes:

a re cognition of

differences 12
.

"Built into the consensual process is the belief

that all persons have some part of the truth... and that we

will reach a better decision by putting all of the pieces
of the truth together before proceeding. There are indeed

times when it appears that two pieces of the truth are in

contradiction to each other, but with clear thinking and
attention,

the whole may be perceived which includes both

pieces, or many pieces

." 13

Although unlikely to frame the

position in the same terms, due to his opposition to the
13

totalization of thought and its political
counterparts,
whether in the form of fascism, Stalinism,
or
mass

culture, Adorno too had moments when
there existed hope of
reconciliation: "Utopia would be above
identity and above
contradiction; it would be a togetherness
of

diversity

The idea of a changed philosophy
would be to

become aware of likeness by defining it as that
which is
14
unlike itself ."

Adorno

s

concern for the relation of aesthetics and

critical thought had an impact on his beliefs about
the

relationship of form and content, revealing itself in his
own philosophical works in the question of style.

In

Minima Moralia Adorno elucidates the attributes of the

properly written philosophic text, where the text's basic
soundness can be judged by "whether it causes one

quotation to summon another ." 15

He explains that the

philosophic text should resemble

a

spider's web, the

spinning/weaving activity anticipating its object.
Thought is then nourished on the objects opened by the

illumination of philosophic conception.

The unfolding of

the object imparts vibrations to other objects hovering

nearby,

generating resonances which enrich experience.

A sympathy for the arachnid perspective, its
sensitivity to the movements of the objects of its
experience,

is one motivation for this work.

14

.

ENDNOTES
There seems to be an ongoing
attempt among
e0rists t0 coin
terns for
categorizing the green movement."
ca^gSrizing
This
work win
attempt to distinguish between
the more mainstream
'environmentalists" on the one hand,
and ?he more
undamentally system challenging
"radical ecolocrists"
on the other.
Instead of adopting recent
neologisms
or inventing ones of my own, I
will try to refer to
those who are attempting to change
the existing
ecological relationships between the
human species
and non human nature as radical
ecologists.
attempts are "philosophical" justifications These
for
radical ecology.
These philosophical efforts aim at
more than the simple integration of the
knowledge
gained from ecological science into existing
frameworks of social and political thought,
they
consciously attempt to justify a fundamental
transformation of social and political structures
as
a necessary link to changed ecological
relationships.
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PART I.
CRITICAL THEORY MEETS
THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT
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CHAPTER

1

CRITICAL THEORY AND THE ECOLOGY
MOVEMENT

The historical relationship between
critical theory

and philosophies of radical ecology was
first staged with
Herbert Marcuse's comments on Rudolf Bahro's
work. 1

Bahro's personal, philosophical, and political
journey is
revealing not only for its establishment of
contact

between critical theory and the ecology movement,
but also
to emphasize the historical importance of attempts
to

theoretically reconstitute "subjectivity."

Any green

alternatives to existing society will be strongly affected
by the manner in which subjectivity is theoretically
reconstituted.

Marcuse extended Bahro's analysis in The Alternative
of "actually existing socialism" of the mid-1970s to apply
to "late capitalism" as well.

Marcuse viewed Bahro's

analysis as an internal development of Marxism, advancing

Marxism's understanding of historical materialism by
emphasizing subjectivity as

a

potential material force for

transformative change. It might be argued of course that

theorizing the "revolutionary subject" has been the

primary concern of "Western Marxism" at least since
Lukacs,

and it was certainly part of the Frankfurt

School's concerns, appearing in the form of an exploration
of the absence or elimination of the revolutionary subject

under Stalinism,

fascism,

and mass culture.

However,

there are at least two objections
to this view.
First,
Bahro's specific idea of "surplus
consciousness" is not
explicitly theorized by the early Frankfurt
School.
Secondly, most interpretations of Adorno's
work, and much
of Marcuse's, have emphasized the
fundamental elimination
of potential or actual revolutionary
consciousness, when

understood as an effective ag ent of historical
change
Bahro and Marcuse argue that the key for

understanding why

a

2
.

shift in Marxist categories is needed

is the increasing "intellectualization" of
labor.

Developments in the production process have resulted in
surplus consciousness,

"an energetic mental capacity that

is no longer absorbed by the immediate necessities and

dangers of human existence and can thus orient itself to

more distant problems
argues,

." 3

Surplus consciousness, Bahro

is increasingly available for the transformation

of subjectivity,

from its egoistic characteristics within

commodity culture into a configuration which creates the

possibility that some individuals become consciously aware
of a need to identify with and enhance the "emancipatory

potential of the life instincts."

Marcuse attempts to

develop his own critical theory by appropriating Bahro's

understanding of the proletariat, traditional Marxism's

A

"collective subject" of historical transformation.

consequence of

a

changed revolutionary subject is

in the source of system crises which,

shift

although retaining

the central problem identified by Marx,
19

a

the accumulation

of capital based on the profit
motive,

now additionally

includes e cological limits to the
expansion of production.
What must be explained by Marcuse
and Bahro is the

necessity for this fundamental shift of
Marxist
categories, and the simultaneous movement

of both

subjectivity and the ecological crisis (crises)
to center
stage in this revised critical theory.
Marcuse’s analysis begins with the reevaluation
of
the relationship of the interests of the
working-class
the general interests of humanity.

capacity

to

Late capitalism's

to compensate labor sufficiently to limit the

more radical demands for satisfaction of "emancipatory

interests" is viewed by Marcuse as "the central historical

problem of revolutionary theory in our time."^
availability of

a

The

nearly infinite variety of commodities

in the forms of material goods,

and the status symbols of

career and conspicuous consumption, work against

a

potentially revolutionary subject's radicalization of
needs.

There is no revolutionary demand for "happiness

and gratification" because consumer culture is able to

compensate for this loss.
The historical development of the system of

production has required an increasing shift of labor to
its subjective component, but it is in the realm of

subjectivity that emancipatory needs eventually develop to
a

level where they may potentially exceed the system's

capacity for compensation.

Surplus consciousness develops
20

in all strata of society as the
productivity of the system

reduces the intensity of struggle for mere
existence.

Bahro argued that there develops

throughout society of

commodity culture.

a

a

"dim awareness"

more gratifying alternative to

This dim awareness is brought more

fully to consciousness by what Marcuse labels catalyst

groups

,

including "the student movement, women's

liberation,
etc

citizen

s

initiatives, concerned scientists,

" 6
.

Even though "surplus consciousness" is available at
all levels of society, Bahro identified the

"intelligentsia" as the potentially revolutionary subject
in the "actually existing socialism" of the late 1970s.

Marcuse elaborates on this point from the context of late
capitalism,

listing two reasons for the leading role of

the intellectuals.

First,

"knowledge is power."

Increasing intellectualization of the production process
results in the increasing importance of the

"intellectualized strata."

Second,

the compensatory

interests of this segment of production cease to be of
intense daily concern.

In capitalist countries,

intellectuals do not generally have as luxurious

a life as

other elites, however, they at least have the "privilege"
of education;

"Which can open the otherwise closed horizon

of knowledge that transcends the existing state of

things." 6

Due to the elitist structure of production

under both socialism and capitalism, the privileged
21

position of the intellectual tends to be
elitist as well.
This helps explain Bahro's own elitism in The
Alternativp
where he turns to

advocating

a

fundamentally Leninist position,

a

vanguardist transformation of the actually

existing socialisms of the mid-1970s. ^

Before continuing

this saga which includes Bahro's later embrace, then

abandonment, of the West German Greens,

a

further

examination of Marcuse's analysis will help illuminate

methodological and other theoretical implications for
developing the critique of existing society.

Marcuse's Analysis
Marcuse asks, is it still possible to develop

a

theory of revolution, one more suited to the conditions of
late capitalism?

He answers that theory requires a

fundamental revision of traditional Marxism's concept of
class.

Marcuse enumerates the components of Marx's theory

of the proletariat,

the class of potentially revolutionary

consciousness, the revolutionary subject. Marcuse first

emphasizes the non-identity between the "proletariat" and
the "working-class."

The working-class of late capitalism

generally is not in the condition of extreme immiseration

described in detail by Marx in the mid-19th century.
Neither is the working-class, defined as those individuals
in immediate or direct engagement in the process of

material

(object)

population.

production, any longer

a

majority of the

Marcuse claims the traditional definition of
22

the worker is part of an untenable
reduction of the

category of labor, the identification
of "labor" with
manual labor.
Intellectual labor under late capitalism
remains in the same essential relationship
to production
as manual labor.
White-collar workers, salaried employees
and those who are "unproductive" are working-class
to the

extent "they do not share decision-making power
over the
means of production." 8

Marcuse (and Bahro) argued for

a

broadening of the

concept of class so that it includes all strata of the

production process without fundamental decision-making
power over production. How can the concept "class

consciousness" then be revived?

Marcuse has to this point

only reestablished the identification of the proletariat

with the majority of the population; this "collective
worker" has the characteristics of "the people" rather
than that of a class, and a fundamental historical problem

with this formulation is that popular consciousness tends
to be characterized by "conservatism and fascism." 0

Revolutionary subjectivity, Marcuse argues, is not that of
a

particular class as traditionally defined (the

industrial proletariat)

,

but is the "consciousness of

individuals from different strata." 10

Potentially, these

individuals may recognize their common interest and

constitute

a

unified "collective intellectual", which was

present (in 1978) as unorganized groups and movements.

23

It is at this point that
Marcuse discusses the

relation of subjectivity to what Bahro
called surplus
consciousness. In addition to surplus
consciousness,
Marcuse asserts that the other component
of subjectivity
is that of emotions, or "instinctual
structure." Although
surplus consciousness is the basis for the
potential

development of

a

radical critique of existing society
and

an understanding of how present conditions
can be changed,

this conscious understanding can be bought-off

(compensated) before radical consciousness is translated

into transformative action.

The emancipatory interests of

the subject, Marcuse argues,

are a vital need "anchored in

the instinctual structure of the individual."

Here, where

the analysis deals with the "life instincts" is where

crucial differences between the two theorists' positions

begin to appear and where possibilities emerge for further
theoretical development, through an alternative,

reconceptualized relation between subjectivity and nature.
Marcuse's subsequent comments on Bahro are

essentially

a

recapitulation of the primary arguments in

Eros and Civilization

-1

.

He argues that emancipation as

a

socio-historical process is linked to subjectivity and its
"erotic basis."

He distinguishes Eros from sexuality and

sexual liberation which have been used in the form of

"repressive desublimation" to reinforce class society.
Eros,

or the life instincts, borrowing from Freud,

counterpart to the instincts of destruction.
24

are the

Eros drives

for "emancipation from socially
determined surplus

repression,

for gratification and intensification
of the

life instincts

instincts,
(reality)

.” 12

For the full unfolding of the life

liberation from capitalism, the performance
principle,

is necessary,

that is,

the life instincts requires revolution.
to Marcuse,

realization of

Nature, according

demands liberation in both its internal and

external aspects, both subjectively and objectively.

He

is hesitant to accept a natural physical limit to

capitalism; "The kind of nature that is suitable to

capitalism may very well turn out to be an insurmountable
^ iltit of capital ." 13
-

Here he speaks of an "unmastered

residue" that might possibly block further capitalist

development.

These comments on the "natural limits to

capitalism" are not couched in terms of wilderness,
rivers, or animal species, but in the terms of Nature as

"counter-image" to capitalist production processes.

What

primarily concerns Marcuse here are the "psychological
roots" of the ecology movement; "Nature, experienced as
the domain of happiness,

fulfillment,

and gratification,

is the environment of Eros--the antithesis of the

performance principle applied to nature ." 14

He also links

the performance principle to patriarchal domination, a

gesture that begins to incorporate the women's movement
into the analysis as well.

For Marcuse it is the

instinctual structure, specifically Eros, that grounds the

potential for transformed consciousness.
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It is also within this nexus
of relationships,

between economics, nature, feminism and
life, that
philosophies of radical ecology in their
various

contemporary forms attempt to elaborate

a

new concept of

subjectivity.

Marcuse's analysis helps establish an
initial framework for evaluating the different
theoretical
positions which have been developed by deep
ecology,
social ecology, and ecofeminism.

The ultimate ground for

Marcuse's argument is personal experience, and it
is the
interpretation of that experience which provides the
theoretical basis for transformative action: "The
instinctual structure becomes emancipatory only in union

with an emancipatory consciousness which defines the

possibilities and limits of this realization and absorbs
that which is merely instinctual into itself ." 15

Marcuse

rejects the assertion that emancipatory potential can be

obtained through unmediated experience, and instead
charges the "cult of immediacy"

(which he associates with

"escapist movements of the New Left") with being

fundamentally reactionary.

(This charge has recently been

revived against the most politically active group of
individuals who identify with the philosophy of deep
ecology; Earth First!.)

After forcefully stating the

reactionary nature of political action based on immediate
experience, Marcuse again addresses the process of

capitalist domination and exploitation of both internal
and external nature.

If experience must be mediated to

26

prevent its reidentification with
the logic of domination,
where is revolutionary consciousness
initially to be
developed? The "social process of
revolution" begins,

Marcuse responds, with individuals for
whom emancipation
has become a "vital need." Marcuse
contends
that these

individuals have already "advanced beyond
the Ego." 1 ^
This philosophical position requires a
specific

understanding of instinctual structure, the primary
drives
of Eros and destruction.
Marcuse claims Eros and

Thanatos

"already imply other human beings."

The instincts are

always already more than individual experience, "they
are

drives of the individual, but of the individual as
’species being .'" 17

Marcuse's brief re-presentation of

his previous works continues with the claim that the

"journey inwards"

(Bahro's expression) of the Ego will

encounter others (society) and the Other (nature), not as
limits to the Ego, but as "powers constitutive of it."

Marcuse asserts that should the "journey inwards" stop at
the "unmediated Ego" this Ego will return to the fetishism
of the commodity world,

a

return to the given, the

presently dominant, established culture.

However,

the

initial motivation for the journey inward, the desire for

immediate experience, comes from

a

"comprehending

subjectivity that goes beyond the Ego." 1 ^

The Ego trapped

in capitalist society must rely on an unmediated

experience of the life instincts in order to bring

emancipatory interests to the level of conscious vital
27

need.

Why is this not

a

tautological argument?

How can

experience occur withp^ the mediation of
the Ego which is
formed in consumer society? How can
experience unmediated
by this Ego be called anything other than
"immediate", and
therefore, according to Marcuse's argument,
be anything
other than reactionary? Because, Marcuse claims,
immediate experience is always already mediated
by

dimly aware

a

subjectivity which then uses experience as

a

"verifying criterion ." 19
Summarizing, Marcuse develops Bahro's idea of

surplus consciousness"

commodity culture)

a

(that which is not captured in

consciousness which makes available

to the individual a dim awareness of the possibility of a

different more gratifying existence.

The reality of

a

possible alternative social existence is then confirmed in
"immediate experience."

A similar understanding of the

structuring of experience occurs in traditions deep
ecologists adopt as possible paths to an ecological
consciousness.

These alternative traditions are stated in

very different, frequently religious, terms.
turn to religious terminology is

Bahro's later statements.)

a

(A

similar

surprising aspect of

Marcuse's remaining analysis

may help shed light on ecological activists' current
strategies.

He argues that the overwhelming power of the

"established apparatus of domination,

"

makes it necessary

to turn scattered resistance into a virtue.

The strategy

of local and regional bases of rebellion is an
28

acknowledgment of the inability to centralize
oppositional
forces, but it is also a strategy that
"anticipates the

objective tendencies toward disintegration
in the existing
"2°
society.

The Red and the Greens

Rudolf Bahro, in

a

1980 introductory essay to a

collection of his speeches and articles, attempts to
present reasons for Marxist socialists to become Greens.
At this stage, his thinking is still identifiable as more

socialist than green by the direction of his reasoning,

revealed in the initial question of why socialists should
be green,

rather than why greens should be socialists;

"The ecology movement and the Green party are of such

great importance for us because they act as
a

a

catalyst for

new political self-conception and practice on the part
O

-1

of the left."^ x

This statement condenses many issues

which have haunted the development of green politics
throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s.

What is the

relation between "the Left" and green politics?

How is

the new political subject to be understood or

reconstituted?

What does it mean for the ecology movement

to be a "catalyst?"

How do ecological insights into the

human-to-nature relationship challenge the assumptions of
socialist theory?

In 1980 Bahro,

released from East

German prison, moved to West Germany where he saw himself
as something of a theoretical and political maverick.
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although he maintained

leading role in West German
Green
Party politics.
Initially he emphasized the
tentative and
schematic nature of his attempts to
address the ecological
crisis from a socialist perspective.
Socialism

S urvival originates

a

in this transitional period
which

coincided with the emergence of the West
German Green
Party (Die Grunen)
The political atmosphere at the time
was dominated by
several important developments: the shift
to the right in
the West with the elections of Thatcher,
Reagan and Kohl;
the prospects of the Soviets going to a
launch-on-warning

system in response to the introduction of Pershing

II

and

cruise missiles into West Germany; and the increasing

political activism of the "new social movements."

It was

from this background that Bahro explained the position of
the ecology movement relative to general social change and
to the rethinking of socialist politics:

"The different

currents of this new social movement cannot be

artificially separated.
into one another,

They merge at least partially

since what they speak to in the

individuals involved appears not in isolation, but in
association.

Often,

the distinction is made only

according to which motivation is decisive for the

particular individual.

The ecology movement seems to

bring together the greatest number of motivations, adding
•

them together and tending to integrate them.

30

^
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This indicates not only

a

recognition of the

historical importance of the new
social movements for
transformational politics, but also the
centrality

a

of

ecology to that politics.

Bahro also emphasizes the

importance of personal, individual
motivation for
transformative political action. These
observations place
the efforts toward a fuller theoretical
understanding of
the relation between subjectivity and
ecology high on the
agenda of the contemporary debate over the
possibilities
of social and political resistance.
Bahro s analysis of
'

the relationship between socialism and the
ecology

movement was initially presented in an economisticly

oriented language not significantly different from
that
which might be used by any capitalist of enlightened
selfinterest,

a

language radical ecologists label "reform

environmentalism."
recognition that,

This reform position is the simple
"If the whole enterprise of expanding

industrial production is continued.

.

.we shall be faced at

the end of the day with a production machine that is

grinding to

halt for want of supplies of materials, yet

a

without whose operation the given population cannot be

maintained ." 23

This is an expression of the basic

understanding of the limits to growth which result from
physical

(un)

availability of production materials, the

increase in world population, and the ever increasing
level of commodity consumption.

many others, is partly based on
31

Bahro*
a

s

solution,

like

theory of basic needs,

which he contends are "quite
4UiLe rpli^hiw
a
reliably ascertained
by
anthropology." 24 it iss hp-rp
in a
a theory
nere ln
of needs
.

.

that

economics and ecology confront
each other directly, and
where a reconstituted ecological
subject might contribute
a new perspective on "needs."
Bahro, when speaking from the
Marxist-socialist

tradition,

addressed the confrontation between
economics
and ecology
terms of working-class interests,

m

but he

later argued that the working-class
perspective should be
transcended
order to establish a new basis for
analysis
and action.
It was Bahro 's repeated return

m

to the

centrality of the ecological crisis that
transformed his
analysis of working-class interests into an
analysis of

general human interests. Bahro converts from red
to green
when he states, "Yet ecology, this concept that
originally

denoted 'only'

a

discipline in natural science, refers in

the present connection to human interests, and interests
of humanity,

that strike deep into the social space, and

in this comprehensive sense it precedes and goes beyond

economics "-5
.

Bahro again, but more radically, rejects

the traditional analysis that identifies working-class

interests with the revolutionary subject, the site for

Marxists of the theoretical and practical resolution of
social contradictions. This theoretical shift has

practical political implications; "The organizing factor

which can bring the alternative forces together and give
them

a

social coordination (as must be desired) will in
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the future not be any
particular interest, but rather
a
long-term human interest ." 26 with
this Bahro redefines

universal interest" and his Marxism
must be rethought:
"What is really radical is to
think from the standpoint of
the interests of humanity as a
whole
Here it
is

apparent that the ecological position
is also the radical
socialist one.
To sketch out a project
for this,

a

counter-project to the blind calculation
that prevails in
the system of power, is equally in the
general
interest

and in our own personal interest,

i.e.

it is also our own

most basic concern.

Catching the Green Spirit
Bahro makes some interesting and surprising initial

attempts at conceptualizing the ecological subject.

His

theoretical development after his move to West Germany
seems at first to take Marcuse's work as its point of

departure.

He rejects Marcuse's "one-dimensionality

pessimism" and contends that there still exist "free
energies" which alternative movements can tap.

The

question of the subject again arises in the context of the

production system, here involving the physical constraints
preventing substitution of commodities for individual
identity.

Bahro believes it may be possible for

industrialization to continue to intensify but it will
bring with it added threats to species survival.

Bahro

comes to believe the tendencies of domination were not
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initiated in social but rather
in "natural" history.
Bahro states that there seems
to be a general tendency
toward self-destruction; its modern
universal

form—

"extermmism." 28

He argues that human beings
must

overcome what he claims is the primary
biologicalevolutionary tendency of our species;
acquiring knowledge
for the mastery of external nature.
His
solution: the

human species must oppose its own
evolutionary tendency
with a counterforce capable of reconstruction
or

demolition of "enchaining structures, for
their
disintegration, even for an exodus from them. "29

Bahro

nominates the human "genotype" as the opposing
force.
What does he mean by "genotype"? "As I see
it,
the

genotype is that social power present in every human
being

which the old prophets always evoked under the name
God."

Bahro seems to argue, on the one hand that the

human species

basic characteristic is

a

tendency to

dominate nature, but, on the other hand, there is also an
inherent tendency to preserve life through social
knowledge.

He is calling for a conscious shift of

emphasis in what he believes to be the basic biological

predispositions of the human species.
However unresolvably contradictory these "genetic"
statements may be,

from the early 1980s forward Bahro'

statements are increasingly couched in religious
terminology.

The philosophical implications of this turn

are captured in his explanation of the "God genotype":
34

"The place of God is where
the development needs
of our
original nature converge, above
all of course an inward
place .' 31 with this turn, Bahro
abandons all traditional
Marxist conceptualization, claiming
Marx was "not

materialist enough."

Marx did not understand that

"beneath" human consciousness is
"human nature as a
whole," and beneath that "nature."
Marx misunderstood
nature, viewing it as too passive.
Alternatively, Bahro
spiritualizes nature, leading him to conclude,
"history is
primarily psychodynamic." This means that
now the basic
transformative goal is the overcoming of that
aspect of
human nature which has "an aggressive warlike
quality ." 33
The means to overcome human nature, Bahro now
believes, is
the institutionalization of the insights of
the inward

journey of those like "Buddha and Christ."
his work in Ike. Alternative because,

He disavows

"In essence my

concept of emancipation was then still located within the

framework of the Enlightenment, with its emphasis on the
communal appropriation of totality for the full

development of individuality ." 33

Bahro believes his

earlier writing was "not the development of theory but the

reconstruction of the Gospel
ambiguously,

." 34

The Gospel, he says

in this case was East German Marxism. Bahro

can no longer be a Marxist, he says, because to be

a

Marxist in the West means "to assent to the fact that

a

definite political-theoretical conception has been firmly

established and still requires firm adherence ." 33
35

He

instead identifies himself as
a populist utopian
socialist, although he intends
to continue to appropriate
"particular elements of Marxism,"
but no longer the

"overall structure."

He confesses
ne
Lonresses to a= »"regression" in

his thinking,

indicating this is due to "the
objective
36
situation itself."
He understands his contribution
to
social change to be his shift of
emphasis toward "the
prophetic level, " toward the "transformation
of

subjectivity" not only individually, but
with
goal.

a

political

The development of humanity will
consist of "an

inward journey rather than external expansion."

The

political aim is "the 'reconstruction of God'...
the

recreation of spiritual equilibrium, within those
levels
of nature neglected by Marx where human
consciousness

comes into contact with the external world." 37
In the early 1980s,

Bahro claimed he could

participate in Green Party activities because the Greens
were "a grouping beyond the anti-religious

Enlightenment." 33

Following his conversion, Bahro

'

s

new

prescription for social organization has been small selfsufficient communes (usually no more than about 3000, no
less than 100 people)

social needs.

that provide basic physical and

This requires a change in values "such as

can only succeed through what up till now has been

described as religious experience." 39

In an apocalyptic

tone he observes that coming changes will be greater than
all other historic change.

He is concerned that the
36

resistance to this spiritual
change is too great at
the
present: "Probably we need,
in order to lower the
threshold of inhibition, a
'materialist' concept of God
(which besides I do consider
possible)
The individual
departure to God— to regaining
one's original self,
.

to

experiencing unity with the Whole-and
the collective
departure into the kingdom of God
(it has historically
many names) are two sides of one
and the same thing, which
in the final analysis only go
together." 40 After having
aided the early development and success
of the West German
Green Party in 1980, in December 1984,
on the occasion of
an address to a Greens convention,
Bahro compared the
Greens to the Nazis, at which point he was
marginalized
within the Party as "an eccentric and
troublesome one-man
A
band.
In the spring of 1985 he resigned from
the
-1

Greens, ostensibly for their parliamentary vote
supporting
a bill

allowing the use of animals for medical research.

Critical/Ecological Methods
The explication of the philosophic journey of Rudolf

Bahro was not performed as

a

definitive statement of

radical ecology, green politics, or any corresponding

understanding of subjectivity, but as

a

representation of

those aspects of radical ecology that have become

problematic for the green movement generally, and for the
various philosophies of radical ecology to be examined
here.

Bahro*

s

statements are an indication of the
37

insightful but problematic nature of much
of radical
ecological philosophy.
Fundamental to all
of these

theoretical developments are the Western
philosophic
tradition's concerns with the relations between
human
beings and non-human nature and the relevance
of
this

relationship for interpreting history.

Within the Marxist

tradition this has been expressed in the various
attempts
to develop the concept of historical materialism.

philosophy

s

Western

concerns with history, nature, and human

nature have been stated predominantly through

a

dichotomous conceptual framework in which one term obtains
a

hierarchically superior status. This "bipolarity" can be

observed in the philosophic treatment of, for example, the
following paired concepts: subject/object, self/other,
mind/nature, spirit/matter, masculine/feminine, man/woman,
human/animal, and so forth.

The Western philosophical

tradition's fullest self-reflexive development and
critique of these structures occurred in the texts of
Hegel and Marx and their philosophical descendants. This

"dialectic" tradition achieved its most advanced

development through its immanent criticism in the work of
Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse.

Habermas and the Ecology Movement

Marcuse's comments on Bahro were made in 1978.

Marcuse's death in 1979

a

After

new generation of critical

theorists would have to address the problems generated
38

from within critical theory and
those resulting from
ecological crises.
The generally recognized
successor to
Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse is
Jurgen Habermas,
although his position relative to the
first generation
critical theorists is not unproblematic 42
Habermas has
reformulated much of the work of the early
theorists and
while doing so also directly addressed the
philosophical
basis of the ecology movement, prompting
responses both
from other critical theorists and from radical
ecology
.

philosophers 43
.

One of the significant difference's

between Habermas and earlier participants in the
tradition
of critical theory is revealed in his position on
the

relationship of the human species to external nature.
Thomas McCarthy wrote what is still the best

introduction to Habermas, and has also translated some of
Habermas's major works 44
.

McCarthy's extensive work

includes persistent criticisms of Habermas, original
insights,

and useful summaries of other critics' work.

Examining the various criticisms will permit an update of
the relationship between critical theory and the ecology

movement first established in the Bahro-Marcuse encounter.
These criticisms also illuminate the inadequacies of

Habermas's version of critical theory for addressing the

ecology crisis.

Habermas's turn to

a

"communicative" or

"discourse" ethic may have cost critical theory much more
than was gained.

After examining the adequacy of the

Habermasian version of critical theory the question will
39

remain whether elements of the
tradition of critical
theory can be reclaimed and
reconstructed

to form a new

framework, one able to combine
insights from both critical
theory and the ecology movement.
Most importantly it can
be asked if a new conception of
revolutionary

subjectivity,

new

a

ecologic al,

subject,

can take on the

tasks of social transformation without
succumbing to the
power of the given, the system of domination.
Can the
ecological subject resist given society and
liberate the

potentials for an ecological future, or are all
attempts
to transform existing society to something
qualitatively

different fated from the outset to be consumed by
the

machinery of domination, exploitation and oppression?
Critical theory in the hands of Habermas has been

radically transformed, the focus of its concerns

fundamentally shifted.

In the context of the attempt to

develop the perspective or standpoint of an ecological
subject,

three especially important aspects of Habermas's

transformation of critical theory can be identified.
First,

and most fundamentally,

is the question of the

shift in methodology by Habermas, which results in

"dualistic" theory.

a

Habermas's position terminates in

a

philosophical position that denies the possibilities of
acquiring "knowledge" of nature in any other manner than

"instrumentally
Second,

.

Habermas views the "new social movements,"

except for feminism (although it is not clear which
40

feminism is being referred to
here), as "defensive"
movements, that is, they do not
have the character of
progressivism he attributes to early
bourgeois and later
labor movements. As a defensive
movement the ecology
movement, as well as alternative and
countercultural
movements, are viewed as primarily
defending earlier ways
of life against various threats,
specifically,
the

economic and administrative "colonization
of the
lifeworld. "^5
Third,

as a further consequence of Habermas’s

methodological changes, the connection with
possible
ecological themes can only occur indirectly via
an

idiosyncratic understanding of the democratic

possibilities opened under communicative or discourse
ethics. This connection between radical ecological and

radical democratic positions is not made explicitly by

Habermas himself, but has been attempted by some of his
followers. It can be shown that these three aspects of

Habermas's version of critical theory (the necessarily
instrumental relationship to nature; the characterization
of the ecology movement as defensive; and the availability

of only indirect possibilities for relating critical

theory to ecological concerns) make this an inadequate and

unsuitable point of departure for developing

a

conception

of an ecological subject with liberatory potentials.

alternative to Habermas is

a

The

return to the concerns of the

earlier Frankfurt theorists, particularly those of Theodor
41

Adorno, which provide a more
fruitful and adequate basis
for conceptualizing an
ecological subject.

Knowledge of Nature
Habermas has repeatedly claimed that
the only
relationship between humans and nature
which yields
"knowledge" is an instrumental relationship 46
.

He

believes nature must be viewed as an
object for the
potential benefit of humans if the relationship

is to

yield information beneficial for the
self-preservation of
the human species.
He claims this is an anthropologically

necessary relationship.

Other "attitudes" may be adopted

toward nature, but they will not yield knowledge
that
allows the human species to "progress" at the level
at

which modern science or "morality" has progressed. 4 ^

In

response to criticisms of this position, he replies,'
"While we can indeed adopt a performative attitude to

external nature, enter into communicative relations with
it,

have aesthetic experiences and feelings analogous to

morality with respect to

it,

there is for this domain of

reality only one theoretically fruitful attitude, namely
the objectivating attitude of the natural-scientific,

experimenting observer ." 48
This position is largely a result of Habermas's

adoption of

a

fundamentally Kantian framework which seeks

the transcendental or quasi-transcendental conditions

which form the basis of knowledge.
42

Habermas does attempt

to Shift the transcendental
argument from its idealist
origins to a materialism that
responds to Marx.
This

fundamental shift away from the
problematics of the early
Frankfurt theorists*, who relied on
a largely HegelianMarxist analysis of society, is also
at the heart of
Habermas's rejection of much of the
earlier work of
Marcuse and Adorno specifically. 49 This
transformation of
critical theory's concerns is especially
evident as it
relates to the early theorists central
concept of the

domination of nature and their attempts to
conceptualize
the possibilities for a "reconciliation"
with nature.

These issues are also central to the ecology
movement and
any attempt to develop a philosophically adequate
concept
of ecological subjectivity.

McCarthy has sustained his criticism of this aspect
of Habermas's work for nearly two decades now.

McCarthy

summarized his argument against Habermas's instrumentalist
view of possible theoretically fruitful relations to
nature in the work Ideals and Illusion 50
.

The two

fundamental criticisms Habermas attempts to assert against
the early Frankfurt theorists are:

(1)

any attempt to

develop a "philosophy of nature" will necessarily be
unable to provide knowledge at the level of modern
science;

any attempt to articulate a perspective of

(2)

reconciliation with nature inevitably leads back to
metaphysics.

C

1

McCarthy's early critique of Habermas's

conception of cognitive possibilities, in the context of
43

an analysis of Knowledge and H

1

ir

n^

claims

/

Habermas's understanding of
"cognition" and "knowledge"
requires a more explicit defense
than was made at that
time.
On what grounds could such
"attitudes"
toward

nature as the mimetic, poetic,
playful, mystical or
fraternal be denied "cognitive content "? 52
Habermas's
response in later works was to attempt
to define
the

meaning of the "progress of knowledge."

He cited the

example of modern science as providing the
only adequate
progressive attitude toward external nature 53
McCarthy's
response was that one can imagine alternative
attitudes
toward nature that at least complement our
understanding
.

of nature,

for this his example comes from Habermas's
own

philosophical backyard in the form of Kant's "Critique
of
Teleological Judgment." McCarthy uses this example to
dispute Habermas's claim that

necessarily revert to

a

a

philosophy of nature would

form of metaphysics that would

claim "a validity independent of and prior to science,
that is,

the form of an Urspruncrsphilosophi e

.

54

Ecocentric theorist Robyn Eckersley has also

challenged Habermas on the assertion of the "progressive"
aspects of modern science.

She gives counter examples;

"The farming and fishing techniques of many traditional

cultures are often more 'efficacious' from

a

long term

point of view than the modern agricultural, forestry, and
fishing techniques that have so often replaced such

traditional techniques

." 55

44

There is also an abandonment, in
Habermas's

formulation of critical theory, of the
dialectical
perspective of the subject-to-object or
history-to-nature
relationships that motivated the earlier
Frankfurt School.
As Henning Ottmann notes in his criticism
of Habermas's
position, "A will to control, whose legitimacy
is based
upon our need to survive and which is itself a
threat
to

our survival, becomes dialectical. The technical
interest
in mastery over nature encounters nature taking
revenge

upon the boundlessness of the will to control.
Combined,

these criticisms can be viewed as

a

fundamental challenge to Habermas's assertions about the

necessity of an instrumental relationship to external
nature, and the progressivity of modern science.

There

are at least complementary attitudes toward nature that

can yield "fruitful" results that go beyond reliance on

"science" as the sole productive or "cognitively fruitful"

means for interacting with nature.

In the contemporary

context this is more than simply one among other

criticisms of Habermas's version of critical theory.
obtains the status of

a

It

fundamental challenge when the

ecological crisis has assumed such enormous implications
for the modern way of life.

This form of crisis may

threaten society's continued existence, and it certainly
threatens the existence of other natural species, as well
as the basic integrity of the planet's ecology.

At

minimum these criticisms indicate the responsibility of
45

the social theorist to investigate
the question of
whether, "it is possible to envision
a philosophy of

nature constructed after the transcendental
turn as a
nonf oundationalist f allibilistic attempt
to conceive of
nature as a hatnm_n a turans that gave rise
to, among other
things, a species capable of communicating
in language
,

,

and

thereby of giving its intraspecific relations
the form of
a moral order.
Of course, this attempt would
have to be

constantly renewed in the light of our historically
changing scientific and moral experience

envisioning of

a

.

This

new "philosophy of nature" can be seen as

the theme of the philosophies of radical ecology as
^-^tiscted in the disparate attempts of deep ecology,

social ecology,

and ecofeminism.

Various critics and

commentators have been all too eager to conflate

contemporary philosophical positions within the radical
ecology movement with Romantic philosophies of nature, and
nature idealism.

One of the responsibilities of radical

ecological theorists is to reveal the differences between
those older philosophies of nature and contemporary

philosophies of ecology.
It is not surprising that Habermas,

given his

position on the possibilities of cognitive relations to
nature,

does not see the ecology movement as residing

within the categorial framework of the tradition of

movements of liberation.

He believes the ecology movement

is more correctly understood through the categories of

46

early romantic and escapist movements,
thus deserving
classification as a "defensive movement."
in his general
discussion of the "new social movements"
Habermas

categorizes only the feminist movement
as progressive: "I
will differentiate emancipatory
potentials from potentials
for resistance and withdrawal.

After the American civil

rights movement--which has since issued
in

a

particularistic self-affirmation of black
subcultures
only the feminist movement stands in the
tradition of
bourgeois-socialist liberation movements. The struggle
against patriarchal oppression and for the redemption

of a

promise that has long been anchored in the acknowledged

universalistic foundations of morality and law gives
feminism the impetus of an offensive movement, whereas
the
other movements have a more defensive character

.

50

It is understandable that Habermas would consider the

ecology movement defensive if we look at his brief
analysis of "Green problems
into two categories,

." 59

He divides these problems

the first he labels "largely

abstract,

"

balance,

scarcity of nonrenewable resources, and

such as industrial destruction of ecological

"demographic developments." Keeping with Habermas's

basically social democratic (in the German context)
leanings, he views the appropriate response to these

perceived problems as
solutions,

a call

for technical and economic

"which must in turn be globally planned and

carried out by administrative means ." 50
47

The second area

of green problems make us
aware of the "inflexible
limits
to the deprivation of

sensual-aesthetic background

needs. "61

These "aesthetic" problems are
the degradation
of the urban environment,
despoliation of the countryside
through housing developments, pollution,
impairment of
health, and so forth. These "aesthetic"
problems generate
a defensive reaction whereby
groups try to restore
or

protect a previous way of life.

Habermas briefly

discusses attempts to theorize ways of addressing
the
assaults on the lifeworld, theories which result
in

proposals for alternative institutional structures
to
those of modern Western society. He basically
dismisses
these attempts and links alternative movements to

philosophical antimodernism and neo-conservatism.

The

problem with the movements are, he asserts, that they
confuse the "communicative rationality" of cultural

modernity with the "functionalist rationality" of economic
and administrative action systems, the systems guided by

money and power. Speaking of those attempts to develop
alternative institutional structures, he writes, "However

unrealistic these ideas may be, they are important for the
polemical significance of the new resistance and

withdrawal movements reacting to the colonization of the
lifeworld.

.

.

(The confusion of lifeworld rationality with

system complexity) explains the

f ronts--which

are out of

place and obscure the real political oppositions--between
the antimodernism of the Young Conservatives and the new
48

conservative defense of postmodernity
that robs a
modernity at variance with itself of
its rational content
and its perspectives on the future." 62

Habermas and Radical Ecology
Despite these seemingly unambiguous categorizations
of the ecology or green movement,

others have attempted to

integrate Habermas's version of critical theory with

vision of ecological rationality.

a

Early in his career

Habermas recognized that ecological questions would be
one
source of crises for advanced industrial systems,

"Ecological balance designates an absolute limit to
growth." 63

He speculated on the possible forms of the

manifestation of the encroachment of economic growth on
ecological balance and rightly indicated the high level of
empirical uncertainty about ecosystems and technological
development, but even in the early 1970s he had recognized
the danger of what is now called global warming.

His

summary of the issue was brief but allowed him to
conclude,

"Nevertheless, these reflections show that an

exponential growth of population and production--that

is,

the expansion of control over outer nature--must some day
run up against the limits of the biological capacity of
the environment." 6 ^

Timothy Luke and Stephen White have taken these

observations as there point of departure in an effort to
develop their implications for
49

a

Habermasian version of

a

critical theory of the global ecological
crisis.
However,
even though their analysis of the
developing "information
society" is well presented, there is
little persuasive
argumentation for how this version of
critical theory can
adequately address the ecology crisis. They
acknowledge
that Habermas has not dealt in any detail
with the ecology
crisis or with the current transformations
resulting from
global capitalist restructuring. Their comments
are
a

useful supplemental analysis of current capital

developmental trends, and include implications for

comprehending how global restructuring involves the

production of the type of subject, in the form of client
and consumer, now necessary for the reproduction of the

mode of production. This cogent analysis of present

production conditions however does not lead to

a

persuasive argument for combining Habermasian critical
theory with the insights of radical ecology.
In Luke and White's view,

a shift in

capitalism has

occurred since the 1940s which may be represented as

a

gradual replacement of the centrality of industrial

production with that of information production.

They

label this new form of production "informational

capitalism.

The specificity of the analysis and its

potential for illuminating the essential aspects of
current capitalist restructuring make it compatible with,
but more specific than, other recent attempts to

characterize the present condition under various labels,
50

such as "post-industrialism,"

"post-modernism," "technocapitalism," "the instrumental mode
of symbolization," and
so on.
Luke and White document the

informations lizat ion" of capitalism
since the second
World War with a variety of statistics
"

and examples,

and

attempt to show that this "qualitative
shift" is still
occurring.
The shift has resulted in
contradictions
between two phases of industrial
production.
These

contradictions in turn open opportunities
for the
emergence of an ecological transformation of

society.

They claim that U.S. transnational corporations
have
forged a transnational industrial regime since

the 1940s

using previously untapped natural resources,
labor
reserves,

and consumer markets.

In order to administer

this truly global economy it was necessary to shift
from
an emphasis on traditional industrial production to

informational-knowledge production activities.

They claim

an ironic effect of this shift in production has been the

development of new interests by those who guide
informational capital; the technical experts, managers,
and professionals.

These newly developing interests at

least partially parallel the political agendas of

ecological activists.^ 7

Especially the U.S. economy, but also the Japanese
and German economies are dominated by informationalized

production of "words, images, and audio."

The

"informationalization" of agriculture and industry takes
51

place through biotechnology, genetic
engineering,
robotics, and computer assisted
production generally.
This conversion is not entirely
frictionless however since
it consumes vast amounts of capital,
requiring the

transforming corporations to endorse images
and lifestyles
they borrow from the alternative and ecology
cultures.

This results in corporate support for
"voluntary

simplicity," "frugality," "conspicuous conservation,"
small is beautiful," and so on.

strategy creates
movement,

a

^

This corporate

fundamental challenge for the green

the necessity of distinguishing its claims from

the needs of capital restructuring 69
.

Luke and White

further claim that this capitalist transformation is also

having the effect of restratifying the labor force along
the lines of technical competence.
the restructuring,

Those who benefit from

the experts, managers and

professionals, are the crucial market for the new

informationalized economy: those who are technologically
incompetent are urged to follow the lead of the radical

ecologists and become frugal and conserve resources.

This

necessary reduction in the material standard of living
runs counter to the earlier consumerist ideology at the

high point of industrial production.

Restratification

along lines of technological competence, claim Luke and
White,

"must also result in contradictions with many of

the egalitarian-democratic myths underpinning mass
7n
electoral politics."

52

The use Luke and White make
of Habermas's idea of the
"colonization of the everyday lifeworld"
is of special
interest in the present context,
since the authors claim,
"Through the production, circulation,
and consumption of
information, advanced corporate capital
has directly

modified the processes of cultural
reproduction and
identity formation in modern society.

This claim

depends on a method of interpretation explicitly
based on
Habermas's work, but the same observations
could be

extracted from the work of virtually any of the
critical
theorists or even from most post-structuralist work.

in

fact,

some of the assertions by the authors could be read

as summaries of the early Frankfurt School studies
of the

"Culture Industry."

These observations about the

structure of advanced capitalism are not so important in
themselves but are an indication of the continuation of
effects identified more than

a

half century ago,

Under corporate capitalism, all individuals qua
consumers become capital assets. This mobilization
of consumers through the colonization of their
fragmentary consciousness directly boosts the
productivity, profitability, and power of corporate
capital's increasingly intensive, automated, and
monopolistic industries .... The first principle of
this order is the fragmentation of consciousness
through experts' definition and design of the
lifeworld.
In turn, consumers can exercise their
"free choice" over the predesigned alternatives,
which will deliver the need satisfactions required to
fulfill their need definitions as they have been
socialized under this colonizing regime to define
them.

53

Nearly the same claims were made
by the earlier
critical theorists, for example, by
Adorno in Minima
If the descriptive claims of
the authors can

be established through the perspective
of critical theory
generally, why should Habermas's schema
be of special
value, and what is the specific link
between Habermas and
radical ecology? Afterall, the observation
that modern

industrial society creates ecological crises
is not unique
to Habermas or critical theory 74
There are two
.

levels at

which Habermas's efforts must be related to "green

problems."

First,

supporters of Habermas must show the

logical connection between his version of critical theory
and a possible resolution of the ecological crisis.
Second,

at the practical or political level,

the claims of

the ecology or green movement as such must be shown to be

compatible with Habermas's theory of communicative action.
The appropriateness of Habermas's theory for the

ecology movement is questionable, as indicated in the

observations above.

How can his views of the ecology

movement as "defensive,

"

as a social movement of reaction

and withdrawal, categorically related to what are

generally viewed as primarily regressive, Romantic, and
escapist movements, be squared with Luke and White's
claims?

They assert that "communicative ethics, when

allied with the insights of radical ecology, can also help

project the tentative outlines of an alternative model of
modernity, which is both ecologically sound and more
54

democratic

75

What exactly is the basis of
this alliance
other than temporal coincidence?
Habermas's theory of
communicative ethics is based on an analysis
of social
development and learning processes that
drive the theory
to claim the only fruitful relationship
to nature is
.

instrumental, and that democratic legitimacy
is solely
dependent on strict procedural qualifications.
Radical
ecologists are, nearly by definition, those who
protest
the ins trumental i zation of nature, and it is
not clear

whether the procedures of consensus-seeking used by
some
greens meet the abstract procedural standards of

discourse ethics.

^

Luke and White's interpretation of

the compatibility of Habermas and radical ecology is not

shared by many, neither from the perspective of radical

ecology nor critical theory.

One reviewer of one of the

author's more recent works even labels it "a superficial

interpretation of Habermas's treatment of new social
movements."'

But,

contrary to the evidence, if we assume

there is no a priori dismissal of the ecology movement by
Habermas, how would his version of critical theory ally

itself with the insights of radical ecological activists?

Logical Connections
In light of the earlier stated criticisms of

Habermas's position that the instrumental mode of
cognition alone produces knowledge with regard to external
nature,

it would seem to be questionable whether it is
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possible to open

path between Habermas and radical
ecology. McCarthy's criticisms, and
many of the other
relevant criticisms, were developed
before the Luke and
White article was published, so it is
odd that these
criticisms are not addressed.
It must be assumed
a

that the

authors accept Habermas's response to the
critics,

especially on the relationship of knowledge to
nature, as
adequate 78
.

Since Habermas has not systematically dealt
with

either the issues of ecological crisis or the
development
of the informational economy,

indicate,

as the authors readily

the extension of the theory of communicative

action to the ecology movement must explicitly indicate
the connections between them for the argument to be

persuasive.

Luke and White rely on two aspects of

Habermas's theory to support their speculations on the

possibility of an ecological continuation of modernity.
First,

the ecological crisis,

although not entirely

replacing Marx's analysis of capitalist crisis, is viewed
as a potential threat to capitalist reproduction and

therefore an impetus for transformation.

Second,

Habermas’s theory of communicative rationality is used as
a

criterion to test the democratic potential of the

radical ecology movement.

Habermas seeks to maintain the

differentiation of rationality into the "separate value
spheres" which has taken place in "modernity."

Habermas

has argued that the fundamental problem of modernity is
56

the colonization of the moral and
aesthetic-erotic spheres
by an instrumental reason which
should correctly be

utilized only in relation to external
nature.
The
different forms of rationality should be
confined to their
proper objects, or appropriate value
spheres,

"balance" with each other,

reaching

a

instead of the present

condition where the instrumental mode of
rationalization
has colonized the other spheres.

The appropriate

"balance" can be determined through the process
of "coming
to an understanding" governed by "validity
claims"

established through

philosophically proper understanding

a

of the quasi- transcendental status of communicative

ethics

.

Luke and White explain what they believe to be

the potential of Habermasian critical theory,
The increasing breakdown of the ecosystem, entailed
by an infinitely expanding industrial civilization,
may come to play a role as significant in reorienting
human life as the one Marx felt the internal
breakdown of capitalism would play. Ecological crises
might function as the material catalyst for an
economic and political transformation that could
reverse the state-corporate colonization of the
lifeworld and create forms of life in which the
potential of modernity could be utilized in a more
balanced fashion 79
.

It is the potential of modernity,

in the form of a

theory of communicative action, that followers of Habermas
embrace.

How do the positions of radical ecologists fit

into this scheme? Is it even appropriate to use the term

"radical ecologists" as if to imply the acceptance of

common self-understanding by those who use the term to

57

a

identify themselves?

The two aspects of radical
ecology

Luke and White find compatible
with communicative ethics
are what would be labeled within
the categories
of the

theory of communicative action
as the "democratic" aspect
and the "aesthetic" aspect.
The democratic aspects
of

radical ecology (relevant in Habermas's
scheme to the
moral sphere of rationalization), are
the activists’
proposals for the institutionalization
of participatory
democracy, "Given the traditions and
material level of

Western industrialized societies, it is
fair to say that
the criteria of a communicative ethics
would

be met well

by the sort of participatory and decentralized

institutions proposed by radical ecologists

." 88

This

seems to be unproblematic as far as it goes, but
there

have been serious disagreements within both the German
and
U.S. Greens about what constitutes democratic procedures.

This fact alone reveals a basis for the frequent criticism
of Habermas's problematic and complex procedural

understanding of communicative ethics

81
.

What is to count

as the "unforced force of the better argument" especially

in the truly substantive context typical of radical

ecological activity, where not only the competence of the

participants is of importance but also where the
necessities of time and historical circumstance must be
considered?

What is "unforced force" when the concrete

interests and capacities to participate are themselves
central issues?

Are we not in fact always left with some
58

form of "compromise" except
at the most abstract,
analytical level ? 83
The authors,

following Habermas, suggest
that a
balance between sphere’s of
rationality is the best that
can be hoped for.
Certainly it is unreasonable
to hope
for anything like a "reconciliation"
with nature as was
thought by the early critical theory,
if this is

understood as

a sort of

universal pacification.

followers of Habermas, at best,

For the

"The aesthetic sphere

could expand as the need for nondestructive
ways of
tending to nature became increasingly
imperative ." 83

They

reject the "mostly misguided" attempts to
"resubjectify
nature, liberate animals, or accord rights
to trees."

They wish to retain modern "decentered"
consciousness,

consciousness differentiated into the three principle
spheres of Kant/Habermas
reason,

;

practical reason, theoretical

and aesthetic judgment 84 The current challenge
.

is not to cast about for ways of obliterating the

cognitive-objectivating attitude toward nature (out of

which science and technology arise)

,

but rather to rethink

the way in which that attitude relates to the aesthetic

and moral-practical attitudes at the level of everyday

practice ." 83

However,

according to Habermas this seems to

limit the possibilities of relating to nature to

narrow range.

a

very

In Habermas's reply to McCarthy's and

others' criticisms mentioned above, he only allows that,

"While in our dealings with external nature we can indeed
59

have feelings analogous to
moral feelings, the normconformative attitude to this
domain of external nature
does not yield any problems
susceptible of being worked
up
cognitively, that is, problems
that could be stylized
to

questions of justice from the
standpoint of normative
validity.
On the other hand, the discussion
from Kant to
Adorno concerning natural and artistic
beauty could
provide grounds for the thesis that
the expressive
attitude to external nature opens up a
domain of
experience that can be exploited for
artistic

production ." 86

It is therefore unclear how Luke
and

White's "ecological path to modernity" can
have anything
other that the traditional dualistic relation
to nature,

as object for domination and object for
aesthetic

contemplation.

In Habermas's critical theory there is
no

logical relation between humans and nature that directly
shifts perspectives from
logic

.

a

logic of domination to an eco-

Habermas has admitted as much with the observation,

It is just as difficult to answer the basic objection of

ecological ethics: How does discourse ethics, which is
limited to subjects capable of speech and action, respond
to the fact that mute creatures are also vulnerable?

Compassion for tortured animals and the pain caused by the

destruction of biotopes are surely manifestations of moral
intuitions that cannot be fully satisfied by the

collective narcissism of what in the final analysis is an

anthropocentric way of looking at things
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”

What do Luke and White
identify as "ecological"
about
their alternative path of
modernity? They emphasize
the
ambivalent potential of informational
capitalism, which
Produces
for an ecological future
society;
but certainly does not guarantee
it. With capitalism's
historical ability to appropriate
attempts to negate it,
it seems that the truly ecological
future will occur only
with great effort, "In beginning and
being grounded in a
modern welfare state that tends toward
an increasingly
extensive administration of economic and
political life,
any meaningful ecological critique also
must recognize
that transnational capital, at least at
first, inescapably
will moderate, limit, and define its
revolutionary

thrusts.” 88

The first generation of critical theorists

are assumed by Luke and White to be too "pessimistic"

generally but especially toward science and technology.
Too pessimistic to have been willing to view such

phenomena as computerization and cable television as
anything but "new instruments for more effective
domination. 89

Luke and White basically argue for an

ecological future on the basis of

a

specific vision of

"decentralized, democratic communities." 90

They analyze

the "concrete objective basis for ecological action" by

projecting six "trends" which, unfortunately for these
authors, have not all continued beyond their now

recognizably anomalous appearance in the late 1970s and
early 1980s.

One of these basic "trends"
61

(which seems to

"

have disappeared in the
1990s

)

is the transition to
new

"spatial-practical settings," forms
of a "new mode of
exurban existence." 91 it is
curious that they extend
the
content of this idea, which comes
from an overly

optimistic reading of brief demographic
changes, with
concepts originating in Murray Bookchin's
idea of

"municipalization.

This is curious or even ironic
since

Bookchin has systematically rejected
Habermas’s position,
and for well argued, philosophical
reasons.

Bookchin’s

ideas about restructuring society come
primarily out of
libertarian and socialist anarchist traditions,
not from
either Marxism or American pragmatism. Like
so much of

academic and socialist discussion, Luke and White's

approach does not so much approach the problem of
the
ecological crisis as

a

fundamental challenge to the

traditional philosophical positions, as it views the

ecology crisis as

a

new opportunity to revive old

traditions or theories of democratic social change.

Their

"path" to modernity is the appropriation of radical

ecological insights for furthering now traditional modern
goals, which are basically humanistic or anthropocentric.

These goals basically revolve around the attempt to

enhance the power of the human species.

"In the process

of elaborating new ideas and forms of life, ecological

activists can help initiate in broad segments of society
the kind of reflective processes, based on Habermas's

notion of communicative ethics, that have the potential to
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"

demystify, decode, and repossess
the material packages and
behavioral scripts being produced
by informational

capital

.

92

It is true that "The new form
of ideological struggle

thus centers on the different
meanings being reassigned to
acts and artifacts in modern
industrial life by
informational capitalism, " but which
side of the

ideological struggle do the Habermasians
really end up? if
embedded in the ideas and practices of
radical

ecologists ," 93 is

a

perspective and an approach that can

serve as "concrete guideposts for an
alternative future
where instrumental reason would be less imperial
and the

basic structure of society would be more in
accord with
the criteria of democratic legitimacy Habermas
has derived

from his communicative ethics ," 94 why do radical

ecologists need Habermas? Does

a

Habermasian approach

"serve as a corrective for some of the more romantic ideas
of the ecological movement ," 95 or does it simply close off

attempts to go beyond the differentiation of value spheres
and the resulting modern form of consciousness? Habermas's

approach provides only an abstract, process-oriented

conception about the necessary conditions for uncoerced
discourse.

It does not make possible the direct

confrontation with the central ecological problems now
facing the world, such as global warming, species
extinction, ecosystem collapse, and so forth.

It only

allows for the extension of the instrumental acguisition
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.

of relevant Knowledge
from nature, or its
appropriation
through the productron
of artworks, „hi ch
at best might
induce reflection on social
problems. Only a
hypothetical, indirect
possibility for addressing

potential ecological catastrophe
is illuminated in
this
approach. There is no compelling
reason radical ecologists
should adopt the critical
theory of Jurgen Habermas
when
he, at most, has provided
an abstract philosophical

justification for what has been for
many years an already
successful concrete practice
(consensus decision-making)

White has claimed that Habermas's
work, "Can at best
give us a minimal ethical orientation
for politics ." 96
There is no logical necessity
connecting the logic of

communicative action with the resolution
of ecological
crises.
It would seem philosophically
more promising to
return to the concerns of the earlier
critical theorists
and their more direct attempt to overcome
the "domination
of nature."
Rather than continuing within the theory of

communicative action, radical ecologists should
examine
Habermas's break from the idea of
nature.

a

"reconciliation" with

Was the framework of the early theorists

prematurely abandoned, leaving behind undeveloped
potentials?

Can the "aporias" of critical theory be

overcome an infusion of radical ecological insight?
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CHAPTER

2

THE CRITICAL, ECOLOGICAL ALTERNATIVE

The philosophies of radical ecology
offer

alternatives to what they variously label
"reform

environmentalism," "shallow" ecology, "liberal"
ecology,
and so on.
These philosophies claim to establish a
sufficient basis for radical ecological practices
intent
on a basic societal transformation.
The goal of
this

reorganization of society would be to enhance and develop
the potential of non- dominating, non— exploitative

relationships between and among humans and non-human
nature

.

This radical ecological critigue of both existing

society and "environmentalism" in many ways parallels
critical theory's early critique of "traditional theory."
This chapter will explore some of the limitations of

environmentalism and versions of critical theory.

Radical Ecology versus Reform Environmentalism
The terminological distinction between "radical" and

"reform" environmentalism originates in the writings of
some self-identified deep ecologists.

It is analogous to

the category distinction critical theory makes between

"progressive" and "affirmative" thought.

The radical

ecological texts speak for themselves here to reveal the

differences between the "radical ecologist" and what can

provisionally be called "environmentalists."
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Part of the

.

difficulty in developing an adequate
concept of the
"green" movement is its political and
philosophical
instability or immanent dynamic.

The ecology movement can

be interpreted through the dynamic tension
which has

developed between its various self-conceptions.

These

must be retained but brought more fully into
conscious and
critical awareness by any effort which attempts to
develop
an adequate conception of ecological subjectivity
and

politics
One of the earliest attempts to understand the

emerging green movement was Spretnak and Capra's Green
Politics

:

The Greens consider themselves the political voice of
the citizen's movements, that is, ecology, antinuclear-power, peace, feminist, and others. Most
members of the Green party are also activists in one
or more of those movements, and this diverse
orientation is reflected in the wings, or factions,
of the party: the visionary/holistic Greens, the EcoGreens, the peace-movement Greens, and the radicalleft Greens.
A great deal of overlapping occurs with
any categorizing of Green identities and some people
say there are no actual factions, but clearly there
are different priorities among the four clusters 1
.

Classifications of the various elements within the
greens are constantly shifting, as each analysis attempts
to impose a different typology on the elements of the

movement as a whole.
or consistency

Lack of identity, of full coherence

(self-sameness) within the movement,

should

be viewed as an indication of the adequacy rather than

75

inadequacy of the movement's attempt
to address its
"object," the ecological crisis/crises.

in the spirit of

critical theory, at least in that version
most closely
associated with Horkheimer and Adorno, it
is necessary to
critically evaluate the fragmented object
in a "non-

systematic" way.

As Adorno never stopped proclaiming,

what is not actually in harmony or reconciled
with itself
is not adequately conceptualized by merely
abstractly

reassembling its fragments into

a

balanced whole.

Therefore, critical analysis or interpretation,

from a

critical ecological perspective, should not hold its

purpose to be the establishment of

a

seamless web of

philosophic or ecological truth and balance, but instead
should assist the objects of its concern to "speak" of the

suffering and contradiction that actually exist.

Hope

lies in a future which reveals itself in the immanent

release,

from within the object, of its potential for

contributing to an "ecological mode of living."

Another early example of the effort to trace the
development of the green movement, especially in the

United States, was Brian Tokar's The Green Alternative:
Creating an Ecological Future

:

"Early environmentalism

developed on a somewhat separate track than the other
movements of the sixties.

It often had origins in

mainstream efforts to conserve natural resources for
longer-term use and in the efforts of wealthy elites to
keep their part of the wilderness free from development
76

and from the intrusions
of other people. "2
So there ls
some truth in the
perception of an elitist and
"romantic"
bias in the early
environmental movement, but
by the mid1960s the increasingly obvious
signs of environmental
destruction and potential
catastrophe resulted in a
shift
in ecological awareness:
"Environmentalism could not hold
on to its exclusiveness and
its undertone of elitism
for
very long.
People looked back to the
nature writings of
the 19th century and discovered
that, for people like
Thoreau and John Muir, the
protection of nature was
intimately intertwined with social
activism and a critique
of industrial society.” 3 By
the early 1980s
it was

beginning to be possible to distinguish
between
environmentalism and a more radical

perspective,

Ecological issues are often approached in
a rather
piecemeal fashion, as environmentalists
tend to
champion their own pet issue in relative
isolation
from all of the others.... A Green
perspective
encourages people to uncover the underlying
causes of
environmental problems in the habits and assumptions
of the societies that have created them.
At the same
time, Green approaches to social issues need
to be
thoroughly informed by an ecological sensibility.^
Critical theory presently has

a

complex and often

antagonistic relation to radical ecology.

The above

observations by "greens" may help to clarify Habermas's

understanding of green problems and the ecology movement.
To the extent that the elitist and single issue

perspectives dominated early environmental efforts
Habermas's characterization of the movement as "defensive"
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IS correct, but this
is not now an
adequate analytical
response to the developing
self-awareness of the green

movement.

Habermas acknowledged the
volatility of
ecological crisis and the
responses to
5
them.

H is earlier
observations were also limited
not only in time but
in
space, since his comments
were mostly directed
toward
events in the Federal
Republic of Germany.

Other commentators on the
green movement have taken
the seemingly paradoxical
position that the West German
Greens had lost much of their
Green or ecological content
very early in their
organizational life. Andrew
Dobson
distinguishes between "shades of
green" providing the
basis for his claim that the West
German Greens quickly
came to be dominated by the
lighter shades
of green.

Dobson's light greens are what the
deep ecologist would
call "reform environmentalists,"
and are elements of the
green movement oriented toward the
critical theory concept
of affirmative" politics. Affirmative
politics

strengthens the given system of domination
and its

fundamentally instrumental logic.

6

Dobson argued that the

"shades of green" analytical strategy, "Help(s)
us to

understand the apparently heretical suggestion that
the
West German Green Party is not a party of ecology

in the

sense in which

word

I

think we ought to understand the

the less visible but more fundamental

manifestations of the Green movement are greener than the
West German Green Party." 7
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If critical theorists
are too analytically
rigid,

Identify the aliynent* of
the Green £arii££
movement, they will have
largely missed the
"radical ecology."

i„ his major work,

^

and

the

importance of

which served to

support the fundamentalist
position of some greens,
Murray
Bookchin attempted to distinguish
between ecology and
environmentalism. Bookchin refers
to his own form of
ecological philosophy as "social
ecology" (examined more
closely in later chapters
(6,7,8) as one of the central
elements of a critical theory of
radical
ecology)

Bookchin discusses the modern uses
of the term ecology and
its original use by Ernst Haeckel
to characterize his
investigations into the interrelationships
between
animals, plants,

and their inorganic environment.

Bookchin claims the early understanding
of ecology has
been replaced by a "very crude form of
natural engineering
that might well be called environmentalism." 8

Bookchin'

definition of "environmentalism" succinctly
captures the
meaning associated with the term by contemporary
radical

ecologists of various hues,

propose to designate

a

"By 'environmentalism'

mechanistic,

I

instrumental outlook

that sees nature as a passive habitat composed of
'objects'

such as animals, plants, minerals, and the like

that must merely be rendered more serviceable for human
use.

Environmentalists then would tend to characterize

nature as a collection of natural resources or raw

materials to be put into use for exclusively human
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purposes

It can be seen from
this characterization
that

Habermas's position cannot
be developed in
compatible with the position
of radical

a

way

ecologists.

Habermas’s theory fundamentally
violates the radical
ecological dismissal of the
human/nature conceptual
dichotomy.
This dichotomy is inherent
in Habermas's
philosophical view, limiting "knowledge"
about nature to
its instrumental aspects.
There has been, within radical
ecology, an ongoing
tension between Bookchin's thought
and that of individuals
who identify themselves as deep
ecologists.
The fusion
and confusion of radical identities
is part of the

subterranean tension of the green movement.

The

difference between social and deep ecologists
is not
always readily apparent, even for as trivial
a

(among others)

published in

a

reason

as the fact that Bookchin's work has
been

collection of various authors under the

title of "Deep Ecology ." 10

in the same work, Arne Naess,

the generally recognized originator of the term
"deep

ecology,

"

reiterates his distinctions between his

philosophy and that of "shallow ecology." Naess's
terminological distinctions are represented through
examples of the different slogans each type uses, but the

distinctions ultimately can be defined on the basis of
deepness

,

"The term deep is supposed to suggest

explication of fundamental presuppositions of valuation as
well as of facts and hypotheses.
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Deep ecology, therefore,

transcends the limit of any particular
ar science of today,
including systems theory and scientifi
tie ecology. Deepness
O normative and descriptiv e p remises qnpsHnnoH
f.

characterize the movement

^

Challenging the various self-understandings
of
radical ecologists are positions which can
only be

unsystematically clustered together under the heading
ecofeminism.

"

There are

a

wide variety of understandings

of ecofeminism, but they generally have developed
out of
the intersection of feminism with the ecology
movement.

Just as the feminist movement lacks philosophical and

political unity or common self-understanding

(or even an

agreed understanding of the possibilities of

a

understand)

,

definition.

ecofeminism cannot be reduced to

"self" to

single

a

However, certain definitions have been

offered in an attempt to function within what is deemed
the "masculine" form which is argumentation,

begin by defining ecofeminism.
perspective.

Ecofeminism is

a

.. I

"We will

will present one

value system,

movement, and a practice, but it also offers

a

social

a pol

.it

i

r.a

1

analysis that explores the links between androcentrism and

environmental destruction.

It is

'an awareness'

that

begins with the realization that the exploitation of
nature is intimately linked to Western Man's attitude
toward women and tribal cultures....'

Other

ecofeminists emphasize other aspects of the contiguity of
feminism and ecology. Spretnak, who has written
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extensively on the "spiritual" aspect
of ecofeminism,
emphasizes the roots of ecofeminism in
radical or cultural
feminism.
This tradition has attempted to
theorize out

of

women's bodies and women's experiences,
"Our sources of
inspiration at the time were not Thoreau,
John Muir, or
even Rachel Carson (though we have certainly
come to
appreciate those beacons since then) but, rather,
our own
experiential explorations ." 13

Another general tendency, especially among U.S.
greens, has been the rejection of political thought
which

has virtually any connection with Marxism, or the Left

generally.

This phobia has even been extended to

"Eurocentric" thought.

After explaining some of these

rejections, John Rensenbrink, political science professor
and green activist,

summarizes the U.S. Greens, "The

Greens are the harbingers of

a new,

more seasoned

politics .... they turn away from protest to concerted
action through sustained organization for the

transformation of society and its politics.

They directly

challenge the industrial mode of production, whether run

by comrades or capitalists

." 14

This sampling of radical ecological self-

understandings should begin to illuminate the elements of
a

constellation named "ecological subjectivity," or what

can be called the concept of an ecological subject.

This

ecological subject-object is caught within a web or

forcefield rippling with crosscurrents and tensions both
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internally and In relation
to the anti-ecological
society
it is a part.
The ecological subject
finds itself opposed
to a modern subject which
perceives itself
opposition

m

to nature,

nature that can only be hnown
in an
instrumentalist sense, a nature
which serves as a means
to
the self-preservation and
development of the human
subject.
The current ecological
subject itself is divided
between that aspect which believes
it is possible
a

to

reform the present system of
industrialization and social
domination, and its more radical
incarnation.
This more

radical ecological subject is itself
also internally
fragmented into various elements. The
fragments of the
radical ecological subject sometimes
resonate

sympathetically, but more often are in

a

societal and

movement-wrenching struggle over self-definition
and selfunderstanding.
One of the central questions for
the

radical ecological subject is whether the
tradition of

critical theory has any potential for initiating

a

sufficiently heightened self-awareness so that at least
partial resolution of its internal tensions becomes
possible.

The further hope is that the heightened self-

awareness of the radical ecological subject might itself
release hidden potentials which could further the

realization of an ecological mode of living.
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Critical and Traditional Theory
To speak of "critical
theory" or "the Frankfurt

School" is generally to mislead.

Any attempt to suimnarize

the work of the individuals
associated with these

categories, collectively or
individually, will necessarily
an exercise in futility.
However, by examining the
relationship between critical theory
and traditional
theory, especially as the critical
theorists themselves
represented the relationship, the
potential fruitfulness
of a more intimate relationship
between critical theory
and radical ecology may be perceptible.
One of the

central texts in the tradition of critical
theory is Max
Horkheimer's "Traditional and Critical Theory."

Horkheimer begins his essay with the question,
"What
is theory?" and answers with a description
of what
the

scientific response would be, something like; "The
sum
total of propositions about a subject, the propositions

being so linked with each other that
the rest derive from these.

a

few are basic and

The goal of such a theory

is a universal or systematic science that attempts to

encompass all possible objects of study under its

deductive framework, these "objects" include human
"subjects."

Traditional theory arose with modern

philosophy and Descartes’ and other philosophers'
development of the scientific method.

Although this

conception of theory, based on deduction through
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propositions tending toward
complete mathematization,
originally was oriented toward
non-human
objects,

it has

become the standard model of
theory for the social
sciences as well. But Horkheimer
does not leave his
question in the hands of the
self-understandings of the
scientists.
He indicates the extent to
which scientific
method does not have a transcendental
or a priori status
but rather how science is part
of society as a whole and
how the interests which dominate
society dominate science
and scientific theory:
"The fruitfulness of newly
discovered factual connections for the
renewal of existent
knowledge, and the application of such
knowledge
to the

facts,

do not derive from purely logical or
methodological

sources but can rather be understood only in
the context
of real social processes ." 16 These real
social processes

include capitalism.

Critical theory does not accept the

belief that facts are simply present and must be
accepted,
that behavior merely adapts to their necessity.

Instead,

theory and the perception of facts are viewed as caught up
in history,

as products of development:

The objects we perceive in our surroundings--cities,
villages, fields, and woods--bear the mark of having
been worked on by man.
It is not only in clothing
and appearance, in outward form and emotional make-up
that men are the product of history. Even the way
they see and hear is inseparable from the social
life-process as it has evolved over the millennia.
The facts which our senses present to us are socially
preformed in two ways; through the historical
character of the object perceived and through the
historical character of the perceiving organ. Both
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activit y rand yerthe indi ^H ar ? Shaped
receptive and passive in the
act

human
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This leads Horkheimer to
an observation about
the
relationship between humans and
nature that would be
consistent with the observations
of radical ecologists
(and the early Marx), "The
distinction within this complex
totality between what belongs
to unconscious nature and
what to the action of man in
society cannot be drawn in
concrete detail." The possibility
for a strictly dualistic
basis of knowledge is eliminated.

Borrowing from the Marxist tradition,
Horkheimer
explains how the world cannot adequately
be characterized
as a harmonic whole, but is better
represented
as

constituted through suffering and antagonism,
including
the antagonism resulting from class
differences.
The

critical theorist takes these influences on
the

development of theory into account;
The identification, then, of men of critical
mind
with their society is marked by tension, and the
tension characterizes all the concepts of the
critical way of thinking. .Reason cannot become
transparent to itself as long as men act as members
of an organism which lacks reason.
Organism as a
naturally developing and declining unity cannot be a
sort of model for society, but only a form of
deadened existence from which society must emancipate
itself 18
.

.

Who is the subject of critical theory?

"Critical

thinking is the function neither of the isolated
individual nor of

a

sum-total of individuals.

Its subject

is rather a definite individual in his real relation to
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other individuals and groups,
in his conflict with a
particular class, and, finally,
in the resultant web of
relationships with the social
totality and with nature. "19
These observations serve Horkheimer
to distinguish

Cartesian or scientistic thought
from dialectical thought
(although dialectics itself must
still be distinguished
into its various varieties), "The
acceptance
of an

essential unchangeableness between
subject, theory, and
object thus distinguishes the Cartesian
conception from
every kind of dialectical logic." 20
Horkheimer
rejects

identifying the emancipatory interest of
escape from such
a society, with the given situation
of the proletariat,

or

the proletariat's self-perception of its
interests.

critical theorist has

a

The

much more complex responsibility

than simply accurately representing an oppressed
class's

given interests.

The theoretician's "presentation of

societal contradictions is not merely an expression of the

concrete historical situation but also
to stimulate change." 21

a

force within it

The function of the critical

theorist is then, at least partially, to stimulate change

by changing the awareness of individuals, particularly
those with the potential to act in the interest of

emancipation of society as

a

whole.

Similarly, the

radical ecological theorist's function is to stimulate
that change in self-awareness of the potential ecological

subject who, through its actions, can help bring into

existence the ecological society.
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Horkheimer speaks of the
future dissolution of the
society of domination and
oppression as coming about
through the "association
of free men."
The future,
emancipated society will only
be achieved after
preliminary stages develop what
are now only tendencies.
This may result in many
transitional moments, but the
duty
of the critical theorist
is to persist in the
theoretical
development of those tendencies,
even in spite of the most
discouraging of existing circumstances:
t
iCh
way of thinking has in common
ith fin?asv
with
fantasy is iwt
that an image of the future which
springs indeed from a deep understanding
of the
present determines men's thoughts and
actions even in
W en the
Ur e ° f eVSntS S6emS t0 be leading
far
fa^awav
e
away ffrom suchh° a future
and seems to justify
every reaction except belief in fulfillment.
It is
not the arbitrariness and supposed
independence of
fantasy that is the common bond here, but
its
obstinacy.
Within the most advanced group it is the
theoretician who must have this obstinacy
.

With regard to the theoretical compatibility
of
critical theory and radical ecological theory,
from the

perspective of critical theory it can be argued that
theory is only critical when earlier thought is taken up
and transformed within the contexts of new historical

circumstances and new needs.

Transformation of earlier

critical thought retains the interest in freedom:

"The

historical significance of his work is not self-evident;
it rather depends on men speaking and acting in such a way

as to justify it.

It is not a finished and fixed

historical creation.
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One of the problematic
aspects of critical theory
for
a radical ecological
subject is the element retained
from
the Enlightenment: instrumental
domination.
This element
remains in the work of all the
theorists except, perhaps,
Adorno.
It is an element of the
domination of nature
appearing frequently in those
constructions of concepts
around the idea of freedom, and in
the relationship
of

freedom to the rational mastery of
nature.

This element

of domination was present from the
beginning,

in those

initial conceptions of the project of
critical theory
Horkheimer elaborated.
In its original conception,

Horkheimer

'

s

version of

critical theory followed the Marxist understanding
of the
development of productive forces,
But the critical theory of society is, in its
totality, the unfolding of a single existential
judgement.
To put it in broad terms, the theory says
that the basic form of the historically given
commodity economy on which modern history rests
contains in itself the internal and external tensions
of the modern era; it generates these tensions over
and over again in an increasingly heightened form;
and later a period of progress, development of human
powers, and emancipation for the individual, after an
enormous extension of human control over nature, it
finally hinders further development and drives
humanity into a new barbarism.

This position would later be modified with the

collaboration of Adorno, in the Dialectic of

Enligh tenment

/'

where the dialectic of progress and

barbarism is presented as having existed from the very
beginnings of civilization.
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Critical theory itself is viewed
by Horkheimer, in
this early essay, as an
extension
of the modern,

enlightenment projects,
however,

and

"A consciously critical
attitude,

is part of the development
of society:

the

construing of the course of history
as the necessary
product of an economic mechanism
simultaneously contains
both a protest against this order
of things, a protest
generated by the order itself, and the
idea
of self-

determination for the human race, that
is the idea of
state of affairs in which man's actions

a

no longer flow

from

a

mechanism but from his own decision "25
.

The traditional philosophic form of the
problem of
emancipation, or freedom, is to contrast this
concept with
its opposite, necessity.
In traditional philosophic terms
it is the understanding of the concept of
necessity in its

relation to nature that is of greatest concern to the
radical ecologist, and central to any further development
of critical theory.

Horkheimer attempts to clarify the

differences between the positivistic, or scientistic,

understanding of necessity and
the concept.

a

critical understanding of

For the scientist there is a strict

separation of the object of study from the subject who

proceeds scientifically:
There is nonetheless a decisive difference when it
comes to the relation of subject and object and
therefore to the necessity of the event being judged.
The object with which the scientific specialist deals
is not affected at all by his own theory.
Subject
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and object are kept strictlv
mK
an^rte
tlVe
occurrence is independent of the
thedv
anri''fh
independence is part of its
necessity: ^he^Observer
such can effect no change in
the object 26
,

.

.

Horkheimer calls this the "Cartesian
dualism of
thought and being," and concludes
that, "Necessity for
them refers not to events which
man masters to his own
purposes but only to events which
he anticipates as
27
probable ."
Here it can be seen that Horkheimer
's
understanding of freedom is that of the
rational mastery
of necessity, rather than simple
adaptation to the ongoing
processes of the world, whether economic,
social,

political or natural.

For a subject who does not separate

itself from the society of which it is

a part,

and who

does not strictly separate knowledge from
action,

"If he

encounters necessity which is not mastered by
man, it
takes shape either as that realm of nature
which despite
the far-reaching conquests still to come will
never wholly

vanish,

or as the weakness of the society of previous
ages

in carrying on the struggle with nature in a consciously

and purposefully organized way ." 26

The future emancipated

society will have carried out the rational mastery of
nature and society as far as possible.

Rational mastery

of nature will therefore change the understanding of

necessity itself, and be viewed as freedom rather than
domination.

Total domination is the state of present

affairs where nature retains substantial power to inhibit
social development, and social life is controlled by an
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economic syst ern that treats
individuals like natural
objects to be dominated.
The human species has
mastered
neither natur 3 process n or the
society it created which
itself has ta ken on the
characteristics of a "second
nature." The critical subject
must then side with the
original proj ect of enlightenment,
1

Both elements in this concept of
necessity— the power
nature and the weakness of society
are
interconnected and are based on the
experienced
effort of man to emancipate himself
from coercion bv
nature and from those forms of social
life and of the
juridical, political and cultural orders
which have
become a straitjacket for him. The struggle
on two
fronts, against nature and against
society's
weakness, is part of the effective striving
for a
future condition of things in which whatever
man
wills is also necessary and in which the
necessity of
the object becomes the necessity of a
rationally
mastered event.

—

of

fn other words,

"natural" necessity and "human reason"

would coincide.

A fundamental question for

a

theory which develops

with the changes in historical situations is to what
extent will it have to be self-modifying.

In the relation

of theory to historically changing situations,

the theory

must change emphases, but not its fundamental self-

understanding,

"The historical development of the

conflicts in which the critical theory is involved leads
to a reassignment of degrees of relative importance to

individual elements of the theory,

forces further

concretizations, and determines which results of

specialized science are to be significant for critical
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theory and practice at any
given time.’’ 30

Horkheimer's
presentation of critical theory as
interdisciplinary and
social scientific, and his
leadership
in the late 1930s

and early 1940s can be best
understood as involving the
ongoing development of his original
understanding of the
project of a critical social theory.
it is this

understanding that Habermas has relied
on as
justification for a claim to the historical
Frankfurt School.

a

legacy of the

He has attempted to return to an

interdisciplinary approach which relies on
empirical
research from the social sciences as well
as

methodological and critical concepts reconstructed
out of
a variety of philosophical traditions. 31
The
legacy of

critical theory would be challenged if radical
ecologists

attempt to appropriate the insights of the earlier
critical theorists for their new or additional purposes.
It is in the relationship between theory and practice

that the work of the various critical theorists can be

differentiated.

The various understandings of this

relationship result in different possibilities for

transformed world.

a

In conceptualizing the relationship

between humans and nature, including internal nature,
critical theorists necessarily must present their

understanding of the methodological or conceptual
possibilities of interpretation.

The constellation

"critical theory" addresses and readdress the capacity to
know and represent its own self-understanding. It must be
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self-reflexive if it is to be
"adequate" to its own
concept.
The tradition of critical
theory has
appropriated the conceptual
framework of Hegelian and
Marxist dialectics, but only
to transform it.
It began
with a critique of the lack
of self-ref lexron on

the part
of traditional or positivist
understandings of theory.
However, in its criticisms critical
theory also examined
its own foundations.
The problem for critical
theory
became the attempt to find some
foothold for its own

project

.

If critical theory is itself
part of history,

and

history is tending toward a barbaric
totalization of
thought, how does critical theory
confront

the implication

of its own inescapable inclusion in
the logic of

domination?

On what basis can it make the critical

judgement that the world should be otherwise?

And if the

world should be otherwise, what indications
are there of
the actual possibility of a future without
domination,

either an

emancipated" world, or

a

world that includes

the ancient philosophical idea of the "good life "? 32

Horkheimer

'

s

collaboration with Adorno on the

Dialectic Qf Enlightenment, generated

a

new phase of

critical theory, one critics generally characterize as
"dark" and "pessimistic."

An extreme of pessimism has

been the most common interpretation of Adorno's version of
critical theory. It is this pessimism, resulting from the

"totalization of critique,

"

that Habermas has taken as the

basis for his departure from the "philosophy of the
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subject,

his "linguistic turn"
or change of paradigm
to a
"theory of communicative
action. "33 If radical
ecologists
are to draw on the tradition
of critical theory,
"

it is

crucial to determine if the
earlier tradition still has
potential to offer concepts which
might lead to an
adequate understanding of the
various problems related
to
the ecological crisis of the
planet.
"Adequacy" can be
measured in this case by whether
destruction of the global
ecology can be halted and reversed.
Might a turn toward
Adorno's version of critical thought
be more
fruitful,

illuminating the potential of the ecology
movement, than a
turn toward Habermas or other members
of the
tradition?

How might Adorno's thought make it
possible for the
ecology movement to become more self-aware
and potentially
more effective? And fundamentally for
critical
theory,

is

it possible to develop a "politics" out
of Adorno's work?

The generally accepted view is that Adorno's
thought

eliminates the possibilities for political action
except
in some extremely esoteric,

forms.

aesthetic and philosophic

This consensus must be challenged and the

potential for generating concrete politics from his
thought,

as a result of a changed historical situation and

additional critical concepts, must be demonstrated.
Specifically, Adorno's thought must be shown to be able to

address the assertions by Marcuse that the ecology and
feminist movements contain revolutionary potential.

Adorno's thought must be shown to contain the capacity to
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address the ecological
probl ems produced by the
dynamics
of industrial production
and capitalism, problems
Habermas
has identified as capable
of generating or
contributing to
a
legitimation crisis."^ Can
Adorno's thought generate
a different set of
conceptual alternatives not
reducible
to the Habermasian response,
which has been found to
be
inadequate, simply calling for
further development
of

technological and administrative
(bureaucratic)
domination?

Paradigm Shifts
Habermas developed his version of
critical theory in
opposition to what he saw as the shortcomings

of the first

generation of critical theorists' reliance
on the
"philosophy of the subject." Habermas
criticizes the
tradition of critical theory that follows
from the

tradition of Hegel and Marx, claiming it does
not provide
a sufficient categorial framework
to understand
inter sub j ect ivity

According to Habermas, the heritage

.

from German Idealism forced thought toward categories
of
self expression

which rely on

a

notion of an "essential"

human nature which is then objectified through labor.
This objectification of the "essentially human" results in
a

sub j ect - ob j ect dialectic that is only able to understand

intersubjectivity as
between subjects.
human action to

a

a

process of objective mediation

Habermas argues that the reduction of

process based on
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a

laboring subject

(his

description of both Hegelian
and Marxist dialectics)
does
not adequately address
the other uniquely human
characteristic; communicative
interaction.
To adequately
address this second dimension
a "linguistic turn"
is

needed to analyze communicative
activity.
it is within
the structure of everyday
language that Habermas
detects
the potential for normative
guidance of human interaction.
Contained within the structure
of speech
is an a priori,

or "quasi-transcendental,

"

assumption of validity.

m

Action

the form of speech oriented
toward mutual understanding
has within it an implicit claim
to truth.
Based on this

"quasi-transcendental" truth claim embedded
within
language Habermas develops the normative
framework of
discourse ethics 35
.

As previously indicated, there are
fundamental

problems with the theory of "discourse ethics"
and its
relation to the global ecological crisis.
The Habermasian
framework of critical theory does not provide
an adequate
way of conceptualizing the human to nature
relationship.
It claims the only "theoretically fruitful"
attitude

toward nature is that of instrumental rationality, in

Habermas

s

categories: purposive-rational cognition.

Additionally, it is doubtful that the formalistic

structure of his argument can be retained when faced with
the requirements of actual discursive confrontation.

"ideal speech situation" does not have sufficient

normative purchase to make it a politically effective
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The

basis for actual situational
discourse. The conditions
necessary for the normative
aspects of discourse ethics to
prevail occur in a very restricted
universe of expertise
and competence.
The possibility of the
transference or
mediation from expert cultures, in
the spheres of science,
law and art, to that of everyday
life activities has not
been convincingly established. Rather
than turn to a
problematic theory of communicative ethics,
if critical
theory is to serve the practice of radical
ecology it will
have to address Habermas's critique and
dismissal
of the

earlier positions within the tradition.

Specifically,

the

basis for the rejection of the works of Adorno
and Marcuse
should be more closely examined. Additionally,
the

significant differences between Adorno and Marcuse
must be

addressed and resolved if possible, particularly on the
two crucial issues of the possibility of a revolutionary

subject, on the one hand,

and the conceptualization of

a

"reconciliation with nature," on the other.
The central question for radical ecology and critical

theory is whether it is possible to relate to nature in

a

way other than that which can be characterized as
domination, or as the deep ecologists call it,

"anthropocentrically."

To answer this question it is

necessary to determine the status of the logic that
supports science and technology.

Habermas rejects the

possibility of scientific or technological development by
any other logic than that of instrumental rationality.
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Marcuse on the other hand
has argued that a "logic
of
gratification" can replace the
logic of domination and
thereby transform all aspects
of society including
science
and technology.
Critical theorists who have
returned to
the first generation of the
tradition to develop concepts
to address the ecology crisis
not surprisingly have nearly
always returned to Marcuse 36
Marcuse has claimed.
.

The very concept of technical
reason is perhaps
deological. Not only the application
of technology
1
tSelf 1S dominati °n (of nature and
7
men)
mefh
th ° dlca t
scientific,
calculating
”^!;:r
! purposes andcalculated,
control.
Specific
interests of
domination are not foisted upon technology
subsequently" and from the outside; they
enter the
very construction of the technical
apparatus.
Technology is always a historical-social
project: in
it is projected what a society and its
ruling
interests intend to do with men and things.
Such a
purpose’ of domination is "substantive" and to
this
extent belongs to the very form of technical
reason J

^

'

Marcuse challenges Weber's claim that technical
reason can be assimilated to reason as such.

On the

contrary, the use made of science and technology by the

institutionalized forces of production, and the resulting
growth in material production, is used ideologically,
argues Marcuse, to claim that technical rationality is

equivalent to reason.

This results in a system of

domination being presented as having ontological status by
those who control production and ideology;
In this universe, technology also provides the great
rationalization of the unfreedom of man and
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autonomous, of determining
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increases the productivity of
labor
Technni
rationality thus protects^ather
thin
cancel ?he
legitimacy of domination and
the instrumentalist
reaS ° n
° n a rationallylSamarian
society. ^
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Habermas does not disagree with
Marcuse as far as it
is true that the specific
historical forms science and
technology take depend on variable
institutional
arrangements.

What Habermas argues is that the
basic
logical structures on which science
and technology

are

based are necessarily purposive-rational
(instrumental ). 39

Scientific-technological "progress" is not

a

"project" of

specific historical constellation of forces,
but "if
based at all on a project, can only be traced
back to a
a

project of the human species as

a whole,

that could be historically surpassed ." 40

and not to one

There is no

other logic to base science and technology on except

purposive-rational logic.
Habermas sees the problem not as the need to

challenge the fundamental logic of science and technology,
but as the historical expansion of purposive-rational or

instrumental logic

into areas it does not belong,

specifically into the "moral sphere."

Here Habermas is

guided by the fundamentally Kantian notion of the

separation of reason into different value spheres with

correspondingly different criteria of validity. This

100

.

strategy is

a

requirement imposed on
Habermas
as a result of the
conclusions he reached in his
critique
of Marx. Habermas claims
Marx did not adequately

differentiate the category of
"sensuous human activity."
Habermas argues this concept
should not be collapsed into
the categories of objectification
borrowed from German
Idealism, but separated into two
irreducible
moments;

labor

(purposive-rational activity), and
social
interaction (communicative action)
The logic of
.

purposive-rational action is the proper
sphere of science
and technology and is necessary
as
long as the human

species must appropriate external
nature for the purposes
of self-preservation. The forces of
production expand

control over nature through the use of
technical
knowledge.

The claim to truth of technical knowledge
is

validated through success or failure.

However,

the

species also reproduces itself through social
interaction,

adapting

inner nature" by means of normative structures

of socialization.

The normative structures under which

this process takes place also require justification, that
is,

they must be justified through the discourse of

"right." Therefore the idea of emancipation cannot be

viewed as equivalent to scientific-technological progress,
but must include the rationalization of social

interaction; the extension of communication without

domination
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For Habermas the
subject-object relationship
and the

subject-subject relationship
follow two distinctly
different logics and should
be rigorously separated
analytically.
it is precisely the
extension of the
subject-object relationship into
the sphere of
communicative action that is the
problem.

it is this

expansion of purposive-rational
thought to the moral and
aesthetic spheres that Habermas
addresses in his theory of

communicative action.
based on

His theory of discourse
ethics,

universal pragmatics of language,
hypothesizes
the "ideal speech situation" in
an attempt to develop a
normative basis for reversing the
"colonization
a

of the

lif eworld

by instrumental rationality.

One result of this analysis is to view
the

rationalization" characteristic of modern
society as an
irreversible process. Any attempt to unify the
different
and irreducible logics of the various value
spheres would
almost unquestionably result in a "de-differentiation"
leading to what Habermas believes would be

a

regression of

rationality behind the level achieved with modernization.
This view of the possibility of a unity of value spheres,

which Habermas believes can only be achieved through an

unfortunate return to

a

pre-modern society, has
conception of

a

level of worldviews typical of
a

devastating impact on the

"reconciliation with nature."

It is

precisely on this point that he initiates the charges of

mysticism and metaphysics against the earlier critical
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theorists and those who read
Marx through the lenses
of
the early philosophic
manuscripts:
I think I have
learned from the tradition of
Hegelian Marxism, from the
history of critical

y fr

aptdornrth at

“^L^t B to Sd Se“S^
j

the
atl g f ° mS ° f
whos: cftegoi“i drs^
?
stinctions
we can no longer
retreat- in^ good
^
retreat
conscience. All this is not reallv
n argument, but more an
expression of skepticism in
the
face of so many failed attempts
to hale one's
ake and eat it too: to retain
both Kant's insiahts
and, at the same time, to return
to the "home"
Behausung. from which these same insights
have
driven us. But, perhaps, McCarthy
or others will
some day succeed in formulating the
continuities
r

^"dgfLhind

m

(

)

between human history and natural history
so
carefully that they are weak enough to
be plausible
and yet strong enough to permit us to
recognize man'<
piace
the cosmos (Scheler), at least in
broad
outlines 41

m

.

The task facing radical ecology,

and any critical

theory that seeks to be relevant in the age of
global
ecological crisis,

is the attempt to formulate "the

continuities between human history and natural history."

Reconciliation and Otherness
Habermas attempts to return to Horkheimer's original

version of critical theory through the development of
theory of communicative action.

a

This is an attempt to

respond to what he sees as the dead end of totalizing
critique, what critical theory became after Adorno joined
the Institute for Social Research.
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Dialer. fir, of

is critiqued and
revealed as encapsulating
a

Philosophical position Horkheimer
and Adorno are forced
to
occupy, a position which
leaves them no place to
turn for
a normative grounding
of critique.
They cannot provide a
Dustification for moving beyond
a society

and a social
theory that have closed in
on themselves.
Is Habermas
correct in his analysis of
the aporetic character
of early
critical theory, or are there
still potentials within
that
theory which have been unexplored?
Is there also
still a

developmental potential within early
critical theory that
can challenge the "linguistic
turn"
and its own

problematic structure?
Habermas's analysis of what he feels
is the version
of critical theory too strongly
influenced by Adorno
begins by tracing the development of
the critigue
of

instrumental reason.
traced back,

m

Because instrumental reason is

D ialectic of Enlig htenment and
subseguent

work by Adorno, to the beginnings of the
history of the
human species, the fundamental problem for

critical social

theory becomes finding some aspect of reason that
can

ground the critique itself.

Critical theory undermines

its own claims to insight when it relentlessly
criticizes

the reason it itself uses for interpretation of the

extension of instrumental rationality to the whole of
society. The basis for securing the critique of

instrumental reason is Adorno's and Horkheimer 's adoption
of the concept/term of "mimesis," an idea representing the
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possibility of approaching
the other of nature
without
domination.
Possibilities for transcending
the total
critique of reason are then
found in the aesthetic
realm
Where the mimetic relationship
to the other is
produced or
reproduced indirectly. Habermas
rejects this solution and
attributes it to a long line
of thought within Western
philosophy, 'The aponas of
the negative-dialectical
self-

transcendence of philosophical
thought give rise to the
question, whether this situation
is not merely the
consequence of an approach that
remains rooted in the
philosophy of consciousness, fixated
on the relation of
subjectivity and self-preservation ." 42
Habermas answers
the question with a "paradigm
shift," from the "philosophy
of consciousness (or subject)"
to that of "communicative
action
.

Habermas's critique of the earlier critical
theorists
emerges from an examination of what he
believes
to be

their relationship to a "scientistic tendency"
in Marx's
writings.
Habermas claims Marx tends to

reductionistically view his project of the critique of
political economy as
a

a

form of natural science, making it

mere extension of "scientism" which ideologically

dominates both capitalist and state socialist societies.

Scientism is problematic since it has become the

methodological and philosophical basis for the extension
of instrumental reason into all spheres of society.

A

"scientistic" self-understanding "identifies the limits of
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obnectivating knowledge with
the limits of knowledge
as
such resulting in science
and technology adopting
the
additional role of a legitimating
ideology.
Marx viewed
the application of science
and technology to

«

the process

of production as not only
part of a system of alienation
of labor, but also as the
basis for the development
of the
forces of production to the
point where they could
provide
an opportunity for the
transcendence of the capitalist
system.
The material abundance provided
by the

development of production capacities
under capitalism
required an equivalent rationalization
of the relations of
production, those property relations
affecting
the

distribution of material wealth.

Adorno, Horkheimer and

Marcuse saw the extension of technical
rationality into
all spheres of human existence, including
the

"relations

of production,

"

as the basis of the domination of
both

internal nature and the relations between
individuals.
This expansion of instrumental rationality
resulted in

Adorno's claim that, contrary to Hegel,
false."

"the whole is

The progressive function of science and

technology which Marx's theory depended on is in this
critical view reversed, and instrumental rationality is

therefore viewed as merely

human labor.

a

more complete domination of

Technical rationality's use in the relations

of production eliminates the possibility for the

development of revolutionary subjectivity, in fact
reducing subjectivity itself to
106

a

mere function of the

production apparatus.

There is then no
possibility of the
development of consciousness
to the point where
it has the
"power to burst the system. "44
This results
in

^

collapse of resrstant
subjectivity and the development,
in
Marcuse s terms, of the
"one-dimensional" society.
Marxist dialectics collapses.

problem for critical theory
then becomes finding
a basis for opposition
to the total system, both
theoretically and in the form of
an actual or potential
subject of social transformation/revolution.
This has

been a problem of central concern
for "Western Marxism"
since the 1920s. Although Horkheimer
and Adorno rely
heavily on his theory of reification
they do not accept
the understanding of human nature
as stated by Lukacs,

While the process by which the worker
is reified and
becomes a commodity so long as he does
not
consciously offer resistance to it— dehumanizes
him
and cripples and atrophies his "soul, "
it remains
true that precisely his human nature is
not changed
into a commodity.
He can, therefore, inwardly
objectrvate himself completely against this existence
°

—

of his.
It is

precisely the view that the commodity form

reaches into the deepest regions of subjectivity that

prompts the Frankfurt School, beginning in the late 1930s
and continuing for at least the next two decades, to

develop its theories of fascism and mass culture.

The

prophesied revolution of the proletariat had not taken
place in the advanced capitalist countries, and where
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.

socialism had ta ken hold it
had developed into
Stalini St
totalitarianism
The consciousness of
the proletariat had
not become revolutionary,
rather it was regressive
and

barbaric;

"Horkheimer and Adorno investigate
empirically
the psychic mechanisms by
means of which the revolt
of
inner nature is refunctionalized
into strengthening the
forces against which it is
directed
.

It is

Adorno who carries out the
relentless critique
of existing society to its
logical conclusion,
and it is

this conclusion, Habermas argues,
which results in the
undermining of the critique itself.
Adorno is fully aware
that the critique of reason must
necessarily result in the
turn of critique back on itself.
This results in the

critical self-reflection of critique:

"That element of

truth encountered through concepts,
beyond their abstract
compass, can show itself only in that which
is suppressed,
despised and discarded by concepts.
It is the utopian
hope of cognition to open up what is conceptless
by means
of concepts without (thereby) assimilating it
to
them.

Such a notion of dialectic raises doubts as to its

possibility

.

47

It is here where negative dialectics has carried

through its relentless critique to the point of

challenging its own foundations that Habermas elaborates
the inadequacies of its response.

The fundamental

question for critique as extended through negative
dialectics, and for any radical ecology that attempts to
108
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adopt this interpretative
structure is,
explicate the idea of

'.How

then can we

reconciliation's

For lt £ only
with the idea of
reconciliation that there
can he any hope
of overcoming the false
totality created hy the
extension
of instrumental rationality
to the point of total
domination

Habermas

reads

with nature as
an

a

opportunity

Adorno's

call

for

,

a

reconciliation

mystical-metaphysical regression,

and as

for

revealing the superiority
of his own
theory of communicative rationality:
The paradox in which the
critique of
1 S
Umental reason is entangled,
and which
^
stubbornly
resists even the most supple
lalectic, consists then in this:
Adorno would have to put forward Horkheimer and
a theory of
memes is, which, according to their
own ideas, is
impossible
Thus they are only being consistent
w en they do not attempt to
explicate "universal
reconcriiation" as Hegel had done, as
the unity
of the identity and nonidentity
of spirit and
nature
but let it stand as a code, almost
in
the manner of hebensphi losop hie.
At most, we
can circle around this idea, drawing
on images
from Judaeo-Christian mysticism; the
formula of
the young Marx regarding the dialectical
interconnection between the humanization of
nature and the naturalization of humans
alreadv
referred back to this tradition.

^

.

,

Habermas chides Adorno for not developing

a

theory of

mimesis. Adorno, with Horkheimer, called for being
"mindful" or "remembering" nature in the subject,

a

process which might result in the recognition that the
"truth" of culture and enlightenment is their opposition
to domination 50
.

Habermas asks how the idea of
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reconciliation can be related
to the "mimetic
impulses" in
a way that is not
merely
intuitive.

Can this idea be
not simply through an
attitude of "mindfulness"
but discursively, in the
form of a concept.
The problem
is that the reduction
of a mimetic impulse,
which is the
foundation of a concept of
reconciliation, to
a

specifiable meaning is the
reproduction of the activity
of
identifying thought itself.
To define mimesis is
to
return the subject to the bonds
of instrumental reason.
Habermas distinguishes between
Marcuse and Adorno on this
point with reference to their later
works. Marcuse
attempts to escape the paradox,
while Adorno
"no longer

wanted to get out of this

a P oria."51

By embracing the

paradox Adorno is only able to
"gesticulate" toward
expressions of the truth in autonomous
art,

since the

truth cannot be represented directly in
philosophical
discourse. Because the truth of the mimetic
relationship
is non-conceptual

m

,

negative dialectics becomes an exercise

"models" that gesture toward what lies outside

themselves.

When Adorno moves out of "discursive thought"

to the "mindfulness of nature,

"

Habermas charges him with

abandoning the "goal of theoretical knowledge" and

interdisciplinary materialism" originally articulated by
Horkheimer as the project of critical theory.

This

articulation of the critical theory tradition, as

a

dedication to interdisciplinary materialism, is what
Habermas views as the basis for the authenticity of his
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own project.

His interpretation of
the eariy Horhheiraer
is offered as the source
of legitimacy for viewing
his
theory of communicative action
as an extension of the
tradition.
Be that as it may, Habermas
still goes on to
claim he is reconstructively
following the intentions of
Adorno's more theological, mystical
version of critical

theory
Habermas claims the name "mimesis"
is the name of
what has been destroyed by instrumental
reason.

believes Adorno cannot provide

a

He

conceptual framework to

explain what is lost when instrumental
reason first
dominates nature and then is extended to
the domination of
society and its individual members. Curiously,
Habermas
claims the term mimesis also calls forth certain
intendpH
associations.

It is here that Habermas's analysis

suppresses that which is of the most interest to the
radical ecologist, in order to justify Habermas's own
project.
imitation,

He claims that "mimesis" calls for a concept of

which designates

a

relation between persons in

which the one accommodates to the other, identifies with
the other,

empathizes with the other.

the intended association with imitation,

Habermas claims
and its

implication with interpersonal relationships, cannot be
reduced to the "cognitive-instrumentally determined

subject-object relations."

The mimetic capacity is

impulse and "counts as the sheer opposite of reason.
He then argues that the "rational core" of mimesis can
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only be "laid open" if
there is a shift
shifr to the paradigm
of
linguistic philosophy where
cognitive-instrumental
rationality can be demonstrated
to be properly understood
as Eatl of "communicative
rationality." Habermas
further
quotes Adorno where the latter
is providing some
+-

indication of the relationship
of reconciliation and
freedom, "The state of
reconciliation would

not annex what

is unfamiliar or alien with
philosophical imperialism;
instead, it would find its
happiness in the fact that the
latter, in the closeness allowed,

remains something

distant and different, something
that is beyond being
either heterogeneous or proper.
Immediately following
this quote Habermas asserts, "Adorno
describes

reconciliation in terms of an intact
intersubjectivity
that is only established and maintained
in the reciprocity
of mutual understanding based on free
recognition ." 55
He

then continues his analysis,

increasingly bringing out the

structure of his own theory.

Habermas's explication of the term "mimesis" as well
as the idea of reconciliation is done with an
eye toward

bridging the gap between his own project and that of the
earlier critical theorists.

What is of analytical

importance here is the displacement of Adorno's text at
the hands of Habermas,

elements.

and the resulting repression of key

In Habermas's interpretation of mimesis he

links it to imitation and conceives of this as an

mtersubj ect ivo phenomenon, but
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in the same gesture he

"

excludes the non-discursive
elements of the Idea of
mimesis.
If the point of
Habermas's analysis is more
than
a mere reductivist
dismissal of Adorno's thought;
if
instead it is an attempt at
what he labeled in his
reappropriation of Marx's theory
of historical materialism
as a "reconstruction,"
then it must be evaluated
on its

adequacy to this concept,

a

concept which has become

increasingly central to Habermas's
project as a whole. 56
As represented in Habermas's
work reconstruction
"signifies taking a theory apart and
putting it back
together again in a new form in order
to attain more fully
the goal it has set for itself." 57

if Habermas's

reconstruction of critical theory is to
be challenged, it
must occur from several directions or
levels

simultaneously.
terms,

First,

it must be challenged on its own

showing that it is not adequate to the
tasks it

sets for itself.

Second,

to avoid a charge of simply

repeating the problems of totalizing critique,
and
therefore arriving in the same aporetic fix as Adorno,
an

alternative version of the tradition of critical theory
must be rescued from that supposed dead end.

This might

be achieved by developing those concepts and

constellations within Adorno's thought.

In addition to

the concepts and non-concepts of reconciliation and

mimesis, other terms of importance in this alternative

reconstruction of critical theory will be "exact fantasy,
suffering, nature, history,

and,
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of course,

domination.

"

There is considerable
precedent for this alternative
version of critical theory. 58
It can be viewed
further development of the
immanent critique of critical
theory itself.
it is sympathetic to
the attempt not only
of the early critical
theorists, but the recent
general
trend of contemporary thought
to overcome the "subgectob] ect" dualism attributed
to Western philosophy as
a
whole. Criticism of this attempt
to overcome philosophical
dualisms and their hierarchical
structure is at the heart
of Habermas's general critique
of contemporary efforts of
critical social theory of all kinds,
not only those of the
early Frankfurt theorists.
He expounds on this in his The

^

Bhilosoptucal pisconrsp of Modernity
,

^

condemning all

efforts which have not made the turn toward
the theory of
communicative action, or attempted to complete
the

"unfinished project of Enlightenment." 59

A two step, immanent critique of Habermas can
be
assembled from various sources already unconvinced by
his
efforts.

Habermas can first be charged with unjustly

dismissing Adorno's efforts to develop the concepts of
mimesis and reconciliation.

Rather than viewing "mimesis"

as the opposite of reason and therefore irrational

(thereby repeating the subject-object dualism at the level
of the description of reason itself,

as mind or spirit,

opposed to nature), this term can more adequately be

viewed as a representation of the "pre-rational

.

60

A

more consistent analysis of mimesis would indicate the
114

multiple meanings of the
term that develop from
its early
USe ln

61

The term is used not
only as placeholder for
nature, which comes to
be
dominated by instrumental
rationality, as theorized
in the
work of the early critical
theorists, but alaa as
the
stand-in for the non-dominating
relationship of humans
with nature, a relationship
not reducible to communicative
or discursive conceptualizations.
It is this non-

dominative relationship which the
term mimesis represents
in the work of Adorno.
This non-dominative relationship
is not reducible to a model
based on intersubjective
recognition, as Habermas asserts.
Martin Jay quotes from
Adorno's works on music to develop
this double notion of
mimesis, "Through its pure materiality,
music
is the art

m

which the pre-rational mimetic impulse
asserts itself
irreducibly and appears simultaneously in
constellations
with the march of progressive natural and
material

domination

.

"

62

The attempt by Habermas to reduce mimesis
to

a

"rational core" of communicative rationality is

unjustified.

Adorno argued against the reducibility of

a

non-dominating experience of the relationship between
subject and object to any model based on

intersubjectivity.

Adorno's work is more plausibly viewed

as an attempt to explore the possibility of representing

philosophically the conceptually unrepresentable
experience of non-domination.
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Negative Dialectics and

are more adequately
understood as

explications of a receptivity
to nature or
otherness in
its different forms,
a "sensuous
receptivity" that is
still possible, at least
for Adorno, in the
relationships
of, at least, autonomous
art.
An understanding
of sense,

or receptive experience,

is explicitly

imbed by Adorno

to

the rejection of metaphysical
understandings of the
subject and subjectivity.
it is in the rejection
of the
idea of a constitutive
subject, the central concern
of the
"philosophy of consciousness,"
that Adorno also rejects
a

philosophy which asserts the
possibility for an exhaustion
of meaning by the subject's
self-constitutive activity,
"The concept of sense involves
an objectivity beyond all
'making': a sense that is 'made'
is already fictitious.
It duplicates the subject,

however collective, and

defrauds it of what it seemingly
granted."^
The resurrection of Adorno's
perspective from

Habermas's unwarranted reductivist
termination thus
includes a defense against the further
charges of

mysticism, and any concomitant philosophical
regression.

Habermas believes this regression would be the
unavoidable

methodological consequence of
concept of reconciliation.
the

a

revival of the theoloai ral

From his earliest work, before

dark" turn of the Dialecti c of Enlightenment

,

and the

death of Benjamin, when it would seem that the Kabbalistic
influences on Adorno would be at their most unguarded, he
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explicitly rejected the
metaphysical understanding
of
concepts such as
reconciliation;
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The operations of mimesis
in any possible
humans-to-

nature reconciliation are not
reducible to the conceptual
structure of discourse, regardless
of how communicative
rationality is construed. Neither
can the meaning
resulting from the interpretation
of the non-dominating
experience of subject and object be
legitimately dismissed
as theological.
The complex relationship between
interpretation and the sensuous experience
of the subject,

even that found in the experience of
autonomous art,
cannot be reduced to the traditional
terms of modern
aesthetic rationality, of the harmonious
reconciliation of
subject and object.
The experience of the possibility of
a

non-dominating relationship with "nature" must be

represented very differently;
All making in art is one long struggle to say what
that made object itself can never be and what art
itself can never know: that is what Geist or spirit
means in aesthetics. And this is where the idea of
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Adorno and Radical Ecology
The task facing a radical
ecological entry into the
tradition of critical theory
must take these insights
of
Adorno and build on them.
Included in this project
must
be a critique of Habermas
which can be staged as
immanent
to the tradition of critical
theory itself.
This has been
initiated elsewhere, including
several confrontations with
Habermas by Fred Dallmayr. A few
preliminary gestures can
help set the stage for the more
extensive critique to
follow. The above quotes from Adorno
can be viewed not
only as textual evidence to contradict
Habermas's reading
of Adorno, but simultaneously and
implicitly as a countercritique of Habermas from the perspective
of an

alternative version of critical theory. Dallmayr
challenges Habermas's reading of the "discourse
of

modernity," especially his characterization of
Hegel, and
Nietzsche.
Habermas, rather than having escaped

^

the

"aponas of the philosophy of the subject"

is shown to

repeat the same problems, the antinomies and polar

oppositions, of traditional metaphysics.^

Habermas

concludes his analysis of the discourse of modernity by
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asserting -the difference
between life _ world and
(communicative) rationality
cannot be bridged or
reconciled in modernity. "68
The increasing

differentiation of society
into independent
spheres with
their own logics or
rationalities requires not
the

reconciliation of these
rationalities at the level
of
"worldviews" and the everyday
life-world,

claims Habermas,

instead modern society requires
spheres,

a

"balancing" of the

that is,

the appropriate containment
of the
rationalities of the economic and

bureaucratic/administrative systems (which
are mediated by
money and power, respectively)
.

This "balancing" can be

accomplished through the proper
development of other
spheres of rationality, those of
morality and

aesthetics,

by the formal process of reaching
agreements or consensus
about the respective processes
themselves. Dallmayr
contends that this "solution" is absent
of substance and
fails to provide any support or grounds
which might
motivate participants in these discourses
to even desire
consensus rather than simply continuing the
trend of

modernity toward increasingly instrumental and
strategic
action:

Little or no substantive changes seem reguired
to accomplish this task or to correct
pathological trends.
.As it seems to me, modern
cleavages Ent z we i ungen and pathologies exceed
the capacities of a balancing mechanism.
In
light of rampantly possessive lifestyles and the
predatory thrust of technology, exiting from
.

(

.

)
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shift opening the

Lbject^o^tEs^

These objections can
be viewed, from the
perspective
Of Adorno's negative
dialectics
laiectics, as ^
pointing to Habermas's
entanglement in identity
thinking.
He collapses
•

the

potentials of Adorno's
discussions of mimesis and
reconciliation into a framework
that loses its
substantive
content.
This content can then
be returned
to the

communications theoretic framework
only artificially from
the outside. The theory
of communicative

action repeats,
against its intentions, the
process of metaphysics, of
identifying thought. Nature
maintains its position as
material to be dominated, and
subjectivity is to be
reduced to normalcy, equivalence,
consensus. Nothing
escapes the desire to reduce all
otherness
to the self-

sameness of the identifying subject.
However, having brought Habermas's
theory of

communicative rationality within the
framework of immanent
critique and ideology critique, revealing
its complicity
the logic of domination is not the
same as adequately
addressing his critique of negative dialectics.
Beyond
indicating possible alternative conceptualizations

m

of the

constellation whose elements include mimesis and
reconciliation is the need to address Habermas's charge
of
a

residual "utopianism" which remains even after the

totalization of critique.

This is the real thrust of

Habermas's charges of mysticism and metaphysics, which
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result from his analysis
or
of the earlv
early theorists'
attempts
o develop an
understanding of the
possibility of
reconciliation of humans and
nature in its various
forms.
The concepts of
reconciliation and redemption
required
some vision of a future
society, when conditions

u

of

domination and oppression
would be overcome.
if
instrumental rationality has
extended itself completely

mto

all relations,

to the point of evaporating
all access

to a subjectivity which
could resist,

what can ground the

hope for a future society
of true freedom and
happiness?
What grounds critical theory's
own claims to access
to a
critical consciousness? Does
not Adorno’s position remain
abstractly utopian, relativistic,
aporetic? Previously,
any historical, material critique
found a transformative
or revolutionary subject to
pin its hopes on: "Marx was
able to avoid the charge of
utopianism in his day by being
able to identify the subject of
revolutionary activity
with a class which, he argued, had
the potential power to
transcend conditions of domination ." 70
The genesis of the

Frankfurt efforts was the response to the
aftermath of the
Russian Revolution, the rise of fascism in
Germany,

and

mass culture" in the U.S., all of which seemed
to deny
the possibility of revolutionary subjectivity.
The challenge to radical ecology is to develop
an

interpretive framework that can adequately address the

problems and questions of the tradition of critical
theory, now within the historical context of
121

a

global

ecological crisis.

The fundamental
constellation of "the
domination of nature" and
other concepts and
categories
used by the early critical
theorists must be combined
with
critical categories emerging
under new historical

circumstances.

This process forms a new
constellation;

the radical ecological
subject.

This new constellation

can be viewed as an attempt
to at least partially
answer
the challenge to "succeed
in formulating the
continuities
between human history and natural
history so carefully
that they are weak enough to
be plausible and yet strong
enough to permit us to recognize
man's place in the
1
cosmos
.
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CHAPTER

3

deep ecology and
methodology

Arne Naess and Deep Ecology
Methodology
One of the primary
philosophical justifications
for
the deep ecology aspect
of the ecology movement
comes from
the work of Norwegian
philosopher Arne Naess.
it is his
"deep questioning method"
that forms the basis
of
the

Philosophy of deep ecology and
the origin of the name.
The deep questioning method
has

itself been questioned
by

some of those sympathetic
to the general orientation
of
deep ecology, finding this
justification
for a

"biocentric" or "egocentric"
understanding of human
beings' relationship to nature
inadequate.
One of those
critics, Warwick Fox, has attempted
to salvage Naess's
deep ecology work by emphasizing
instead another aspect of
Naess's methodology, that of
identification.
Fox also

turns to humanistic psychology and
its offshoot.

transpersonal psychology, to provide

a

psychological

justification for the deep ecological
identification with
nature.
However, this too results in a problematic
philosophical position, or in fact no philosophical
position,

a

stance without logical justification,

Fox endorses for strategic reasons.

justification is not in itself

a

a

stance

The lack of logical

disqualification of Fox's

argument, but the consequences for political action based
on a "self" resulting from the adoption of this
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intuitionist method do
create fundamental
problems for any
ecological politics.
The early critical
theorists provide an
alternative
understanding of the relation
of the human to
nature
(subject to object, relationship
and its potential
for an
emancipatory political practice.
With the concept of
mimesis as used especially
by Adorno, it is
possible to
orient a critical understanding
of the relation to
nature
Without falling into intuitionism,
and without being
trapped in the consequences
of a "logical system."

Arne Naess and the Origins of
Deep Ecology
Arne Naess has not published

a

work that explicitly

and exclusively addresses the
methodological foundations
of the idea of deep ecology,
however, these foundations or
as he calls them "fundamentals"
appear scattered
throughout his published work, in other
deep ecologists'
work, and most importantly in a
critical analysis by
fellow "ecocentrist" Warwick Fox.
Fox divides Naess's
idea of deep ecology into three aspects,
the formal,

the

popular and the philosophical, and critiques
each,
attempting to salvage the intent of the idea of
deep
ecology, but in the form of

a

"transpersonal ecology"

based on insights from transpersonal psychology.^

The

"popular" sense of deep ecology is merely the recognition
that a variety of philosophical and political positions

now oppose themselves to the continuation of modern
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industrial civilization as
manifested in its relation
to
the global environment
through multiple examples
of
ecosystem destruction and
species extinction. Naess's
"popular" sense of deep ecology
is contrasted with the
"fundamental" which challenges
the present relationship
to
"nature" more fundamentally
than the "environmentalists"
who continue to desire the
benefits of the modern
industrial society while simply
addressing environmental
problems from within an ideology that
views these problems
as amenable to technological,
administrative or other

existing remedies.

Those who do not question the basic

assumptions of modern industrial society,
but merely
attempt to alleviate its most unpleasant
or harmful

effects on humans, are characterized as
anthropocentric,

reformist environmentalists.

They have

a

"shallow"

understanding of environmental/ecological problems.

Those

who have understood that the environmental crisis

questions the fundamental assumptions and activities of

modern industrial society have taken
of the problems.

a

"deep" perspective

Naess and his most prominent American

proselytes, Bill Devall and George Sessions, believe

anyone who deeply questions existing society's actions and

consequences will come to

a

certain understanding of the

ecological situation, an understanding which includes some
common or general components as well as such specific

understandings as that of the "intrinsic value" of the
richness and diversity of life.
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One general fundamental

would be that the complexity
and richness of the
biosphe re
or planet is severely
threatened, and requires
immediate
actron in response 2 Fox
summarizes, " It is clear
that
the general orientation
that they (Naess
.

and Sessions)

advocate is concerned with
encouragrng a supportive,
liveand-let-live, or symbiotic
attrtude on the part of
humans
not only toward member
of the ecosphere but
even toward
all identifiable entitle
or iooia in the ecosphere." 3
Fox's point in the presentation
of this aspect of Naess's
position is to indicate the extent
Naess is concerned with
a "general orientation"
toward ecological awareness,
leaving room for

multitude of non-dogmatic
approaches to
solving the ecological crisis.
However, the philosophical
and political problems this position
generate
a

cannot be

dismissed by adopting

a

laissez-faire attitude of

tolerance when radically different results
may result from
equally "deep" philosophical or ecological
positions.

Naess's belief that all "deep questioning"
will lead to
roughly equivalent general orientation to
ecological

problems is simply misconceived.

a

Fox demonstrates this

inadequacy in regard to the "formal" sense of deep
ecology
Naess developed.

However,

Fox wishes to retain the truth

of the popular sense of ecology by reformulating
Naess's

"philosophical" sense of deep ecology with the help of

transpersonal psychology.
Fox critiques Naess's formal sense of deep ecology

examining its presentation in both published and
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^

unpublished works by Naess.

Naess's formal sense of
deep
ecology is heavily influenced
by analytic philosophy
and
is established by definitron,
but it is the acknowledged

possibilities for developing
"deep" but ecologically
destructive philosophical
positrons which is the
troubling
aspect of the formulation.
Fox quotes extensively
from
the unpublished manuscript:

”

The difference between the
shallow and the deeo
?
° ne ° f deepness
argumentation
and of differences in conclusions.
in the
shallow movement in favor of
decreasing
pollution and economy of resources,
positions
arG aC
Y assumed valid which are questioned
i
in the deeper movement
1 subscribe to the
hypothesis that when the deeper issues
are
introduced in a debate, the conclusions
tend
towards those of the deeper movement
.... because
going deep" is the essential point, I
recommend
at
P° ln t of view might be characterized as
„
»
deep even if it defended some of the
most
wasteful and socially destructive policies,
namely, if it were derived from a coherent'
philosophy answering deep questions. Whatever
philosophy, whether Western or Eastern, we take
as a starting point, it will not be compatible
with, or at least not suitable for a defense
of,
present unecological policies.

^

^

,

Naess's procedure or method for establishing

philosophical depth is to begin with an intuitively

derived assumption which he calls
"norm."

"fundamental" or

a

a

The details of the procedure are not of as much

importance here as the consequences

.

^

Deep ecology is

defined in formal terms, not on the content or substance
of the procedure,

although Naess believes all deep

questioning will result in the same general orientation
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toward ecological problems.

following challenge;
be no examples

fundamentals].

This leads Naess to
the

am tempted to say that
there will
[of nonecocentric
views being derived from
Serious attempts to find
a deep
"I

justification of the way life
on the planet as treated
today... are doomed to
failure,
what I say is meant as a
challenge; is there a philosopher
somewhere who would

like
Fox takes up the challenge
and asserts> „ It s
my contention, which I
propose to substantiate below,
that
to try?"6

,

Naess

intended meaning, that is, Naess's
formal sense of
deep ecology, does not constitute
a defensible
sense of

deep ecology." 7
Fox then uses Naess's formal
methodology to show that

both anthropocentric and anti-ecological
positions can be
established by positing certain "fundamentals”
that have
at least as much depth as Naess's
intuitive assumption of
Self-realization!"
(The exclamation mark is
the

idiosyncratic sign Naess uses to designate those
"norms"
that serve as the foundation for further norms
and

hypotheses.

This helps explain the name of the most

recognizable of the deep ecology activist groups, Earth
First!

.

)

Fox’s counter examples begin with the two

fundamental norms

"Obey God!

"

and "Evolution!

"

which

result in conclusions for practical action in the forms of

domination of the earth and genetic engineering,
respectively.

8

Since these alternative fundamentals are

in fact actually held by many individuals in existing
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socii
letY '

thS demonst ^tion not
only indicates the
logical
difficulties of Naess s formal
understanding of the idea
of deep ecology, but it
also indrcates the
inadequacies of
thrs sense of deep ecology
for a radical ecological
’

politics.

Fox concludes that the
formal sense of deep
ecology is untenable, and if
the popular sense of
deep
ecology is to be sustainable
it will depend on what
Fox

characterizes as the "philosophical"
sense of deep
ecology.
One of the effects of this
challenge to the
formal understanding of deep
ecology is to question the
term itself.
Since vastly different results
can be

achieved by basing alternative normative
systems on
fundamentals that are equally "deep"
but practically
contradictory, the term "deep" itself

seems to require

rethinking.

The original justification for the

terminology is untenable, depth of questioning,
so is
there any way to retain what has become an
important

signifier in the ecological struggle?

Fox prefers to

abandon the term in favor of "ecocentric ecology,

"

a

term

more directly indicating his belief in the importance
of

transpersonal identification.

However,

if Fox's own

position is shown to be philosophically, logically and

practically problematic, what status does "deep ecology"
have,

and can a more appropriate concept or concepts

replace this radical ecological identity?

Does an

ecocentric or modified deep ecological approach to
"nature" produce an alternative ecological subject, one
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whose different awareness
enables it to respond
in a nondominating or non-destructive
manner toward nature?

Warwick Fox and Transpersonal
Ecology
With the untenability of

the "formal" sense of
deep

ecology.

Fox turns to the
"phrlosophical" sense that
Arne
Naess also developed.
Before examining Fox's
elaboration
of the concept of "transpersonal
ecology" it is necessary
to understand the role of
the process of identification
in
the development or maturing
of what Naess calls the

"ecological self."

Naess claims the process of

identification is at the heart of the
development of the
ecological self, "The ecological self
of a person is that
with which this person identifies.
This
key sentence

(rather than definition)

about the self, shifts the burden

of clarification from the term 'self'
to that of

identification,' or rather 'process of
identification .'" 9

Besides Naess's unpublished work, Fox also
examines
other, published statements of Naess's
understanding of

the relationship between the process of
identification and
the ecological self.

In "Identification as the Source of

Deep Ecological Attitudes" Naess provides an extensive

defense of his understanding of identification 10
.

Naess

claims those in the deep ecology movement have in common

certain concerns and "ways of experiencing nature and

diversity of cultures

." 11

Naess has listed in various

places some of the basic principles of his own deep
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ecological philosophy. This
version of deep ecology
he
calls an "ecosophy, " and
since he claims multiple,
individual ecosophies are
possible and encouraged,
he
labels his own version
"Ecosophy T." central
principles
of Ecosophy T are the
concepts of self-realization,

identification and the Self (with
the capital S)
Naess further develops his
understanding of the
ecological self and its realization
by distinguishing the
deep ecological concept of
"Self" from the

"egoistic,"
utilitarian, or instrumental self,
usually identified in
psychology as the ego.
In opposition to the
egoistic
self, Naess quotes several
passages from various prophets
and teachers to demonstrate his
understanding of

the Self,

passages primarily derived from religious
traditions
especially that of Buddhism. Naess
summarizes the
insights by revealing,

maximum

is,

as

I

"Self-realization in its absolute

see it,

the mature experience of oneness

in diversity as depicted in the above
verse

." 12

Because

of his reliance on these mystical and
meditative

traditions to indicate the intended concept of
the Self

which develops with ecological awareness, Naess feels
it
is then necessary to attempt to indicate the
difference

between the deep ecological understanding of the self and
any mystical state.

Naess rightly notes that the mystical

traditions tend to stress certain aspects of experience
that deny or dissolve the individual self into

"nondiversi f ied supreme whole ." 12
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These mystical

traditions are aiso criticized
from a positivist and
scientific perspective for
their vagueness and
confusion,
describing an experience
that seems to be
unsustainable in
normal, everyday activity.
Naess's understanding
of the
process of identification
necessary for ecological
Selfealization is a self-conscious
attempt to deal with the
objections to the mystical or
meditative conception
of a

non-egoistic ecological consciousness.

The burden of the

position is to indicate how it
is possible to develop
a
"wider self" through a process
of identification that
does
not collapse all distinctions
into an undifferentiated
oneness or wholeness. Naess defines
the process of
developing the ecological self,
"Identification is a
spontaneous, non-rational, but not
irrational, process
through which the i nterest or interests o f
another h.in,

axe reacted to as ou r own int er est or infprp.9

U

"14

This

understanding of identification leads to the
"obliteration
of the experience of distinction between
ego and alter,

between me and the sufferer." 15

it is of course this

claim that generates the problems connected to
the charge
of mysticism.

Naess says this experience of

identification with the other in joy as well as in
suffering,

is only momentary or intermittent,

and retains

the recognition that there are different individuals.

However,

it is exactly this relation between identity and

difference, and the resulting questions it raises about
the possibility for retaining the uniqueness of the
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individual,

and for its potential
for spontaneous or
free
activity, that is central
to so much of
contemporary
radical social theory and
can be found as a core
concern
of the early Frankfurt
theorists.

Naess claims that "shallow"
ecology or
environmentalism, attempts to
explain or explain away
deep, intense or wide
identification as a psychological
function of thpe prro
WTn
_
ego
In western
social science, selfrealization is the term most often
used for the
competitive development of a person’s
talents and the
pursuit of an individual’s specific
interests (Maslow and
16
others ).’’
Instead of understanding
identification
r

a_

'

as

merely the intensification of the
structures of the ego
(which includes "altruistic" activity
that

is little more

that self-interest "rightly understood"),
Naess borrows
from Spinoza to indicate an alternative
understanding of
the self which "strives to develop its
essence."

In this

borrowed understanding, the urge of the self
to "persevere
in one’s being" is not merely an urge
to survive,
but is a

"natural" urge toward "higher levels of ’freedom’
(

libertas

)

.

This is a form of wider identification

which should not be confused with an altruism based on
the

suppression of selfishness, the sacrifice of one’s own
interest for the sake of others.

In the unecological

psychologist ic understanding of altruism there is the
requirement of "alienation" if someone is to act in the
interest of another.

According to Naess, alienation from
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one's own interest prevents
full maturation of the
individual, so altruistic
behavior is immature
behavior.
Alternatively, alienation and
identification with others
should be understood as
opposites. Naess argues

that the

world or "reality" consists
of original "wholes"
which
have become fragmented through
human "development."
Rather than viewing the world
as does the dominant
understanding which asserts isolated
items
or things

become lumped together to produce
recognizable
information, "reality consists of
wholes which we cut
down 1
So for Naess identification
.

is a reversal of our

alienation from the real world and our
true interests,
"In other words: there is not,
strictly
speaking, a

primordial causal process of identification,
but one of
largely unconscious alienation which is
overcome in
experiences of identity ." 19 Furthermore,
the process of
identification is a "natural" process in that
it is the

consequence of the maturation of the individual.

This

understanding of the process of identification, according
to Naess,

is in opposition to the dominant form of

psychology founded on the ego-alter (subject-object)
distinction or duality.

The eco-philosophical necessity

of "altruistic" behavior is eliminated with that

distinction,

"The psychology and philosophy of the

(comprehensive)
a

Self insists that the gradual maturing of

person inevitably widens and deepens the self through

the process of identification ." 20
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This is a strong

statement about (male?,
ontogenetic and phylogenetic
development.
It requires an answer
to the guestion,
-what
makes this maturation
"inevitable" and how is
it, more
specifically, a process of
identification?" a critical
questioning of this position
must address not only
the
status of the various identities
and totalities involved,
but their relationship to
history, to the ongoing
interaction between society and
nature,
and the

transformation of the possibilities
of identification
which have taken place as a
result of historical change.
Naess begins to address this
problem of history and
the conditions under which the
process of identification
can occur: "The notion of maturing
has to do with getting
out what is latent in the nature
of a being.
Some

learning is presupposed, but thinking
of present
conditions of competition in industrial,
economic growth
societies, specialized learning may inhibit
the process of
maturing. A competitive cult of talents
does not
favor

Self-realisation.

As a consequence of the imperfect

conditions for maturing as persons, there is much

pessimism or disbelief in relation to the widening of
the
Self,

and more stress on developing altruism and moral

pressure.

When Naess speaks negatively of moral

pressure he is implying
morality,

a

specific understanding of

that of Kantian morality, with the same

distinctions Habermas makes between morality and ethics 22
.

Naess argues that the emphasis on
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moral solution is

necessary for those who
attempt to solve the
problems of
increasing alienation from
the perspective of
a radical
distinction of ego and alter,
of subject and object.
Kantian inspired animal
rights philosophies call
for moral
action, such as not inflicting
suffering on
animals, not

because of the animal's suffering
itself, but because of
the effect it has on the
human
subject.

As Naess

explains,

"When we decide ethically to
be kind to them, it
should be because of the favorable
effect of kindness on
us-a strange doctrine "23 Naess asserts
thafc
suffering „
is "perhaps the most potent
source of identification,"
.

,.

because of the spontaneous reaction
to the suffering of
other creatures by human beings,
which occurs "naturally"
unless "special social conditions"
inhibit that
spontaneity.

Spontaneous acts of goodness toward the

suffering would not be considered moral
actions by Kant,
but rather would be labeled "beautiful."
Against Kant,
Naess favors the beautiful action over the
moral. ^4
If this appreciation of the beautiful
act as an

indication of deep identification still seems inadequately
defined,

and unsatisfying as a coherent philosophy of deep

ecology,

it is a problem Naess himself recognizes:

The above seems to point in the direction of
philosophical mysticism, but the fourth term,
Self-realisation, breaks in and reinstates the
central position of the individual--even if the
capital S is used to express something beyond
narrow selves.
The widening and deepening of
the individual selves somehow never makes them

144

"

every cell
s

b:?n“
1

f

IT progTaxLTd\T aTlTll™

\o rt^eo r r 0 rthi: g in'aiai g

WhlCh
th e

r

ted

that I^do^ot "f ind that^th
5316 t0
do this in their
contemplation of^h^pair
Y 1Urality
'm unity
but
ho^ 'L
how
As a vague postulate diversities “
it has a Lrifir
3 t0tal view
h °«ever
imperfectly^"
-

-

Even with Naess's faith in
the possibilities of
Self
realization and his insistence
that deep ecology is not
just another form of mysticism,
he shares with critical
theory two views about the
present.
From the deep
ecological perspective contemporary
history

is not one of

"progress" but of catastrophe,

"Human conduct still today

as a pioneer invading species
present

cultural lag.

It is a conduct

(sic)

a catastrophic

systematically

counteracting the process of identification
with its fruit
of compassion and living light on
Earth. 2 ^
This

catastrophic view extends beyond simply

a

cultural lag,

The increasing destruction plus increasing
information

about the destruction is apt to elicit strong
feelings of
sorrow, despair, desperate actions and
tireless efforts to
save what is left.... So far as

I

can see,

the most

probable course of events is continued devastation of
conditions of life on this planet, combined with

powerless upsurge of sorrow and lamentation ." 27
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Ecocentric Remedies
Warwick Fox has attempted
to further develop
the
concept of ecological
rdentrficatron by introducing
the
work of transpersonal
psychology into the deep
ecology
philosophical positron outlined
by Naess, but even
thus

effort retains the vagueness
that gives deep ecology
the
appearance of mysticism or romantic
nature worship.
Fox
examines three varieties of
identification: personal,
ontological and cosmological.
Personal identification is
the familiar form of the
process of identification,
those
people and objects closest to us,
the ones we encounter on
an everyday or intimate basis
that are most readily
assimilated to our sense of self.
Immediate family may be
regarded as essentially part of self
even to the extent
that one’s life may be sacrificed to
protect those with
whom we identify.
Fox rejects personal identification
as
an adequate basis for deep ecology since
it can as easily

produce aggressive and dominating behavior as
nurturance
and caring.
Those or that which is farthest removed from
one

s

identifications may in fact be viewed as

a

threat to

those closest to the self, that is, those furthest
away
will be perceived as the threatening "other."

Although

deep ecologists tend to speak as if their identifications
are personal identifications,

Fox argues that this is

largely due to the difficulties of putting into words the
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Wider or deeper
identifications characteristic
of those
who share the understandings
of deep ecologists.
Fox's briefest treatment
is given to ontological
identification, "Ontologically
based identification
refers
to experiences of
commonality with all that
is that are
brought about through
deep-seated realization of
the fact
things are. "28 F ox states
that ontologicaUy based
identification is notoriously
difficult to

put into words,
but that it is probably a
common experience and one
that
is developed through the
practice of Zen Buddhism.
Fox
also states that Martin Heidegger
has come closest to
putting this sense of identification
into
words.

Fox

emphasizes how this feeling is one
of astonishment or
amazement at "the manifestation of
Being," that, "Things
ire!

There is something rather than
nothing!"

He claims

this experience of the world can be
obtained on an ongoing basis, not just in brief moments
of mystical
rapture.
This on-going experience results in
a "deep but

impartial sense of identification with
all existents."

Quoting one of the leading proponents of the
Heideggerian

version of this deep ecology, Fox notes that this
experience leads to
to let beings be,

a

certain type of action, the tendency

to let them take care of themselves in

accord with their own natures. 29

But Fox explicitly

associates this form of identification with mysticism,
first by quoting Wittgenstein on the meaning of the

mystical, and then by indicating that the experience
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itself can only be
obtained through what
are generally
considered mystical
disciplines,
one seriously wishes
to pursue the
r^-F
question of
ontologically based
identification then one
must be prepared to
undertake
arduous practice of the
kind that rs associated
with
certain kinds of experientially
based spiritual
30
disciplines
i

.

The third basis for deep
ecological identification
is
cosmology which for Fox
is closely related
to ontological
identification but allows more
people into the deep
ecological household, including
those who come to deep
ecology by way of the science
of ecology:

Cosmological ly based identification
refers to
experiences of commonality with
all that is
r
bOUt
9
r<
h ^ep-seated^eanzaiion^f
fa ct that
fact
tha? we and all other entities
are aspects of a
single unfolding reality.
This realization can be
brought about through the empathic
incorporation of
any cosmology
This means that this realization
can
be brought about through the
empathic incorporation
of mythological, religious,
speculative
philosophical, or scientific cosmologies 31

“

T

.

Central to this cosmological identification
is the
idea of a "single unfolding reality."
Fox claims
the

insight into the fact of human participation
in the single
unfolding reality is capable of being "provoked"
by

traditions as diverse as "the world-views of
certain
indigenous peoples

(e.g.,

the philosophy of Taoism,

of some North American Indians),
or the philosophy of Spinoza."

In addition to mystical or quasi-mystical
traditions,
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Fox

also beiieves that
modern science provides
the means for
deep ecological
awareness, ..Modern science
is providing an
increasingly detailed account
of the physical
and
biological evolution of
the universe that
compels us to
view reality as a single
unfolding process .'' 32
Fox prefers the
cosmologically based form
of
identification because
ube or
of its aHvanbo
advantages over personal
or

ontological identification.

Personal identification
as

a

basis for deep-realization
of the single unfolding
process, has a tendency to
lapse into egoistic

identification where that which
is closest and most
like
one's self is defended at the
expense of that which is
most different from one's ego.
Family,

friends,

fellow

countrymen will receive the benefits
of identification,
while nature, especially in its
non-warm, non-fuzzy,

forms
are more likely to be not only
undefended but positively
dominated and exploited. However,
personal identification
still provides the model for much of
the language of deep
ecological identification.
Ontological identification,

wonder at the fact hhat the world

is,

does not provide

much ground for communication of the
individual's
experience of identification with the rest of
nature.

Cosmological identification on the other hand, general
accounts of how the world

is,

are able to be communicated

symbolically, that is, cosmological identification can
be

communicated through

a

range of traditions,

from "the

communication of scientific, speculative philosophical,
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religious, and mythological
views to the communication
of
vivud visual images such
as mandalas and the
kinds of
images that have been
presented here in which
entities
have been conceived of
as leaves on a tree. "33
Fox
ompletes his plea for a
transpersonal ecology by
claiming
that

In terms of politics and
lifestyles,
transpersonal forms of identification'are
e
1
Cti
that tSnd t0 pr ° mote the
?”?“Ied^
ireedom of an
all entities
to unfold in their own
* °£
kind lnclude "°t on™
actant that
treadin g lightly" upon
the earth M
;
(i.e., lifestyles
of voluntary
simplicity) but also actions that
respectfully
but resolutely attempt to alter
the views and
behavror of those who persist in
the delusion
that self realization lies in the
direction of
dominating the earth and the myriad
entities
with which we coexist. ^

T

Negative Dialectics and Identity
This overview of the "methodological"
basis of the

philosophy of deep ecology indicates three
areas needing
critical reflection.
First, as Fox indicates,
the deep

questioning method does not result in uniform
conclusions
about the actions individuals should take in regard
to

nature and other human beings.

This results in Fox's turn

to the idea of identification which Naess also
proposes as
^

fundament al aspect of deep ecological awareness.

Expanding on this insight, Fox proposes that "cosmological
identification" is the most adequate means of achieving
the necessary ecological awareness for addressing current
150

ecological crises.

Finally,

among the forms of

cosmological identification
which "might" supply
the
epistemological basis for
a more adeguate
an ecocentric
transpersonal ecology,

deep ecology, or

is modern science
critical examination of
the adequacy of
transpersonal
ecology must examine
more closely, more
"deeply,
Fox s
claims about identification
and more specifically
the
relation of identification
to modern science.

A

'

'

Theodore Adorno’s "negative
dialectics" offers an
alternative approach to the
concerns of the deep and
transpersonal ecologists, which
is more consistent
philosophically and addresses the
problems
of the

relationship of access to knowledge
to identity formation
at a deeper or more
self-reflexive level. Neaativp

M^ti^ was

the title of Adorno’s last
completed full
treatment of the problems of philosophy
and specifically
of the situation of the human
domination of nature.

Negative dialectics was an attempt to
develop

philosophically an approach to the relationship
of
cognition or awareness to "nature," yet
seeks to

understand that relationship while still
honoring the
difference or uniqueness of that which is
not

the subject

of cognition.

In the deep ecological language this
was an

attempt to understand "identification" without
reducing
the object of cognition to a mere manifestation
of the

constitutive power of the subject.

Negative dialectics

rejects the Hegelian solution to the contradictions
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tween subject and object,
between human subjectivity
and
nature, that manifests
itself in a dialectical
reconciliation of subject and
object, in Absolute
Knowledge and the Absolute
Subject.
Negative dialectics
rejects the claim that the
negation of the negation
is
positive, that is, that the
outcome of the struggle
between the subject and
object is harmony
or

reconciliation, at least not
not- in the
actual world in which
we live.
The idealist reconciliation
occurs only

m

abstractly leaving the actual
conflicts and contradictions
of everyday life unchanged.
The deep and transpersonal
ecological approaches, at
least in their philosophical
representations, present an
understanding of the process of
identification which very
much resembles the Hegelian or
idealist solution of the

problem of the alienation or contradiction
between humans
and nature.
When identification of the self with
the

world is viewed as an identification
with
this results

m

larger Self,

philosophical difficulties corresponding

to those typical of idealism.

m

a

Naess and Fox realize this

their attempts to rescue the concepts of
individuality

and diversity from the tendency of identification
to

collapse into identity, the lack of differentiation

between the particular beings or entities of the world.
If identification with the world results in
a reconciled

Self,

it has the philosophical and political implications

of a totalizing perspective and possible totalitarian
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The uni

™3s

or essential drfference
of that
which is not the self,
or the subject, may
collapse into a
mere manifestation or
of the self.
r
SP lf
Fok attempts to
address
thiS
diSCUSSl °" of "Personal"
identification and
its difference from
cosmological identification.
Personal
identification tends to result
in all those behaviors
associated with "possessive
individualism, - the desire
to
control and dominate that
which resists reduction
to self.
Fox also points out the
frequent use of the language
of

^

personal identification even by
those who might be
cosmological ly identified, but he
fails to explore this
beyond the simple recognition of
the utility
of using

familiar terminology to explain
the concept of
Identification.
The necessity of using the
terminology of
personal experience is a clue to the
problem
of

cosmological identification.

The examples Fox uses to

explain the idea of cosmological
identification, Buddhism,
Taoism, modern science, all have a common
tendency which
makes them cosmological, that is, they tend
to collapse
the individual or particular into the
general or

universal.

The felt necessity to use the terminology
of

personal identification is an indication of the only

partially acknowledged philosophical inability of
ecocentrism to provide an adequate response to the need to
give full credit to the particular and individual.

Personal and cosmological identification are in tension

because they tend to result in the opposing tendencies of
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individualism and totalism
or holism.
The means of
ecological identification
described by Naess and
Fox,
either religious or scientific,
lack the conceptual
distinctions necessary to
fulfill the task of
generating
ecological awareness, especially
the establishment
of

critical ecological consciousness
capable of an analysis
of existing social,
economic and political
structures
which would enable coherent
radical ecological practice.
Instead of mystical religious
traditions, positivist
science, or psychologism, what
is required is a means
of
interpreting the relationships of
subjectivity and
objectivity that can represent the
full richness of those
relationships without sacrificing the
human subject to a
fateful nature or making nature a
mere material for
domination and exploitation serving the
aggrandizement of
the ego and humanity.

Negative dialectics is an attempt to honor
the
particular, the unique in the other, through
a

philosophical interpretation of the relationship
of

subjectivity to nature, including the fact subjectivity
is
one manifestation of the objectivity of nature.

Adorno's last two major works, Negative

Aesthetic Theory

,

Pi a

1

prf

In
i

<-*

and

he attempts to accomplish what Fox and

Naess seem to be striving for;

a

way of interpreting the

situation of human beings in the world in

a

way that

provides opportunities to resist the prevalent,
hegemonic,

"

ideology of domination which has resulted in
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the increasing destruction
of external nature
and the
crippling and sufferrng
of human beings, both

physically

and 'psychologically...

One of the major
difficulties in
confronting negative dialectxcs
is Adorno's necessary
insistence on the impossibility
of reducing philosophical
interpretation to a single
fundamental or principle.
According to negative dialectics,
the analysis of the
"object" under consideration
must be given full

recognition of its uniqueness,
difference, or otherness,
but, in the tradition of
dialectical
analysis, this

recognition must also acknowledge
the history of the
object, and the history in the
object-those

impacts and

elements of society which penetrate
the object as well as
the interpreting subject.
Interpretation, both negatively
and dialectically, necessarily
results in

layered

a

complex of mediations between the
object and the
interpreting subject. Compounding the
difficulty of
interpretation is Adorno’s assertion (contra
Hegel)

the whole is not rational,

contrary,

is not the true.

the whole is the false,

that is,

that

On the

the world is

not tending to a synthetic resolution of its

contradictions in

a

positive absolute, but rather the

tendency is toward unreconciled catastrophe.

Negative

dialectics is sometimes also called immanent criticism,
immanent contradiction, or non-identity thinking.

Asserting the importance of recognizing the non— identity
of subject and object,

or of word and thing,
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is not to say

that there is no reco
g nitron of the importance
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(or "identification"
for cognition and
for practice,
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ideology, the pledge that
there should be no
oontradrotren, no antagonism.
in the simple
identrfymg judgment, the
pragmatist, naturecontrolling element already ioinq wit-n
joins with a utopian
7 Y
element
element.
io to Z
A is
be what
is not yet
Such
hope is contradictorily tied
to the breaks in
e
orm of predicative identity.
Philosophical
?
traditionshad a word for these breaks:
lQ6dS
4-
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Adorno is making several claims
in this statement
that are relevant for the problems
of identification and
methods" of philosophical interpretation.
To suppose

that psychological or philosophical
identification is
simply a matter of discipline or
technique is to be blind
to the impact of the contradictions
and conflicts of

society which impact those disciplines,
techniques or
methods themselves.
The transpersonal ecologist's
reliance on religious and scientific disciplines
to

generate

a

reconciled ecological consciousness is an

idealistic misrecognition of the place of suffering
and

exploitation present in the world.

It is not possible to

overcome the contradictions of society simply by
individual identification with the world, because the
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whoxe, as the result
Qf
the actions of human
domination which
the beginnings of human
history, but which
were
intensified with industnialization
and capitalism.
(There
are srgnificant differences
between those phiiosophers
of
ecology who attempt to
identify the fundamental
cause of

^

^

ecological destruction with
industrialization itself or
with capitalism as the
dominant mode of production.
Perhaps rather that attempting
to choose between the
two
as to which is more
essential, it would be more
worthwhile
and consistent with negative
dialectics to examine their
interrelationships and see how they
have been linked or
mediated with each other and with
other elements of
identity thinking and its various
forms of material
practice.)
To identify with the whole
is only part of the
process of overcoming the domination
of nature,

since

identification would necessarily involve
identification
with a contradictory whole there is

no avenue to immediate

access to the truth of the ecological
situation.

Naess's

representation of identification as the process
of
overcoming alienation, thereby returning to

fullness-of-

a

experience, or an original,

immediate relation to nature,

is an idealistic and romantic delusion
with unavoidable

reactionary consequences.

Rather than viewing

identification as an avenue of immediate access to truth,
or to "right living" or primordial "dwelling,

"

identification can be viewed as an anticipation of the
157

"not yet" of the

"

utopia" to come, an
existence

unavailabl e in the existing
world,
to exist,

a

nature which has yet

not even in the mythic
past.

This "not yet" can

° nlY C ° me lnt ° belng
throu 9 h the adequate
interpretation

the existing situation,

an interpretation
which

indicates how the other of
nature is repressed, how
suffering manifests itself.
adequate interpretation
would bring this repression
and suffering to
consciousness, as part of the
mediation of the present
fragmented ecological consciousness
with that future world
where contradiction and the ideology
of domination
no

longer exist,

"Utopia would be above identity
and above

contradiction; it would be

a

togetherness of diversity." 36

Adorno agrees that identification may
lead to the
desired relationship with nature, but
he rejects

assertions that the reconciliation with
nature is possible

m

its full sense

m

a

world of suffering and catastrophe:

For the sake of utopia, identification is
reflected in the linguistic use of the word
outside of logic, in which we speak, not of
identifying an object, but of identifying with
people and things.
Dialectics alone might
settle the Greek argument whether like is known
by like or by unlike.
If the thesis that
likeness alone has that capacity makes us aware
of the indelible mimetic element in all
cognition and all human practice, this awareness
grows untrue when the af f inity--indelible, yet
infinitely far removed at the same time is
posited as positive.
In epistemology the
inevitable result is the false conclusion that
the object is the subject. 37

—
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Adorno does not deny
the awareness
generated in the
identification with others,
but he
returns to the

observation that the
process of identification
has the
idealist tendency to
posit in the other the
self or

subject of identification.

The danger is of
projecting

onto the other the
characteristics of the self
and
subjecting the other to the
needs

of the self as an

extension of the process of
the domination of
nature.
Identification can only retain
what is intuitively
perceived as true by retaining
the qualitative affinity
recognized in the process of
mimesis. Adorno
claims

mimesis is a mode of cognition
that allows the possibility
of knowledge without domination.
What is required however
is a comprehension of this
process that goes beyond deep
ecology's mystical practices of
expanded consciousness to
a knowledge that can be
achieved without sacrificing the
uniqueness of the particular, a
uniqueness which makes
every entity an object of ethical
consideration for its
own sake.
Deep ecology and transpersonal ecology
have no

interpretive strategy capable of indicating
right
ecological action even after the broader
identification or
increased ecological awareness has taken place.
Both

Naess and Fox view their position as "non-coercive"

because there is no "necessity" attached to the
attainment
of ecological awareness.

They seem to believe that the

abdication of the responsibility for establishing

a

of mediating between potential intuitive awareness,
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means

coherent PbUosophy,
and
something like a l iberal

^

polltlcal

,

, ^

to i eratlon

£(Jr freg
this laissez-faire
ideology produces
a radical
junction between their
individual advocacy
of
ecocentric views and
their belief in the
necessity of a
heightened ecological
awareness.
They each provide
arguments for the benefits
of identification
with the rest
of nature, and an
intensified need to defend
the Self from
the destruction of
existing society, but
then provide no
basis for this link except
an ambiguous hope
that the

instead,

Self-identifying individual
will choose the deep
or
transpersonal ecological path.
Both contend that
there
will continue to be
conflict, even among or
between those
who have achieved ecological
awareness.
However,
Fox

seems to argue that this
"necessity'' of human nature
can
be overcome even against the
evidence of the ecological

crisis itself,

Understanding this fact [the
transpersonal
understanding of the self] enables
us to see why
a
S nal
C 10giStS reject approaches
that issue
"
i^ ”
moral
r
hf »
oughts"...
and why they do not attempt to
Corre tness of their views in
such a way
that thp? conclusions
^
are morally binding on others
Tn
£
In both
cases, the reason is that they
are not
interested
supporting approaches that serve to
reinforce the primary reality of the
narrow,
atomistic, or particle-like volitional
self.
For
transpersonal ecologists, given a deep
enough
understanding of the way things are, the
response of
emg molined to care for the unfolding of
the world
all its aspects follows "naturally"--not
as a
logical consequence but as a psvcholocri ca

^

m

m

i
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unfolding

(developraen^^aSring)

“f

Never mind that the
world
oria seem,
seems eto contradict
this
assumption of the
relationship of human
maturation to the
lre t0 031:6 f ° r
natUre
NeV6r mind tha t
modern western
x
osophy, rncluding the
P
Habermasian version of
critrcal
theory as well as most
versions of ecosocialism,
which
vrew maturity as the
increasing ability to
form abstract
moral concepts and act
rn a specifically
moral world of
where non-human nature
can only be
'

^

"maturely"

as an object for
technical control and
human use 39
.

At least Naess has the
intellectual integrity to
recognize
the dilemmas of hrs
position, "The above seems
to point rn
the direction of
philosophical mysticism...."
And even
though he attempts to
reinstate the centrality of
the
individual with the fundamental
"Self-realization!" he

realizes he has not made an
argument for this position,
merely asserted a hope, "The
widening and deepening of the
individual selves somehow never
makes them into one
'mass

What is needed is

a

coherent explanation of

the links between identification
with others and

philosophical and political positions
that use the
insights thus generated as a basis for
a practice that can
halt and reverse the tendency for
ecological
and social

destruction and catastrophe, not

a

speculative hope in

questionable process of "natural" maturation.
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^

CritlClsm or negative
dialectics begins with
e object of
interpretation and attempts
to weave a
conceptual net that suspends
the object "momentarily,
to
reveal the process it
contains, including
that to which it
is potentially becoming,
In the historical
situation
that

is the culmination
of destruction
nnu where
w
ction and
neither the

individual" nor "nature" truly
exi st, uh
y exist
the process of
identification
the here and now does
not lead to the
truth of the ecological
situation but to an
indication

m

its negative existence,

understanding of
and nature.

of

the absence of an adequate

reconciled subject and object,
history
What is possible is not an
immediate access
a

to original nature,

or ecological truth,

but the awareness

that true nature would be
radically otherwise than it is
at present.
What is necessary is not simply
a mystical

identification with nature and

a

subsequent defense of its

"essential" characteristics as established
by personal
assertion or scientific certainty, but
an interpretive
strategy capable of grasping the contradictory
and

antagonistic world in its complexity.
yn Negative Dialectics Adorno proposes
a theory of

philosophy which attempts to do justice to the nonidentical,

to that which is not the subject.

The

challenge for radical ecology is to interpret this theory
and its context,

the critique of philosophy and its

application to aesthetics, and translate it into

a

ecological understanding and interpretive strategy.
162

fully
One

Of the aspects of
Philosophy closely
related to Naess's
deep ecology which
Adorno addresses is
that of
intuitionism, specifically
that of Bergson.
Again, the
problem of intuitionism
is its attempt to
attain immediate
insight Without the help
of philosophical
interpretation:

m

to exist
fact as an archaic
rudiment of
mimetic reactions, what
preceded
its nast h u
a promise beyond
dS
the ossified present
nS
UCCeed ° nlY desul torily,
however
Evert r°
f
" ncluding
^rgson's
own
need^
the
® rat
i° nal ity he scorns,
rationali?v
and needs it
preciseiy at the moment of
Absolutrzed duration, pure concretion
becoming, the pure
would re coil into the
timelessness
C
meta P h ysics since Plato
and
a Aristotle.
Aristotle
He did not mind that the
thina
he groped for, if it is not
to remam
,
IS Visible solely with the
equipment of
reflection upon its own means,
and
that it grows arbitrary in a
procedure
unrelated, from the start, to that
of
cognition.

^

Adorno is asserting the necessity
of philosophical
interpretation of the experience of intuition
and of

reflection on the interpretive process
itself.

So,

even

if intuition does contain the truth
related to the

continuation of mimetic possibility it only
escapes
idealist metaphysics and its consequent abstraction
of
insight from its socio-historical context through

reflection on its own possibility.

If ecological

awareness is going to go beyond mere affirmation of the

existing ideology of domination, whether as reformism or
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in more brutal
authoritarian
hontanan forma,
-f

then deep ecology
must
naive belief in
immediate access to
the
truth of nature. The
problem for radrcal
ecology i s to
develop an interprets
"method" which results
in an
ecological understanding
of the relatronshrp
of society
and nature that grves
full credit to the
non-identical as
«ell as the contradictions
of existing society.
This
becomes even more challenging
when consideratron is
given
to the various critiques
of Adorno's critical
theory which
explicitly rejects the orthodox
interpretation of the
possibility of the revolutionary
subject, a subject

-ve

beyond

a

corresponding to the actually
existing members of the
industrial proletariat. An
additional problem to be
included in these considerations

are those interpretations

of Adorno's alternative
conception of a resistant

subjectivity which assert that he
fails to provide an
adequate conception of an alternative

subjectivity, or

that he retains it only in the
form of isolated

individuals dedicated to the "esotericism"
of aesthetics
and critical thought. Besides these
problematic relations
to the possibility of critical
practice there is the

question of the suitability of Adorno's
position for the
ecology movement. After all, Adorno was
dedicated to the
immanent critique of philosophy and aesthetics,
"cultural
forms,” and rarely addressed what are now seen
as
the

primary concerns of the ecology movement, those much
more
physical,

apparently less "cultural," phenomena such as
164

acid rain,

toxic wastes, and vanishing
species.
If
Adorno's critical theory is
to provide a potentially
adequate interpretive framework
for radical ecologists
it
must yield two possibilities
most of its critics deny
it
is capable of; a revolutionary
subject beyond the

contemplative individual, and,
closely related, an
interpretive structure which neither
evaporates into
mysticism nor simply imposes idiosyncratic
judgments on
its object of analysis.
The encounter between Adorno's
critical theory and
radical ecology must then engage the
two areas of

subjectivity and politics.

What are the insights and

limitations of the deep ecological or transpersonal
subject or Self, and how might deep ecology
and critical

theory cross-pollinate to produce

a

more adeguate

interpretation of our ecological situation?

How would

this new, potentially revolutionary, ecological subject

interpret specific or particular claims previously made
about how to proceed in addressing the problems of the

collapse of the global ecosystem to the extent that the

planet may not be able to support human life?

Even more

specifically, how would a radical ecology informed by

critical theory address the deep ecology proposal for

increased wilderness preservation and its struggle with
the ideology of economic growth?
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CHAPTER

4

DEEP ECOLOGY and
subjectivity

The deep,

transpersonal, or eoocentric
ecologists
represent the self as the
key to answering
various
ecological problems, including
the general or
overall
ecological crisis which is
also believed to be
a crisis of
thS SPlrit
A Central difficulty the
ecological self or
subject faces is in the
relationship of its general
or
universal perspective to the
uniqueness or particularity
of individual entities.
Can the ecological
identification
the ecocentrists argue for
provide the level of ecological
awareness needed to reverse the
problems of ecological
destruction and at the same time
honor the uniqueness of
individuals? Both Naess and Fox
recognize the potential
problem of a self-identification which
identifies with
nature generally but then cannot be
linked with the needs
of individual entities except by
appealing to a process of
"natural maturity" the ecologically
identified self (Self)
-

undergoes.

A critical examination of this position
must

question the status of this natural maturity
and the more
generally held belief in some teleologically
directed
universal process of development of human beings.

problems associated with

a

The

belief in teleological human

development should also be examined in the context of the

problematic theories about the processes of
identification.

This examination can be carried forward
169

by addressing several
specific questions
resulting from
these problematic
beliefs.
First ls the question
again Qf
the possibility of an
immedrate access to
knowledge
achieved in the process
of identification.
i s not the
identifying self, as well
as that wlth which
identifies, marked by the
contradictions and conflicts
of
society, so that identification
does not give

^

Mediate

access to an originary
truth of pristine nature?
An
alternative more socially and
historically situated
understanding of the processes
of identification would
then present, at best, an
opportunity to critically
examine the mediations between
society and nature at
various levels.
This would result in the
need for a
theory of society as much as an
understanding
of

ecological science.

Second,

to what extent is the claim

of universal identification
and natural maturity the claim
of a specific class, race,
gender, and so forth? Deep

ecology has already been criticized
for its assumptions
about gender, and it is important to
reemphasize this
critique and extend it to include an
encounter with the

perspective of negative dialectical or non-identity
thinking.

Finally, Naess limits the ethical or moral

implications of the process of identification with
the
wider self of nature by returning to the idea of
the need
for individual self-preservation based on a theory
of

vital needs.

What is

a

vital need and how might vital

needs change historically and in response to the
170

o

development of indivi
ndividuals and ecosystems?
i s there
escape from the trsnn^
traditional problem of
distinguishing
between true and false
needs?
n

Critique of Self-identification
Various authors have
challenged the deep
ecology
understanding of identification,
putting into question
the
type of self or subjectivity
assumed by these radical
ecologists.
Tim Lube has challenged
the deep ecology
understanding of subjectivity
by, in part, relying
on the
insights of Horkheimer and
Adorno and the tradition
of
critical theory 1 Deep
ecology depends on
.

the two

fundamental values of
"self-realization" and "biocentric
equality, " and it is the
process of developing an
ecological awareness of these
fundamental values and their
resulting consequences which
Luke critiques.
Luke claims
the deep ecologists take an
anti-Enlightenment stance

which includes anti-industrial,
anti-technology (neoLuddite) and neo-primitive elements.
His final judgment
of deep ecology is that it is
deeply flawed, projecting an
idealized reconciled humanity onto
nature, and implying a
need for what could become a "new
discipline
of ethical

surveillance (self-administered by the
subject in Taoist
meditation, Buddhist self-in-Self introspection,
and

mythic Native American purification rituals)
to
reconstitute human subjectivity within natural

subjectivity ." 2

The question here is whether the deep
171

ecology insights can
be preserved ±f
VaUd 3 r6SCUlng ° f theSe
''

^Whts

^

_

not by means of the

Phiiosophy of deep ecology,
but with an extended
critical
theory based primarily
on the
work of Theodor
Adorno.

Luke summarizes the deep
ecologrcal project, "By
citing new norms to
constrarn humanity's
destruction of
the ecosphere, deep
ecologists aspire to overturn
the
Enlightenment schema underpinning
advanced industrialism's
instrumental rationality.
In adopting examples
they see
primal cultures, deep
ecologists believe they
can
effectuate Nature's reenchantment,
the development of

m

nondominating sciences, and an
emergence of a new
ecological society by creating
new forms of human
selfhood ." 3 The development of
a nondominating science
was of course at the heart of
the Marcuse-Habermas debate
and a basic reason for Habermas's
rejection of Marcuse's
call for a "logic of gratification ." 4

The epistemological

status of science is also related
to Habermas's charge
against Horkheimer and Adorno of mysticism,
since Habermas
sees no other possibilities for science
to relate to

nature than through technologies that are
fundamentally
tools of domination.

The relationship of a non-dominating

radical ecological version of science, the
"reenchantment"
of nature and its affect on new forms of
"selfhood," can

be addressed within the context of Luke's critique
of deep

ecology by way of

a

critical response.
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George Sessions and
extend Naess’s ’’ecosophy,

idiosyncratic assertions,

Bin
”

Devall have

^^^

beyo „d its sometimes
in an attempt
to develop the

common themes" of deep
ecology.
0 ne of Luke s
fundamental critici1SmS
qmq n-f
°f n
d6ep ^ological
subjectivity
n0t mSet
.

^

^

is

-

-present a radical new
orm of ecological
consciousness, but instead
should be
seen as merely replicating
many of the
characteristics of
modern individualism,
and that the assertions
about

possibilities for the development
of this ecological
consciousness are in fact
class based.

His central

criticism of the deep
ecological understanding
of the
self, or subjectivity,
focuses on its
reliance on

questionable means for attaining
this subjectivity, not
the goal of elimination
of the prevailing worldview
of
present society with its
instrumental rationality and
domination of nature. Whether
using the deep questioning
method, Taoism, Buddhism, or
other traditions for raising
personal consciousness, the deep
ecologists
seem to be

open to the objection that they
have abstracted these
traditions out of their social-historical
context.

This

seems to be true of the appropriation
of the religions,
and of Native American peoples'
beliefs and ritual

practices.

This abstraction has two consequences:
first,

fails to acknowledge the authoritarian
societies the
traditions developed within and reinforced;
second, it is
it

not at all obvious how these traditions
and rituals.
173

especially tho

„

ot "primitive"

^

“"temporary social
conditions.
ThS hSart ° f thS

the deep ecology
understanding ot subjecfrvlfy
rs the lack ot
an adegnate
reatment ot the relationshrp
between history and

nature
the deep ecologist
progects the need tor
liberation onto "Nature"
and in so doing
projects
what is actually one
particular aspect of the
ecosphere
(the human) as the
expression of the whole
of nature
This is comparable to
the Marxist understanding
of false
consciousness, where the
bourgeois or capitalist
class
asserts that its class
position has achieved the
truth of
history and is the
representative of the progressive
development of history, and
which manifests itself
in

^ims

various specific forms including
that of the nation-state,
private economy, individualism,
and so forth.
The
falseness of the assertion, its
status as ideology, is the
result of mistakenly taking the
particular as the
universal.
in the bourgeois idealism
of Hegel,

reconciliation of subject and object,
or society and
nature, becomes metaphysical when
development
of the

dialectic between the two opposing
phenomena achieves its
ultimate realization in subject-object
identity,

Absolute Subject.

the

Luke claims the deep ecology philosophy

repeats this ideological construction in
two ways.
is class based,

but,

in addition,

it is an expression of

the particularity of the human species,
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It too

it is

"anthropomorphic," the nir-im =
uitimate s lgn of faii
ure for d
ecological ethics
r„v
n
LUke surr|marizes this
conclusion.
Nature in deep ecology
simply
Y becomes
COmes a new
transcendent
_
identical subject-object
to redeem humanity.
By
projecting selfhood into
Nature, humans are
to be saved by
mg their self maturation and
spiritual growth in
it.... Nature, then,
becomes ecosophical
humanity's
alienated self-understanding,
partly reflected back
to
itself and selectively
perceived as self-realization,
+-

.

,

m

rediscovered in biospheric
processes. *5
takes its most "alienated"

This process

form in the return to
Gaia

mythology where the earth
is viewed as
self-regulating
meta-subject.
Perhaps the
issues involved can be

Clarified, and an alternative
conception of the
relationship of society and
nature be advanced, by
examining the manner in which
Adorno approached a
fundamentally similar philosophical
and political riddle.
An examination of Adorno's
understanding
of the

relationship between society and
nature, or history and
nature, indicates the continuity

of his thought throughout

his years as critical philosopher.

particular,

Two works in

the essay "The Idea of a Natural
History" and

his late work Negative Dialectics
reveal a consistent

theoretical position in this fundamental
area.

The

argument for this continuity and consistency
in Adorno's
work was first put forward by Susan
Buck-Morss. 6
Adorno

begins his exploration of the relation of nature
and
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hl
a

7

Y

^

diStlngUiShl

«tory of nature"
science,

-y

-

hl » understanding
from those of

or a nature as
simply an object fQr
However, I do not
overstep myself if i

that the real intention
here is to dralectically
overcome the usual
antithesis of nature and
history.
Therefore, wherever I
operate with the concepts
of nature
and history, no ultimate
definitions are meant,
rather I
am pursuing the intention
of pushing these
concepts to a
point where they are
mediated in their apparent
difference. " 7 For Adorno
then the concepts of
history and
nature interpenetrate and
can only be developed
in
a

process of analysis. However,
as

a

preliminary

approximation of the difference,
Adorno strongly
associates the status of nature
to that of myth,

"The

concept of nature that is to be
dissolved is one that, if
I translated it into
standard philosophical terminology,
would come closest to the concept
of myth."
This

understanding of the concept of myth
means "what has
always been, what as fatefully arranged
predetermined
being underlies history and appears in
history;
it is

substance in history." 8

Then of course it becomes

necessary to more fully explain the relation
of nature and
history, "History means the mode of conduct
established

by

tradition that is characterized primarily by
the

occurrence of the qualitatively new; it is

a

movement that

does not play itself out in mere identity, mere

reproduction of what has always been, but rather one in
176

which the new occurs;
it is a movement
that gains its true
character through what
appears in it as new "9
‘“J s
understanding of history
as a relationship
to the
ls
the basis for its
distinction from myth,
and can he viewed
as central to what
will become negative
dialectics and its
criticism of Hegelian,
Marxist and Heideggerian

L

Philosophical positions

Por example,

in the section
of

on "Natural History"
Adorno uses Marx

against dogmatic Marxists
to extend the critique
of Hegel.
After quoting a long passage
from the introduction
of

Capita which includes Marx's

assertion,

"I comprehend the
development of society's
economic formation of
society as
a process of natural
history. .. "U, Adorno
explains Marx's
meaning against the interpretation
of the Marxists,

what

is being argued,

asserts Adorno,

"natural laws" of capitalism.

is the status of the

The "law of capitalist

accumulation" is conceived as an
inevitability of natural
processes, as the "law of nature,"
a naturalization of
history that serves to mystify the
exploitative process of
capitalism.
The reason it can be called a
law by Marx is
because of its appearance to the subjects
of society,
"That law is natural because of its
inevitable character
under the prevailing conditions of
production.
Ideology
is not superimposed as a detachable
layer on the being of

society; it is inherent in that being." 12

these

The status of

natural laws" is not that of ontological

inevitability, but of something to be abolished,
177

a

^

possibilityY bpr^n
q
+-v>
Decause
they are historical
human beings. Adorno

t

th^t- is,
that
made by
<

knows this
LUIS IS
is true
tr„» because of
the
purpose of Marx's workK "Th-iQ
Thls ls confirmed
by the
strongest motive behind
all liarxist
cm
Marxist theory:
ih
that those
laws can be abolished.
The realm of freedom
would no
sooner begin than they
would cease to apply.. .13
For
Adorno then, Marx's concept
of the laws of
capitalism is
used to reveal the workings
of domination, a
process that
has become so extensive,
he argues, that what
is in fact
historical appears to have
the status of the
,

-i

'

''natural."

This fulfillment of domination
is best exemplified
in the
Philosophy of Hegel, where spirrt
comes to dominate all
existence, finally rising to the
status of a "second
nature." But rather than the
unfolding of necessity as
Hegel contends, this is the
formulation of the "bourgeois

consciousness,"

consciousness that views its power
to
rule as an expression of natural
necessity, veiling
a

its

program of self-interested domination,
"Spirit as
nature is the negation of the spirit,
however,

a

second

and that

the more thoroughly the blinder its
self-consciousness is
to its natural growth.
This is what happens to Hegel.

His world spirit is

the ideology of natural history.

calls it world spirit because of its power.

He

Domination is

absolutized and projected on Being itself, which is
said
to be the spirit." 14

Adorno's critical theory is based in

the argument that this domination has extended itself
to
the totality of society,

leaving only fragments and
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marginal existences to
mark t-ho
the possibility
of its
"
" hen
b
consciousness" Resents
1S t0 ltSelf
reVerses the human and
the natural and
mystifies history as fate;

^

^

°—

.

«**••

5t2fi
IS trapped within
fhprof.
itself as its o™' otherness

of idealism.

hT

.» being

“

total.
what
appear
to
?°
Phe
on

eS

The morfr^L^essly
socialization commands all
momenta n f K
interhuman immediacy, the
smaller the capacity
of men to recall that
this web has evolved
the more irresistible
its natural appearance
he appearance is reinforced
as the distance'
S
0ry
d MtUre teeps growing
lrreslstib
Parable of
imprisonment

L

rtSf“

“

^

This leads Adorno to again
assert the reason for
considering the antithesis of
nature and history as both
true and false.
The two are opposites as
a result of what
human beings have done with
respect to nature, dominating
it, making it the "other"
to be dominated, and feared.
It
is feared because it can
potentially overwhelm the

subject.

The opposition is false to the
extent that

philosophy constructs its categories in
such
conceals the truth, the truth that history

a

way that it

is used to

conceal the historical nature of existing
domination and
exploitation.
The unveiling of this requires a critical

interpretive approach to the relationship,

"History can be

considered from two sides, divided into the history
of
nature and the history of mankind.
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Yet there is no

separating the two
sides- 33
as l0ng
i„
as
^ist, natural
rt
„
human hrstory win
qualify each other."
Th i s is
quote from Marx, which
Adorno emphaslzes
dogmatic materialists
"16 Of course the
necessity of
interpretation invites
the question of its
relation to
Practice, especially a
transformative or revolutionary
practice and its relation
to an "ecological
'

^

.

politics. "17
This excursus through
Adorno makes it possible
to
-re fully explore Puke's
objection to the deep
ecological
subjectivity.
Deep ecology points
to the various
religious and philosophical
traditions to legitimate
its
understanding of the process
and consequences of
identification.
Included in the list of
approved means to
larger identification is the
participation in outdoor
activities, including "fishing,
hunting, surfing,
sunbathing, kayaking, canoeing,
sailing, mountain
climbing, hang gliding, skiing,
running, bicycling and

birdwatching." 18

Luke points out that many of
these

activities are those of "industrial
tourism," activities
of overstylized modes of
corporate consumerist
leisure." 19 Many of these activities
require a class
position within existing consumerist
capitalism that
allows for considerable consumption of
leisure time as
well as the physical means of
participation, a position
that could result in the philosophy of
deep ecology being
labeled an "ideology of white-collar
intellectuals or

professional-technical workers" who are simply defending
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th61r PriVUegSd
lifestyles
occurs in such activities

-rely another
even one of

..citizen.,

.

win

The Identification
which

tend not to be that
of

in the biosphere
of equaUty,

or

e q uality in

the sphere of social
relations,
but an identity complicit
with a mode of
production,
consumption, and reproduction
that replicates
systematic
domination and exploitation
of nature in its
various
addition, the knowledge
acquired through the
"reenchantment of Nature" will
not be that of ilme
diate
truth but that which is
mediated through history,
and

through nature's entwinement
with history, as both
Adorno
and Marx indicate.
What is lacking in the
deep ecological
understanding of subjectivity
and its relation to
identification is sufficient
distinction or

differentiation of different types
of self or subjects and
a more concrete or specific
understanding
of the process

of identification itself,

one that does not leave us
with

largely abstract notions of the
self and of nature.
Without an explicit acknowledgment
of the relationship of
the possibilities of self-realization,
or
self-

identification with the means to actualize
those
possibilities, the deep ecology philosophy
threatens to
remain abstract, contradictory and potentially
a

contributor to

a

social situation of intensified

domination and exploitation, all in the name of both
"defending external nature" and "disciplining internal

nature."

Luke questions the practical consequences of
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these adventures of
outdoor self-realization
and
entif ication,
who will make such
goods [composite surf
boards, hang girders,
and eighteen-speed
trail b r kesl or
produce food while others
see* self- realisation
and
biocentri.c equality?"20
Can the deep ecology
philosophy be altered to
bring
about a viable understanding
of the possibilities
of selfidentification with nature?
Or are there such
fundamental
contradictions within the
positron that some alternative
conception of the relationship
of society to nature,
and
Of individuals to society
must be developed?

Different Identities
One aspect of the ecocentric
understanding of the
process of identification that is
most problematic

is its

tendency to abstractly acknowledge
the importance of
history and situation as they relate
to the processes of
identification, but then fail to adequately

take this into

account
occurs.

m

cases where "defense" of nature actually

Marti Kheel has highlighted these problems
by

analyzing deep ecology's claims with the use
of the
primary feminist category of gender. Kheel

argues that

central to both deep ecologist and ecofeminist
thought is
an opposition to "axiological or value theories"
which

attempt to establish universally binding, logically

derived criteria for determining moral values, which
result in systems of rights and obligations.
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Alternatively, both
assert +-u
the need for a
transformed,
ecological consciousness
as necessary for
the existence of
a relationship
tetween society and
nature that Is not one
of domination and
destruction.
Deep or transpersonal
ecologists call for
self-realization,
or Self-

realization!,

in an attempt to
establish this greater

ecological swarsnsss
areness

nQ of the
One
assumptions of this
ri

.

.p

,

,

self realizing identification
°n is
ls that
th^-t- it will
necessarily
lead to defense of the
rest of nature as a
process of
"natural maturity.
Kheel argues that the
deep ecological
i +-

•

understanding of the process
of identification is in
fact
a masculine process
of identification with
potentially
destructive consequences for
nature, thus revealing the
inadequacy of the deep ecological
understanding of
ecological consciousness.
Kheel claims the difference
between deep ecology and
ecof emmism is their alternative
views of the root cause
of "our environmental malaise ." 21
Deep ecologists
or

ecocentrists view anthropocentrism as the
root of
ecological problems, while ecofeminists
conclude that it
is
androcentrism, " not humans but "men and the

masculinist worldview" which are ultimately
responsible
for ecological problems.

Kheel traces the ecofeminist

analysis of androcentrism to Simone de Beauvoir and
her
work The Second Sex which provides an explanation
of the

process whereby nature and women are objectified as men
acquire their sense of self.

Kheel also relies on
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psychoanalytic "object relatrons
theory., to explain
how
the formation of male
identity requires

a two-stage
process of disrdentification
with the mother.
identity
formation is not only a
difference or differentiation
of
individual egos but of gender
specific difference.
Dorothy Dinnerstein is cited
as showing how the
male not
only disidentifies with the
mother

and women, but with
the

rest of nature as well.

Object relations theory
explains
masculine development of identity
as a process of

objectification of the other-both
of women, and nature
generally— and the desire of the male
for unity

with the

original mother figure,

a

desire to "reexperience the

original state of union ." 22

whet her the psychoanalytic
or

ecofeminist reduction is adequate
to address the
ecological crisis is itself open to
critical examination,
but what is of interest here is how
this

analysis reveals

the limits of present deep ecology
philosophy 23
.

One of the key assertions of the deep

ecologist/transpersonal ecologists is the consequence
of
identification with nature as a whole. Once the
individual matures in his identifications he will
then

begin to react to nature as one’s self and protect and
defend it both as

a

whole and in its particulars, similar

to how one would tend to act in situations requiring
the

narrowly construed ego's struggle for self-preservation.
The only reason to kill would then be for "vital needs."

As Arne Naess has explained,
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is thab human
be?Sgs
perc™“
Urge other biving
beings have for
self-realisaM
therefore assume a_kind of r-o=.° n and th at we must
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candudL_ to,arris

P ril cl P le °f biospheric
}
sometimes been misunderstood
right has
as ll ning that
needs should never have
human
priori fv
needs.
But this is neve?
intende^LIf Practice, we
have for instance
greater obliaafC,
n l
g
that which is
nearer to us.
This mn
Utlas
whl ch sometimes
involve killing or iniurinn
The
dimensions of
f humans must
compared with vital needs
be
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ther s P®cies, if
is a conflict.
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Naess discusses the
relationships of equality,
identification, killing, vital
needs. and rituals;
This does not imply that
one acts, wishes to
onalsten y can act in harmony
with the
princiol ^
equality.
The statements about
httoU
biospheric equality must be merely
taken as
guidelines.
Even under conditions of
Intense
identification, killing occurs.
The Indians in
f ° rn
" lth thelr animistic
mythology, were
an
h'
eq
llty in principle, combined
with real?,?
;f
realistic admissions
of their own vital
needs.
When hunger arrives, brother
rabbit
UP n the POt
'* brother is a
citizen,
bu^h
f
;
hut
oh, so f
temptingly
nutri t ious --this
exclamation is too easy: the complicated
rituals
which surround the hunt in many
cultures
illustrate how closely people feel
bound to
other beings, and how natural it is
to feel that
when we harm others, we also harm
ourselves.
Non-instrumental acts develop into
instrumental Z!=>

h

d

!

'

.

Kheel's analysis centers on the writings
of Jose
Ortega y Gasset and Aldo Leopold. What these
two have in
common is a love of hunting, the point of the
analysis

being that even those who are killing for sport claim
to
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be deeply identified
wlth the naturg they
naturalness" or inevxtabrlity
of development
or maturity
associated with the
process of identification
„ ith "nature
as a whole," as
claimed by the
deep/transpersonal

^

ecologists, does not in
fact occur.
A i do fold's
relationship to hunting
is of special
interest since he
is
frequently cited in the
deep ecology literature
especially that of Earth
Eirstl, as someone
who had an
especially heightened since
of ecological
awareness
Le °P° ld
developed the idea of
the "land ethic" which
claims human beings
should be "gust
Plain citizens" within nature
as a whole.
if soraeone were
to exemplify the
consequences of radical
ecological
Identification with the whole
of nature it would be
reasonable to believe it would
be someone

-

'

like Leopold.
However, he makes fundamental
claims about the

relationship of hunting and identity:
t:l Ct that findS
delight in the sight and
Dursn?h off game is bred into
pursuit
the very fiber of
e rac e.... the man who
does not like to see,
unt, photograph, or otherwise
outwit birds or
animais is hardly normal. He is
and I for one do not know how do supercivilized,
deal with
im
Some can live without opportunity
for the
exercise and control of the hunting
instinct,
lust as I suppose some can live without
work,
play, love, business, or other vital
adventure.
But in these days we regard such
deprivations as
unsocial.
Opportunity for exercise of all the
normal instincts has come to be regarded
more
and more as an inalienable right.
.

.

.

.
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AS Kheel points
out,

this individual
who seems to
epitomize so much of
what deep ecoiogists
believe is a
strong advocate of
sport hunting, which
seems to be in
C ° ntradiCtl0n t0
the

*Y the deep ecologists
of the necessary
development of concern
for other entities
for their own sake"
as the individual

"Hr

becomes

increasingly identified
with the whole of
nature.
than, a
natural" process
procps^ of
n
m
maturing,

Rather

r

-p

,

the non-destructive,

non-dominating behavior
idealized by the ecocentrists
is
product of social and
historical

1

factors as well as the

vital needs" of the human
organism.
The ecocentric
reliance on a theory of
"normal" development or
maturing
of the individual human
being is in fact a return
to some
notion of an ontological
essence, some "necessary
structure" of "human nature.
nature " This conception
does not
adequately consider the role of
history, of

"socialization," through family,
economics, politics, and
so forth.
What is required instead is an
understanding of
the mediating links between the
process of identification
and the development of an ecological
awareness
adequate to

the problem of destruction and
catastrophe,

"ecological" and "social" forms,
and the community.

in both its

for both the individual

The quote marks indicate the dominant

use of the language which includes
assumptions of identity
and duality, of a nature separate from
history and

society.

Much of the concern of

a

theory of non-identity

or negative dialectics is to emphasize the
impossibility
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“
reverse,

opposite

“*
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ail concepts
necessarily include
their

KheSl eXtendS hSr

“ alysis

„a

m

in
attempt to capture
the sense of deep
ambivalence of those
dedicated to
hunting and killing.
The ambivalence is
generated by a
conflict between the
desire to be one with
nature again,
time to retain what
is uniquely human.
However, what seems to
be uniquely human,
as it is

frequently represented by
many of the heroes of
deep
ecologists, is a characteristic
of those identified
as
male.
Ortega is quoted to indicate
this deep ambivalence
toward the hunt, the animal,
nature,

and self-identity:

can it be other wise,
because man has never really
known what an animal is.
Before and beyond all science,
’’Nor

humanity sees itself as something
emerging from animality,
but it cannot be sure of
having transcended that state
completely ." 27 The analysis
continues with the indication
that this ambivalence is a
result of the yearning for
unity, but fulfillment is made
impossible by the death of
the animal.
In object relations theory
"it is only when
the boy child transforms his mother
into an object that
his identity can be formed.
In a similar way, animals
have become objects in the eyes of
these men ." 28 What
results is the opposite of the deep/transpersonal

ecologists' claim for the processes of maturity
and Self-

identification, the other is not honored for its own
sake.
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but becomes a sacrifice

+-u

the development
of

identity.

(male)

The "merging" with
nature as a whol
whole results in
the death of the nvHrnn
particular animal, "The
sicmi-f-;^
significance of
'
d " Ctl0ri of th *
“‘“1 to 0 bj,c,
tJi

"

“

„ „„

“•

-or. important

animal itself. "29

p vpn those
Even
most closely identified
with
the deep ecology
movement. Bill Devall
and George
Sessions, who have worked
with Naess to develop
a deep
ecology platform, include
hunting as "an especially
useful activity'
fh^-tn
+-u
hat, with
Y
the proper attitude,'
can
help encourage 'maturity'
of the self." 30
Kheel fully understands
the claims by Naess,
Fox and
others that they do not rntend
to sacrifice the
individual
for the sake of identification
with the larger whole
of
nature, but the examples of
Ortega and Leopold make
clear
that the process of identification
cannot be assumed to
result in a natural maturity
assuring the commonality of
purpose among deep ecologists.
This would seem to be a
basic problem for deep ecological
ethics.
Does Leopold's
statement constitute a sufficiently
"vital need" of the
,

'

.

individual human being to justify the
killing of another
being?
Kheel returns to the principles of
object relations
theory to summarize the importance of her
analysis,

"This

preference for identification with the larger
'whole' may
reflect the familiar masculine urge to transcend
the

concrete world of particularity in preference for
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s

something more enduring
and abstract
Ecof
-Ecofeminists
must
prepared to examine
more deeolv
y t-u 6 unconsc ious
drives
that f,
•

•

•

.

.

i

e

.e

,

self that one seeks
to expand. "31
One response to this
argument has been
briefly
attempted by Bril Devall
who directly
addresses Kheel
CritlC1Sm
ThS res P° n
rs framed in regard
to

^

'

history of suppression
of "the erotic" and
the
possibilities for alternative

the

sexual identity.

He argues
that the feminist or
ecofeminist analysis that
concentrates on the difference
between male and female
forms of identification
tends to intensify the
"battle
between the sexes" or the
"sexual problem." Devall
believes the "sexual problem"
cannot be resolved through
the "impact of feminism
and popular sex therapies"
but
instead requires a turn to
"earth-bonding experience. "32

Implicitly criticizing Kheel

's

reliance on object

relations theory, but more
explicitly any theoretical
position related to psychoanalytics,
Devall states,
When psychologists focus more
on human
re ationships than on
relationships which
US
n nonhuman nature, they do
not move
us^nfn
us
into wild ^territory.
We only touch the
surface of the pond if we deny the
empowering
energy of eros and sexuality in the
web of
re ationships of our ecological
self.
Eros can
be expressed through different
sexual modes and
different genders may express eros energy
in
innovative ways. Recalling eros from
banishment
and. integrating it through our
practice requires
moving from our minimal self further into
wild
territory, listening to feelings long
suppressed.
In Marcuse's terms, what is
required is a new radical sensibility that draws

^
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on the qualitative,

y
world of experience. elements,™
33

'

precon scious

Devall acknowledges
that the
ne "nri
m
primary
worlds of
experience" are "nrnh^iu
^
P obably influenced
by gender" and
cites
studies by carol Gilli
gan and others
evidence that women find
rewards in establishing
particular relationships,
rich in texturing
Lur mg, meaning,
m
and
affective layering."34
From
•

^

fchis

u

afc

^

first

on the path to an
expanded understanding
of the
role of gender identity
in any attempt to
develop
a

greater self-identification,
"In our examination
of
different ways to explore
ecological self, it is
wise to
remember the complexity of
relations between gender
identity, sexual roles,
sexual preferences and
socialization. "3^ Howevpr
u
a
cwever, w
what
he presents with the
one
hand he removes with the
other.
There is
v,

+-

no

acknowledgment of the depth with
which gender identity
inhibits some possibilities and
enhances

others, and there

is little acknowledgment of
the extent gender identity

structures all social relationships.

Instead he attempts

to collapse the differences
of gender or sex,

"Both women

and men participate in engendering
new life. Bringing
forth new life is part of the creative
process of sharing
and discovering meaning.
Humans produce or engender in a
larger context, but not alone. Humans
engender because
they are connected, physically, emotionally,
erotically,

with the widening circle of energy.
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feminist argument
that the root of the
"ecologrcal crisis" is
best viewed as
a Product of
androcentric or patriarchal
culture.
He
admits that feminrst
critiques have "provrded
powerful
insights exposing the once
hidden assumptions under
which

modern civilization
operates," but he rejects
what he
an attempt to reduce
deep ecology to a branch
of
feminism.
The feminist argument
is viewed instead
as a
limited concern of interhuman
problems which falsely
pushes nature into the background.
Devall fails to

acknowledge the ubiquity of the
problem of gender identity
for the project of a wider
self-identification,

"Anthropocentrism remains the central
concern of deep
ecology.
The ecological crisis has
complex psycho-sexual
roots.
In this historical era we
can continue
intellectual tasks of uncovering
historical causes of the
crisis and at the same time move
beyond divisiveness to
explore ecological self. ”37 For Devall/
moving beyond
divisiveness means to move beyond the
"sexual problem,"
that is, to put all this intellectually
fashionable

^

feminist criticism and other "intellectual
tasks" in their
proper place and get on with the real business
of

exploring the ecological self, which has merely
incidental
192

or historically
contingent relations
to gender identity.
The real work of
addressing the ecological
crisis, the
movement into the ''wild
territory" involves
releasing

suppressed ontological
possibilities.

SoLgLX^a^

-^ntmcation

with
1 eXls :in,
connections with individual
3
J
live^can de" P ecolo
enter into feminist
9Y
ecophilosophv
H

?

eqUireS
™e;;SlHur
cui^-.f^rnSft^lrc
3 posltlve taskour dichotomy.
3

We need eachCSt-hp
61
ontological insights... Our
1
severe that we cannot wait ontological^risis^” S °
for thfperfect
in e
ectual theory to provide
us with the answers. 38

^

Devall is saying that the
relationship of gender to
identity is of little consequence
compared to a "deeper,"
"ontological" problem of the human
species' destruction’ of
nature.
He seems to imply that everyone
should give up
this foolish intellect ualizing
and go to the woods and get
ecologically Self-identified.
Feminists should be
concerned with the real problems of the
world not these
secondary issues of inequality.

Critical theory has also suffered from
an

androcentric blindness or at least an inadequate

examination of the differences between masculine
and
feminine relationships to the issues central

to critical

theory,

including the domination of nature.

Nancy Fraser

has developed a critique of Habermas's version of
critical

theory that is not simply an addition to the other
critiques discussed earlier (see Chapters
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1

and

2)

.

In

this critique,
Habermas is shown
to have made
unactnowiedqed assumptions
about the structure
o f society
an
about the capacity
of his categories
of analysis to
offer an adequate
interpretive framework
for the project
of emancipation.
Praser argues these
assumptrons, when
lly analysed, reveal
an androcentric
bias in
Habermas' version of
critical theory.
Fraser concludes
with some recommendations
for the drrection
in which a
more adequate critrcal
theory of society would
have to
take;

^Xla^^^he^

that puts them
as"
institutions that, albeit in
different wavs
W ° m n S subordin ation,
since both family
and
and°o?t
Y
official? economy appropriate
short circuit our participation our labor
in the
interpretation of our needs, and
shield
norma^veiy secured need interpretations
from
tacal cont estation
P
what we need instead
is a framework capable of
foregrounding the evil
of dominance and subordination 39
'

Her additional criticisms include
the point that
there is a need to acknowledge the
ways the socialization
process within the family are structured
by gender
identities, and that this has consequences
beyond what
Habermas claims are the major problems of
the welfare

state and its relation to capitalism,

"public sphere

." 40
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family life, and the

Although not entirely on the
same grounds, the
other
theorists associated strongly
with the early Frankfurt
School of critical theory,
Horkheimer, Marcuse and
Adorno,
also suffer from gender
myopia in much of their
analysis
However, Marcuse and Adorno
did address the
status of women in existing
society.
Marcuse even went so
far as to identify the
women’s movement
as one of the

hopes for an emancipatory
political practice.
Adorno
always cautious about asserting
any positive political
program, did provide insights
into women's situation,
which have become central themes
in later developments of
feminism, although not directly
linked to

«

_

his

observations.

Because the final emancipation of women
was so selfevident to socialist programmes, there
seems for a
long time to have been no need to think
through
concrete position of women.... The impossibility the
of
liberating women under the present conditions
is
attributed not to the conditions but to the
advocates
°5,f reec^ om anc the frailty of emancipatory
ideals,
which brings them close to neurosis, is confused
with
their realization.... 4 3
_

'

*-

-

Adorno is claiming that women, as the victims of

a

society of oppression, have been blamed for their status
instead of the blame being attributed rightly to the
social conditions themselves.

One of Adorno’s frequent

targets for criticism was dogmatic Marxism and then

actually existing socialism, especially the Stalinist
version.

The discrimination against women which kept them

from employment in the paid sector and tied to unpaid
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household work did not
protect them from
the oppression of
economic conditions;
®y virtue of her di
production she re tains
0888 of
Certain
ts whlch
characterize the human
u
in the grasp of
society. .She^ ilrllJ'T St entirel V
subject in historical
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The state
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eSCaped the
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stlce masculine society
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h
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Y
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44
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The liberation of women
then does not occur
simply by
moving from unpaid to paid
labor.
The different,
gendered, positions in "exchange
society" are each
expressions of the operations
of the production-

consumption system.

A truly free society would
remove

both types of domination,

"Hope cannot aim at making
the

mutilated social character of women
identical to the
mutilated social character of men;
rather,

its goal must

be a state in which the face of
the grieving woman
disappears simultaneously with that
of the bustling,
capable man, a state in which all
that survives the

disgrace of the difference between the
sexes is the
happiness that difference makes possible ,,4d
Even though the early critical theorists
develop

critiques which offer possibilities for

a

gender sensitive

social theory, and specific comments on the
workings of
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domination and exploitation
with regard to women,
their
positions fundamentally do
not include a nuanced
discussion of the
mediations which would
constitute an adequate critical
analysis.

M

However,

some

indication of the relevance
of an ecofeminist
informed
critical theory may be produced
by a closer examination
of
the deep ecology reliance
on the concept of "vital
needs."
Vital Needs
Deep ecologists,

including George Sessions and
Arne

Naess,

have attempted to move beyond
the simple invocation
for self-realization and wider
self-identification by
providing a list of "Basic Principles"
which,
it was

hoped, would summarize deep ecological
insights after its
more that 15 years of practice, and be
"understood and

accepted by persons coming from different
philosophical
and religious positions." 46 This is a list
of basic

principles, a "platform for

a

deep ecology movement" which

consists of eight points that Naess and other deep

ecologists argue they have in common.

Position number

three includes the statement that "Humans have no right
to

reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital

needs."

The richness and diversity referred to are the

"richness and diversity of life forms" as values "in

themselves" which contribute to the "flourishing of human
and non-human life on Earth." 47

The remaining points or

principles essentially refer back to this idea of vital
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needs

resulting in assertions
Lions that human
h,
population
rSdUCed that public
Policy affecting
economics,
technology, and ideology
must
,

^

'

change,

and

^^^

understand these principles
have an obligation
to try to
directly or indirectly
implement the needed
changes.
The
principles, including the

idea of vital needs,
have been
discussed and explained in
various contexts.
Devall
and Sessions' understanding,
"The term 'vital need'
is
left deliberately vague
to allow for considerable
latitude
judgment. "48 They claim
this need for latitude
judgment is a result of
different climates and
other

m

m

m

related bioregional situations,
including "differences in
the structures of societies
as they now exist,"
for

example,

"for some Eskimos,

snowmobiles are necessary

today to satisfy vital needs." 49
Again,

Luke

critique of deep ecology dwells
on the
implication of the idea of vital
needs for a politics of
deep ecology, "if humans have no
right to reduce the
diversity of life, except to satisfy
vital needs, then
s

what are the standards for identifying
vital needs?" 50
For Luke this brings up basic
questions about deciding
whose vital needs take precedence when
different entities
are
conflict. Are humans allowed to fight
diseases by
killing viruses and bacteria? What about
introduced

m

species which are destroying ecosystems, should
they be

wiped out or are they just part of nature evolving
into
new forms? The few examples provided by deep
ecologists
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s

.

in response to
these types of
questions seem to
Luke to be
orm of ..soft
anthropocentrism," the
smuggUng in Qf
huitisn va. I110
ues at the expense
of other entities,
"People
will continue to
cut and burn trees
6eS
kl11
kill an d
h eat
plants
and animals, or
isolate and kill
kill germs
to fulfill vital
human needs or protect
the integrity
eegn ty of
nf humanly
h
defined
'

.

g

ecocommunities

.After deep ecologrcal
framing, it
appears that a ritual
prayer, the right
attitude of
respect, or compassionate
loving gratitude
.

.

„m

rationalize and legitimate
softer anthropocentric
actions
Luke may be too harsh
in his judgments.

partially

This is

a

product of the selective
quotations he uses to
support his position, quotes
that link diverse
philosophical positions on the
basis of their own self-

identification but which may in
fact be contradictory.
The most philosophically
unsatisfying

versions of deep

ecology are those that attempt
to link it with established
religions such as Buddhism.
Perhaps a more genuine
critique would examine the more
philosophically coherent
philosophy of deep ecology's founder,
Naess, although one

of the primary limitations of
his position,

the cultivation of

a

it is true,

is

tolerant acceptance of anyone who

wants to be included within the deep
ecology tent.
extent Naess, Devall, Sessions, et
al. endorse the

To the

tendency to ecumenical inclusion of all
faiths they are
deserving of Luke’s criticism and closely
fit his

199

“

“

*

“»»«

It Presents
moral visions of what
might be; at ttle
the same f
time, it fails
to outline practicable
means for realising
these
ecologically moral visions ” 52
ions.
Th-i
This conclusion
is in fact
ased on a very selective
sample of "deep
ecologists" and
may not be appropriate
if the more
philosophical and less
mystical versions of the
philosophy are examined.

A closer examination of
Arne Naess’s position
reveals

several similarities to
critical
iho
critical theory,
particularly that
of Marcuse.
However, an analysis of
the critical
theorists’ explicit
expressions of the lints
or mediations
between society, nature, and
the individual, may
serve to
correct some of the shortfalls
of the deep ecology
analysis, extending it and
opening additional theoretical
and practical possibilities.
The place of needs in
an
adequate critical theory of
society, or a critical
theory
of ecology, must be linked
to the possibilities
of

politics and its relation to the
situation of emancipation
or the good life.
An analysis of needs apparently
requires at least two interconnected
approaches.
The

first theoretical necessity is
to acknowledge the

impossibility of predetermining the
content of needs in
situation of emancipated and ecological

a

consciousness.

This results in some acceptance of
the fact that the

establishment of needs must take place within
the context
of need interpretation in something
like a
"public
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sphere

.

Secondly,

™“

for the ecologically
or critically
thS COntSnt ° f nSed
lnt

r"'
e
lstmction

of something

needs" from wants,
wishes
bnes
'

lke .-vital needs"
or "true
fa
or false
needs.

Problem occurs in Marcuse,

l

i

'

The classic critir^i

begin with

4-

u

_
heory
expression of this

s

where

attempts to distinguish
true from false
needs;
n
obj ective conditions°to

b™ U
S

toe^xtent^o^vh

vita^ ZT
lon of

of

T

and poverty,
are^niversallv^r
But as historical'standardsf
th ey'df
lesser)

toil

“t^t

contradiction to theprevad ini
C

“

claS thelStSoriiy
1'

are true and^alsp

31 ''! 5

'

the question °f what

individuals^themseives^but^nly

SS’SS.'E
Adorno,

the

answer.

53^

^™^

^

to

in his essay on "Society"
discusses various

attempts to define society and
its components and finds
them wanting. They tend to
inadequately reflect on the
effects of the processes of
abstraction and reification,
like that of "role playing."

in

one of the scattered

examples of Adorno's idea of the
alternative society of
the future,

he indicates a relationship to
needs, but this

indication is stated, as Marcuse says
is necessary in
existing conditions, in the form of
contradiction;
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e
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idea that everything
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emptiness and abstractness
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that of a shabby
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market
system in
modern-day society
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exchange if he
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?^ h 37 proflt ls his subjective
motivation
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^sf
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Doug Kellner, in an examination
of these issues,
expresses concern with the position
exemplified by the
above Adorno statement.
He believes the early critical
theorists failed to distinguish between
consumerism and
consumption, at least sufficiently to be able
to

acknowledge the possibility of decisions about
consumption
that may not be completely supportive of the
system of

domination and exploitation by the capitalist system.
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This is an attempt
on Kellner's oarr
P rt to move away
from the
a izmg critique,
a move which
allows for the
t-

.

.

activities

cotscptict t, individuals,
develop

„

tu,,„ tein,,.-

_

„„ „
Ih

„

„,„i ts

„„

«

„

view of the potentials
of individuals
under existing
socrety, "Consumption
can thus be a rational,
life-

enhancing activity that
increases one, human
powers and
fulfills genuine human
needs.

Consequently, rather
than
denouncing comities and
consumption per se, we
should
try to discriminate
between valuable and
worthless or
dubious commodities, and
dehumanized, fetishized

consumption as opposed to
creative, life-enhancing
consumption.
Deep ecologists then must
provide criteria to
distinguish vital needs from
non-vital or false needs if
they are to meet the demands
of their critics, but they
must also explain the criteria
for interpreting
those

needs in such

a

way that they can be defended
within the

sphere of public discourse.

Nancy Fraser discusses the

difference between what she calls the
"discussion of need
satisfaction" and "the politics of need
interpretation ." 56
Any interpretation of needs claims
would have to be
justified.

Fraser attempts to explain what such an

interpretive justification would have to
consist of;
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conce;ning th: : 0 ci:r^ ral Consider *tions
by WhlCh rario
competing need
“s
interpretation^ are
For example, how
generated,
exclusive
1
various rival needs
e
?
How
hierarchical or
I *** ,lo
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lnterpretatl °ns are
those reached by means
of
1Cati,e
processes that ,os
„
,
of democracy, equality,
8als
and
nS
COnse
are
relevant' in°jui?ifvin°
°w
3
This means comparing
®
alternative^ist
dlstrlbutl ve
outcomes of rival interpretation
justifying some interpretations
off lo
°
s °cial needs
as better than othpri jm
S balanClng
procedural anS conseauentiaT? t
st considerations
More simply it invniv
u
balancing
democracy and
equality 5^

!
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Fraser's position sounds
very much like that of
Habermas with his attempt
to establish a
communicative
ethic to rejuvenate the
"public sphere."
fact, Kellner
too follows his above
observations with an appeal

m

to the

critical theory efforts of
Habermas,

Habermas has been proposing
sustained public
discussion of needs, values and
public policy
His
argument that we must revitalize
the public sphere
and engage in debate about
crucial social, political
and ethical issues is relevant
to the topic at hand
Following Habermas, Critical Theory
can help to
promote public debate on needs,
commodities and
consumer practices so as to aim for
democratic
consensus on these issues.
Such debate could be
connected^ with discourse on values and
the good
.

However,

Fraser indicates her version of needs

interpretation and its justification is
significantly
different from the Habermasian version, "In
its firstorder normative content, this formulation
is Habermasian.
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° r qUaSi - tranSCe

WhSreaS Hab6rmaS
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metainterpretation.

ground co
cative
ethxcs- in the conditions
of possibility
of speech
.

understood universalistically
and ahistorically
I
COnSid8r
SVOlVed ^toricxx;
specific
possibility 59

“

'

.

The underlying difficulty
with the deep ecology
approach to needs and their
interpretation is a continuing

vacillation about the status
of needs as
ontologically
derived and therefore to
a great extent
expressing a
desire for transcending or
quasi-transcending the need
for
historical interpretation,
thus denying the
fundamentally
historical character of needs
as they are produced
by the
operations of the system of
production and
consumption.

This may be an indication
of

a

fundamental conflict within

need interpretation, one that
cannot be resolved at the
theoretical level but which is
instead only possibly

addressed in actual discussion by
individuals, through
their ecocentric interpretations
of the needs of their

local ecocommunity.

We again return to the question
of

whether deep ecology involves any
criteria, including
substantive criteria, for need interpretation

in actual

local discussion.

There is recognition in deep ecology, or
at least by
Naess, of the impossibility of simply relying
on market

systems to determine distribution of need
satisfaction.
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v„ lon ,
interpretation,

"Classical economics
concerned itself with
lth
a substantial
dX part
nart o-f
k
of human needsS
Th Qe ~
Perspective was
..,
hnt_,
hl
losop hical and
p
practical
Modern economics
tends
O narrow d0 wn
the perspective
and fcQ
the market for human
needs.
Ecosophy asks fQr a
estabUshment of the classical
perspective, adding
insights from cultural
anthropology. -60 Naess
recognizes that the existing
system of "representation"
and its intricate links
to the interests
of large
corporations does not meet
the requirement for
public
discussion of needs and
need interpretation.
He explains
how politicians and
"energy experts" speak
of increasing
energy "needs" by attempting
to equate them with
"human
needs" instead of making
the more appropriate
distinction
that energy needs are a
product of the market and
the
standard of living in consumerist
cultures. 61 Naess
explores in some detail the
relation of economics and
ecosophy, tracing the ideas
of economics and politics
to
the classical Greek understanding
of the terms, describing
the science of economics as
"household management" and the
polls as a "community of households."
He devotes a full
'

.

^

^

chapter to this discussion including
the observation that
deep ecology has tended to ignore
economic discussion, and
that he is providing

a

partial response to criticisms

which have focused on this gap.

One of his basic points

is that current economic measurements
are fundamentally
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"

inadequate for dealing
with the ecological
crisis.
The
measures do discrete
between types of needs, "
In GNP
there is no plnce for ^ h-i
motion between waste,
luxury,
and a satisfaction of
fundamental needs ." 62
In
summarizing his chapter on
technology and lifestyle
Naess
also connects needs to
technological development,
*

.

•

"The

ecosophical basis for an
appraisal of technique is
the
satisfaction of vital needs
in the diverse local
communities 63
.

Naess thus is aware of the
necessity of developing an
interpretation of needs that takes
history and social
conflict into consideration,
although it is unclear to
what extent he believes society
penetrates individual
consciousness in its structuring of
needs.
The discussion
of the possibility of
self-identification with nature
would indicate a strong belief in
the voluntary ability of
individuals to alter their need structures,
or

alternatively, that the wider ecological
self-awareness is
a product of increased maturity,
seen as a "natural"
process.

Criticisms of both of these positions have

indicated that deep ecology has not adequately
addressed
the question of the depth of penetration of
the psyche of

individuals by the operations of the present economic
and
sexual order.

Besides the examples already given, and the

alternative view of Adorno about the depth of structuring
of needs interpretation by an oppressive society,

it is

only necessary to point to such phenomena as bulimia and
207

rexia nervosa as
examples of where
individual will or
choice is an inadeguate
emanation of the d i stortion
of
"needs hierarchieseven at the most
basic or -vitallevels 64
.

Even though the description
of needs by deep
ecology
tends to take on positivist
or transcendent
characteristics, there is the
recognition of the
desirability of determining
actual need structure
in local
settings, including the
consideration of non-human
needs.
In this context, Naess
discusses the control
of "life

spaces" and the closeness
or remoteness of control
as
function of self-preservation,
or the satisfaction of
"basic needs .- 65 He attempts
to link the political
program of local control of
decision-making

a

to his

understanding of needs,

"The next ecosophical
principles

to be incorporated are those
of self-sufficiency,

decentralisation, and autonomy.

These social principles

are first to be linked to their
biological

counterparts ." 66

He then curiously discusses need

satisfaction in terms of "control," the
intent being to
explain that satisfaction of needs, in
order to be

ecologically coherent, should be the result of
utilizing
resources closest to hand. As need satisfaction
becomes

reliant on ever more remote sources, it generates
an

increasingly unstable set of relationships, "Increase
of
remoteness correlates with increase of dangers, of

inadequacy of powers of self-preservation and therefore
208

with decrease of sp1f-m,i
ealisation potentials ." 67
Naess
en connects these
observations about
biological and
human needs to the
correlated social
practices, "By the
local self-sufficiency
and autonomy we
shall
sources of basic need
satisfactions, or more
generally
sources of Self-realisation,
nearby in the life
space and
secondly, to what degree
the organism has
adequate control
Of this area to satisfy
its needs ." 68
in comparing competing
needs of different
organisms,

specificaily of humans to
non-humans, Naess offers
another
principle, "Responsible
decisions closely
require one to

consider the entire norm
system.

The dimensions of

needs of humans must be
compared with vital
needs of other species, if
there is a conflict ." 69
Naess's distinctions between
needs— biological, species
specific and class specific-lead
him to
ask if "non-

biological" needs are in fact
needs or whether they are
better understood as wishes. The
implicit underlying
question being, "What is the relation

of social structure

to the formation of needs ." 76

Finally,

the interpretation of needs
ultimately

depends on individual experience and
therefore on the
processes of identification. Naess makes
critical

comments on the relation of the "happy
consumer" to the
type of consumption of outdoor activity
that
serves to

reinforce capitalist practices, but he still
advocates the
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"

importance of outdoor
activities, "Understanding
of
anything in nature begins
with direct experience,
but this
soon stimulates reflection. "VI
He recognizes the
necessity of interpretation
or reflection
on the

experience of nature and the
relation of the
interpretation of nature to
the determination of
needs and
their satisfaction.
For Naess,
Napqq the mediation
provided by
reflection serves as a link
to the necessity of
preservation of wild nature.
The reason for protecting
wilderness areas for other than
human utility is
.

still

perceived as a human need, but a
need that develops in
consequence of increased maturity,
"These propositions
suggest that to ascribe value to
animals, plants,
landscapes, and wilderness areas
independently of their
relation to human utility or benefit
is a philosophically
legitimate procedure. To relate all value
to mankind is a
form of anthropocentrism which is not
philosophically
72
tenable
.

Naess then attempts to unite the connections
between
the issues of self-preservation, moral
action, and the

relation of "beautiful actions" to the environment,
"A

person acts beautifully when acting benevolently from
inclination.

Environment is then not felt to be something

strange or hostile which we must unfortunately adapt

ourself to, but something valuable which we are incl 1 ned
to treat with joy and respect,
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and the overwhelming

richness of which we
are inclined to
use to satisfy our
"
vital needs 73
.

The practical
consequence of this stance
has been the
emergence of the radical
ecological g roup Earth
First and
s defense of
wilderness and wildness.
The question of
the relation of the
philosophical justification
of deep
ecology to its political
application should now
,

be

considered.

It is only in this
relation of philosophy
to

social and political change
that deep ecology, and
radical
ecology generally, can be
adequately evaluated.
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CHAPTER

5

DEEP ECOLOGY AND
POLITICS

The Philosophy of deep
ecology has .manifested
itself
the radical ecology
movement most directly
in the
element known as Earth First:.
The group has grown
a
VW van full of radical
"cowboys" into an
organrzation with
its own Journal, educational
foundation, and supporters
that number in the thousands
if not tens of
thousands.
Thus development has taken
place since 1980, and
includes
events that landed co-founder
Dave Foreman and others
in
prison for "ecoterrorist"
activities.! By the mid-1990s
the group had members, or those
who identify themselves
as
Earth First ers, across the U.S.
and around the world.
The brief history of Earth First!
is mostly that of

m

^

!

actions taken in order to save
"pristine" wilderness areas
and the biological diversity and
spiritual potential of
these fragments of ecosystems.

This dynamic history

continues at what seems like an accelerating
pace even
though most of its original leadership has
distanced
itself from the highly activist group, a
distancing not

because of its radicalness, but the opposite.

The charges

against the organization by its founders are based in
the

belief that it has grown into the type of organization
it
was originally conceived against, one characterized as

increasingly bureaucratic, bogged down with internal

bickering and now controlled by "social justice" critics
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ft st agenda "
deraiis
a

de
efSnSe

"

;

WlldemeSS

—

whlch began as

compromise. "2 Some
of
h
he
founders fare moved on
to concentrate
aimost sole ly on
the expansion of wild
areas in the world
and especiaii
y in
North America
Although the anatomy
of the various
actions to defend specific
parts of the natural
world
provide useful lessons
on the group and
the
motivations of individual
members, as well as
on responses
by the system of domination
and exploitation that
is
destroying the planet piece
by piece, what is of
most
concern in the present
context is the relationship
of
radical ecological resistance
to the assertions about
its
.

philosophical underpinning-deep
ecology.
Examining the
relationship of theory and
practice will require drawing
on actual examples of
confrontation between the radical
ecologists and the dominant economic,
political and social
system.
However, history as such is not
the present
concern, rather what is required
philosophically at this
point is the critical evaluation of
the relationship

between the philosophy of deep ecology
and its radical
practice.
Three aspects of this will be considered

here:

first,

evaluation of the place of "wilderness" in
the

self-understanding of the activists; second, their
use of
the tactic of monkeywrenching; and finally,
the
potential

of the concept of the "bioregion" as

P^^tical organization.

a

basis for future

Another way to understand these

issues is by attempting to address the question,
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"How does

the defense of
wilderness relate

t<j

^

^

^
m

identification propounded
by Naess and Fox "
?
respect
to critical theory
potential contribution
to this
exploration, it can be
ashed, ., oes Adorno's
use of the
concept of mimesis offer
an alternative
conceptual
approach which can
simultaneously better
explain the
actions of the radical
ecologists and their
contradictions, and then
indicate an analysis
which can
more adequately guide
future radical ecological
activity-'
i m Portant will fop an ana wo
oe an analysis and
understanding of
the extent to which the
actions of
i

-i

,

these radical

ecologists are "revolutionary"
and what is meant by
the
term.
Especially interesting in this
respect is the

question of why the activists
claim to be nonrevolutionary yet official police
organizations identify
them as terrorists? Finally,
does the commitment to
wilderness, bioregions and a general
ecosystems approach
to ecological problems provide
an adequate
basis for a

post-domination-of-nature society, or does the
concept of
bioregions need to be supplemented not
only with
a

vision

of future politics, but also by an
analysis that can

adequately address the relationship of the
ecological
crisis to current social and cultural crises,
crises which
are also a manifestation of the internal
domination
and

colonization of nature.
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Nature and Identity
The heart of the Earth
First! movement is
its "no
compromrse" stand with re
g ard to wiiderness.
w ilderness
preservation and restoration
is the basis for
all
subsequent action;
In a true Earth-radical
group, concern for
S
P
rVati ° n
be the ke Ystone.
The
me ia.ea
idea ot
of wilderness
wUd
o -t-vor.
after all
S
radical in human thought--more
radical
than
Paine, than Marx, than Mao.
Wilderness sav,.
uman beings are not paramount,
Earth is not for
Homo sapiens alone, human
life is but
e Tift
form on the planet and has
no right to ?ake
exclusive possession. Yes,
own sake, without any need wilderness for its
to justify it for
human benefit. Wilderness for
wilderness.
For
bears and
i

,

’

whales and titmice and
and stink bugs. And. .wilderness rattlesnakes
for human
ings.
Because it is the laboratory of
human
evolution, and because it is home 3
.

.

For the deep ecologist,

the primary reason for

preservation and extension of wilderness
is to keep intact
the processes of evolution, which
represent
various

journey's along different ecological paths
expressed
through the genetic material and behaviors

of individual

species.

diversity.

Wilderness is necessary to preserve biological
The rate of species extinction is greater now

than any time in natural history, even greater
than the

fabled die off of the dinosaurs.^

The activities of

radical Earth First !ers then are aimed at restoring the

means for evolutionary processes to continue even if
as most believe,

when

— human

— or

beings make it impossible for
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"

their own species to
continue to exist
th 6 9031
of these
a cH,HH
ctivities is not to
establish a sustainable
u s tamable
society, but
O Simply mate
possible the continuation
of the evolution
complex life with the
remaining genetic
material and
intact ecosystems that
are available: "We
must envision
and propose the
restoration of biological
wildernesses of
several million acres
in all of America's
enca s ecosystems,
ern
with
corridors between them
for the transmission
of genetic
variability. Wilderness
is the arena for
evolution, and
there must be enough of
it for natural
.

t-

rein

.

5

system,

forces to have free

What Foreman proposes
is not
and not simple preservation

a

better managed

of existing "wild.,
sites, but the extension
of wilderness with no
ultimate
boundary.
The limits of his
neo-primitivism are unclear,
"Keep Cleveland, Los Angeles.
Contain them.
Try to make
them habitable.
But identify big areas that
can be
restored to a semblance of
natural conditions, reintroduce
the Grizzly Bear and wolf and
prairie grasses, and declare
them off limits to modern
civilization ." 6 i n his argument
for putting Earth first. Foreman
insists that native

diversity and the evolution of life
should be placed
highest on any value system. The
protection of standards
of living or any other human interests
are secondary,

"In

everything human society does, the primary
consideration
should be for the long-term health and
biological

diversity of Earth.

After that, we can consider the
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welfare of humans.

We should be kind
Klnd

'

^
compassionate,

and

caring with other people,
but Earth comes
first. "7
One of the enduring
difficulties with Foreman's
position, and one that has
led
to charges of
racism,

ls

the value system that
develops
p out of
o£ thls uncompromising
defense of genetic diversity,
the
me "refusal
rerusal in
to use human
beings as the measure by
which to value others."
This
problem goes beyond Earth First!
's insistence
about

civilization's tendency toward
anthropocentrism to what
many claim is the group's
underlying misanthropy.
The

most notorious of these value
dilemmas comes when
evaluating disease and famine in
relation to human
populations, "Human suffering
resulting from drought and
famine in Ethiopia is tragic,
yes, but the destruction
there of other creatures and
habitat is even more
8
tragic ."
Foreman links this assertion directly
to the
philosophy of deep ecology or "biocentrism."
it is

through this philosophy that Foreman
attempts to justify
his position,
The dominant philosophy of our time
(which contains
Judeo-Christianity, Islam, capitalism, Marxism,
scientism, and secular humanism) is anthropocentrism.
It places human beings at the center of
the universe,
separates them from nature, and endows them with
unique value. EFlers are in direct opposition to
that philosophy.
Ours is an ecological perspective
that views Earth as a community and recognizes such
apparent enemies as "disease" (e.g., malaria) and
"pests" (e.g., mosquitoes) not as manifestations of
ev il to be overcome but rather as vital and necessary
components of a complex and vibrant biosphere.^
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I"

—

This privileging of
the natural over
the human has the

"

3

1 of the
culture-nature
duality, and therefore
may succumb to the
Liie same „
conceptual
structuring, revealed in
the type of analysis
of
rationality which critical
theory emphasizes.
Horkheimer
and Adorno examine these
fundamental processes in

^

DliilBCl

L - En

^^

The purpose of
Horkheimer and
Adorno's examination of
enlightenment is not simply
to

abandon "enlightenment" or
human reason, "The
accompanying
critique of enlightenment is
intended to prepare the
way
for a positive notion of
enlightenment which will
release
it from entanglement in
blind domination. "10 The
tw0 main
theses of the work are that
"myth is already
enlightenment; and enlightenment
reverts to mythology. »U
These theses are examined in
specific relation to two
examples, the first of which
involves an interpretation of
the journeys of Odysseus in the
Odyssey.
They illuminate
the "difference and the unity" of
"mythic
nature" and the

"enlightened mastery of nature."

An examination of this

example of the relationship of myth and
enlightenment, the
dialectic of enlightenment, may aid in
understanding the

philosophical issues and problematics of the philosophy
of
deep ecology.
Horkheimer and Adorno examine the Homeric poem of the
adventures of Odysseus from

a

unique perspective.

1

^

The

hero is viewed as the prototypical example of the

bourgeois individual" and the story of his adventures is
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111

erPrSted 35

3

St ° ry ° f the crea
tion of the bourgeois

self.

More generally, Odysseus's
adventures represent
the
various stages of development
of self-identity.
More
directly, the tale is
interpreted as recounting
both the
development of subjectivity
generally, and particularly
its bourgeois or
individualistic form.
Odysseus is
confronted with various
challenges to his
survival, and to

his individual autonomy.

These challenges appear
in

various forms of nature nr
or fate, TlV
where impulse or instinct
tempt the hero to abandon the
self in exchange for
pleasure or happiness. Odysseus
overcomes these
temptations and challenges through
various, often clever,
means, which result in the hero's
denial of
,

his desires in

the service of preservation of
the self.

The different

episodes of the adventure involve
overcoming internal and
external nature in order to retain the
identity
of the

self:

The very spirit that dominates nature
repeatedly
vindicates the superiority of nature in
competition.
.Only consciously contrived
adaptation to nature brings nature under the
control of the physically weaker .... Imitation
enters into the service of domination inasmuch
as even man is anthropomorphized for man.
The
pattern of Odyssean cunning is the mastery of
nature through such adaptation. Renunciation,
the principle of bourgeois disillusionment, the
outward schema for the intensification of
sacrifice. .. .He just pulls through; struggle is
his survival; and all the fame that he and the
others win in the process serves merely to
confirm that the title of hero, is only gained
at the price of the abasement and mortification
.

.
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undi vide^happiness I3 mplete
.

'

universal, and

The mastery of nature
is achieved
throu g h clever
calculation, w hat the
authors will call
instrumental
rationalrty.
Thls "rationaldominatron of nature
is
understood as the control
of fate or mythrc
forces, and
results rn a self that
is formed through
the limited
Processes of rnstrumental
rationality. The
domination of
external nature is
accomplished by way of
the internal
domination of the self:

SUUV' "!'
1

*“« n

to natural deities.

All human
sacrifices' when
sacrifices,
systematically executed
deceive the god to whom they
are made: thev
subject him to the primacy
of human ends and
dissolve his power; and the
carries over smoothly into deception of' the god
that practiced bv the
h
disbelieving priests on the
believers ... By
calculating his own sacrifice,
he effectively
negates the power to whom the
sacrifice
is made
In this way he redeems the
life he had
forfeited.
In this interpretation then,

sacrifice is an early

form of "rational exchange"
whereby the sacrifice enables
humans to gain control of the actions
of the gods, of the

mythic forces of fate, of nature, and
of men.

Examination

of the specific episodes of Odysseus'
journey become for
the critical theorists an examination
of the history of

western civilization since, as archaic prototype
of the
bourgeois individual, Odysseus anticipates what
will be

the general structure of later society.
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The Odyssey is

something of

a

modern society.

model for understanding
certarn aspects of

The entire journey
of Odysseus and
the details of the
crrtrcal theorists' analysis
is not possible
or needed
here, but a few examples
will help illustrate
their
concerns about the relationship
of myth and
enlightenment
and indicate some further
directions for development.
their analysis of the
episode in which Odysseus
escapes
Polyphemus the Cyclops,
Horkheimer and Adorno
interpret
this as a depiction of the
stage or phase of "brute
egotism" in human development,

m

Polyphemus represents a later
stage in world
e
th
a
C
° f hunters
and herdsmen" For Homer
“U
blrbarf"'
35
the absence of any
anfthe
ck of any systematic
organization of labor and
society governing the disposal
of time.
This is
3
1
1
1 S ° Ciety
funded
^"
on the
subjection of the physically weaker,
subiectiofof
but as vet
he yardStlCk ° f
Proper^and

syste^tic^g^K

^

^

it^™h^
Odysseus

(Udeis)

™
'

and some of his crew are held

captive by the Cyclops, and it is through
clever deception
that Odysseus escapes although in the
process
he loses

some crew members to the ravenous Cyclops.
is to answer the Cyclops’

question of Odysseus’ identity

by adopting the name "No-man" or "Nobody."
(Udeis)

Odysseus’ ruse

When Odysseus

attempts to escape after blinding the Cyclops, the

Cyclops’ pleas for help to the other members of his
tribe

become ineffectual after they ask for the name of the
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1
offender, and he answers,

"No-man"

uaeis
(Udeis]
)

h
has
escaped.

Odysseus takes advantage
of the refatronshfp
of Xanguage
refers,

that is,

word" and "the thing."
meanings, doth as

the difference
between "the
In this case,
"Udeis" has two

a

proper name and as "no
one." Odysseus
is then moving in a
space of thought that
is different
from that of the mythic.
This development in

conceptualization, according
to the critical
theorists,
resembles that reasoning which
supports the system of
con t r ac t s
The ear 1 pr fn-rm
form m-F
of reason was unable
to
distinguish word from thing,

'

.

Objecc.

i

STS

SK.SSSword rs emphasized, in order to
change the actuality
Y
In this way, consciousness
of intention arises: in
is distress, Odysseus becomes
aware of the dualism
arnS that the same word can mean
different'
things 16

'

It is in the use of the ambiguity
of the relationship

of word and thing that Odysseus is
able to save himself,

but only by denying himself,

"Odysseus' two contradictory

actions in his encounter with Polyphemus, his
answering to
the name,

and his disowning it, are nevertheless one.

He

acknowledges himself to himself by denying himself under
the name Nobody; he saves his life by losing himself. "II

Another example supports the critical theorists'
claims about this process of development of instrumental
227

rationality,
°

e

the domination of
nature
Lure

autonomous individual,"

in

'

and th
the formation

their
rneir discussion
di^
of the

hero’s encounter with
the goddess Circe
£ ce.
giro tempts the
Circe
crew with beauty and sexual
Y
sexual pleasure.
This episode of the
tale represents a hrgher
phase of develops,
bey0 nd the
simplistic egoism of the
Cyclops.
This is the point
of
development of magic and the
use of ambiguous
illusion,
"The magical story of
Circe refers back again
to the magic
stage proper. Magic
disintegrates the individual,
who
once again succumbs to it
and is thus made to
*.

revert to an

older biological species. ”18

Clrce is able to

„

take

erotic initiative" and so for
the critical theorists
represents the type of the
prostitute. Circe has an

^

ambiguous nature, both corrupter
and helper, a mythical
mixture of both water and fire
gained from her immortal
ancestors.

The magical spell which she
uses on the crew
turns them into swine, unlike
her previous victims who

became again undomesticated creatures
of the wilderness.
The men are liberated from the
repressed nature that had
made them individuals, "selves," and
thereby achieve an
illusion of "redemption."

represented as
theorists,

a

This form of redemption is

delusion by Homer as indicated by the

"But because they have already been men,

the

civilized epic cannot represent what has happened
to them
as anything other than unseemly degradation,

and in the

Homeric account there is hardly any trace of pleasure." 19
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The critical theorist
eorists

1

=
analysis
continues with
comments on the
ne statu*
status of women in
the bourgeoispatriarchal social order
tv-,
order.
They especially
note that the
ritual used by Circe
in working her
magic
i

^

is the

repetition of the process
by which women
themselves are
subjugated.
Women "under the
pressure of civilized
judgment" identify with
the image that
civilization
presents of them, weak
and defenseless, but
also

desirable,

"As a representative
of nature,

woman in
bourgeois society has become
the enigmatic image
of
irresistibility and powerlessness.

m

this way she
reflects for domination the
pure lie that posits
the
subjection instead of the
redemption of nature. "20
In their analysis of
Odysseus’

overcoming of Circe’s

power,

Horkheimer and Adorno’s
interpretation is
inadequate in that it too rigidly

focuses on that aspect

of sexual relations,
particularly marriage,

that lends

itself to concepts related to
those of exchange society.
To be more fully adequate to
that which it analyzes, in

addition to the analysis of exchange
relationships, the
interpretation requires the independent
analysis of

patriarchal relationships.

It is true that Odysseus is

able to resist Circe's temptations
with the help of an
antidote received from the god of commerce
and the market
But Odysseus is still threatened by the
sexual power of
Circe,

so,

with sword in hand, he forces her to swear to

an oath that if he has sex with her she will
not use her
229

°*“

“

to

p„,« cl

tr

„

mutilation, from t.v.ng.
for
prohibition oi
promiscuity and for male
domination, which—
in as a permanent
n
epri vation of instinct-is
nevertheless a symbolic
selfmutilation on the part of
the man. "21 But as
P. j. Mills
has indicated, the critical
theorists have failed
to
see

that the oath is one-sided,

"They miss the double
standard
the oath, for what is
clearly prohibited is
female
promiscuity.
Odysseus indulges in sex with
Circe and
curtails her relations with
other men, even though
he is
married to Penelope "22 For
Horkheimer and Adorno the
oath is an early form of the
marriage contract, in their
analysis pleasure is degraded to
love as ideology,
circe
renounces the power of her desire
and Odysseus

m

.

is no

longer able to enjoy the full
pleasure of sexual
surrender.
This, they argue, is a precursor
of the

frigidity" of the bourgeois marital
relationship where
the marriage contract is an expression
of
love as

ideology, performing "its work of deception
about the

hatred of competitors." 23

But the analysis of this

contractual relationship is incomplete, it fails
to
address the full ineguality of the contracting
parties,
and does not fully indicate the coercion of the
contract.

Horkheimer and Adorno emphasize the resulting
solitariness

that results from a world of exchange where

competition invades all aspects of life, but it is not
only the injustices of unequal exchange that are revealed
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by the circumstances of
the oath.

As „ ills indicateS;

mentioned is that man
and woman have never
been equal in love on
patriarchal society; l ove
as
ideology has always been
more deadly for woman
than for
man.
The defeat of female
desire, the defeat

of female

power in love,

is extracted from
Circe through trickery
and the threat of violence." 24

In the ensuing analysis
of Odysseus'

return to has

homeland, Horkhermer and Adorno
attempt to show the power
of the remembrance of suffering,
but by neglecting the
specificity of the previously discussed
relations of
marriage, they fail to appreciate
the gendered character
of the suffering.
Circe's oath was a renunciation
of

promiscuity on her part, but it did not
apply to
Odysseus's own actions. When he returns
to

his kingdom he

questions his wife’s fidelity and disguises
himself in an
attempt to discover the truth. He finds that

Penelope has

resisted the suitors who have pursued her in the
19 year
absence of the king, but other female members of the

court

have not been so faithful.
the story,

Horkheimer and Adorno complete

"In Book 22 of the Odyssey,

there is

a

description of the way in which Odysseus' son punishes the
faithless women who had reverted to prostitution .... The

passage closes with the information that the feet of the
row of suspended women 'kicked out for
not for long.'"'

1-

0

a

short while, but

Mills points out that the description

of the women as prostitutes is Horkheimer and Adorno's
231

'

an indication of
their (male) blindness
to the
fact that the women
did no more than
Odysseus had done
with Circe. Horkheimer
and Adorno's account
of the
meaning of that last line
hinges on the universal

character of suffering and
the remembrance of
that
suffering indicated in the
structure of the passage
However as Mills responds,
"Horkheimer and Adorno
see this
episode as an account of
atrocity in which we
cannot
forget the victims or their
agony,
but this is to see a

generalized brutality in what
is a specifically
female
death inflicted on women for
violating codes of sexual
behavior set up by men. "26
Robert Hullot-Kentor also seizes
on the final image
of the dying women to help
refute the interpretation of
Adorno which Habermas has fostered
and which is unable to
bear the weight of its assertions.
Hullot-Kentor focuses
on the analysis of the Odyssey
as an example of what he
believes is Adorno's fundamental
philosophical innovation,
the unity of the self is the work
of a sacrificial
cunning
Accomplished in sacrifice is the exchange
as
equivalents something of less value for
something of more
value.
As the acts of sacrifice develop, as the
process
.

of substitution is extended,

cunning is developed.

Cunning should be understood here in relation to
the

history of philosophy, specifically to Hegel's
understanding of the cunning or ruse of Reason.
Dialectical development occurs through the actions of
232

individuals through
history, but without
cneir awareness
therr
a
nf
imate ends to which
history progresses.
Reason
progressively actually
itself, eventually
achieving
solute Knowledge, but
it does so „ behlnd
the subjects involved.
The individual
subjects are
sacrificed to the ultimate
purposes of Reason.
HullotKentor asserts that
Adorno's writings are
based on the
reversal of what is in
Hegel a process of
domination
This process of both
abstract and concrete
domination is
typical of western
civilization.
The highest forms
of
this process of "domination
by substitution" are
scientific and mathematical
snrh =,«
such
-i

.

^

as

'

m
i

^

,

physics.

The

reversal of the Process me ^
of domination requires
the
recognition of the futility
of this process of
sacrificial
substitution, "Adorno shows
that the overturning
•

,

.

of

sacrifice,

and the movement toward
the development of
cunning inheres in the dialectic
of sacrifice ." 28 After
commenting on the analysis of
marriage and property in the
Odyssey essay, Hullot-Kentor
indicates
the analyses'

common direction,

"The reversals of marriage and
property

are only instances of the basic
issue of the possible
reversal of mediation with which Dialprt-ir- n f

En l ightenm e nt is concerned: the
reversal of subjectivity
from the domination to the liberation
of nature ." 29 He
quotes Adorno on the relation of sacrifice
to

a

society

beyond the present one, "Odysseus is at the
same time
sacrifice for the abrogation of sacrifice. His

a

masterful
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renunciation, as

a

struggle against
myth, stands ln
fQ]
>r a
society that no longer
demands renunciation
and
domination: one that
masters itself, not
in order to
oerce itself and others,
but for reconciliation "30
The
thrust of Hullot-Kentor's
argument is that all
of Morno ,
worts are dedicated to
revealing the internal
tendency of
sacrifice's service of
cunning or reason, but
which
eventually becomes aware
of its own futility,
creating the
possibility of its reversal
from domination to
liberation.
The internalization of
sacrifice is the establishment
.

of

self,

sacrifice took place to
preserve the self, but,
"The
internalization of sacrifice is
the establishment of
the
principle of identity as the
principle
"31
of the self.

The self-identical self
cannot be sacrificed because
there
is no substitute for it.
The point is made by
Adorno,
"The self is precisely the
human being to whom the
magical
power of substitution is no longer
attributed.
The

establishment of the self severs that
fluctuating unity
with nature that the sacrifice of
the
self claimed to

achieve." 32
forms,

The struggle against nature, and
its mythical

required

a

process of sacrifice that eventually

produced the possibility of
identity,

a

self with its continuing

the self-identical self.

The basis for the

critique of sacrifice, sacrifice established
in the

operations of that instrumental rationality which

cunningly offered the unequal exchange as if equivalent,
itself develops out of the process of sacrifice.
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Reason,

the unity of the
general anH
general
^
and particular
dr
i« th e
ls
principle
.
i entity,
Reason means, according
to its own form,
something libe the ldea
of the reconciliation
of the
universal and the particular ..33
The non-substitutahle
self, the self-identical
self, the imitable
self is
+.

•

'

.

.

.

essentially different from
or other than nature,
yet when
this self forgets that
it is nature it
also forgets the
purposes for which it was
formed,

says Adorno,

"m

the

instant in which men sever
the consciousness of
themselves
as nature, all of the
purposes for which they
struggle to
Preserve themselves, social
progress, the intensification
of material and intellectual
forces, indeed consciousness
itself, are vitiated ." 34
Reason, as the principle
of
identity, attempts to control
the world, nature, by
reducing it to itself. This
"second nature” becomes as
imprisoning as the mythic nature
that inspired sacrifice.
The extension of control and
domination would be
characterized in later works by the
critical theorists as
the "totally administered society."
it is only through
the memory of itself as always and
still part of nature
that the self can obtain freedom from
its self-built
prison of second nature, "Precisely reason
that no longer
takes itself to be absolute, that recognizes
itself as

nature and no longer as something absolutely
opposed to
nature, precisely this reason that is conscious

of itself

as nature,

ceases to be mere nature
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Hullot-Kentor

*"

"

“•

“““ » »«.=.,

,i
act or remembrance
which
which tran^-F
transforms domination
i nto the
possibility of liberation
This
ihis is
i, a result
of the
similarity of art to
society, "The same
process of the
domination of nature that
society carries out
occurs
within the art wort;
the same sacrificial
act of reason is
carried out by art through
its construction. »«
36
The
sacrifices carried out in
the actual domination
of nature
are justified as
"necessary" by the
self-preserving
reason, the principle
of identity.
Art can mourn the
sacrifice by "undoing" its
self-identity. Adorno
compares
this self undoing of art
to the weaving and
unweaving that
occupied Penelope as she
waited for Odysseus,
rr

artifacts is what art actually
does to itself
since Homer's poem, this
episode is not whaj it is
easily mistaken to be, an
addition or vestige' bu?
ather a constitutive category
of art:
ategory art absorbs the impossibility through this
of the
f the
Y
ne and the many as ** element
of its
ini?v
lty
v° no less than
Art works,
reason,
have
their
eir
form of cunning 37
.

Hullot-Kentor indicates the hanging of
Penelope's
maids is one of those moments of the
self-undoing of art
where the memory of the unnecessary
sacrifice
points to

the possibility of a society beyond
domination.

The memory has two aspects: it contains
not only what
was undergone, but the possibility of the
fairy
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1Ch predicate s
happily ever after.
the
i n reflect
° n this dial
at a standstill.
ectic
enlightenment
5 to terms as
consciousness of the
the
uselessness^f
of sac nfice.
this consciousness
in
ss
reason
.

.

.

recovers its

'

38

Memory of Deep Ecology
one of the most
troubling assertions
contained in the
philosophy of deep ecology,
and in Forets
understanding
the role of "intuitive
awareness" in acquiring
knowledge of the correct
relation between humans
and
nature

We can all recognize
that linear rational
1
of’ou^brain and conscioisLss Pre

RauLaUty

“ irt
valid,
perhaps

P
-

more so,

V

r
r

t

Y

is intuitive,

cognizant of Ultimate truth^byhsitting 01 6
t,
W ld than bY StUdying
a lib^ry*
Reading books,
ReaSng
b
k
engaging in logical discourse
and compiling facts and
figures are necess
in
the modern context, but
they are not the only
ways to comprehend the world
and our lives
Often our gut instincts enable
us to act more
effectively
a crisis than does careful
rational analysis. 39
"

*

'

^

t

m

This incipient anti-intellectualism,

a

reflection of

American "pragmatism" and radical
"actionism,
ominous characteristics with the
additional

"

takes on

uncritical

embrace of the "natural" side of humans,
reminiscent of
Niotzsche s idolization of the beast,
We reject the New Age eco-la-la that says
we must
transcend our base animal nature and take charge
of
our evolution in order to become higher, moral
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to glorying in
t0 beln9 anima1
our^weat^horrao”™5
We struggle against
ears an d blood.
the modern c®
^
u11, passionless
mpulsion
to become
androids
wP °
logical lives; we
Uve
s ^itary,
smell, tastl See
Earth; we live with
hear and fee l
40
gusto
'

'

'

^

'

'

.

This emphasis on
action and animal
nature is again
e simple reversal
of the nature-culture
duality

characteristic of rdentity
thinking.
This reversal does
not eliminate the
inherent tendency of
conceptual
domination, it merely
sides with the opposite
term in the
struggle, there is no
"reconciliation.'.

Fo reman however,
does occasionally
acknowledge the difficulties
of
obtaining the truth.

back- to- the- landers
thinkers, and^adi^l^

"cutt^T

conS?*
this land— of Turtle
rth /hmer i ca- -we ^are^ a

f

millennia of

°f

“-culture

eS^ts^tT

T

t

“
^
be a P r °duct of

TAlTr^l
We^rn “vmSion.
^product

1

° f elght

As was discussed previously
concerning the

relationship of immediate experience
and knowledge, it is
clear that Adorno does not accept
the legitimacy of the
claim to immediate truth, that
alternatively there is
needed a critical interpretation of
experience to reveal
its truth content.

The claim of deep ecology and of

Foreman of being able to achieve
immediate truth
intuitively is ideological to the extent

it serves as

complete justification of eco-def ensive
actions and to the
extent that it denies the deeply penetrating
structures of
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society into the
mental P
processes
ocesses nf
of in
the individual.
The
„
SXPerlenCe ° f thS W
^rness devotee may contain
an element of
"higher truths,- hut
•

.

'

this

intuits

recognition requires an
interpretative response,
at
minimum interpretation
is needed to
translate intuitive
knowledge into strategic
and ethical action,
such as
monkeywrenching.
In the context of
Adorno attempts to justify
the necessity of
critical
interpretation of intuitive
experience and relate
it to
truth content.
Perhaps there are
sufficient affinities
between the aesthetic
experience Adorno

examines and the

wilderness experience Foreman
promotes that, with
appropriate "refunctioning"
of concepts responding
to the
difference in their "objects
of interpretation,"
a more
adequate critical interpretive
framework can be provided
for the radical ecology
movement. 42

Specifically, what is

now needed is a more nuanced
understanding of the
mediations between society and
nature, their mutual
determinations, and the necessity
of their simultaneous
consideration for both theory and
action.
What is of concern here is the
relationship of
experience to intuitive knowledge
and how this can be

interpreted to provide

a

more secure footing for the

actions of radical ecology which aim
at the eventual
establishment of an ecological society at
peace with
nature.
This depends on how experience, specifically
the
experience of "nature," is transformed into
knowledge.
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Critical Theory and
the Primitive
It may help to
clarify

„ hat is at stake

^^

examining Adorno's
understanding of the
prehistory of
science and art, and
the potential of
transforming their
purposes.
The status of
intuitive knowledge
is at the
heart of the criticisms
of deep ecology
which have
attempted to portrav
no
Portray it as
essentially fascist.
Adorno
and Horkheimer's
attention to the elements
-if-

«

of fascism and
its relationship to
"primitive" experience
may in um inate
the potential problems
of deep ecology's
current
philosophical strategy.

Key to understanding
the early critical
theory work
on these issues is the
Lie rrmr-om+concept/term mime.si
"
a

foundational concept never
defined. "44

Nature appears as

an overwhelming force to
the early human, a force
that
must be appeased or fooled.

Only consciously contrived
adaptation to nature
rings nature under the control
of the physically
r
The ratio which supplants
mimesis is not
simn? "'i
simply
its counterpart.
It is itself mimesis:
mimesis unto death. The subjective
spirit which
cancels the animation of nature
can master a
despirituairzed nature onl Y by imitating
its rigidity
Y
and desprrrfuaUsing Itself in
turn.
Imitation
ters into the service of domination
inasmuch as
even man is anthropomorphized for
man.
The pattern
g iS the maste
° f nat ure through
such adap?ation?«

^

Modern reason has "degenerated" as it has
imitated
the nature which it has come to dominate.
A vicious,
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much as "nature"
ever has.

tb.

The role

1Mvid

„„

,

-^ghtenment was
as the Path
path to th
the overcoming
of myth and
mythlike
nature
Enlightenment is the
effort to

-en

.

drssolve myth,'

——

Pi. Of
nature of the subjective.
3eCti ° n ° nto
thif°view, the
supernatural, spirits and h in thls
re mirror images
Of men who allow
themselvesTotl
be ? righte ned by
natural phenomena.
Conseauen? lY the many
figures can all be
mythic
brought tf
00 denom inator.
and reduced to the
human subject?^
1

U

Enlightenment asserts
that everything of
meaning rs
available to the reason
of "man."
Through formal logic
and its mathematicization
rn science the
world is made
calculable, predictable,
and most importantly
available
for utilization by man.
The earliest conversion
of myth,
from explanation of the
world and projection of
the human
to potential control
and use, took the
form of magic, a

precursor to science, "Myth
intended report, naming,
the
narration of the Beginning;
but also presentation,

confirmation, explanation:

a

tendency that grew stronger

with recording and collection
of myths.
Narrative became
didactic at an early stage.
Every ritual includes the
idea of activity as a determined
process which magic can
nevertheless influence ." 47 However,
within magic, nature
was not organized conceptually
as so many examples of a
common characteristic; the specificity
or uniqueness of
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oTr.tr
XOnS

"

«'

«•

»uttau,

°f

thS PriSSt ° r
Shaman to its
potential
infl
nfluence in inducing
other events:

Magic was not ordered hv nn Q
dentical spirit:
it changed like
the cultic rr/ ks
whlch were
supposed to accord with hh
Magic is utterly untrue
Spirits
et ln it domination
not yet negatedbv
mng itSelf into theis
pure truth anfactin
a
world that has become!
subjectl^i?”^ ° f the
magician imitates demons;
in ordej to fZ
them or to appease
frighten
them, he behaves
frighteningly or makes
gestures
y
res of a PPeasement.
Even though his ta^v
he never
conceives of hLself as
for whom the
man
happy hunting-grounds
become the unmfd
£led cosmos,
on
the inclusive conce
concent
a n
Pt for all
possibilities
of
plunder.
J;

-

.

u

i

It

is not the invisible
power of nature as a
whole

that the magician seeks
to influence, instead
there is
still the recognition in
these actions of the
specific
qualities of the object influenced,
"In magic there is
specific representation. What
happens to the enemy’s
spear, hair or name, also
happens to the individual; the

sacrificial animal is massacred
instead of the god.
Substitution in the course of sacrifice
marks a step
toward discursive logic ." 49 Even
though magic honors the
uniqueness of the individual it attempts
to influence, in
this attempted influence against
the mythic or fated

character of the world, the repetition
of nature, it also
becomes the first attempt to "identify"
nature,

nature to category and example.
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to reduce

The critical theorists

^

:

eugue that the
identifying and
controlling of nature
is
the essence of
science

Science prepares the
end of fhi
In science there
State ° f affair s.
is no specif bh
if there are no
sacrificial an representation: and
* here ia a
Representation is exchanged
° god.
fungib1 ®universal interchangabiUtv
t ° m ls
at
sma shed not
representation but as
° f matter
the rabbit does not
0f
and
ret,r«™f
representing
virtually ignored b ?
y

“r”^
L
^
w™.

m
-

'

the^V^

'

Science attempts to
demythologize or disenchant
the
-Id, but it does so at the
expense of the
unrgueness of
each individual. Magic
retained an affinity
for
individuality
its use ofF mimesis,
y bv
y it*
"Likee science,
srihnm magic
pursues aims, but seeks
sppV fto
n achieve
them by mimesis-not
by
progressively distancing
itself from the object. "51
Mimetic magic still recognizes
the affinities are
similarities between self and
other, between the
human and
the "other" in nature.
»

*

Science in its ideological
forms is extended into
means for the control of human
nature as
well,

a

and thus

acquires the characteristics of
the very nature it first
wanted to control. Science, in
the hands of a society
dominated by the exchange principle
broadly understood,
transforms the individual into a
mere example of universal
processes, a speciman available for
control and

manipulation.
science,

The history of "development" from
magic to

from myth to enlightenment is also

a

story of the

return into the mythic, of renewed
confrontation with
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fateful necessity,

"Mythology itself
set off th
Unendl g
process of enlightenment
in which ever
^
er and again,
with t-hp
inevitability of necessity,
every specific
theoretic vi
succumbs to the destructive
criticism that it
is only a
the -ry notions
of spirit, of
truth
an
a d
indeed, enlightenment
itself have become
irseit,
h
animistic
magic. The principle
of fatal necessity.
... "52
The tendency toward
ever increased
domination is not
confined to science or
only directed toward
external
nature, but is also
the tendency of
philosophy and the
confinement of sub ectivity
:
to rational calculation.
Adorno calls this tendency
"identity thinking."
''

“

,

if

Philosophy is to break the
hold of the logic of
domination
then it must become aware
of the alternative
possibilities

of thought lodged in the
repressed fragments of
mimesis
that remain,

While doing violence to the
obiert of

obJecT^itT

3

3

KT*w

8

'

ooject, and it unconsciously
obeys the idpp n f m
amends to the pieces for what
it "has done
hlS unconscious tendency
Y/
becomes
conscious
ous
fl
Accompanying
irreconcilable thoughts is
11
J
;
the hope for reconcilement,
because the resistance of
being the commariding
freedom of th^
the subject, intends in the
object even
that which the object was deprived
by
objectification. 53

A

^

^

'

Philosophy must make conscious the
potentials of the
objects it responds to, potentials
suppressed in the
activities of identifying thought, including
the various
forms of substitution or exchange.
The
"exchange
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n

mentality" and processes
of substitute
substitution are
ideological
that the non-identical
is clai me

m
.

d to he identical

Borrowing from Hegel,
Morno asserts that
"yielding" to
the object is the only
way for its
posslbiUtles fco
expressed.
However, if the Hegelian
system is followed,
thought merely returns
on itself as a
reflection of the
subject not the revelation
of the object.

^

Adorno does not
simply reject Hegelian
dialectics, but radicalizes
it and
already radicalized forms
as presented by
Marx.
Adorno attempts to rescue
the insights Marx had
from the
Marxists who captured the
critical philosophy. The
rescue
is dedicated to the
individual and the particularity
of

nature,

"If the thought really
yielded to the object,

if

its attention were on the
object, not on its category,

the

very objects would start talking
under the lingering
eye."s4 But the theoretician
is not simply a quietistic,
meditative mystic,
True practice, the totality of
acts that would
satisfy the idea of freedom, does
indeed reguire full
theoretical consciousness
But practice also needs
something else, something physical which
consciousness does not exhaust, something
conveyed to
reason and qualitatively different from
it... The part
of action that differs from the pure
consciousness ... the part that abruptly leaps
out
this is spontaneity, o
The problem of the spontaneous response
to the object

interpretation is the mistake of seeing in the object
what is actually in the self.

This is the basis of the

analysis of "Anti-semitism" in the Dialectic. nf

245

“

'

Central to this
analysis is the
relationship of mimesis
to projection
and false
projection.
Projection is tracked
to its animal
origins
and the attempt to
survive,
in a certain sense
all perceotinn io
projection of sensory
impressions t

P^ 6011011
"

The

-

3 legac y of our
animal prehistory, a
mechanism r
and obtaining food,
6
31
an extension^/the'^K
°n
the
combative
impulse with which t-bo n-;
u
animals -»ith
or Pain--reacted to
movements lrres ective pleasure
P
of the
intentions of the object
Tn h uma
bein
has been automatized
9 s projection
like nth
^
d
behaviors which h^e'becoL

^

.

The process of projection,
(which is not entirely
different

like that of mimesis
)

>

is refined or extended

With the development of
civilization.

This development

occurs both at the social and
individual levels;
6111 ° f
things the fixed universal
order
of^/hi^h
of which science is merely
an abstract
expression, is ...the unconscious
animal organ in the struggle for product of the
existence, of
automatic projection. But in human
society,
where affective and intellectual
life are
differentiated with the formation of
the
individual, the latter requires an
increasingly
firm control over projection; he
must learn at
one and the same time to refine and
inhibit it
By learning to distinguish between
his own and’
extraneous thoughts and feelings under the
force
of economic necessity, a distinction
is made
between without and within, the possibility
of
distancing and identifying, self-awareness and
the conscience.
Further consideration is
necessary to understand the controlled
projection, and the way in which it is deformed
into false projection which is part of the
essence of anti-Semitism.^
'

—
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The "system of th f
ngs " is the set of
reiationships
are estabUshed as
the
ting identlfying
self
ernalizes fts impressions
of the world.
This process
of the human organism
is necessary for
survival, and also
results in the formation
of the "rndividual
"
However,
thrs formation is unstable,
requiring extreme effort
to
sustain it.
The "projection" of
the outside world
into
the individual psyche,
is the formation

T
-

,

.

of the self or

subject,

and requires the development
of control of the
process itself. A false
projection in a sense reverses
the process, what is
perceived as external is
actually a
representation of the subject.
The important distinction
here in the critical theorists'
explanation is between
true and false projection,
and the subsequent impacts
these will have on the individual.
The formation of the
individual is a product of this
process of projection:
In order to reflect the thing
as it is, the
subject must return to it more than
he receives
from it.
The subject creates the world
himself from the traces which it leaves outside
in his
senses: the unity of the thing in its
manifold
characteristics and states; and he therefore
constitutes the I retrospectively by learning
to grant a synthetic unity not only
to the
external impressions, but to the internal
impressions which gradually separate off from
them.
The real ego is the most recent constant
product of projection 58
'

'

.

The process of projection is a creation of both
the

external world and the internal world (the "I"),
simultaneously.

But the constancy of the external world,
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the stability of the
object,

is a product of th
the subject's

relation to the object,
which as nat
nature
constant flux.
The object's identity
is
'

'

is in a state
of

i mposed by
the
This "synthetic unity"
of the object is
the
basis for the unity of
the subject, and
the objectivity of
the subject.
These considerations
go far beyond what
has
thus far been presented
as deep ecology.

subject

.

Any attempt to overcome
the domination of
nature and
therefore create a world in
which
real freedom and

happiness are possible must
recognize the necessary
role
of critical interpretation
in
that effort.

The rescue of

nature will also be a rescue
of reason and can only
be
accomplished by attending to what
is not identical to

reason;

Only in that mediation by which
the meaningless
sensation brings a thought to the
full
d
iVl Y
Which
is capable, while on
th=
^h hand
^
t e other
the thought abandons itself
without reservation to the predominate
impression, is that pathological
loneliness
which characterizes the whole of nature
overcome.
The possibilities of reconciliation
appears not
certainty unaffected by thought,
the preconceptual unity of perception
and
object, but in their considered opposition.
The
distinction is made in the subject, which has
the external world in its own consciousness
and
yet recognizes it as something other.
Therefore
reflection, the life of reason, takes place as
conscious pro j ection

U

.

m

m

Critical interpretation is "conscious projection,"
the subject aware of the process that results in the

"synthetic unity" of the object, of nature.
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Again,

the

danger is

fal se projection,

a

one that does not
make the
necessary distinctions
between self and the
independent
objects of the external
world:

13156

Action.

fundamentally related ?o
the'repressed

fT

must^ry^fconfoL^o 'the'l “eJnn“
familiar;
•

'

tut

fal™

prij

r d

int!L?feKpe?Lnce s
s “b

j®

ectr^^^es^r

n

as

world

neS

hostu

ct wil1 n °t admit as
his

^
oTeven
ra0St

” hlCh

Hi
thoiagh they are most
assuredly so, are
attributed to the object— the
prospective
victim 60
.

False projection is

a

repressed mimesis, where the

self or subject is projected
onto the external world.
This false projection, which
results in the fear of the

other and the subsequent attempts
to master or dominate
it, is a key to understanding
the various forms
of

oppression and exploitation, including those
based on
race,

gender,

class,

and other natural categories.

To

overcome domination requires the internalization
of the
external while honoring the particularity or
individuality
of all aspects of the external world.

Foreman has an understanding of enlightenment not so
far from the implications of Adorno's analysis,
Do not misunderstand my words.
I seek after wisdom
and enlightenment, too.
I go alone into the
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wilderness in quest of
visions
t try
m Y s elf with my own
n0t to delude
self-imnort-^nA
+-

there.
Realit y is out
In the Big Outside
act:i on i n defense
of it--raw, rank,
brawling" anri
Sh
-is vastly more
it: may be “
important than al?°ri
enli 9htenment
With which I can swell
my heaS in
years in which my
consciousness exJsts?^" 1 SC ° re
’

'

'

-

Monkeywrenching

Monkey wrenching is one of
the primary means of
uncompromising defense of the
Earth.

The term is borrowed

from Ed Abbey, but Foreman
has done the most to
take it
from the somewhat romanticized
novel form to actual
widespread use in the radical
ecological movement.
Foreman continues to defend
eco-tage tactics by placing
them within a philosophical and
practical framework.

Monkeywrenching has the characteristics
of nonviolent
anarchism.
Foreman's first claim in
the defense of

monkeywrenching is that it is nonviolent,
Monkeywrenching is nonviolent resistance
to the
destruction of natural diversity and
wilderness. It
is never directed toward harming
human beings or
other forms of life.
it is aimed at inanimate
machines and tools that are destroying life.
Care is
always taken to minimize any possible threat
to
people, including the monkeywrenchers themselves ^2
.

Monkeywrenching is also "truly individual action."
It is

necessarily so because of the usually illegal nature

of the activities,

caught,

However,

carried out with the hopes of not being

therefore requiring the utmost in secrecy.
two particular incidents indicate the difficulty

of defending the nonviolence position in conjunction with
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the necessity of
secrecy.

The most notorious
case of
ecotage gone awry may
be a recent tree
spiking" case that
resulted in injuries,
although most Earth
Fi rst!ers claim
the incident does not
have the characteristics
of a true
monkeywrenching activity. 63
The logger who
was sawing a tree that
had been "spiked"
but without
notification of the activity,
so that the likelihood
of
eventual injury to timber
workers was fairly high.
This
contradicts the supposedly
ethical and strategic
use of
this technique by the
eco-defenders
All
.

^

potentially
injurious actions should be
minimized, usually by fully
informing potential victims.
.

The other aspect of
monkeywrenching,

its requirement

of secrecy,

reveals the two-edged nature
of the activity,
as it landed several ecoteurs
in prison.
Earth Firstlers
and their associates were arrested
after beginning to
execute plans for toppling electrical
power line support
towers.
When a small group of activists
began to ecotage
the tower they were surrounded by
scores of FBI
agents.

The FBI had penetrated the radical
ecology movement on the
grounds that the ecotage activity is a form
of

terrorism. 64

Foreman was arrested as

a

co-conspirator in

the action because he had helped the group
obtain some

limited financial support although everyone insists
he had
no direct knowledge of what the money was being
used for.

The guestions of nonviolence and the need for secrecy

require an explicit defense because their conjunction is
251
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_^

not recognized by those
who
Qf
crvxl disobedience,
including the civil
rights actlons
the U.S.
Direct action in defense
of civil rights
received substantial
philosophical and spiritual
justification through the
writings of Dr. Martin
Luther
King, Jr. and his
reliance on the thoughts
and actions of
Gandhi and Thoreau.
It may be illuminating
to compare the
arguments of Foreman and King
to find where they
converge
and diverge in an attempt
to determine if changed
historical circumstances
indicate a necessary change
in
tactics as well.

^

^

Foreman views monkeywrenching
as a "deliberate and
ethical" activity which is
not revolutionary. He claims
it is not the aim of ecodefense
to "overthrow" any social,

political, or economic system, "it
is merely nonviolent
self-defense of the wild." This defense
is aimed at
keeping "industrial civilization"
out of nature and to
speed its retreat from areas that should
be wild. 65

Foreman likens monkeywrenching to the
Boston Tea Party of
1773 and to the work of the Underground
Railroad preceding
the U.S. Civil War.
The philosophical and ethical dimensions
of Foreman's

defense of ecodefense may be most fully revealed in
direct

comparison to the defense of the activities of the civil
rights movement by Dr. King.

King indicated there are

four basic steps in any non-violent campaign:
"( 1

collection of the facts to determine whether
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injustices are alive,
purification, and

(4)

(2)

negotiation,

(3)self-

direct action. "66

we can compare
We
the relation of the
four steps outlined
by King along with
his additional counts
on direct action to
the activities
of the Earth First ers
The beginnings of
Earth First'
fit well with the King
model of nonviolent
campaigns. As
indicated by Rib Scarce in
his study of
the
founding members of uartn
Earth Firgf
hirst! almost uniformly
came
from activist backgrounds
that had included full
!

.

i

i

,

participation in the establishment.

Many were lobbyists

and representatives of
environmental groups, some
attempting to develop comprehensive
wilderness plans with
Congress and the Carter administration
in the
late 1970s.

Foreman is a prime example of this
very conventional
citizen activist profile; briefly a
Marine, Wilderness
Society lobbyist, committed to rational
argumentation and
negotiation.
The decision to abandon conventional

environmentalism for radical ecological activity
came only
after long years of negotiation and compromise,
which the

radicals finally realized had in fact resulted in
near
total victory for the forces of economic growth and

ecosystem destruction.

67

But the justification for the

Earth First! movement is not the same as the justification
for specific acts of monkeywrenching

.

Foreman offers many

examples of individual actions in his general defense of

monkeywrenching.

The high level of scientific knowledge

and investigation of the "facts" by Earth First! ers is
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evident in the detail
detailed arguments
that take place
In the
Pages of their Journal.
However, it is not
as Clear what
role of negotiation
is for Earth
First!
Their „ no
compromise" stand would
seem to rule out
an y negotiation,
yet in forming the
group it was recognized
that the more
radical stand they would
take would make
mainstream
environmentalism appear
moderate and reasonable
and
thereby open room for
negotiation for the
mainstreamers 68
foreman
dlrec t comments on the
difference between civil
disobedience and monkeywrenching
seem to indicate
significant deviations from
King's
'

.

.

position,

society or some aspect th^ro^-p ^
nonviolently vioUtinS the law

^

cases ls to reform
Conscl ® ntl °asly and

personal integrity.
In othpr racoe
33
against evil being done, to
refuse to acquiesce"^
erebY
Spirituall V'
In both
cas e rarres? and unlsh
h°
ment are integral elements of
P
the action?^

^

In characterizing Earth First!

;

+.

.

,

civil disobedience he

claims its motivations have differed
from those of "Gandhi
and the Civil Rights movement." Civil
disobedience by the
ecologists is "goal-directed” rather than
spiritually
directed, "Many Earth First !ers would
argue that thwarting
destructive projects is the purpose of the civil

disobedience they commit.

Although this has been my

motivation when participating in civil disobedience,
it
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is

not the classic
strategy of civil
disobedience „ 70 But
in
examining Dr King's
actual arguments
and uses of civil
obedience it is not so
clear that the
differences are
ose Foreman cites.
King asks what the
purpose is of
direct action and answers
the complaints
against it.

Nonviolent direct arfinn
crisis and establish
SUCh 3
such creativeT^®
n that 3
community that has
constantly !e!usedT°
forced to confront the
6 iS
issue! It seeks
eeKs to
t^df
!
the issue so that it
dramatize
be ^ored.
“
the purpose of ?he i
So
t
° Create a
situation so crisis-packed
e
" lU lnevita bly
open the door to
negotiation
i

.

.

.

^

Foreman does not give enough
credit to the civil
tights movement or the
radical ecology movement;
not to
the civil rights movement
because it goes beyond a
stereotype of simply seeking
idealistic
truths and

spiritual redemption, and not
enough to the radical
ecologists for acting in a
philosophically coherent
manner, action which does not
require hero-like sacrifices
of their enlightened elite."
Foreman misunderstands his
own argument,
onJceywrenchuig

can also be seen as a sophisticated
political tactic that dramatizes ecological
issues
thSm before the Public when they
otherwise
would be ignored in the media, applies
pressure to
resource-extraction corporations and government
agencies that otherwise are able to resist
legitimate" pressure from law-abiding conservation
organizations, and broadens the spectrum of
environmental activism so that lobbying by mainstream
ffrnnng
groups iso nnf
not considered "extremist ..7 7
]

rr
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Even though this paraliels
exactly the argents
of
Dr. King about the
goals of civil disobedience
and their
relationship to tactics.
Foreman characterizes
this
aspect of his argument simply
as "Machiavellian"
as mere
means-to-an-end, but this is to
misunderstand Machiavelli
as well as King.
Machiavelli s advice to the
prince was
to use whatever means
necessary to obtain or retain
his
purposes, that is, that the end
justified
•

the means.

this can lead to

But

contradiction of means and ends,
and
ethical incoherence.
Typically, Machiavelli advocated
various means to gain political
power, power
a

that then

became the means for any chosen
purpose.

However,

the

means to alternative ends tends to
become the goal itself,
so that the purpose of political
power becomes an end in
itself and therefore essentially morally
bankrupt.

King

argues that the means must be consistent
with the end,
"that ends and means must cohere" and
"the idea that means
must be as pure as the end, " not that the
means must be an
end
itself, as Foreman implies 73 Foreman

m

.

seems to

want to present monkeywrenching as a means
to an end, the
end being the promotion of biological diversity.

The

question is whether monkeywrenching in its actual
practice
is consistent with the ultimate end of expanded
wilderness

and the protection of biological diversity, usually stated

by the deep ecologists in ethical terms as the right of

particular forms of life to exist "for their own sake."
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ould be more philosophically
convincing to build
on King's observations
about the relationship of
just and
unjust laws, which King
attributes to the earlier
thought
of Saint Thomas Aquinas.
In this argument a "just
law is
a man-made code that
squares with the moral law or
the law
of God ." 74
King argues that the civil
rights
demonstrators were acting consistently
with this higher
law and the segregationists
were not.
Foreman uses the
same type of appeal to higher
laws as justification of
direct, and usually illegal,
action, "When we break unjust
political laws to obey higher ethical
laws, we must guard
against developing a laxity toward
standards
in general.

Indeed, when one deliberately engages
in civil

disobedience from time to time, one needs
to attend to
just laws with an even greater sense
of responsibility ." 75
King also gives further evidence of the
difference
between just and unjust laws by claiming
that when the

majority inflicts

a

code on the minority that is not

binding on itself, this is unjust, or "difference
made
legal,
a

or

but when the majority compels a minority to
follow

law that it is willing to follow itself, this is
just,

sameness made legal.

King continues this moral

justification of direct action by stating that true peace
exists when there is respect for the dignity and worth of

human personality.

The deep ecologists are arguing for

respecting the dignity and worth, or the "intrinsic
value," of other non-human entities.
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They indicate that

v

this is not an impossible or
even unusual attitude
to take
toward non-human nature by citing
the rituals and
prayers
of pre-modern native peoples
when they would need
to take
the life of another being, or
would in some other way
actively intervene in the relationship
with non-human
nature.
King furthermore indicates the
necessity for the
public character of direct action,

One who breaks an unjust law must
do it ooenl
lovingly
.and with a willingness to
accepttht
penalty
I submit that an
individual who breaks a
law that conscience tells him is
unjust, and
Willingly accepts the penalty by staying
in jail to
arouse the conscience of the community
over its
injustice, is in reality expressing the
veryy highest
9
respect for law 77
.

.

.

King uses the same examples as Foreman, the
Boston
Tea Party as a positive form of civil disobedience,
and

Hitler's use of what were legal means to produce
that practiced genocide.
First!,

7 ^

a

society

What is required of Earth

or the followers of deep ecology,

is to extend the

philosophical justification for their actions not distance
themselves from them.

However,

it is unclear whether the

more accurate model for radical ecological actions is
civil disobedience style direct action, or Vietnam and

Central American style guerrilla war.

The crucial

differences between strategies and justification have

significantly different impacts on social change.
Foreman's understanding about the relationship of direct

action to publicizing the actions seems ambivalent if not
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contradictory.

He claims that
monkeywrenching actions
do
not now require publicity
and that public

pronouncements

invite increased police
actions,

'•Monkeywrenching has now

received adequate media
attention, it can be
argued, and
can now be carried on
effectively without publicity
.... In
certain cases, publicity about
an action may still
serve a
worthwhile purpose; this must
be determined individually...
But on what basis should
the individual decide
to go
public and how does this relate
to possible
arrest,

time and fines?

Foreman states,

j

aU

"The goals of

monkeywrenching are to block
environmentally destructive
projects, to increase the costs
of such
projects and

thereby make them economically
unattractive, and to raise
public awareness of the taxpayer-subsidized
devastation of
biological diversity occurring throughout
the world ." 79
It would seem that "silent"
monkeywrenching only partially
accomplishes its goals if it fails to
actively engage the

public on the political and ethical levels,
instead of
merely privatizing the struggle. The

insistence on the

secretiveness of the lone ecowarrior carries with
it the
undertones of the myth of individualism which lies

at the

heart of the ideology of domination and destruction.

Foreman seems to recognize the dilemma but does not

adequately address the issues.

After repeatedly denying

the intention of reforming society or seeking its

revolutionary overthrow, he asks, "How do you change
society when you are apart from it?
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How do you understand

yourself when you
denv thp
ueny
cnri ai environment
*
me social
that
produced you? How can you gain
support for

your goals and

actions when your behavior alienates
potential
supporters? ”80 He returns to the
guerrilla war analogy to
emphasize that even in violent
confrontation, the "wise

guerrillas know that they are part
of society and need
support from the population base." 81
it would seem the
more consistent and powerful argument
and tactic would be
to follow Dr. King's insight about
the need to
use direct

action as

means of mobilizing potential supporters
and
the consciences of the opposition.
a

On the one hand Foreman awaits the day
when the truly

free society will have realized the bioregional
and

wilderness visions of reinhabitation and
neo-primevalism.
On the other hand, he claims to be against
"reform" and

unsupportive of "revolution."

This combination of being

for and against radical change results in

a

reactive if

not fully reactionary response to the abuse of nature, one

without

a

long-term strategy,

Monkeywrenching, on the other hand, is aimed not at
reforming society but at thwarting destruction.
Although a similarly high level of deliberate and
ethical behavior is required, spiritual growth is not
a specific goal of ecotage (although it may be a side
benefit)
What is important is stopping the damage;
the monkeywrencher, like the guerrilla fighter, is
more effective when avoiding capture and being able
to return again and again. 8 ^
.
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But the guerrilla fighter
has long-term purposes,
to
defeat the enemy, to drive
them from the homeland,
to
establish an alternative way
of life.
Foreman's argument
seems to contradict itself;
arguing for an expansion
of
wilderness and reinhabitation of
bioregions, but at the
same time to claim no political
objectives of reform or
revolution, just the objective to
"thwart ." 83 But in
proclaiming the objective to thwart
the government and its

industrial supporters of "development"
Foreman relies on a
too simple analysis of the
historical and political basis
for the legitimacy of the U.S.
government.
Under closer examination, it is
q uestionable whether
Foreman is taking his own arguments
seriously.

is

of

Perhaps he

practicing monkeywrenching at another level,
paper" monkeywrenching,

a

version

"In addition to illegal

ecotage, monkeywrenching can be thought of
as

strategy

a

that includes entirely legal techniques and
that operates

within the system, too

it is known as

monkeywrenching' in such cases

." 84

'paper

Are the

inconsistencies of his position, especially where they
appear most polemical and hyperbolic, in fact the paper

monkeywrenching of
Southwest?

a

weathered old cunning coyote from the

Maybe his observation of others is

a

representation of self,
Sometimes, when I hear public statements about
monkeywrenching, I feel like a Coyote strolling
through a Texas cow town and I tuck my tail between
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"

n

S

r

tracks to the

h?ns

“T 7

head and make

wink and a corner-of-the-mouth
someone's putting out leftovers smile and know
on the back
t s important, in
this funny place called
a

Ch

Ih

In his chapter on "Strategic
Monkeywrenching,
he reiterates the need for
secrecy,

on the subject

"

*

•

where

for keeping the book

(which he wrote and promotes)

"out of

sight," and on the need to choose
targets carefully to
avoid the FBI (which arrested him)
and other police
forces, it is possible to detect
a wink from Foreman's
back porch when he explains the
strategic importance of
bumper stickers, "Any conservationist
bumper sticker may
mark one as a suspect in some rural
areas.
Careful

ecoteurs may even try camouf lage--an American
flag decal
or NRA sticker.
Non-monkeywrenchers like me should
continue to brandish 'I'd Rather Be Monkeywrenching'

bumper stickers

." 86

A slight smile can be glimpsed when

he says he would not encourage anyone to
monkeywrench, but
in a footnote to such an unexpected statement,
he adds,

More important,

I

would not want to dis courage anyone

from monkeywrenching.

Those willing to commit ecotage are

needed today as never before. The advice

merely that--advice
and includes

a

.

wink,

87

I

offer here is

The smile gets a little broader

V
pearl ' har>dled
wrenches for
n
nd 3
Wilderness campfire with
a few old frie°d
good cigar, and musing
smokin 9 a
about the future
monkeywrenching in the most
generaf of
say to George and Bonnie
1 mlght
that ? have l few
\
ldeas for
monkeywrenchers who don’t want
tn
CaUght
want to be as effective
d Who
as possible 88
And of course the little
wilderness campfire should
never
be understood as a hangout
for
'

“

radicals,

-Of course,

the

above comments are gust
renderings around the fire,
smoke
rings blown into the night
air, desultory
accompaniments
to the hooting of owls.
The kind Ui
of casual
casual talk
rnr you might
have heard in a seedy Boston
waterfront tavern
in,

”

1773

say,

89

Bioregionalism
If Earth First !ers,

present and former, and deep

ecologists generally, view the retention
and expansion of
wilderness as the primary focus of
their political

agendas,

then how do human beings fit into
this neo-

primeval world?

Foreman and others suggest that

bioregionalism" is the most compatible form
of social
organization to enhance the goals of deep ecology,

which

center around the protection of biological
diversity.

Bioregional groups met in the first North American

Bioregional Congress in the Ozarks in 1984.

bioregionalism as

a

However,

way of life had gathered sufficient

momentum by 1978 that the first books dealing with the
topic began to appear,

including Peter Berg and Raymond
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Dasmann

s

R£inliii]2i1^

Reinhabitation
is a form of "living-in-place"
which,

eans following the necessities
and pleasures of life
£
as they are uniquely presented
by a particular ,h
and evolving ways to ensure
long-term occupancy of
that site A

society which practices
living“n-p?ace
keeps a balance with its region
of support^lhrouqh
links between human lives, other
living things and
the processes of the planet-seasons,
weather wear
cycles
as revealed by the place
itself,
it i s the
opposrte of a society which
mate^Liying
short-term destructive exploi^httlFllfd through
and
Foreman summarizes this concept of social

organization,

"Bioregionalism, then, is fundamentally

concerned with dwelling in place,
from the suburbs,

cities,

a

concept far removed

and farms of our continent.

Reinhabitation involves adapting yourself to the place
instead of the place to you; it means becoming part

of a

community already present--the natural community of
beasts
and birds and fish and plants and rivers and mountains
and

plains and sea ." 91
The idea of bioregionalism presents problems of

political organization especially as it relates to ideas
about the level at which community decisions should be

made which impact the relation between society and nature.
Foreman rightly points out that under present conditions
the adoption of strict local control of

a

bioregion would

have devastating ecological consequences,

While local control of the land is fine in theory and
as a long-term goal (after we truly appreciate this
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"

land and agree to adapt
ourselves tn r instead
the other way around)
of
let no
er
for “““>Ple,
that we would have littlf
D rot"Tf
other natural areas in
,"? 61 " 655 or
ios?
® " estern states
it were up to the
if
state-level pol
5
residents of those states
rural
on(?ress is a °l
beacon of ecoloairai ori n .... Congress^
shining
-st state S?sia
?o
yet to a rural
county commission. 92
•

i

,

'

,

.

'

Foreman views the process
of converting society
from
its present incarnation,
emphasizing technology,
industry
and growth, to one which is
ecologically aware,

as that of

"reinhabitation."

The bioregion would center
around the

expansion of wilderness areas,
but would include "natural
corridors established to allow
for the free flow of

genetic material between them and
to such preserves in
other bioregions. "93 This process
is not one of mere
preservation of existing systems but
would at
least

initially,

require active intervention,

"in many cases,

temporary transitional management will
be needed to help
nature restore suitably large areas to
wildness.

Extirpated native animals should be introduced
if
possible.
If salmon streams need to be repaired,
clearcuts rehabilitated, prairies replanted,
roads

removed

then that becomes the hands-on work of

reinhabitation. 94
The central political question for this project of

reinhabitation is how it relates to present political
structures.

One of the problems of addressing the needs

of the bioregions is how those needs can be represented.

The bioregionalists see the bioregion as
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a

substitute or

supersession of the
nation-state.
Peter Berg has
attempted to express the
necessity of transforming
politics from its nation-state
basis to the bioregion.
It's time to develop the
e

“—

?he naiu? a rsystems°that
“^“^tainlng
m ely SUpP ° rt a11
Bioregions are the natural
life.
11
lives.
Re inhabit at ion^of^bioregions
yone
adaptive cultures that follow
the
characteristics of climate,
watersheds sol
orms, and native plants
land
and animals that Hof’
6
these places, is the
appropriate
£
3
transition from Late Industrial direction
society. §5
in an interview with
Berg has gone
into some detail about the
relationship of bioregional
possibilities as an alternative
to the nation-state,
"Bioregion as a location is an
ecological context. Who
are you?~I am a person who
lives in a place that contains
other life, in ecosystems, and I
am part of those
processes; I am part of my bioregion.
You can be part of
your bioregion, but it's getting
harder and harder to be a

^ ^

unigSe^
,

member of

a

,

nation state, in good faith, because
the

planetary biosphere doesn't have nation
states." 96
explains the idea of the bioregion as an

Berg

organizational

principle that develops out of the expansion
of the idea
of ecology beyond its narrow understanding
as

a scientific

field.

Berg believes the ideas of ecology will have
as
revolutionary an effect on life in the future as
physics
has had since the early days of the modern period.

Even

the word ecology only came to mass consciousness with
the
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"

work of Rachel Carson in
1963 with the
publication of
"These ideas from the
natural sciences
started to come over into
popular consciousness

not as

tools to disassemble nature,
but to see it, to
sanctity. 97

^

its

In commenting on the
relationship of bioregion
to

nation-state, Berg also attacks
the myth of the
proletariat,
What is the role of the nation
state? it seems that
it s_a very destructive one
from a biospheric point
of view.
Not only is it replaceable,
it probabw
must be replaced by another view.
Should my
r
1
h
ani
? ° r should the
y be human
species in the biosphere?
h°
Probably human species in
I
ih!
the biosphere.
Should they be the workers of
the
world:
No, the managers have to lose
their chains
1S thS PUr P° Se of 9 r °wth in the
economy?
Whai rs
What
is the
?he purpose of progress? It
seems
that
r
n
-r-o
Hnof
they're
destructive purposes. y y

™

d

«=>\7

y

f

Berg compares the dying "industrial"
society to the
emerging ecological one.
In the industrial era, the image was
material
progress, transforming things, mutating things,
changing their being, their shape, their chemistry,
their nuclear components, changing everything about
them!
Whereas I think self-reliance, sustainability,
climax, states of succession those are good images
for the ecological era.
And a lot of people can
relate to them.
They have a lot of lessons to teach
about human interaction. 99

Berg believes the new ecological consciousness will

manifest itself in terms of "political locatedness
will result in

a

.

"

"bioregional consciousness" that will
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This

.

,

seek political autonomy for the
separate bioregions, but
Berg's vision seems naive and idealized
in retrospect,
In Europe, the boundaries of
ethnic peoples can often
be considered roughly bioregional
... As
become more desperate to control their nation spates
situations
they impose more on the regions,
bioregions, anS
ethnic peoples, and by so doing create
in them a
desire for a separate identity, and a
feeling of
deliberate repression of their values. 100

Against these assertions, the "ethnic
cleansing" at
the root of the disintegration of the former
Yugoslavia

should give pause to any utopian assertion of
the
natural

tendency toward harmony should humans organize

themselves politically on the basis of
localism.

a

fetishized

Finally, Berg puts the emerging ecological

consciousness in political revolutionary terms;
For us to become liberated from such lateindustrial forms of control, it seems to me that
we need an image, a vision without which we
cannot survive.
That's what 'freedom' was,
beginning in the 18th century.
Freedom suddenly
became a flame.
People would die for freedom.
Think of the Paris Commune: people were so
desperate to revise society in an egalitarian
way that they seized part of Paris and said, 'We
will live or die to be this way.
Well, I see
us literally dying and not living if the
depredations on the planet continue. and so a
vision that is worth living for is what I'm
hoping to get from wilderness
'

The North American Bioregional Congress has met since
1984,

and the bioregionalists involved have developed

complex and thoughtful approaches to the development of

bioregional politics and consciousness.
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Bill Devall,

"

committed to deep ecology
and bioregional ism
states,
"Bioregional movements are
political and
social

expressions of our vital need
to be part of/ not
apart
from, the place wherein
102
we dwell
Although
bioregionalism may contain the
potential
.

for new political

forms,

for abandoning nation-states
and multinational

corporations,

it has not sufficiently
addressed the

repression of internal nature
which when released may
take
its revenge in new levels of
domination
such as in the

former Yugoslavia, a revenge of
nature modeled on
fascism.
Foreman recognizes that the
goals of the radical
ecologists presently have an
unachievable utopian quality
about them, and in this he may share
some of the pessimism
of critical theory,
Perhaps it is. a hopeless quest. But
one who loves
arth can do no less. Maybe a species
will be saved
St
11
UnCUt ° r a dam Wil1 be torn down.
SavbP
Maybe nnr
not.
A monkeywrench thrown into the gears
of
the machine may not stop it.
But it might delay it
make it cost more. And it feels good to
put it
there. UJ

T

T
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CHAPTER

6

SOCIAL ECOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY

Social Ecology and critical theory are
in

relationship.

a

complex

The philosophy of social ecology
is

primarily the work of one person, Murray
Bookchin, who has
attempted since the 1950s to combine the
insights of

radical social thought with those of ecology
and

evolutionary biology.

His first book, under the pseudonym

of Lewis Herber, Our Synthetic Environment
in 1962,

f

was published

the same year as Rachel Carson's Silent Spring

However, the most complete statement of his philosophy
is

found in The—Ecology of—Freedom in which Bookchin
brings

together ideas and observations from more than twenty
years of thought into a sustained argument for the

development of an ethics grounded in ecology and
evolution.

This claim for an "objectively grounded"

ecological ethics is the focus of social ecology and the
source of its influence on the radical ecology movement.
It is also the basis for many criticisms which come from

two principle directions; the deep ecologist or

ecocentrist wing of the ecology movement, and from
critical theorists who fundamentally identify with the

work of Habermas.

Bookchin himself at times argues that

social ecology is an extension and correction of the work
of the early critical theorists, Horkheimer, Adorno, and

Marcuse.

Any serious examination of the philosophy of
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social ecology must also
examine these relationships.
this chapter Bookchin's
claims for the adequacy
of his
approach for addressing the
ecological
crisis,

:

n

that his

"dialectical naturalism" overcomes
the limitations of
other philosophies of radical
ecology as well as the
problems of the various versions
of critical theory,
will
be explored.
In the next chapter the
resulting social
ecology understanding of
subjectivity will be examined
to
determine its adequacy for addressing
the ecological
crisis.
Chapter 8 will then provide an
overview of the
resulting recommendations or
restrictions on politics as
they relate to the subject of
social
ecology.

Dialectical Naturalism

Bookchm has attempted

to summarize the philosophical

basis for social ecology in the term
"dialectical

naturalism." 1

it is frequently difficult to
understand

what Bookchin's arguments actually mean as
is evident from
the wide range of interpretations his work
receives,
as

well as his own responses to criticism.

At the risk of

yet another misinterpretation it will be helpful
to

summarize the major thrust of his argument.

Bookchin conceives of his work as an attempt to
combine the insights of dialectics with those of
of natural evolution.

a

theory

He traces his understanding of

dialectics from Aristotle to where it reached its "high
point," in the logical works of Hegel, but, Bookchin
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b

argues,

Hegel

of diaiectics

'

s

was not the fullest
possible

This can only occur,
he claims, by
"naturalizing the dialectic. -2
This dialectic
differs
from the dualism that
Plato offered, a dualism
which
underlies what Bookchin calls
"conventional reason."
.

Conventional reason is controlled
by the identity
principle (the critique of
which was the primary
concern
of all of Adorno's work),
"Conventional

reason rests on
identity, not change; its
fundamental principle is
that &
the famous 'principle of
identity,' which means
that any given phenomenon can
be only itself and cannot
be
other than what we immediately
perceive it to be
at a

given moment in time.

change

It does not address the
problem of

." 3

Conventional reason seeks logical
consistency,
the application of the identity
principle,
but does not

explore the process of change
systematically as
of development that includes reason
itself.

a

process

The Platonic

dualism of identity and change, claims
Bookchin, "echoed"
through Western philosophy until the
nineteenth
century

when dialectical thinkers explored how
"unity itself
actually consists of the unity of opposites ." 4
Bookchin
claims Hegel basically solved the paradox of
how "self-

persistence" is achieved through change.

Dialectical

reason expresses the developmental notion of reality
by

claiming that A equals— oth A and not A

.

An entity is not

only what it is at this moment but also what it is
becoming.

It contains a latent potential which,
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under

appropriate conditions, will
come to manifest
itself.
This is sometimes expressed
as the identity of
identity
and non-identity, or the unity
of opposites.
Bookchin
claims "dialectic" has been
misused, even by
Hegel,

made it into

a

cosmological system resembling

a

who

theology,

as Absolute Knowledge,

the result of the unfolding
logic
of the contradiction and
resolution of the contradiction,
of identity and non-identity.
This was "even labeled
’God' by Hegel ." 5
In order to correct this
theological
misuse of dialectic, Bookchin proposes
to introduce the
idea of the theory of evolution into
dialectical thought.

Bookchin sees the dialectic, when
combined with
post-Hegel theory of evolution, as the

a

solution to the

philosophical problems of the ecology movement.

He

generally characterizes other forms of
philosophies of
ecology,

especially deep ecology, as mystical and

irrational.

The danger presented by these other

ecological philosophies is that most of their concepts
are

"unnecessarily vague," and in their worst forms they are
misanthropic, anti-intellectual and contain the potential
for a very reactionary politics.

A crucial point in Bookchin'

s

explication of the

origins of dialectics is his claim that dialectics, and

dialectical reason, must be emphasized as
should not be viewed simply as
reason is not only

a

a

"method."

a

"process" and

Dialectical

way of thinking about causality or

way to analyze the relationship of an entity to what it
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a

might become, but is also
an ontology,
the objective world,

a

"Dialectic is also,

ontological form of causality.

it is,

description of
in fact,

in effect,

way of reasoning about causality
in the form of
development and, simultaneously,

an

both

a

a

an account of the

objective world.
ontology. "6

The

Logic,

in Hegel's work,

joins hands with

i ogical

categories are developed by
means
of what Bookchin calls "eductive
thinking" (as distinct
from deductive or inductive which
he identifies with
conventional reason), so that the "category”
develops
toward its latent or implicit possibilities.
The

dialectical development of the categories
is part of the
process of the Becoming of Being, that is,
dialectical

"causation" is the "differentiation of potentiality
into
actuality in the course of which each new
actuality

becomes the potentiality for further differentiation
and

actualization." 7

Aristotle

s

Bookchin understands Hegel and

interpretation of causality as "emergent,

"

the

becoming explicit of the implicit in the "unfolding of its
latent form and possibilities." 8

Hegel uses the example

of the development of an acorn into an oak tree to

indicate that development does not "go in just any

direction," in indefinite change, but toward that which
fulfills its potential.

influenced" language,

a

In Hegel's "theologically

thing or phenomenon must unfold or

develop toward its perfection, and if it fails in this

unfolding of its potential it is "inadequate" to its final
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form or idea,

it is "imperfect."

Hegel's theologically

influenced understanding of
contradiction
the working out of the dialectic,

is

expressed in

"The whole course of the

dialectic culminates in the 'Absolute'
which is 'perfect'
in its fullness, wholeness,
and unity ." 9

Bookchin claims his own dialectical
naturalism
overcomes this theological understanding
of development
inherited from Aristotle and Hegel,
"Dialectical
naturalism, on the contrary, conceives
contradiction as
distinctly natural in the sense that things
and phenomena
are incomplete and unactualized in their

development— not

imperfect' in any idealistic or supranatural
sense ."-*- 9

Dialectical naturalism, instead of terminating
in an
absolute, whether labeled the Ideal or God or
something
else,

attempts to "advance

a

vision" of ever-increasing

fullness or wholeness that includes

differentiation and subjectivity ." 11
i-

o i a t i on s hip

s

"richness of
It is in the

of evolution to subjectivity that most

criticisms of Bookchin'
Bookchin'

a

s

project have been generated.

understanding of the relationship of

dialectical naturalism to subjectivity is at the core of
his attempt to develop an "objective ethics" that could

serve as

a

guide to ecological action and the development

of an ecological society.

A closer examination of the

relationship of dialectical naturalism and subjectivity
will take place in the next chapter, but

a

brief overview

will serve to introduce two other "methodological" issues;
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Bookchin's rejection of Marx,
and the rejection of
the
early Frankfurt School
position, which is staged
on

related but not identical
grounds.

Bookchin understands social
ecology as presenting an
alternative to the "despair" of
the "Frankfurt Schoolover its inability to adequately
address the "problem of
objective ethics. "12 Bookchin
claims the establishment
of
an objective ethics would
provide guidance
for the

development of "ecocommunities" which
would live in
balance with nature, and just as
importantly, would
constitute a liberated and truly just
society.
Bookchin
believes the establishment of an objective
ethics
is

possible based on the philosophy of social
ecology.
By
ecologizing" the dialectic received from
the tradition
extending from Aristotle through Hegel, he
believes
dialectics can be removed from its absolutist
tendency and
provide the possibility for the development of

subjectivity without any predetermined terminal point.

To

achieve this, Hegelian dialectics must be "greatly

modified," beginning with

a

shift of emphasis from the

notion of "strife," most often translated as "antithesis,"
toward differentiation and "mutuality."

Bookchin's

dialectical naturalism replaces strife or conflict as the
basis for progress with an "ecological view" of progress
as the growing or increase of self-consciousness and

mutuality.

He claims "the organic" creates forms,

relationships, processes and environments for itself
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through its metabolic activity,
and this activity of selfmaintenance involves a "rudimentary
subjectivity ." 13 The
organism must be able to identify
itself
in at least some

basic form for it to maintain
its life-form as a unique
whole.
But beyond maintenance of its
organic integrity,

Bookchm claims the organism "strives"
that what it is,

evolution,

to become other

"Conceived dialectically, organic

like social development,

is,

in a very loose

way,

subjective in that life-forms and the
communities
they establish, strive to be other than
what
." 14
they are

This striving of life yields "increasing
degrees of

subjectivity" as qualitatively new "attributes"
and

interrelationships" are actualized from the
potentials of
life.

This qualitatively new form of life can
occur at

the level of biotic,

communal, or social organization.

The emergence of new degrees of subjectivity
expresses and

radically conditions "the fact that
emerged,

opening

a

a

new potential has

new realm of possibility with its own

unique self-directive mode of activity ." 15

Viewed

historically and cumulatively the results of the
actualizations of potential "constitute
continuum."

a

developmental

Bookchin summarizes this view of dialectics,

Emerging from this superb, basically Hegelian,
ensemble is a world that is always ethically
problematic, an ethics that is always objective, a
recognition of selfhood and subjectivity that
embodies nonhuman and human nature, and a development
from metabolic self-maintenance to rational selfdirection that thereby locates the origins of reason
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But this basically Hegelian
dialectics needs a theory
of evolution as a corrective
to the "hard teleological

predeterminations" it acquired from
the Greeks and from
17
Christianity
it is "only ecology that
can ventilate
the dialectic" and bring about
an end to the "hard
.

teleology" of previous versions of
dialectics.

The

inclusion of ecology in dialectics
makes it "co-extensive
with natural evolution ." 18 A theory
of natural evolution
that ecology provides would not only
correct the hard

teleological tendencies of dialectic, but
the dialectic
would then serve as a "source of meaning" for
natural
evolution; not only a source of rational meaning,

but also

ethical meaning.

As part of the natural world, human

beings must inevitably intervene in nature, Bookchin
asserts,

and the result of this "natural" intervention is

the creation of a "second nature" out of first nature,

"By

second nature,

I

mean humanity's development of

human culture,

a

wide variety of institutionalized human

communities, an effective human technics,

symbolic language, and

nutriment

." 19

a

a

a

uniquely

richly

carefully managed source of

This second nature was produced through

a

"highly graded" and "many phased" evolution resulting in
social institutions, various forms of human interaction,
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"

,

and "in the best of cases,
a mutuality between
first and
second nature that enriched
both natures ." 20
The ecological crisis then
is a crisis of "the
emergence of society out of biology"
that resulted from
the contradictions of "hierarchy,
domination, patriarchy,
classes, and the State." 2 ! This
understanding of the
origins of the ecological crisis is
what prompts Bookchin
to use the term "social ecology,"
which is intended to
emphasize the Sfl sial origins of the
crisis, and the fact
that the "resolution of this social
crisis can only be
achieved by reorganizing society along
ecological lines,

imbued with an ecological philosophy and
sensibility ." 22
The resolution of the social crisis
requires an objective
ethics which can be found in dialectical
naturalism.

Humanity is the "embodiment of nature rendered
selfconscious and self-reflexive,

"

at least potentially.

This

is not the present social condition since this
potential
is currently "filled by blind market-oriented
interests

and an egoistic marketplace mentality ."^ 0

Bookchin states

that an objective ecological ethics has not yet been

"rationally developed,

"

but at a minimum this future ethic

must include the idea of "human stewardship of the

planet ."^ 4

Planetary stewardship would involve the

"radical integration" of first and second nature,

including the development of new ecocommunities

ecotechnologies

,

and "an abiding ecological sensibility

that embodies nature's thrust towards self-ref lexivity
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.

20

This would be nature acting
on itself "rationally
based
on "coordinates created
by nature's potential
for freedom
and conceptual thought," an
objective ethics attempting
to
define "what-could-be" as the
realm of "objective
26
possibility ."
Tn a
truly ecological society
second
nature would be first nature
rendered self-reflexive,
thinking nature could now
self-consciously "guide its own
evolution." Ecological society would
be a transcendence
of both first and second nature
in what Bookchin calls a
fr££ nature.
This would not involve a collapse
of either
first into second nature or vice-versa,
as each would
retain its "specificity and integrity."
Bookchin claims
this simply would be an expression
or extension of natural

m

evolutionary tendencies,

"Humanity,

far from diminishing

the integrity of nature, would add the
dimension of

freedom,

reason,

evolution to

a

and ethics to first nature and raise

level of self-ref lexivity that has always

been latent in the very emergence of the natural world ." 27
This does not give humans free rein over nature since

natural evolution also "confers responsibility" on human

beings because of their unique capacities to think

conceptually and "feel
life."

a

deep empathy for the world of

Humanity thus has the responsibility to reverse

the destruction and devastation of the biosphere, to

intervene in natural processes, and potentially to be as

creative as "natural evolution itself."

This

understanding of the potential and responsibilities of
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human beings shifts the analysis
of ecological problems
to
the question of the ways human
beings will intervene
in

nature.

Whether "humanity" will become
conscious of
itself as a tendency in natural
evolution or not, whether
human beings come to act as
responsible moral
and

ecological agents, is a social problem,
according to
Bookchin, which requires a specifically
s ocial ecology for
its solution.
In various contexts Bookchin has
elaborated on why he

believes other philosophical orientations
would not
adequately address specific ecological problems,

or the

ecology crisis generally.

Deep ecology has received

severe criticism for its irrational, mystical
and

frequently reactionary tendencies 29
.

He has also rejected

various forms of systems theory and other neo-positivist
attempts to conceptualize the ecological crisis,

frequently making use of arguments that closely resemble
those of the early Frankfurt School 20
.

He also rejects

orthodox Marxism in much the same way, but extends his

criticism of Marxism to the "Neo-Marxism" of the critical
theorists,

including Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse.

Bookchin’

critique of the critical theorists hinges on

s

his understanding of the relationship between domination

and hierarchy.

Even though this understanding is the

basis for Bookchin'

s

claims about the fundamental

differences between social ecology and early critical
theory,

it is not clear what he believes to be the
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continuing link between the two.

He sometimes seems to

fundamentally dismiss critical
theory but at other times
appears to be declaring himself
the rightful heir to the
earlier project, in opposition
to Habermas.
This position
forces Bookchin to respond to
attacks not only from
deep

ecologists or ecocentrists
wing of critical theory,

a

,

but also from the Habermasian

response that includes

a

challenge to its claim to the heritage
of critical theory;
ls

tr
lc th at Adorno could not remove
what Buckf9
orss calls
"the taboo against positivity." To
do so
would entail a "reconstruction" of
humanity’s
relation with nature in terms of a radical
social
ecology according to which the graded
(i.e. mediated)
development of natural history into social
history
ceases to be teleologically pregiven in the
emergence
o
capitalism and the notion of humanity's
domination
of nature--a notion of domination that
has its roots
the domination of human by human. ... Social
ecology, which was unknown to the Frankfurt
School
except in a very technical form, could have
provided
the mediations that would have spared nature
philosophy and a naturalistic ethics from the stigma
it acquired as a result of a static Hellenic
ontology, National Socialist "folk philosophy" and
Marxism's "diamat." jl

m

Even though in his battle with those faithful to
Habermas, Bookchin seems to nestle close to Adorno and

early critical theory, at other times he leaves the

impression of an unbridgeable gulf between critical theory
and social ecology:

"Despite some recent nonsense to the

effect that the 'Frankfurt School' reconnoitered

a

nonhierarchical and ecological view of society's future,
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in no

V

”

sense were its most able thinker:

notably

M.ix

•

I

<

seems to depend on the "resoluteness"
of the critique of
hierarchy and domination. The respective
critiques
of

hierarchy and domination therefore require
analysis.

a

fuller

Before moving to that task however, the
charge

of "Pessimism" deserves comment.

Bookchin reiterates the

charge in several places with phrases such as
"Theodor

Adorno and Max Horkheimer's dark pessimism," or
"Reason,
whose defeat at the hands of Horkheimer and Adorno
evoked
so much pessimism among their colleagues ."'

1

The

arguments of Hu lot Kentor against Habermas's
I

"pessimistic" reading of Adorno would also apply to
Bookchin'

s

charges, but it is not necessary to look any

further that Bookchin himself to weaken the charge of

pessimism; "To simply designate Adorno 'pessimistic'
cheap shot."

;/|

is a

It is in the explanation of why the

description of Adorno as "pessimistic" is unfitting that
Bookchin stakes his claim most clearly to the legacy of
the early critical theorists,

Adorno was a transitional figure whose pulsating
contrariety and focus on the non-identity of the
object with the concept advanced a powerful
perspective for clearing the air of ossified notions
of reason,

history,

progress, conformity,
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anarchism against which he

Social ecology’s claim to
have developed Adorno's
perspective on non-identity is
dependent on Bookchin’s
ability to clarify the difference
between domination and
hierarchy, and place the concern
with hierarchy at the
center of the analysis of the
ecological crisis.

Domination
Bookchin tends to collapse Horkheimer
and Adorno's
understanding of the domination of nature
into an orthodox
Marxist or economic reductionist perspective
based on the
subsequent required interpretation of Marx's own

understanding of the relationship of domination
to labor.
Bookchin believes the critical theorists' analysis
of

reason and of the trajectory of civilization are
dependent
on a certain Marxist understanding of the domination
of

nature.

Indeed, human reason, in their view, was hopelessly
tainted by its origin (as they understood it) as a
means for dominating nature a vast, presumable
civilizatory enterprise that also required the
domination of human by human as mere instruments of
production. Marxist theory saw human servitude and
the development of classes as unavoidable steps in
humanity's 'tortured' march toward freedom from
material want and, hopefully, from social domination
itself. 36

—
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Bookchin claims this understanding
of the process of
vilization was taken for granted
as fundamental by all
members of the Frankfurt School,
'

and it was this

conception of the role of domination
in the development of
civilization that eventually led
to their "fatalism."
This Marxist basis of their
analysis led them to conclude
that any attempt at liberation
or emancipation was

"hopelessly tainted by the need to
dominate nature and
consequently -man .’" 37
Bookchin is claiming that Marx’s
emphasis on the necessity of the domination
of nature for
human survival and for the development
of human

subjectivity imposes

a

burden on his theory which

logically results in an inevitable total

instrumentalization of human reason and society.
Alternatively, Bookchin argues, domination is
"thoroughly
social" in that it begins within society and is
then

transferred onto the relationship of humans and external
nature.

This is the basis for the centrality of the

"social" in social ecology,

Various modes of social institutionalization, not
modes of organizing human labour (so crucial to
Marx), led to domination.
Hence, domination can be
removed only by resolving problematics that have
their origins in hierarchy and status, not simply in
class and the technological control of nature.
Domination, in effect, is not eluctably wedded to
human survival in a "hostile" natural world, as Marx
and the Frankfurt School believed, but to farreaching institutional changes 38
.
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Bookchm claims the relationship

of domination to

nature is "radically reversed"
in social ecology in
comparison to the Marxist
understanding.
The domination
of nature did not begin
with interaction with nature
as a
basis for survival, but as part
of the

institutionalization of social relationships
based on
"natural" differences, most
importantly differences that
result in the development of
"gerontocracies" in which the
young were "placed in varying
degrees of servitude
to the

old,

and in patriarchies where women
were placed into the
servitude of men.
Since the domination of nature did
not
start in the effort to "control" nature
or natural forces,

nature then can be seen as a "ground for
freedom" as
opposed to the basically "Victorian image

of nature" which

views it as "blind, mute, cruel, and stingy."

These

claims must be examined in detail to illuminate
the real

differences and similarities between social ecology
and
critical theory, and to generate possible alternative

interpretations of the self-understanding of the critical
theorists

Bookchin's understanding of the thrust of the
critical theory argument and its limitations is dependent
on the relationship he sees between critical theory and

Marxism.

Bookchin's analysis of Marxism is done largely

through the spectacles of

a

scientistic interpretation.

Bookchin admits that the question of the "scientific

methodology" of Marx can be read in many ways, but he
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chooses to read it in

a

fairly narrow sense.

Bookchin's

central concern here is with the
"scientistic" Marx who
attempts to reveal the "natural laws"
of economic
movement.
Especially of concern to Bookchin is
Marx’s
claim that "the economic formation
of society... is a

process of natural history."

Bookchin claims it is in the

Marxian dialectic's claims about the concept
of
"lawfulness" that the project shows its ultimate
theoretical and political bankruptcy
The crucial issue here is how to read
Marx's

interpretation of capitalism and its place in "natural
history."

Bookchin's reading exemplifies the typical

critique of Marx's tendency toward "scientism, economic
reduct ionism,

and technological determinism.

"

It is

claimed that Marx views the objectification of nature for
human purposes as the fundamental relationship between
humans and external nature, that in fact it is precisely
to the extent that the human species makes nature an

object of production that it can be distinguished from

other animal forms of life.
class struggle,

History, as the history of

is the story of the appropriation of

production surplus by
laboring ruled class.

a

ruling class at the expense of the

With capitalism, the process of

exploitation is extended in all directions, but, in this

version of the interpretation, capitalism also
revolutionizes all relationships in society and makes

possible

a

new form of society which will eliminate the
294

exploitation of labor through class
structure.
One of the
central questions then is the "necessity"
of capitalism
and the extent to which the domination
of nature is viewed
as the basis for the future free
society.
Under
Bookchin's interpretation, and the orthodox
Marxist
interpretation, the domination of nature must
extend
itself as far as possible to pave the way for
eventual

emancipation.

The development of technology is then

viewed as the basis for freedom, since only complete
domination of nature makes nature the totally subjugated
object of ever expanding human needs.

The ability to

fashion nature as desired is the sign of human freedom.

Technical control of nature is then the project and

definition of human reason.

The organization of society

is therefore challengeable only on the basis of its

rationality, that is,

its ability to dominate nature in

order to extract use from nature that fulfills human
needs.

Society is challenged on the basis of its

rationality in this narrow, instrumental, sense.

In

Bookchin's version of this story,
Marx, while he may have joined Hegel in a commitment
to consciousness and freedom as the realization of
humanity's potentialities, has no inherent moral or
spiritual criterion for affirming this destiny. The
entire theory is captive to its own reduction of
ethics to law, subjectivity to objectivity, freedom
Domination now becomes admissible as
to necessity.
"precondition" for liberation, capitalism as a
"precondition" for socialism, centralization as a
"precondition" for decentralization, the state as a
"precondition" for communism. 40
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Bookchin interprets this to mean that
domination can
only be challenged on the basis of
the "objective
laws"

Marx has described in economic terms,
where domination is
elevated to the status of natural fact."
Even though
Marx did not intend the rise of totalitarian
society as
the embodiment of a society based on
these understandings
of domination, his understanding of the
domination of

nature means there are "no inherent ethical
considerations

m

his theoretical apparatus" that would lead in
another

direction 41

This lack of an ethical orientation outside

.

the domination of nature is for Bookchin "the fatal
flaw"
of Marxism that then carries over into Frankfurt School

thought,

creating the absence in critical theory, or so

Bookchin claims, of
ethics

"4

‘

a

grounding for an "objective

1-

.

There are of course other interpretations of Marx,
but the most important in relation to Bookchin'

assertions is that of Adorno.

One of the central

questions for determining the difference between Adorno's

negative dialectics and Bookchin'

s

social ecology is: What

is the relation between domination and history,

domination and society or culture?

or

Bookchin asserts that

critical theory is still in the "thrall" of Marxism, in

particular the scientistic version of Marxism that views
domination not only as

a

necessary moment in the dialectic

of freedom and necessity, but domination as the very basis

of freedom,

a

domination destined to continue even after
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a

"proletarian victory."

Central to this perspective is

Bookchin 's claim about the status of
"natural law" in
Marx's work, and the necessarily instrumental
approach to
nature that this entails. Bookchin acknowledges
that a

scientistic reading based on the Preface to Capi tal
may be
objected to on the basis of other passages in the

Grundrisse as well as in C apita l itself, but, he insists,
the scientistic reading is the more authentic,

"What

decisively unites both the scientism of physics and the

Marxian Dialectic, however, is the concept of 'lawfulness'
itself

— the

preconception that social reality and its

trajectory can be explained in terms that remove human
visions,

cultural influences, and most significantly,

ethical goals from the social process

." 43

Bookchin

includes the "Frankfurt School" in this assessment,
Like Marx, the Frankfurt School had a typical
Victorian image of nature. Nature was seen as a
"domineering" force over humanity that human guile-and the class rule--had to exorcise before a
classless society was possible.
The Frankfurt
School, no less than Marxism, in effect, placed the
onus for domination on a "blind," "mute," "cruel,"
and "stin
society 4 F'

nature,

not

(let me emphasize)

only on

.

Bookchin establishes only two interpretive
possibilities,

a

dichotomously structured choice of

positions, regarding the issue of the domination of
nature; either the domination of nature begins with the

human domination of nature, necessarily extending into the
whole of society, and presenting itself as the avenue to
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freedom (this being "Marxian dialectics"),
or,
to social ecology)

(according

the idea of domination originated in

the domination of one part of society
over another,

and

only then extended to the unnecessary
domination of
nature
At one level this can be seen as merely

a

restatement

of the difference between Marx and Hegel in their

respective interpretations of the master-slave dialectic.
For Hegel the struggle for self-consciousness involves
the

"struggle unto death" between two consciousnesses which,
if it does not end in death for one of the parties,

to the enslavement of one by the other.
f -consciousness

is that the slave,

in order to serve the master,

leads

The paradox of

in working on nature

finds his consciousness

objectified within the nature on which he works.
Ironically,

the slave comes to see his "self,

that of the master, objectified in the world.

"

rather than

Marx alters

this labor theory of self-objectification to ground his

claim that within the interaction between humans and
nature in the working-up of nature into useful objects can
be found the beginnings of the domination of nature and of
the creation of the truly human species.

Similarly,

the

common participation in labor by the proletariat in the
factory serves as the basis for the development of "class

consciousness" which eventually leads to revolution.

Bookchin is reenacting this Hegelian versus Marxian

understanding of the basis for social domination but in
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slightly altered terms.
innovations

Bookchin believes his

based on the inclusion of
his theory of
evolution and on his interpretation
of the origins
,

of

civilization,

are a more adequate
interpretation of the
origins of domination, and
therefore provide a more

coherent basis for overcoming
domination.

The claims made

for social ecology depend on
the adequacy of Bookchin'

understanding of the relationships
between evolution and
subjectivity, between hierarchy and

domination, and on the

adequacy of alternative interpretations
of these.
difference between social ecology and

The

critical theory

hinges on the interpretation of natural
history in
relation to social history.
This is the reason for

Bookchin

'

s

concentration on the relationship in Marxism

between domination and "natural law" and the
resulting

possibility for

a

society free of domination, that

is,

free of the "necessity" of domination.

How might Marx be otherwise interpreted, or more
importantly, do the members of the early Frankfurt School

subscribe to the interpretation Bookchin attributes to
them?

Specifically, does Theodore Adorno hold to this

understanding of Marx, and, if not, where can we locate

a

break in the chain of the history of domination, or in

Adorno's terms, an end to the dialectic of enlightenment?
Adorno interprets Marx as fully within the dialectic
tradition, not simply as another positivistic scientist.

An adequate interpretation of the claim in the Preface of
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that the comprehension
of the economic formation
of society is a "process
of natural history"
revealed by
its "natural laws"
requires a truly dialectical

understanding of natural history
and the status of
natural law within that history.
Adorno claims that
Marx rather than Hegel most
fully understood that, "The
objectivity of historic life is
that of natural

history. "4o

This understanding does not
reduce society to
the deterministic, fatalistic,
predictability of matter in
motion, but conceives of the
structures of domination in
society as having the force to continue
despite the

consciousness of individuals.

The status of the

operations of domination are "laws" because
of their
ideological status,
The so-called law of nature that is merely
one of
capitalist society, after all, is therefore
called
mystification by Marx.
.That law is natural
because of its inevitable character under the
prevailing conditions of production.
Ideology is not
superimposed as a detachable layer on the being of
society: it is inherent in that being.
It rests upon
abstraction, which is of the essence of the exchange
process. Without disregard for living human beings
there could be no exchange.
'

.

.

This "natural law" has the same status as myth,

true and untrue.

it is both

It mystifies a relationship as "natural"

that is in fact thoroughly social and therefore

potentially changeable.
as a law,

The structures of domination act

as a "universal," because they act "over the
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heads

of the particular
subjects involved.

Marx makes

this clear,

other way round, having objective
wealth
the worker's need to develop. ^7

m

a

Adorno elaborates on this interpretation
ion of Marx, but
way that does not collapse Marx's
understanding of

the relationship of society and nature
into the

scientistic understanding Bookchin attributes
to him.
The
scientistic interpretation of Marx may have been
necessary
for critics to adopt at a certain time in
history, when

the Soviet dominated interpretation of the
"sacred texts"

was the orthodoxy with which all opposing views
would

organize themselves, but with the political collapse of
that totalitarian state it is appropriate to develop

interpretation and critigue on

a

more rigorous reading.

If the object of criticism then is the systematic

distortions of Marx, Adorno would be in agreement with the
gist of Bookchin'

s

claim,

Only such a perverter of Marxian motives as Diamat
which prolongs the realm of necessity by avowing that
it is the one of f reedom--could it occur to falsify
Marx's polemical concept of natural legality from a
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construction of natural history into
scientivistic
°
in a iantS
Yet thls does not ^ob Marx
talk of naturalT f
history of any part of its truth
content, i.e., its critical content 48
*

'

.

To emphasize the point once more,
Marx's

characterization of the workings of capitalism as
"natural
law is intended as both accurate description
and ironic
observation.

It is

"lawful" to the extent it is mystified

to appear as if it is simply a manifestation
of the

necessity

of nature,

"The totality of the process does

appear as an objective context arising by natural growth.
It is indeed due to the interaction of conscious

individuals, but neither seated in their consciousness nor

subsumed under them as

a

whole.

The irony is to use

the language of "natural science" to describe a thoroughly

social phenomenon.

But at yet another level of reflexion,

the natural-social distinction loses its dichotomous

structure and must be thought dialectically,
Such a social concept of nature has a dialectic of
its own.
The thesis that society is subject to
natural laws is ideology if it is hypostatized as
immutably given by nature. But the legality is real
as a law of motion for the unconscious society, as
Das Kapital
in a phenomenology of the anti-spirit,
traces it from the anal sis or tne commodity form to
the theory of collapse.
,

It seems clear that the Diamat or scientistic

interpretation of Marx's critique of capitalism was not
adequate either "hermeneutically" or historically.

Bookchin's

(or Habermas's)

reductions of the critique must

be viewed as largely strategic in an effort to legitimate
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their own projects, but this
does not mean that there
is
not an element of truth in
the scientistic

interpretation.

5!

Adorno explains some of the
motivation
for Marx and Engels's stress
on the need for

an "economic-

revolution as

consequence of their struggles with
the
anarchists over leadership of the
revolution, a struggle
against the anarchist tendency to
concentrate on the need
to abolish the State and its
institutional structures. A
revolution against the State would merely
be a "politicalrevolution, "The revolution desired by
(Engels) and Marx
was one of economic conditions in society
as
a

a whole,

in

the basic stratum of its self-preservation;
it was not

revolution as

a

change in society's political form, in the

rules of the game of dominion ." 52

To the extent the

solution of domination was seen to lay in the rational

planning of economic activity, the limits of Marx's vision
became apparent with the actual structure of the Soviet
State.

Adorno seems to claim that the actions of then

actually existing socialism" served as an indictment of
economic reductionism even in its most subtle and

dialectical form.

Marx and Engels's belief in the

centrality of economic revolution was inadequate,
Their imago of the revolution put its stamp upon the
image of the primal world; the overwhelming weight of
the economic contradictions in capitalism seemed to
call for its derivation from the accumulated
objectivity of what had been historically stronger
since time immemorial.
They could not foresee what
became apparent later, in the revolution's failure
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even where it succeeded: that
domination may outlast
an e
eC ° n ° mY <WhiCh the two of
them, of
course hhad
d not confused
course,
with state capitalism)
a
n
e
by he anta 9 0nisti c trend shown
by
Marx and Fnngels, the
rl:
antagonism of
mere poirtrcs, is extended beyond economics toward
the specific pnase
phase
Of that economics. 53

—
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Domination is not solved through state
planning of
the economy,

in fact it may intensify.

Whether the Soviet

state embodied true socialism is beside
the point,
domination could no longer be viewed as
solvable by the
simple attempt to plan production. This
prompts Adorno to
speculate about the possibilities of an
alternative vision
of a free society, a vision that does not
collapse
into

mere economic administration.

He implies that the future

society would have to be based on another understanding
of

domination besides simply that of economic necessity,
Touched upon by events of the twentieth century,
however, is the idea of historic totality as a
calculable economic necessity. Only if things might
have gone differently; if the totality is recognized
as a socially necessary semblance, as the hypostasis
of the universal pressed out of individual human
beings; if its claim to be absolute is broken only
then will a critical social consciousness retain its
freedom to think that things might be different some
day

—

This criticism, of a social theory that views the

world as

a

totality,

implies that

a

especially an economic totality,

return to the individual and non-identical

may provide an important perspective for understanding the

possibilities for an emancipated future.
indicates in his study of Adorno,
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As Martin Jay

In the future, Adorno
implies, a different
r
cognrtron freed from
theconstraining
of
SUt>j C
VitY ln itS ob 3 ecti fied form,
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L
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individual will re|?ai:^£f
modern mass society as one P
moment in the
of peace.
And most utopian of all, the fof e-field
object will
m° r
e 9 ain ita rightful
place alongside the
individual and collective subject
in a dialectic
ajLe ctic of
mutually supportive
55
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non-identity.

The individual is one aspect
of Adorno's concern with
the non-identical and the
particular, but it is only in
relationship to the universal and society
that these have
meaning.
To honor the non-identical,
identity thinking

must both occur and be thought against.

This is what

gives Adorno's works their paradoxical
and sometimes

enigmatic quality.

In describing the relationship
between

individual and society, even though he is
pointing to the
need to rescue individuality from its submersion
in mass
society, Adorno indicates the individual cannot
be simply

abstracted by thought from the matrix of society, but
neither is it appropriate to view society as the simple
adding up of the actions of its individual members.

The

individual and the cognition of the individual are

historical products in an extended sense, where human

history merges with natural history.

The individual

subject thinks through concepts that are dependent on the
(dialectical)

experience.

connection between subjectivity and

Adorno rejects any attempt to radically

separate the transcendental from the empirical subject,
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be Ud ed then is the rel
ation between
'3
? and
ndividuai
transcendental subject.
The
lndivrduai one is a component of
the empirical world
as has, since Kant, been
stated in countless
variations.
But its function, its capacity
for
xpenence which the transcendental
subject
lacks
or no purely logical construct
could have any sort
e Per enCe
1S in trUth far more constitutive
than
?L
r
the ?function
ascribed by idealism to the
transcendental subject. 56
'

'

'

"

.

The individual is not to be placed
above or outside of

history either, although its "thinking"
cannot do without
the "transcendental" moment,
Nevertheless, the concept of transcendentality
reminds us that thinking, by dint of its
immanent
moments of universality, transcends its own
inalienable individuation.
The antithesis of
universal and particular, too, is both necessary
and
deceptive.
Neither one exists without the other the
particular only as defined and thus universal; the
universal only as the definition of something
particular, and thus itself particular. Both of them
are and are not.
This is one of the strongest
motives of nonidealist dialectics. 55

—

This issue of the relation of the empirical subject
or the individual to the notion of the transcendental

becomes especially important when considering Bookchin's
claims about the basis for social ecology's evolution-

infused Hegelian dialectic.

Adorno emphasizes the

inseparability of subject and object, individual and
society, particular and universal,
see in the next chapter,

crucial points.

in a way,

as we will

that Bookchin minimizes at

For Adorno the social and historical
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origins of concepts, or the
"formality" of individual
thought, must not be forgotten,
refle ion u P on its own
formalism is
reflection on society, and results
reflection*"™
in a
paradox: .. .the form-giving
constitutive elements have
social sources, but on the other
hand, ... they a?e
objectively valid.... The paradox is
likely to be at
SUb ^ ect s ^ective imprisonment
in
itselt
itLlf
The cognitive function, without
which
there
would be neither difference nor
unity on the
subject's part, had emerged from a
source
It
consists essentially in those form-givers;
as far as
there is cognition, it has to be
carried out along
their lines even where it looks beyond
them.
They
define the concept of cognition. Yet
they are not
absolute; they have come to be like the
cognitive
unction itself, and their disappearance
is not
nDlfnnrl the
^ realm _
beyond
of the possible

h

*
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For any alternative society to exist in
the future it

would require new forms of cognition which,
Adorno
implies, would be related to changes in the
"division of

labor

which impact the forms of cognition and

individuality itself.

The individual arises from the

species' necessity of self-preservation,

that is,

individual does not exist prior to "society."

the

This

observation resonates with the claims about the early

history or "pre-history" of subjectivity explored by
Horkheimer and Adorno in Dialectic of Enlightenment

.

Adorno in the late essay "Subject and Object" reiterates
the position on the development of the individual as

a

product of evolution, or natural history.
But the priority thesis is absurd only as long as the
individual or its earlier biological form is
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hyposlasizeci.

In the history of evolution,

a more
eSm tl0n W ° Uld be the tern ra l
P°
prills, or at
least the contemporamousness
T
of the species
That
Y

'the' human being antedated
the species is either a
Bibiical reminiscence or sheer
Platonism.
Nature on
its lower levels teems with
unindividuated organisms
If, as more recent biologists
claim, humans aie
actually born so much more ill-equipped
than other
creatures, it probably was only in
association, by
udimentary social toil, that they could
stay alive;
the ti rincipiiim ndj viduat on a would
be secondary to
that, a hypothetical kind of biological
division of
labor.
That any single human should have emerged
irst, archetypically, is improbable.
By the faith
in such an emergence, the prjncipium nrli vi
dnati oni s
historically fully developed already, is
mythically
projected backwards, or onto the firmament of
eternal
ideas.
The species might individuate itself by
mutation, in order then, by individuation, to
reproduce itself in individuals along lines of
biological singularity 59
i

i

i

i

.
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Of course the priority of the individual is central
to the philosophy of liberalism,

Marx's criticism.

and the object of much of

The problem for historical Marxism

became the place of the individual in socialist society.
The individual

'

place was one of mostly meaninglessness

s

in much of socialist history.

One of the primary motives

of the early critical theorists was to rescue

individuality from mass society in its various forms:
fascist,

state socialist, or monopoly capitalist.

Motivated against this economic reduction of the
individual into

a

mere cog in the machinery of production

was what Martin Jay has explained as,

"Adorno's

philosophical defense of the contingent, suffering,
empirical subject, that ethically materialist moment in
his thought

." 50

Bookchin denies the possibility of
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ethical claims by critical
theory primarily because of
the
connection the critical theorists
make about the
domination of naturp
-t-o
lduure, its
toi =i-t-o
relation
to *4
Marx's understanding
of human labor, and the
difference of labor from mere
animal activity. 61 Central to the
critical theory claims
about these relationships is their
treatment
+-

-j

.

of the

emergence of identity, the "prehistory"
of subjectivity,
which is at the core of the "dialectic
of enlightenment."
Bookchin must challenge this "natural history"
of the

subject if his claim about the priority of
"social

domination" is to hold true.

The claims he is forced to

make about the "origins" of domination depend on
his

understanding of hierarchy and on his understanding of
the
differences between his conception of domination and that
of the critical theorists.

Hierarchy
Bookchin rejects critical theory as an adequate
approach to the problems of the ecology crisis because,
for example, Horkheimer and Adorno are not "resolutely

critical of hierarchy and domination ." 6 ^

depends on Bookchin'

s

This claim

understanding of domination and

hierarchy and also the meaning of "resolutely critical."
Bookchin rejects the understanding of domination that is
tied to Marx's claim that human labor involves the

necessary domination of nature, "The argument that our
abuse of nature subverts the material conditions for our
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own survival, although surely
true,

instrumental.

is crassly

It assumes that our concern
for nature

rests on our self-interest,

rather than on

the community of life of which we
are part,

very unique and distinctive way ." 63

feeling for

a

allbeit in a

This sounds very much

like the argument of the deep ecologists,
particularly

Naess,

and their rejection of the merely
utilitarian

arguments of environmentalism.

It is also similar to the

deep ecologists' call for wider "Self-"
identification.

Before rushing to reduce social ecology to just
another

variation of deep ecology however, Bookchin's

understanding of the difference between social ecology
and
critical theory should be inspected more closely.

Bookchin does not view the relationship between the human
subject and its object, nature, as one of estrangement or
alienation, on the contrary,

"It is becoming a cliche to

fault ’separation' as the source of apartness in our

highly fragmented world.
is also a form of

We must see that every process

'alienation' in the very non-Marxist

sense of differentiation in which the whole is seen as the

richly varied fulfillment of its latent potentialities

." 64

Bookchin's vision of alienation and differentiation is one
of "self-expression or self-articulation"

"other" is viewed as part of a "whole."

where the
He does not deny

the existence of antagonism, but claims this can be

overcome by "struggle" and "reconciliation."

Bookchin

claims conflict and the attempt to control nature (an
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alternative formulation of the
phrase "domination of
nature") are not the only way
to understand natural
evolutron and social antagonism,
but that, "The reality
of
conflict must never override
the reality of

differentiation as the long-range
character of development
in nature and society." 6 For
Bookchin,

human society is

an extension of natural evolution
seen as the "flow of
derived phases as well as a shared
development from the
simpler to the more complex."
Evolution consists of ever

greater "unity-in-diversity,

complexity, and variety,

"

viewed as indicators of life's participation
in its own
evolution.
Diversity is not only a source

of ecological

stability, but the expression of "freedom"
at the core of
evolution itself, "Diversity. .may also be
regarded in a
.

very fundamental sense as an ever-expanding,
albeit
nascent,

source of freedom within nature,

a

medium for

objectively anchoring varying degrees of choice, selfdirectiveness, and particip ation by life-forms

dwn— volut ioh

66
.

However,

in

their

this evolutionary freedom is

not identical to human freedom,

"The dim choices that

animals exercise in their own evolution are not the will
that human beings exhibit in their social lives.

Nor is

the nascent freedom conferred by natural complexity the

same as the rational decisions that human beings bring to
the service of their own development

." 67

Although here

highlighting the difference between the animal and the
human,

Bookchin is claiming that there is no "rupture"
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between human will and freedom
(conceived as "selfconsciousness and self-reflection")
and natural history.
Human will and freedom are
aspects of nature in which
all
phenomena are emergent, "graded"
forms of a potentiality
which manifests itself in various
forms, including
the

human,

in the process of evolution.

This raises two questions,

first, when does

"domination" then arise, and secondly,
what is the role of
’scarcity"
the struggle for self-preservation,
that

m

necessity of controlling nature for
biological reasons
recognized by Marxists, liberals, and
others? Bookchin
discusses these issues in the chapter "The
Emergence of
Hierarchy" in T he Ecology of Freedom
Bookchin asks a
.

series of questions which imply there are
ways of

considering the relationship of humans to nature
which are
alternatives to the "Marxist" model. Among other
questions he asks,

"Is it a given that nature is

'stingy*

and that labor is humanity's principal means of
redemption

from animality?"

Of course he has already loaded the

question both with the use of the term "redemption,

"

and

with his previously articulated economic determinist

interpretation of Marx, one which reduces Marx's argument
to a demand for a necessarily increasing domination of

nature if humans are to achieve "freedom."

The questions

he asks imply a choice between interpretations,

either

"society" effectively exploited nature to build

a

surplus

at which point one "class" of people appropriated the
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surplus for themselves
groups

(the Marxist interpretation)

,

or

(or "strata")

within society appropriated
the
technology and surplus and
then constituted themselves

as

"clearly definable ruling class. "68
Bookchin summarizes
his series of questions by
identifying the issue he wants
to address, 'I am asking
not if the notion of dominating
nature gave rise to the domination
of human by human but
rather if the domination of human
by human gave
a

rise to

the notion of dominating nature." 69

He proposes a set of

key indicators that should show
which of the

interpretations is the more adequate.
set of dichotomous choices,

technics,

In this proposed

he opposes culture to

consciousness to labor, and hierarchies to

classes as the categories that explain the
opening or
closure of possibilities for human history.

Bookchin argues that hierarchies resulted from
natural differences, but were not strictly speaking
caused" by natural difference.

The natural differences

between young and old, and women and men became social
differences as the males and elders began to
institutionalize" roles within the emerging social
structure,

roles that changed the balance of power between

members of the early human groups, finally resulting in
the emergence of "rulers."

Bookchin denies "domination"

existed in the earliest "organic" societies, the "early
world" based on "matriarchy."

Domination did not exist

because the ideas of "domination" and "rule" did not
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exist,

contrary to the claims of
"anthropologists like
Levi Strauss or "feminists
like Simone de Beauvoir ." 70
This distinction about the
"ideas" of domination or
rule
serves as a first indication
that Bookchin is not using
terms in anything like Marxist
or most other contemporary
thought.
In his elaboration of the
emergence of
hierarchy, the concern is not so
much with whether there
are actual relationships of
domination or power but with
the ideas that then become the
basis for further

structuring of relationships and there
generalization,
Not until distinctly social interests
emerge that
clash directly with this natural matrix
and turn the
weaknesses, perhaps the growing tensions,
of organic
society into outright fractures, will the unity
between human and human, and between humanity
and
nature, finally be broken.
Then power will emerge,
not simply as a social fact, with all its
differentiations, but as a concept--and so will the
concept of freedom 11
.

Recognition of the importance Bookchin places on the

necessity of the existence of the concept before

a

relationship can properly be called domination, power, or
whatever,

is central

for comprehending his fundamentally

idealistic and subjectivistic orientation.

This

orientation is partially obscured by his claims for the
"naturalization" of the dialectic by means of his

idiosyncratic theory of evolution.
This element of social constructionism is more

explicit in Bookchin'
criticism.

s

recent responses to deep ecology

He clarifies his distinction between the "idea
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of dominating nature" and
"actual domination of nature"
in

response to criticism from Robyn
Eckersley and Warwick
Fox,

d°
kno ™. how often 1 have to repeat
•„
that there
is a distinction between the
i^a
of dominating
U e
an ldeol °gy— and actually

dominating
Thl
he n
domination of nature is an oxymoron that nature,
is
absolutely impossible to achieve if only
because all
phenomena are, in a broad sense, "natural"
Eckersley, however, ignores the fact
that my writings
focus on the id^a of domination of
nature, not on the
actual dominating of nature which I
repeatedly
indeed emphatically, claim is impossible
,

,

Bookchin claims he is not "exclusively"
concerned
with whether

a

specific society "actually" damages an eco-

community, even if it is to the extent of extinction
of
species.

His concern is with the "systematic" factor in

social life of the

"

idea of controlling nature." 7 ^

Bookchin summarizes this curious formulation for

understanding the ecological crisis;
am also concerned with whether it (a given society)
ideologically identifies human progress with the idea
of dominating nature.
I am concerned,
in effect,
with a broad cultural mentality and its underlying
sources notably, the projection of the idea of
social domination and control into nature not with
transient behavior patterns that come or go as a
result of opportunistic, often historically shortlived circumstances."^
I

—

—

This assertion allows Bookchin then to disassociate

himself from

a

deterministic reading of his statements

about the relationship between hierarchy and the

domination of nature.

In this way he can reject
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criticisms that point out that
hierarchical societies have
and could exist that do not
dominate nature,
and

conversely, egalitarian societies
have or could exist that
do.
This seems to mean, for Bookchin,
that the
domination" of nature does not occur
until a society
consciously invokes the "idea" of
domination in its

relationship with nature.

Domination of nature cannot

occur,

by definition, until the idea of
domination has
come into existence with the "warped"
development of
society,

"I

emphasize intentionality and the historical

experience provided by our emergence out of
second nature
as

I

a

distorted

speak of the idea of dominating nature

'emerging' out of hierarchy in my theoretical
works--

that is,

that

I

conceive of hierarchy as

a

historical

presupposition for the idea of dominating nature.
In this increasingly subjectivist,

argument,

tautological

it becomes necessary to indicate the point of

contact between hierarchy and domination.

Bookchin calls

for an examination of the "logic of history" by "looking
at the past from the standpoint of origins

provides

a

."

76

He then

narrative of the beginnings of social life, an

"origin" that reaches back into the matricentric "organic"

societies that are "difficult to detail," and only

gradually evolve into hierarchical social systems.

It is

claimed in this story that the "biological facts" of age,
sex,

and ancestry, are not turned into the basis of

hierarchy and domination by the "early organic societies."
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This requires Bookchin to
speculate on the phases of
social change that brought
these "ideas" about.
In

"preliterate" communities "women"
lack the male's
mobility, basically because of
their domestic tasks that
revolve around the care of the
human
infant.

This "primal

division of labor" limits the woman
to basically sedentary
ways of life while the males become
ever more proficient
the fundamentally violent activity
of hunting

m

and the

associated activity of group defense.

The biological

differences between men and women in primal
society then
lead to a necessary, but "complementary"
division of
labor,

but the division of labor leads to the
formation of

very different social spaces,
For not only hunting, but also defense and later
war
are part of the male's division of labor.
Insofar as
these responsibilities require the conscious
administrative coordination of people and resources,
they are not merely hard biological facts of life;
instead, they are uniquely social facts, or what we
in the modern world, are likely to call pol ti r.^1 77
i

.

The domestic and "civil" spheres then are not in

conflict in the primal society since the division is

a

reflection of the biological necessity of the sexual

division of labor, and the roles within society are still

structured on the basis of the "biological facts" of age,
sex and ancestry.

But the "raw materials" for the

hierarchical society yet to come are in place, and it is
now that the important step is taken away from the harmony
of organic society toward the emergence of the
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hierarchical society and
the spread of the
idea of
domination

Bookchin claims that in
the drvision of labor
the
sexes complement each
other economically but
that the
Young and the old do not.
The elder members of
the group
come to be "vital
repositories of knowledge and
wisdom,
but this knowledge and
wisdom forms
the basis for the

elders'

function in what is becoming
a distinctly social
and cultural sphere.
The old become conscious
of the
social as a result of necessity,
a matter of survival,
since their waning physical
powers make them aware of
their "vulnerability to natural
forces," a weakness that
can only be alleviated by the
development of "social
power" and a specifically
"hierarchical social power."
The old are the architects of
social power and its
hierarchical institutionalization. Even
if only
'unconsciously," the old begin to develop
"a certain
amount of cunning and self-interest"
which becomes the

awareness and hatred of natural necessity
which presents
itself as the increasing possibility of death.

In their

resentment the old turn this natural necessity
against the
young
the form of "cruelty accomplished through
social

m

means."

This constitutes the beginnings of

a

change in

nature,

Nature begins to take her revenge on the earliest
attempts of primordial society to control her. But
this is nature internalized, the nature in humanity
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wisdom, however" the
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temperament of repressive
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rationality'^

However,

age alone is not

a
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sufficient basis for the

development of "institutionalized
hierarchy" since
everyone must get older.
The "prrmordial balance"
among
members of the community
had previously been
marntained
through a "parity of privileges"
for the old, so
that,

for

Bookchin, what is problematic
is how the elders
attempted
to institutionalize these
privileges in a way that
developed into a repressive
hierarchy.
He draws on
anthropological studies to indicate
how the elderly tended
to also function as "medicine-men"
who acquired social
power from the rituals they frequently
controlled, "Social
power begins to crystallize as the
fetishization of

magical power over certain forces
of nature.

79

with this

observation the shaman becomes the
"strategic figure in
any discussion of social hierarchy"
as this person
"solidifies the power of the elders."
Bookchin represents
the shaman as occupying a position

of "professionalized

power," specialist in the division of labor,
specialist in
fear, mediator between the "suprahuman
power of the

environment and the fears of the community ." ° ^

Bookchin

then elaborates on the process whereby power is

institutionalized in hierarchies and developed into
systems of domination, or "epistemologies of rule."
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Bookchin's argument is
loaded, or overloaded
with
idiosyncratic understandings
of concepts, specifically
those of domination and
hrerarchy. Even though
Bookchin
argued that the critical
theorists were too beholden
to
Marx's conception of domination,
that the domination of
nature over human beings had
to be overcome before
freedom
was possible, he also
recognized they had included

criticism of the domination of
"men over men." However,
Bookchin believes they completely
ignored or even accepted
the problem of hierarchy.
How then would Bookchin explain
Adorno's statements about hierarchy
while discussing the
subject-object dialectic? The
subject-object dialectic is
the form of the argument about
the relationship between
humans and nature on which Adorno
focuses.
This
form of

the argument is inherited from the
development of

dialectical thought since at least German
Idealism,

extended through Hegel and Marx.

Bookchin would certainly

recognize the subject-object dialectic as an
important if
not the central issue in the problem of the
domination of
nature,

especially since he makes the issue of

subjectivity, particularly the subjectivity of nature,
so

central to his own project.

Bookchin in fact very closely

links his theoretical project to Hegel's attempt to

resolve the subject-object dialectic, asserting that

dialectical naturalism is the most adequate solution to
the problems raised by Hegel's notion of the Absolute

Subject and Absolute Knowledge.
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Adorno also rejects

Hegel’s solution to the
problem of the subject-object
dialectic, which resolves it
into the supremacy of the
subject, and he likewise
rejects the opposite solution,
the supremacy of the object.
In fact, Adorno goes so far
as to claim,

"The purpose of critical thought
is to

abolish the hierarchy. "81

Thls can be read as g statement

about the basic attitude of critical
theory towards the
issue of hierarchy.
Hierarchy, in
all its forms,

is

unacceptable to critical theory, hierarchy
where either
"side" of the dialectic attempts to assert
dominance.

Bookchin's understanding of hierarchy is too
narrow, as is
his attempt to define the domination of nature
as
the

"idea" of domination.

The consequences of his argument

are not only that its idiosyncrasies produce
vast

confusion rather than illumination regarding the

relationship of society to the ecological crisis, but it
also occludes the insights available from other

philosophical positions, including deep ecology, Marxism,
feminism,

and critical theory.

Bookchin’s philosophy of social ecology, as he
applies it to alternative interpretative frameworks,
results in systematic blindness.

This is especially true

in regard to his interpretations of Marx and critical

theory.

Bookchin quotes from

a

section of Horkheimer and

Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment to provide evidence of
the lack of resoluteness of the critical theorists against

hierarchy and domination, and to counter claims that the
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critical theorists "reconnoitered

a

ecological view of society's future

nonhierarchical and
." 82

The key sentence

for Bookchin's interpretation
of one section of "The

Transformation of Ideas into Domination,"

a

discussion

about "uncompromising individuals,"
is the last sentence
of the section: "The history of the
old religions and
schools like that of the modern parties
and revolutions
teaches us that the price for survival is
practical

involvement, the transformation of ideas into

domination ." 83

Bookchin (mis) reads this as Horkheimer and

Adorno's endorsement of domination and hierarchy.

in fact

the passage should be read as exactly the opposite,

as a

condemnation of the procedures of hierarchy and
domination.

In the preceding paragraphs the authors

discuss the relationship of "ancient history" to its

repetition in 'more recent times."

The "uncompromising

individuals," like John the Baptist, the cynics, and

individuals from the tradition of the Upanishads, are

mistakenly understood, they argue, if they are interpreted
as simply one in a series of stages of progress in the

main tendency of their respective societies.

They are

more correctly read as pointing toward "left-wing ideas
split off from the powerful cliques and parties."
a

This is

perfectly apt description of the early Frankfurt

School's self-understanding.

The authors emphasize this

radical difference in their characterization of the

"uncompromising individuals" and their "anarchic"
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organization,

"The uncompromising people
who are recorded
history did not lack all forms
of organized society,
otherwise not even their names
would have been handed down
to us.
They set up at least a certain
systematic doctrine
and rules of conduct. "84 These
individuals did not

m

establish

religion but "merely" founded "an
order," and
they also criticized and developed
philosophies,
a

even "a

theory of the state."

Like the critical theorists who

rejected capitalism and state socialism,
the

uncompromising individuals "set greater
store by the idea
and the individual than by administration
and the

collective.

They therefore arouse anger."

These

individuals "may have been in favor of unity and

cooperation but they were not able to build
hierarchy.
example,

a

strong

Adorno's endorsement of the essay form, for

can be read,

should be read, as following in the

line of these anarchic, uncompromising individuals who,

"Neither in their theory (which was lacking in unity and
logic)

,

nor in their practical behavior (which was not

adequately coordinated) did their being reflect the world
as it really was."
is,

a

The world as it really was, was and

world of domination and hierarchy,

a

world no self-

respecting uncompromising individual would want to
"reflect" either in their thought or their actions.

The

critical theorists' additional comments in this passage,
on the Buddha and asceticism,

attempt to reveal how even

radical thought can be compromised by
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a

"real talent for

organization."

These examples should be read
as

indicative of the ambiguous character
of the relationship
of asceticism and materialism,
and how the avenues of
radical change should always be
considered problematic in
there ambiguity.
The history of religions,
schools of

philosophy, modern parties, and modern
revolutions

indicate the repetition of the same message:
when radical
ideas enter into social practice they
seem
to always

become complicit with domination and hierarchy,

what were

once critical insights, or revolutionary
ideas, become
tools of domination.
The critical theorist, or radical
ecologist,

is faced with a dilemma,

thought to radical action:

how to relate radical

"The critic who talks thus may

speak the truth in the eyes of the civilizing

philosophers, but he is not in step with the course of
social life

." 85

It is essential at this point to turn to the problem

of the creation or transformation of radical ecological

subjectivity and its political consequences, this time as
they are theorized by Murray Bookchin.
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CHAPTER

7

SOCIAL ECOLOGY AND
SUBJECTIVITY

Social ecology's conception
of subjectivity
depends
on Bookchin's understanding
of evolution.
It also depends
on his refusal to accept
conflict or antagonism
between
the human organism and
non-human nature as a fundamental
aspect of the subject-object
relationship.
He does not
accept, as do nearly all Western
philosophers, that humans
must struggle to appropriate
from nature the necessities
of life.
Bookchin’s is a basically indefensible
philosophical position, as it is
represented in the

central work Ihe Ecology of Freedo
m,

a

position he has

since partially backed away from,
but without fully
acknowledging the consequences for the
philosophy of

social ecology as

a

whole.

The constellation of concepts

this problem revolves around include
scarcity, necessity,
freedom,

domination and subjectivity.

Bookchin no longer

uniformly asserts that there is no natural scarcity
with
which the human organism must adapt itself, but he
has not

adequately dealt with the way this change of position
affects his understanding of critical theory and its

reliance on the assumption that human beings necessarily
must labor on nature to fulfill their metabolic needs.
The critical theorists,

and most of Western philosophy,

attempt to connect this biological necessity to the

formation of subjectivity.

They therefore must examine
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the subject-object
relationship to determine
how the
process of concept formation
produces deferences
between
human metabolic activity
and the unconceptualized

processes of biological
maintenance developed by
other
life forms.
The necessity of
understanding the
relationship of concepts to
things requires some
theory of
language, and therefore
some understanding of
socialization and psychological
development.
In the
philosophy of social ecology
it is clear that the
production and reproduction of
the "symbolic order" is
under-theorized as a result of
Bookchin' s early refusal to
fully examine alternative
understandings
of the

necessities of metabolic activity.

The fundamental

structure of the philosophy of
social ecology is put in
question by an inadequate theory of
language,
thus

requiring a salvage operation if the
genuine insights
Bookchin does offer are to be retained.

Subjectivity and Teleology
Bookchin develops his understanding of human

subjectivity by examining the development of
subjectivity
in nature through its various stages,

phases,

or "grades."

This development ranges from the inorganic through
simple

organic molecules, to cells, organisms, and finally to
human beings

.

What interests Bookchin is the way nature

has evolved; through an inherent self-identifying

activity,

required of any complex compound or organism if
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it is to continue its
existence beyond a momentary
conjunction of ra ndo m ly
colliding atoms
For
to live there must be
some capacity on its
part to
.

^

identify itself over time
q n that
rime, so
it can maintain its
integrity, grow, develop and
reproduce.
Bookchin
represents evolution as an
"iimnanent striving” of
nature,
a description meant
to distinguish his
understanding of
evolution from what he charges
is the Darwinist or
NeoDarwinist over-emphasis on random
changes of genetic
structures, competition between
and among
,

’

species,

therefore,

a

development.

and,

fundamentally directionless process
of
He rejects evolutionary
biologists'

arguments,

like those of Stephen J. Gould's,
about the
processes of evolution. He particularly
rejects the use
of examples, like the Burgess Shale
fossil record, which

biologists normally cite as evidence of
the accidental
characteristics determining survival of
particular
species.

Instead, Bookchin argues the proliferation
of

species, before the cataclysm that destroyed
so many of
them,

was an indication of the "fecundity" of nature,
an

example not of accidental influences or randomness in

evolutionary development, but of an immanent, ubiquitous
"striving of life for ever more complex development."
This striving for life, according to Bookchin, necessarily

also means the striving for more complex forms of

subjectivity.

Borrowing from other evolutionary theorists

and naturalists, especially Kropotkin, Bookchin believes
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it is more accurate
to view the "fitness"
of an organism
as that which is
best abie to help
others survrve
He
explains Kropotkin's
concept of "mutualism"
ln terms of

the "symbiotic"
relationships that develop
between and
n organism which
lead to the increased
development of
all organisms.
Bookchin claims that
evolutionary fitness
is "rarely biologically
meaningful as mere species

survival and adaptation."-'-

Bookchin 's emphasis is

a

much needed corrective
to

those theories of evolution
that place all adaptive
activity in the categories
of competition, scarcity,
and
conflict, however, he goes
beyond correcting the onesidedness of the crude Darwinistic
interpretations to a
similarly one-sided support of
the ideas of cooperation,
symbiosis, and mutual aid.
The work of biologists like
Lynn Margulis and James Lovelock
seem to strongly
undermine early theories of evolution
that did not take
into account the impacts of
species on their environment
and the way these activities could
feed back into the

survivability of the species themselves
and of life in
general.
The culmination of this capacity

of organisms to

modify their own environments is of course
the "Gaia
Hypothesis" as defined by Lovelock, "This

postulates that

the physical and chemical condition of the
surface of the

Earth,

of the atmosphere,

and of the oceans has been and

is actively made fit and comfortable by
the presence of

life itself.

This is in contrast to the conventional
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wisdom which held that
life adapted to the
planetary
conditions as it and they
evolved their separate
ways.
Bookchin goes beyond
the claims made by
the
originators of this theory
about the self-maintaining
activity of life by
combining these observations

"2

with his

understanding of the
self-identifying activity
of
organisms. He considers
this self-identifying
activity to
be a form of subjectivity,
even in as rudimentary
a case
as the individual cell's
need for self-maintaining
ecognition.

This leads Bookchin to
further claim that,
"Life is necessary not only
for its own self-maintenance
but for its own self- formation
'Gaia' and subjectivity
are more than the effects
of life; they are its
integral
attributes.
Although the Gaia Hypothesis
as presented
by the biologists is persuasive,
it is problematic to link
life's self-maintaining
characteristics to an immanent
teleology of subjectivity as Bookchin
asserts.
This
.

assertion is problematic both because
of the teleology of
the argument, and because of the
lack of sufficient
distinction between human and non-human
subjectivity.

The characterization of evolution
as involving some

basic self-identity is

a

genuine insight.

Organisms must

be able to distinguish their own structure
from that which

they are not.

But to characterize this simply as

subjectivity is onesided if there is not the simultaneous
acknowledgment of the organism's conflict with what is
non identical to it.

The organism is in a dialectic
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between itself and what
is other than itself,
and
therefore is inadequately
understood if characterized
Sim Pl y
the
of subjectivity
rather than as a
manifestation of a dialectic
of subjectivity and
objectivity, or identity
and non-identity.
The same is
true of the concepts of
mutualism and symbiosis,
which are
only understandable as they
are constituted by
their
opposite, or by that which
is in contradiction
to them.
Bookchin must minimize the
negating

"

forces of nature in

order to raise up his constructions
of the concepts of
mutualism, complexity, and
subjectivity to the level of an
objective ethics. These concepts
do provide some critical

purchase for understanding the
limits of the currently
dominant characterizations of nature
and evolution,

especially as these are transposed
uncritically into
justification for egoistic competition
and an ever-

expanding global capitalism.

However, Bookchin makes

claims for his alternative concepts that
go beyond their
genuine critical value to a specific
teleological

understanding which is unnecessary and cannot be
adequately supported.
The matter of the philosophy of social ecology's

teleology has been at the center of much of the criticism
it has received,

and Bookchin

's

clarifications in response

have done little to eliminate the problems.

In his most

developed single work, he specifically discusses the
relationship of his philosophy and teleology,
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But Bookchin does not want
to confuse this

inevitability of mind with the
strong claims of Hegel and
others who are bound to a "hard"
teleology.
Bookchin
wants to retain the idea that
human subjectivity is the
"actualization of potentiality," the
manifestation of an
immanent striving within substance
itself,
but he is

unclear about what relationship he
perceives between this
and the concepts of fortuity, uncertainty,
and randomness

Bookchin rejects the Darwinist interpretation
that random
change is an integral factor in the evolution
of species,

but this would seem to verge on making the
evolution of
the specific forms of life, particularly human
self-

conscious life,

a

teleological inevitability, present in

essence at the beginnings of the universe.

Bookchin

denies this inevitability but in an unsatisfactory way,
Our notion of teleology need not be governed by any
"iron necessity" or unswerving self-development that
inevitably" summons forth the end of a phenomenon
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This passage seems to
invite two very different
interpretations.
The passage could mean
that human beings
are in fact the expression
of a single universal
subjectivity that elaborates
itself through time.

eventually bringing into being
the human organism capable
of self-consciousness.
Human subjectivi ty would
then be
the inevitable expression of
the striving universe
unless
some catastrophe strikes, stopping
evolution towards the
unique manifestation of this
potential.
Fortuity, or
chance is then a block to the
development of human
subjectivity which is the goal of the
immanent striving of
nature. Alternatively, the striving
of nature toward
subjectivity might manifest itself in a
variety of self-

conscious or self-reflective forms.

The rejection of the

idea of the "inevitability" of the human
form of self-

conscious,

self-reflective subjectivity in this

alternative interpretation would be an acknowledgment
of
other possibilities, or potential other forms, of
self-

consciousness

.

The difference in interpretation has real

consequences
reason,

society.

,

most importantly in what we accept as

and therefore what will be considered

a

rational

Bookchin views human subjectivity as essentially
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common human capacity
and an expression of
the "high
degree of orderly continuity"
in "first nature."
Thrs
continuity is the
"actualization of potentialities"
which
result in ever more complex
and more "self-aware
or
subjective" life-forme;
torms. 6
This evolutionary
continuity of
development results in life-forms
capable of
a

conceptualizing, understanding,
and communicating with
each other in "increasingly
symbolic terms." This is
most
fully developed as conceptual
thought and language, the
distinguishing characteristics
of the human species.
The human species has these
capacities to an extent
that is unprecedented
any existing life-form
Humanity's awareness of itself,
its ability ?o
generalize this awareness to the
level of a highly
systematic understanding of its
environment in the
l0
Phy
6thlCS and aesthetics,
and
fn™f?naui
finally, its
??
capacity to alter itself and its
systematically by means of knowledge
and
technology, places it beyond the
realm of the
subjectivity that exists in "first
nature " 7

m

'

'

What this capacity to alter nature
means for

political action will be taken up in the
next chapter.
What is of importance here is the relationship
of the

domination of nature to conceptualization and
language,
symbolic order which is uniquely human,
that,

a

a

symbolic order

according to some feminist theories, is

fundamentally
order

a

male order rather than

a

universally human

If the present symbolic order is inevitable,

except for the possibility of the termination of the human
species,

then the structure of that order has potentially
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disastrous results for
women.
Alternatively, if the
current symbolic order
is merely one
expression among a
variety of possible
syn^olrc orders then a
space is open
for challenging the
existing
order.

The possibilities for
the development of
subjectivity
also have consequences
for non-human nature.
Bookchin
goes beyond merely stating
that human subjectivity
is a
product of the development
of nature to conclude
that
humans are constituted to
intervene in first nature,
that
humans "can consciously change
the entire realm of
'first
nature. '"9 it is how Bookchin
characterizes this capacity
to intervene in first nature
that has concerned many of
his critics, and especially
problematic are the purposes
of the intervention,

Humanity has been instituted to
intervene actively
consciously, and purposively into
"first
unparalleled effectiveness and alter it na?Sre- with
on a
planetary scale. To denigrate these
capacities is to
deny the thrust of natural evolution
itself toward
1C complexity and subj ectivity—
g
the
potentiality
°J
of
first nature" to actualize itself in
selfconscious intellectuality.

^

There are two concerns which emerge from
this

formulation of dialectical naturalism.

First,

how

strongly do we read the human species and its
symbolic
order as the expression of the tendency, directionality,
or goal of natural evolution.

tendency,
future.

Second, how should that

directionality, or goal be projected into the
The extent of the transparency or opaqueness of

339

man SUbjeCtlVlty must

determined in order to
Justify
human intervention into
first nature in its
effort to
"develop its potential."
However, beyond
Bookchin's
formulation, the potential
of nature must be
considered
not only in terms of
subjectivity but also in
terms of

subjectivity, or in more
conventional terms, in
its
objectivity. These issues
come together in Bookchin's
attempt to relate human
rationality to natural
subjectivity, "whether or not
we decide to select
reason
as the most complex
expression of subjectivity,
the graded
emergence of mind in the natural
history of life i s part
of the larger landscape
of subjectivity itself. »U

Eookchin understands "mind" as
more than the activity of
the human brain, as including
the "human body as a whole"
as an embodiment of natural
history.
Whether it is the
embodiment of all of natural history
or simply one aspect
°f it is more to the point.

Ethical Subjects

Bookchin argues that "ethical imperatives"
result
from an ecological interpretation of
nature but these

cannot be established except with the actual
existence of
a truly ecological society.
The present society
is

incapable of determining these ecological ethics
because
of its "sensibilities" which are structured by
the

imperatives of capitalism.

Bookchin argues that an

interpretation of nature linked specifically to the
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immanent development of
subjectivity is the only
„ ay to
conceive of a "wholeness
of nature that
makes its
"resurrection" possible,
He claims the
critical theorists
were unable to provide
a sufficient
interpretation of
nature to accomplish the
goal of "resurrection,"
specifically, "The flaw in
Horkheimer and Adorno’s
works
on reason stems from
their failure to integrate
rationality with subjectivity
in order to bring
nature
within the compass of
To do so# they
have had to understand the
message of social ecology,
a
realm that was completely
outside their intellectual
tradition. "le Bookchin claims
Horkheimer and Adorno too
closely adhered to Marxism for
them to bridge the gap
between nature and subjectivity,
that they were too easily
led into considering the
subjectivity of nature as mere
mysticism.
The result is the collapse of
their critique
of reason into another form of
instrumentalism, and the
advocacy of yet another philosophy
which views nature as
object for human manipulation. Bookchin
claims social
ecology can lead us out of this aporia
toward the

^

development of an adequate, objectively
grounded ethics
that will enable the transformation of
"existing
sensibilities, technics, and communities along
ecological
lines."

J

This ecological sensibility would then create

the possibility for ethical intervention in nature,
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Bookchin engages critical
theory again a few
Paragraphs later, hut thus
tame it rs Marcuse
he chooses
as a target and rrghtly
so.
The focus of the attack
is
Marcuse's conventional
Enlightenment bias of seeing
human
freedom as resulting from an
ever more thorough
domination
of nature.

Bookchin quotes Marcuse's
assertion that the

pacification of nature, "presupposes
the mastery of
Nature, which is and remains
the object opposed to the
developing subject. "15 However,
Bookchin then
inadequately discusses the central
point of Marcuse's
observations, that human interaction
with the rest of

nature involves both "necessity" and
"freedom," only to
justify his own alternative understanding
of
nature.

Bookchin'

s

conception of nature is difficult to defend,

but central to the consistency of his
philosophical

position,

There is no "cruelty" in nature, only the
predation
(and mutualism) around which natural history
has
evolved its structures for sustaining life and
ecological balance.
There is no "suffering" in
nature, only the unavoidable physical pain that comes
with injury.
There is no "scarcity" and "want" in
nature, only needs that must be satisfied if life
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The "social category of
scarcity" is important
to

understanding Bookchin's
project of reconciling
humanity
and nature.
Social ecology's solutions
for resolving the
problems of the domination of
nature will not focus on
the
economic" problems of scarcity,
and neither win there
be
an attempt,

like that of the early
critical theorists, to
evoke a relationship to
non-identical nature that includes
the inescapable moment of
domination within the process
of
abstraction or conceptualization
itself.
Instead Bookchin
Will evade the problems of "scarcity"
and reject any
attempt to understand the complexity
of the concept of
mimesis and its relationship to reason
and an alternative

conceptuality in which nature and humanity
may be
reconciled
It is unclear how Bookchin understands
the problems

of conceptualization and the subject-object
relationship
of critical theory and especially of Adorno's
negative

dialectics.

In a reference to the position of Horkheimer

and Adorno on reconciliation, Bookchin contends,

function of an ethical philosophy does not entail

mimetic reduction of ethics to its source

.

"The
a

But it is

not clear how he interprets the critical theorists'

emphasis on mimesis or how his notion of natural

subjectivity differs from the mimetic.
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Adorno especially

.

incorporated mimesis into
his understanding of
the
possibilities and forms of
criticism
and of

world.

a

truly free

Its in the understandings
of the concepts of

domination, mimesis, subjectivity
and nature that critical
theory and social ecology
must be differentiated.

Scarcity, Natural and Social

Bookchin's claim that there is
no "scarcity" in
nature requires closer examination.
In discussing the
emergence of hierarchy Bookchin
briefly focuses on the
idea of scarcity and suffering,
1S

merely a Actional phenomenon
that
be d escnbea primarily in terms
of needs or
w . nf
piously. Without a sufficiency in the means
of life,
life life itself is impossible,
and without a
6 XCe S
the se means, life is degraded to
a
f
el struggle
for survival, irrespective of the
ievel of needs.
Leisure time, under these
conditions, is not free time that fosters
intellectual advances beyond the magical,
artistic
and mythopoeic.
To a large extent, the "time" of a
community on the edge of survival is "suffering
time." It is a time when hunger is the allencompassing fear that persistently lives with the
community, a time when the diminution of hunger
is
the community's constant preoccupation

Bookchin extends the concept of scarcity by
indicating there is both biological and cultural scarcity.
Cultural scarcity is

a

result of socially induced scarcity

that potentially could be alleviated since the

technological means are present for its elimination,
however,

the social structure actually creates a system of

needs that work against their satisfaction.

His

conclusions about socially
or culturally induced
scarcity
are not novel, and a
much more complex
elaboration of this
Phenomenon is available from
other sources, such
as Marx.
What is of particular
interest here is Bookchin's
assertions about the relationship
of biological scarcity
to the emergence of
human culture. He seems
to claim
different meanings for the
term "scarcity" depending

on
the immediate focus of his
arguments, asserting there
is
no scarcity in nature (only
needs that must be satisfied)
at one point, but then
indicating an analytical

distinction between biological
and cultural scarcity at
another crucial point in his
argument.

Also,

in his

battle with the Habermasians,
Bookchin has claimed to have
"modified" his views about scarcity
and post-scarcity,
stating, "capitalism has given
'scarcity' a unignp
character ." 19 But it is not clear from
this admission
whether or not he believes scarcity
exists always
and

generally in nature, or if it only exists
in various
distinct forms, corresponding to specific
"cultures"

(what

Marx would call "modes of production")

There are a number of objections which have been

voiced with regard to Bookchin'

s

understanding of

evolution and ecology, objections which if substantiated

would have various impacts on the overall philosophy of
social ecology.

First,

it is not clear that subjectivity

can be taken as the telos, however "soft," of natural
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evolution, when it seems
more appropriate< as
ecological theorists have
argued, to consider
mere
survival itself as the
primary thrust, or
measure of
success of evolution 20 mi^
Thls dee
P ecological critique
leads to one particular
dr political
ov ecological
political or
•

demandthe preservation of
species at viable population
levels,
ecosystems of long-term
survivability, in order to
continue the process of
evolution.
The "continuation of
evolution" would include both
survival of existing species
and the potential for further
speciation.
This

m

fundamentally ecological and
neo-Darwinian position does
not depend on the expansion
of the idea of subjectivity
to
the whole of nature.
This criticism charges Bookchin
with
reinserting hierarchy in the
conceptualization
of nature

by making subjectivity the measure
of evolutionary
progress.
If human subjectivity is the
ultimate measure
of the development of subjectivity
in nature generally the
human is again placed in a hierarchical
relationship to
the non-human or the "under-developed
subjectivity" of

other forms in nature.

Related to the criticism of the emphasis on

subjectivity is an objection to social ecology's
additional assertion that there exists

a

tendency toward

increased complexity in natural evolution.

pointed out by Bookchin'

s

critics,

As has been

the Gaia hypothesis

itself does not indicate that complexity as such is an

assurance of the survivability of life on the planet;
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sometimes

reduction in complexity
increases the
Ukelihood of survivability.21
without subjectivity
and
its closely related
idea of complexity as
the overall or
primary tendency of natural
evolution, the links
between
dialectical naturalism and
anarchism begin to lose
their
strength.
The dependency of social
ecology on
a

a

questionable theory of evolution
has led some critics
to
charge that Bookchin is merely
using ecology selectively
for the purposes of an
anarchic Utopian vision that
otherwise is difficult to defend
philosophically. 22
These arguments tend to challenge
Bookchin 's position
based on the available evidence
from ecological

science
and from arguments within
evolutionary biology, but it is
not clear that the "facts" can
settle the issues since the
interpretation of the tendencies of evolution
condition
the status of those facts themselves,
and for Bookchin
these "facts" are a fundamental matter
of contention (for

example,

the fossil record itself). 23

Bookchin's argument

about the relationship of actuality to potentiality
cannot
be dismissed simply because the present state
of
the

physical and biological sciences have alternative

assumptions about the construction of the universe.
Instead of criticizing the philosophy of social ecology
from the outside, on the basis of what are basically

objectivist arguments (however correct they may in fact
be)

,

the only fruitful way of revealing the limitations of
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Bookchin'

s

position is from the
inside--immanently,

critically.
The point at which the
philosophy of social
ecology
distinguishes itself from
Marxism and critical
theory is
at the interface between
nature and culture.
There are
crucial gaps in Bookchin's
arguments in exactly those
Places where he attempts to
distance himself from
critical
theory, and it is precisely
at these crucial turning
points that a reinterpretation
of the arguments of

critical theory may provide a
more adequate resolution
to
the difficulties in which
social ecology finds
itself.

The relationships between
natural scarcity, domination,
and hierarchy form the constellation
which, if unlocked,
should allow an alternative vision
of the ecological
future to emerge.

Bookchin attributes to Marxism as

a whole,

and to

critical theory’s use of Marx's understanding
of the
relationship of human labor to nature, a
particularly
narrow or "orthodox" understanding. The
central charge
concerns what is involved in the appropriation
of the

metabolically necessary means of existence for the
human
species.

Philosophically it is

a

concepts which sufficiently convey

question of developing
a

description of the

phenomenon without unduly prejudicing our understanding
with inappropriate metaphorical and historical resonances.
The two terms of most concern are domination and

hierarchy, which Bookchin claims are most properly
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understood as ..social" ter ms

so social in fact
that he

,

claims the "domination of
nature" could not exrst
until
after hierarchy existed.
He takes hierarchy
to mean,

in
the elevation of one
group of human
beings above another,
specifically, elder males
above the
young and the females.

its initial form,

Central to the comparison of
social ecology to other
radical ecological critiques
and to critical theory is
Bookchin's unconvincing assertion
of the meaning of the
idea "domination of nature." By
shifting the meaning of
the terms,

Bookchm not only obfuscates

the arguments of

those he criticizes, but also
renders his own position
problematic.
Like many others from a traditional

socialist background he uses

a

semantic play within the

term "domination" to ground the claim
that domination of
nature is impossible 24 Bookchin claims
to be concerned
with the "idea" of domination, defined as
society's
.

systematic identification of its own progress
with that
domination, the domination of external nature being
merely
an extension of the already present domination
of human by

human.

Since the domination of human by human precedes

the domination of nature by humans,

according to Bookchin,

the location for addressing ecological problems is found

fundamentally in social relations.

This is the reason for

his emphasis on the necessity of certain democratic forms
of organization when discussing the future ecological

society,

a

much different emphasis than that of deep
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ecology,

for instance, which
tends to concentrate
on the
situation of actually existing
life-forms in various
ecosystems and the actions
needed to preserve their
biological integrity. This
is at the core of
the

disagreement within the green
movement in the U.S., if
not
the world, between those
who emphasize
social justice

issues and those who primarily
seek wilderness
preservation and species protection.
These two
alternatives are not simply
complementary positions. As
the fundamental disagreements
between deep and social
ecologists have intensified they
have increasingly
mutually questioned the philosophical
grounding of their
respective political actions.

Critical theory made the domination
of nature
central concept in its critique of
society.

a

it is

important to examine the alternative
understanding of this
concept within critical theory and how
Bookchin
has

misinterpreted this understanding.

A reexamination of the

concept of the domination of nature should
also open new

potential for building on social ecology's understanding
of subjectivity.
The critical theorists like many radical ecologists

use the terms domination, mastery, and control

interchangeably to describe the relationship of human to
nature.

However,

this slippage in terms does not seem

by itself to alter Bookchin'

s

critique.

His claim that

the domination of human by human as the basis of hierarchy
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"

establishes what he believes
are categories of
analysis
that are more fundamental
than those which come
from
Marx's analysis of human
labor and nature. 26
Bookchin
claims, "Horkheimer and
Adorno (and the Frankfurt

School

generally) do us

great disservice by imputing
domination
to the emergence of reason
as such. "27
He indlcates that
the critical theorists'
understanding of the relationship
a

of domination and reason
"reveals the basic difference"
between their theoretical strategy
and his own.
He quotes

Horkheimer,

From the time when reason became
the instrument for
domination of human and extrahuman
nature by

manery beginnings-it has been
frustrated
rustrated in^t^
its own intention of discovering
the
truth.
This is due to the very fact that
it made
nature a mere object, and that it
failed to discover
the trace of itself
such ob j ectivization, in the
concepts of matter and things not less
than in those
of gods and spirit. 28

m

01"

lts

/

m

Bookchin emphasizes that the difference
between the
critical theorists and his own position is
that

domination, according to social ecology, begins
with the

domination of human by human.

But in his further

elaboration of this point Bookchin seems to be missing
the
basic argument of critical theory, "Indeed, even after the

emergence of hierarchy, reason's objectification of

phenomena was largely centered on the domination of 'man
by man,

'

long before 'nature idolatry' succumbed to

secular philosophy and science.

2^

Bookchin seems to be

equating critical theory's understanding of reason's
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relationship to nature with
the emergence of
philosophy
and science as traditionally
understood, not with
conceptualization as such. He
is also claiming
alternatively, that social
ecology goes "behind"
or before
Philosophy or science to an
earlier social formation
when
social hierarchy first
presents itself.
r s this
what

Bookchin is claiming or is
there another interpretation
of
his objection to critical
theory? what a*,
the critical

theorists claiming about the
relationship of reason to the
domination of nature, and how do
they conceive of
conceptualization itself?

Bookchin gets closer to the crux
of the problem when
he briefly examines the concept
of
"exchange" and how it

is used by Horkheimer and
Adorno.

In their analysis of

the Odvssey they write,
he step from chaos to civilization,
in which natural
conditions exert their power no longer
directly but
through the medium of human consciousness,
has not
changed the principle of equivalence.
Indeed, men
paid for this very step by worshipping what
they were
once
thrall to only in the same way as all other
creatures.
Before, the fetishes were subject to the
law of equivalence.
Now equivalence has itself
become a fetish.

m

Bookchin'

s

remarks on this observation reflect the

same reasoning as in his defense of his concern with the
idea of domination.

-

He claims there was not a

sensibility of exchange" present in the primordial world,
that that sensibility did not exist until the marketplace

had been established.

There seem to be at least three
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alternative ways of approaching
Bookchin's objections.
he is claiming that some
thing or some relationship

if

does
not exit until the concept
for it exists, then
this would
seem to be idealism and social
constructionism at its
worse.
If it is meaningful to
say that domination does
not exist until the idea of
domination exists, or that
exchange does not exist until the
idea of exchange exists,
it must be equally true that
dinosaurs did not exist until
the idea of dinosaurs existed, or
that the world was not
round until the idea that the world
was round existed.
This is absurd. Alternatively,
Bookchin may be claiming
that the understanding of exchange
in its fullness was not
available to early humans, and this is of
course
a true,

but trivial, observation.

What is being argued by the

critical theorists, regarding exchange, is one
aspect of

dialectical understanding of history.
potential,

The

that is, before the full actualization of the

idea of exchange expressed itself, existed partially
or in
a

limited form in the primordial relationships of humans

to nature.

A fully developed exchange sensibility of

course could not have been available to early humans, if
we understand that fully developed sensibility to require
the immersion in market society.

What is really of

interest here is the claim that the first glimmerings of
an understanding of exchange,

a

proto-exchange, or, using

Walter Benjamin’s terms, an Ur-exchange, was taking place.
The validity of Bookchin's objection to the idea of
353

exchange being used to
describe early humans
reiationship
to nature depends on
whether the description
fruitfully
opens the question of the
domination of nature to
critical
reflection, and whether it does
so in a manner which
makes
for a more adequate critique
of existing society
,

than does

social ecology.
The issues surrounding the
idea of exchange are
examined by the critical theorists
in two different
arenas, the subject-object
relationship as expressed in
the emergence of the ego or human
subject in the attempt
at self-preservation, and in the
shaman's use of ritual,
magic and sacrifice to mediate between
humans and the

spirits.

Bookchin provides an alternative narrative
of

the role of the shaman and the emergence
of the ego.
For Bookchin,

"the shaman is a strategic figure in

any discussion of social hierarchy" and
therefore this
role is at the heart of the problem of domination.
shaman,

usually male, effects changes in the status of the

elders and their privileges.
fear

The

who

The shaman is a "specialist

professionalizes power.

"

The shaman is a

mediator between the powers of the environment and the
"fears of the community," who uses magic and divination as
his means.

Bookchin views the shaman as an early form of

political manipulator,

"the incipient State personified."

The shaman is always under threat of retaliation should
his charms fail and thus must insure his own survival by

creating structures of support and ongoing power through
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mutually advantageous
alliances.

The shaman as "quasi-

religious formulator" is the
creator of "the ideological
mythos that crystallizes
incipient power into actual
power. "32 Alliances tend
to be formed between
elders and
young warriors, while myths
establish ongoing
authority,

and,

when combrned,

these allrances and myths
constitute
early forms of political
institutions and political
coalitions.
Bookchin claims these
proto-political forms
already tend to exaggerate the
aggression and violence of
the "masculine temperament" of
the "patricentric"

community.

At this point systematic
domination comes into
being as a result of the hierarchy
of the elder males over
the young and over women.
True class relationships have
yet to form since the principles of
"organic
society,

usufruct, complementarity" and "the
irreducible minimum,"
are the norm, so no specifically
economic exploitation is

systematically involved.

Wealth as such is suspect and

elaborate means are involved to become dispossessed
of
what could only appear as "bewitched concretized
power." 33
This means for Bookchin that there is

a

period of emerging

social hierarchy and domination of human by human which

occurs prior to economic exploitation,
pr^class,

"We must fix this

indeed, pi^.economic, period in social

development clearly in our minds because the vast
ideological corpus of ’modernity'

— capitalism,

particularly in its western form--has been designed in
large part to veil it from our vision." 34
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Bookchin claims

^
the mystification of
these earlier stages of
domination of
human by human occur even in
such concepts as "primitive
communism" and "matriarchy."
For example, within the
idea
of primitive communism is
the "insidious concept
of a
stingy nature,' of a ’natural
scarcity’ that dictates

communal relaticns-as though a
communal sharing of things
is exogenous to humanity
and must be imposed by survival
needs to overcome an ’innate’ human
egoism that
’modernity' so often identifies with
”’35
’

selfhood.

Likewise, Bookchin proclaims, the
idea of matriarchy
assumes that women ruled society before
men,

of matriarchy does not challenge
domination,

alters which gender will dominate.

so the idea
it simply

Both of the examples

again reveal the narrowed interpretive
framework from
which Bookchin operates.
Primitive communism

does not

imply a need to overcome innate human egoism,
but rather

necessary cooperation for group survival as

a

a whole.

Bookchin reads the term through the lenses of his theory
of the emergence of hierarchy not through those which view

cooperation as economically necessary.

And to view

matriarchy simply as another form of domination is to
ignore its possible radically different structure.
The role of the shaman,

according to social ecology's

"origins" narrative, was later expanded to that of

a

priesthood due to the frequency of failure of the shaman's
attempt at intervention into natural events.
and magic could then be replaced by
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a

Divination

theology--a rational

1

explanation of the history
and origins of men
and gods.
What previously were
individual technical
failures

of the

shaman could now be interpreted
as the moral failure
of
the community.
In addition, the systems
of command and
obedience developed by the
shaman later could be
used by
others desiring power, specifically
the "military
fraternity" of the warriors,
who in time became the
nobles
and lords of the feudal manors.

Closely related to this narrative
of the origins of
domination is Bookchin's understanding

of the emergence of

the human self or subject.

Central to the idea of the

development of the human subject must
be some
understanding of the process of distinction

or separation

of the human from non-human nature.

Bookchin argues that

this separation should not be viewed
as based in an

"epistemology of rule and domination, or worse,
class
relationships and exploitation." 37 Instead he

calls for

the development of a phenomenology of the
self that

adequately takes into account the other aspects of
selfformation: conciliation and participation.

claims the

I

Bookchin

which emerges from the "welter of its" is

not the product of antagonism,

since antagonism,

in

Bookchin's view, is based in fear,

a

experience which must be learned.

Bookchin is responding

to the modern,

or bourgeois,

thoroughly socia

notion of the self as

fundamentally competitive, of human subjects as
antagonistic egos seeking ever increased opportunity for
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the expansion and expression
of power, most succinctly
stated by Hobbes in the phrase
of a "war of all
against
all." But in his counter-image
Bookchin's alternative
understanding of the ego is itself
one-sided, "Had reason,
with its capacity for calculation,
been used to divide and
destroy rather than unite and
create, the very human
quality of humanity would have
turned upon itself and the

species immolated itself ages ago,
long before it devised
Its armamentarium of modern
weaponry ." 38 a brief review
of the history of war and genocide
should subdue the
impact of such overly optimistic,
near Utopian claims.
However, even though he overemphasizes
the peaceful and
cooperative side of human actions, by pressing
forward
with this understanding of the conciliatory
and

participatory possibilities of human subjectivity
Bookchin
does provide some theoretical potential for the
development of radical ecological thought.
Bookchin claims the alternative human subjectivity,

repressed in

a

society structured on the basis of

antagonism, competition, and limitless power-seeking, was

expressed in earlier societies in their relationships to
external nature.

Here he returns to the themes of

shamanism, magic and animism.

Bookchin cites as

confirmation of this understanding of early human-tonature interaction the tendency of preliterate peoples to
treat the objects and life-forms of nature as other
subjects,

even to the point of attempting to "reason" with
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them as they would with
another human being.
There is no
radical separation of spirit
and body, of mind and
matter
in this organic form of
knowledge,

Preliterate epistemology tends
to unify rather th.n

1„
our
preliterate animistic mind. To
the animi qt- mgn'
soul
for example, is his breatt
Is
eart, or other such clearly
substantial entities. 39
It is in attempting to explain
the apparent violation
of the "conciliatory epistemology,"
itself

S'h“
a

preliterate "conciliatory sensibility"
use of magic and ritual),

result of the

(appearing in the

that Bookchin makes claims at

odds with those of critical theory.

The understanding of

magic and ritual in organic or "primitive"
societies
requires some interpretation of the role of
mimesis and
its relationship to the process of conceptual
abstraction.
In question is the operation of magic and
ritual and how
it mediates between the human community and
the external

world,

By magically imitating nature, its forces, or
the actions of animals and people, preliterate
communities project their own needs into
external nature; it is essential to emphasize
that external nature is conceptualized at the
very outset as a mutualistic community. Prior
to the manipulative act is the ceremonious
supplicatory word, the appeal to a rational
being--to a subject--for cooperation and
understanding. Rites always precede action and
signify that there must be communication between
equal participants, not mere coercion.
The
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consent of an animal, say
a bear, is
essential part of the hunt in which an
it win

Bookchm's discussion

be

is a response to
Horkheimer and

Adorno

understanding of the relationship
of myth and
magic to the domination of
nature, and the ascendancy
of
instrumental rationality in modern
society.
At issue is
the possibility for an
understanding of reason not
reducible to an instrument of
calculation,
an

understanding of reason that provides
nature without domination.

a

relationship to

Bookchin must deny the

presence of fear in nature, just as he
must deny the
presence of domination in the relationship

of human beings

to the nature they must appropriate
out of metabolic

necessity, because these concepts undermine
his

understanding of hierarchy and its relation to
liberatory
reason.

The philosophy of social ecology requires

a

return to the origins of human social relationships
in

which fear, domination, and conflict are absent,
but

a

return which is at the same time also fully conscious or
aware of this past and therefore able to raise up, or
resurrect, nature into

a

would be a return to

non-dominating subjectivity,

a

new state of "free nature."

dialectical "Aufhebung" to

a

This
a

higher level of development

with greater diversity, complexity and self-reflection.

Bookchin views the critical theory project as doomed from
the beginning because it includes the "negative" aspects
of subjectivity

— fear,

antagonism, domination--as present
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at the beginning of the
development of human beings,

"dialectic of enlightenment"
as
domination,

a

The

"dialectic of

according to Bookchin, is
"actually no
dialectic at all-at least not
in its attempt to
explain
the negation of reason
through its own self"

development. "41

The fundamental project
both social
ecology and critical theory
share is the attempt at a

recovery of reason from its collapse
into instrumental
rationality.
Central to this disagreement are
different
understandings of the relationship of
mimesis and reason.
For Bookchin, "simple mimesis" as
an integral part of

magic and ritual, implies

a

unity with the "object."

Bookchin represents this unity as the
recognition of the
object's "subjectivity." 42 For Adorno mimesis
is the

recognition by the human of the uniqueness of
the object,
n °t its common participation in subjectivity,

The shaman's rites were directed to the wind,
the rain, the serpent without, or the demon in
the sick man, but not to materials or specimens.
Magic was not ordered by one, identical spirit:
it changed like the cultic masks which were
supposed to accord with the various spirits.
Magic is utterly untrue, yet in it domination is
not yet negated by transforming itself into the
pure thought and action as the very ground of
the world that has become subject to it.
The
magician imitates demons; in order to frighten
them or to appease them, he behaves
frighteningly or makes gestures of appeasement.
Even though his task is impersonating he never
conceives of himself as does the civilized man
for whom the unpretentious preserves of the
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.

J

happy hunting-grounds
become the unified cosmos
the inclusive concept for
all possibilities of
plunder q

t

With the development of
rationality, or the dialectic
of enlightenment, in which
magic becomes science,
the
relationship of the unique, different
or non-identical to
the human subject collapses
into the unity
of the

identical and universal, as quoted
previously,
1106 therS iS n ° s ecific
P
representation: and
if fher
there are no sacrificial animals
there is no ood
Representation is exchanged for the
fungible

universal interchangability
An atom is smashed not
r
n atl0n Ut aS 3 specimen of
matter, and
the
th e rabbit
rabbtt ddoes noti represent but, as
a mere example
is virtually ignored by the zeal
of the laboratory. 4 ^
.

In the change from magic to science
the self becomes

increasingly identified with nature as

a whole,

the

individual entities with their unique spirits
become
examples of the spirit of nature as
is then identified with the human,

a whole,

a

spirit that

"in place of the local

spirits and demons there appeared heaven and its

hierarchy; in place of the invocations of the magician and
the tribe the distinct graduation of sacrifice and the

labor of the unfree mediated through the word of
command.

4 S

This elimination of the particular or unique

aspects in nature continues until human subjectivity has

engulfed all of nature in its self affirming project until
finally,

"Man" assumes the power of "God" and turns the

unique potentials of each being into means for his own
ends.

Each individual example of nature is simply another
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instance of the unity of
nature, its identity
as material
for manipuiation,
"Disqualif ied nature beco.es
the chaotic
matter of mere classification,
and the all-powerful
self
becomes mere possession-abstract
identity. "46 What is
important in the discussion of
these "origins" of
domination is the development
and extension of
instrumental rationality to the
totality of thought, where
this development began, and
where an alternative reason
remains. At the time of meaningful
magic the

kernel of
the development of instrumental
reason was present but
still remained to be developed,
"in magic there is

specific representation.

What happens to the enemy's

spear,

hair or name, also happens to the
individual; the
sacrificial animal is massacred instead
of the
god.

Substitution in the course of sacrifice
marks
toward discursive logic ." 47

a

step

This is not the same as

saying that the substitutions involved in
magic and ritual
in preliterate society had the full
blown characteristics
of logical analysis or that this society had
the

understanding of the binding contract of "equivalent
exchange

as in modern market societies.

In modern

society abstraction serves to radically separate subject
and object,

to identify the object with its concept

without remainder, to eliminate in thought the uniqueness
of the particular entity.

In magical mimesis this radical

split between subject and object does not operate,

363

Lik e science, magic
pursues
achieve them by mimesis-not aims, but seeks tn
by progressive!
«
9
distancing itself from the
objec?
grounded in the "sovereignty
of ideas " whirh fh
6
primitive, like the neurotic,
is
himself; there can be no
"over-evalMtiln lit,
processes as against reality"
where there is
radical distinction between
thoughts and realty. 48
For the critical theorists
domination begins with
abstraction, with the substitution
of concept

"

V?

for

immediate experience of the thing
or object.
This process
of abstraction is tied to the
process of domination in
labor,

the transformation of nature
into a use for humans,

"The universality of ideas as
developed by discursive
logic, domination in the conceptual
sphere, is raised up
on the basis of actual domination ."^ 9
For the critical
theorists the animal's world is a world
without concept,
It lacks any word to seize the
identical in the flux of

phenomena,

to isolate the same species in the
alternation

of specimens,

or the same thing in altered situations."

The animal does have the capacity for recognition
but it
is very limited,

about it,
a

the "flux of things" has no permanency

there is no definite past and no expectation of

future.

The animal is both enclosed within itself and

exposed to the world,
has no self ." 50

"An animal answers to its name and

The animal can experience fear, pain,

sorrow, but not true happiness,

since happiness requires

the concept,

a

the world,

way to bring the world to

moment.

a

way to resist the emptiness of the flux of
a

halt for

a

The animal lives in a world of "stifled urges and
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"

unbounded passion" without
the capacity to "apply
the
brake of cognation to their
destiny. "51 Adorno
WQuld
elaborate on these themes an
later works where he
explored
the relationship of the
concept to the identifying
subject.

The concept is a way of
controlling nature and
of establishing the human
subject or ego, "In truth,
all
concepts, even the philosophical
ones, refer to

nonconceptualities, because concepts
on their part are
moments of the reality that
requires their formation,
primarily for the control of nature. 5 2
So

human thought is

a

for Adorno,

process of identifying, of
eliminating

the non-identical by identifying
the concept with the
thing, "Yet the appearance of
identity is inherent in

thought itself, in its pure form.
identify.

To think is to

But this is not to indicate the
absence of

any hope of going beyond the identical,
of possibilities

outside of the domination of nature; in fact,
dialectics
is the consistent sense of nonidentity."

The "untruth of

identity" is that "the concept does not exhaust
the thing

conceived." 54
itself,

This non-identity inheres in the concept

referring as it does to something outside itself,

it is constituted also by what it is not.

of philosophy,

The development

along negative dialectic lines

(and maybe

in the direction of a revised dialectical naturalism)

helps to reveal the non-identical in the conceptual,
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,

^

Philosophy is the most serious
of thinqs
”

stt'

»

Without abandoning itself.

®
5

*

hut th

K; »

ltS own conduct

'

The process of producing the
"primacy of identity,"
its various forms, must have,
according to Adorno,
involved an "unspeakable effort"
on the part of the
species.
The emergence of the I or the
ego makes
possible the perception of freedom and
unfreedom

m

(unfreedom viewed as the constraint the
environment
imposes on the subject).
The "naive subject" simply
opposes itself to its environment, not
understanding its
own inclusion in nature, seeking a
"spiritualized" realm
beyond that of natural causality. The subject
desires to
be master over nature, but its true freedom
requires

revelation that it is in fact reflecting rather than
escaping from the domination of nature,
To dominate this conditioning, consciousness must
render it transparent.
The thought, by means of its
freedom, turns back to itself as to its subject, and
its sovereignty also leads to the concept of
unfreedom.
.It is the nature-controlling sovereignty
and its social form, dominion over people, that
suggest the opposite to our consciousness: the idea
of freedom. Its historical archetype was he who is
topmost in hierarchies, the man who is not visibly
.

dependent

.

.

Freedom would require escape also from the domination of
the

I,

of the subject identical to itself through
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domination of the object, the
other.
The idea of freedom
trades on a world before the
ego, before the constant
I
made possible through the
identifying
concept,

The dawning sense of freedom
feeds upon the
lmpUlSe n0t ye " Peered by
any
anv°solid
solid I.
The more the I curbs that
impulse
the more chaotic and thus
questionable will it
md the P re temporal freedom. Without an
anamnesis of the untamed impulse
that precedes
the ego— an impulse later
banished to the zone
of unfree bondage to nature--it
would be
impossible to derive the idea of freedom,
although that idea in turn ends up
reinforcing
the ego.
In spontaneity, the philosophical
concept that does most to exalt freedom
as a
mode of conduct above empirical existence,
resounds the echo of that by whose control there
and
ultimate destruction the I of idealistic
philosophy means to prove its freedom 58
.

Before the subject's relation to nature
becomes
transparent, and this is still not so, the old
way of
things predominates.

The dialectic of enlightenment is

the attempt to be free of nature's power to
dominate the

human species by controlling that power of domination for
the species

own purposes.

Nature is controlled according

to dominating reason by applying the right concepts to all

its parts,

and can only then escape the primordial fear of

the all powerful other of nature,

"Man imagines himself

free from fear when there is no longer anything

unknown.

radical

.

.

...

.Enlightenment is mythic fear turned
.Nothing at all may remain outside, because the

mere idea of outsideness is the very source of fear." 5 ^
Fear is controlled by the naming or conceptualization of
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that which is feared,

the power of unknown
nature to
dissolve the individual subject.
This dissolution is not
that of subjectivity into
objectivity, but loss of the
individual self,

hat the primitive experiences
in this regard is
not a spiritual as opposed to
a material
substance, but the intricacy of the
natural in
contrast to the individual. The gasp
of
surprise which accompanies the
experience of the
unusual becomes its name.
it fixes the
transcendence of the unknown in relation
to the
known, and therefore terror as
sacredness.
The
dualization of nature as appearance and
sequence, effort and power, which first
makes
possible both myth and science, originates
in
human fear, the expression of which becomes
explanation.
It is not the soul which is
transposed to nature, as psychologism would
have
it, mana, the moving spirit, is no
projection,
but the echo of the real supremacy of nature
in
the weak souls of primitive men.^

This understanding of the relationship of word
to

thing and its development out of fear is in sharp
contrast
to Bookchin's own understanding.

Bookchin claims the word

was part of ritual and common life,

"But the ritual of the

word in the form of incantations and work songs reminds us
of a more primordial sensibility based on mutual

recognition and shared rationality."^^

The primitive

relation to nature is not one of fear and the struggle to
continue individual and collective existence, but of
mutual respect and the recognition of the "object's

subjectivity."

This understanding is not merely in

reference to the already advanced social forms of ritual

368

and ceremony, but includes
a basic understanding
of
conceptualization itself.

Bookchin’s understanding of
the relationship of the
particular to the universal with
respect to language is
wholly inadequate. He concedes
there was recognition of
particularity in the primitive world,
"a sense of

particularity in the manifold of this
experiential unity."
The "animist" could distinguish
bear from bison
and from

human being, by name and even
aesthetically, as cave
paintings indicate. What is very
curious is Bookchin's
equation of "universal" with "spirit" in
a very
narrow,

overly literal sense,
the r epressiv e, abstraction of the
individual
bear into a bear spirit, a universalizing
of the
spirit of bears that denies their specificity,
is I suspect, a later development in the
elaboration of the animistic spirit.
In
rendering the individual bear subject to
manipulative forms of human predation,
generalization in this form marks the first
steps toward the objectification of the external
world.
Before there were bear spirits there
were probably only individual bears 62
.

For Bookchin then the hunting and killing of the bear
is not a manifestation of domination,

of nature by humans.

These do not exist until the

individual bear is conceptualized as
of the bear "spirit."

mastery, or control

a

mere representation

There is a confusion here in the

relationship of particular and universal.

At the moment

of differentiation involved in conceptualization, of

applying

a

general concept to an individual object there
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^
is movement within
the dialectic of
particular and

universal.

The distinction between
species, bear from
bison from human, for example,
is already a movement
of
contrast between the pcix
particular
Licuiar and
anH the universal,
without
literal reference to "spirit."
The uniqueness of the
individual animal has been at
least partially dissolved
in
its reduction to the member
of a species, into "a
bear."
In this way, one aspect of
the non-identity of the

individual being or entity is
violated at the moment of
its conceptualization.
To attempt to claim the
universal
is not operating within language
or conceptualization
until there is explicit reference
to "spirit" is to
crudely identify the universal with
a theological and

metaphysical understanding of the concept
of the
universal.
But this misidentif ication of

the universal

with the theological meaning of the term
"spirit" is
exactly what Bookchin does,
By abstracting a bear spirit from individual
bears, by generalizing from the particular to
the universal, and further, by infusing this
process of abstraction with magical content, we
are developing a new epistemology for explaining
the external world.
If the individual bear is
m erely an epiphenomenon of an animal spirit, it
is now possible to objectify nature by
completely subsuming the particular by the
general and denying the uniqueness of the
specific and concrete.
The emphasis of the
animistic thereby shifts from accommodation and
communication to domination and coercion.
But the shift has already occurred with the reduction
of the individual to the member of a species, the
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particular to an example of
the universal.
The concept
"bear" has already partly
eliminated the non-identity

of
the individual animal,
which could only be
retained in
something like a "pure nominalism."
Social ecology’s
desire to respect or honor the
"uniqueness of the specif 1C
and concrete" coincides with
that of critical theory,
but
the relationship of reason
to this possibility is
deeply
embedded in the process of
conceptualization
itself,

according to critical theory.

Bookchin cannot accept

this,

more adequate, understanding of
the dialectic of the
particular and the universal because
it would implicate
identifying reason as containing an
element of repression
from the very beginning.
This immediately puts the
discussion of the possibilities of freedom
back before the
institution of social hierarchy to the more
fundamental
problem of the relationship between human and
nature.

very formation of the individual ego, which is

The

a

manifestation of the adjustment to reality required by
the
physical limitation on the organism, is an aspect of the
domination of nature both external and internal.

Bookchin

s

understanding of the dialectic of particular

and universal cannot address the repressive qualities of

language and conceptualization as such.

Adorno on the

contrary retains the initial insight of Hegel without
"hypostatizing” spirit in Bookchin'
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s

Hegelian manner,

s

“d

servant, "develops" the"
genesStof
ne

r rP0Se

as wel1 as t0

heterogeneous
matter
teT TThe
h
origin of "I" in "Not I"
remains
scarcely veiled.
it is looked up in the
real
living process, in the
legalities of the
survival of the species, of
providing it with

nutrients.

Thereafter, Hegel hyposL^s
the
vain.
To succeed somehow, he ”
must
blow it up into a whole, the
total spirit. 6
d,

The

I,

but

the ego,

m

emerges for Hegel, Marx and the
critical

theorists in the encounter between
the human organism and
external nature, in the necessity of
metabolism.
Different understandings of the resulting
potential for
freedom is what later marks their
different philosophical
positions. Adorno would repeatedly return
to the

relationships between self-identification,
conceptualization, and the taking-in, or incorporation,
of
external nature as the other. He typically would
indicate
the relation of concept to identity as that
of devouring,
of eating the other 66
.

There is a gap in Bookchin'

understanding of subjectivity between the relationship of

metabolism and human conceptualization.

Bookchin does

acknowledge the intimate link between subjectivity and
metabolism,

"In the organic world,

the metabolic activity

of life-forms constitutes the sense of self-identity,

however germinal,

from which nature begins to acquire its

rudimentary subjectivity ." 66

However, Bookchin does not

see metabolic activity as simultaneously the maintenance
of

self-identity and the destruction of the non-identical,
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Its absorption or
incorporation of the other
into the
self.
Bookchin's dialectic of
subgectxvity becomes onesided as a dialectic of identity
incapable of adequate

acknowledgment of the coercive
effects on the nonldentical, especially as this
occurs at the human level
where conceptualization
facilitates the control of
nature

Women and Reason
Social ecology's conception of
subjectivity also
impacts how reason is related to the
differences between
men and women. Remember, Bookchin
argues the "natural"
differences between men and women, basically
revolving
around reproductive biology, as well as
women's smaller
physical size, creates a "natural" division
between their
respective sphere's of activity, "The female
is a

specialist in child rearing and food-gathering.

Her

responsibilities focus on nurture and sustenance.

From

childhood she will be taught to identify with such
'feminine'

traits as caring and tenderness, and she will

be trained in comparatively sedentary occupations ."^ 7

addition,

In

the woman is the source of community in the

earliest organic societies,
The blood-tie and the rights and duties that surround
it are embodied in an unspoken oath that comprised
the only visible unifying principle of early
community life. And this bond initially derives from
woman.
She alone becomes the very protoplasm of
sociality: the ancestress that cements the young into
lasting consociation, the source of the blood that
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commonalit^of ohains^the

06 Wh ° nourishes a

a
mutuality
recognition that extends from
infancy to death
she
IS instructress in the
basic ways of life the
indisputable personification of
^'
conceived as an intimate familialcommunity' as such
experience. 68

It was "woman" who made
the human species different

from others by her emphasis
on the sharing of food as
a
"consistent communal activity" and
as a "universally
social phenomenon. "63 it was woman
who provided the basis
of civilization, the model of
the "Mother Goddess," and
the creator of the original golden
age,
We cannot ignore the fact that
woman's foraging
activities helped awaken in humanity an
acute
sense of place, of pikos.
Her nurturing
sensibility helped create not only the
origins
of society but literally the roots of
civilization--a terrain the male has arrogantly
claimed for himself. Her "stake in
civilization" was different from that of the
predatory male: it was more domestic, more
pacifying, and more caring. Her sensibility ran
deeper and was laden with more hope than the
male's, for she embodied in her very physical
being mythology's ancient message of a lost
"golden age" and a fecund nature.^ 6
.

In Bookchin's social ecology the emergence of

domination results from the male's usurpation of women's
place in the creation of civilization, at least its
symbolic usurpation.

Although hierarchy begins with the

institutionalization of the shaman's role as an aspect of
the authority of the elders,

soon it is the elder men only

who rule, extending patricentric relations to full

patriarchy,

374

the a chet yp al Other of
M ora
nlTiLlTlT
thpT
^
the
human embodiment
of its „ ar ped imag^ of
evil

M

,

Under patriarchy woman
represents the opposite of the
male "moral" development of
civilization, because she
shows the signs of inferior
nature in her very being, in
her smaller size and weaker body.
Woman becomes the very
source of the concept of domination,
"Even before man
embarks on his conquest of man— of
class by

class-

patriarchal morality obliges him to affirm
his conquest of
woman.
The subjugation of her nature and
its absorption
into the nexus of patriarchal morality
forms the

archetypal act of domination that ultimately
gives rise to
man's imagery of a subjugated nature ." 72
Bookchin
identifies

a

linguistic link between women and nature,

It is perhaps not accidental that nature and
earth
retain the female gender into our own time. What may
seem to us like a linguistic atavism that reflects a
long-gone era when social life was matricentric and
nature was its domestic abode may well be an on-going
and subtly viable expression of man's continual
violation of woman as nature and of nature as
woman.

But Bookchin argues against those such as Simone de

Beauvoir who claim that under patriarchal morality woman
is reduced to a generalized Other who is opposed,

and contained.

negated

Alternatively, he argues male morality

"particularizes this otherness into
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a

specific hatred of

^

her inquisitiveness, of
her probing subjectivity
and
curiosity. "74 Woman haunts
male "civilization"
with the
fear that her powers have
not been fully exorcised,
powers
which inhere in the ability
"to reproduce the
species, to
rear it, to provide it with
a loving refuge from
the
'unfriendly world,'" and in woman's
powers of material
achievement, including food
cultivation, pottery, and
weaving, all of which provided
the basis for the emergence
of male civilization.
But, Bookchin insists,
the

domination of woman is not a denial
of "woman's"
subj ectivity,
Ironically there is no denial, here,
of
subjectivity but a shrieking fear of her woman's
latent
r
d
e P ° ssibillt y tha t they may
be stirred
in?n life
i^ again. Hence, patriarchal morality
back into
must bring her into complicity with the
male's evertremulous image of her inferiority. She
must be
taught to view her posture of renunciation,
modesty
and obedience as the intrinsic attributes
of her
subjectivity, in short, her total negation as
a
personality
.

.

'

From this indication of woman as the negative
of the

masculine image of morality and civilization, an image
that echoes that of Horkheimer and Adorno, 76 it is not

clear how Bookchin 's dependence on the idea of maternal
care or "mother love" should be interpreted, especially

with regard to the issues of separation and alienation.

Bookchin rejects what he sees as Hegel's over-reliance on
an antagonistic understanding of alienation
"

Selbs tentausserung"

)

(the German

which he claims is more accurately
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translated as "self-detachment"
rather than alienation.
Bookchin views alienation,
separation, or self-detachment
as based not on antagonism
but on "wholeness,

fullness and

completeness" resulting in the further
assertion that
Hegel's understanding of negativity
is more adequately
understood as an annulling of the

"other" not in the since

of annihilation but "in order
to absorb it into a movement

toward

a

richly variegated completeness

." 77

Bookchin

rejects the "strictly theoretical" or
"strictly

intellectual" strategy Hegel adopts for
resolving the
paradox of alienation. Bookchin proposes
to examine the
more concrete "juncture of biology and
socialization" that
occurs with human birth and early childhood
development,

with the intention of uncovering

a

basis for reason not

reducible to merely instrumental terms.

It is in the

relation between child and mother that Bookchin finds the
most important influences on the development of human
reason,

"Biology and socialization, in fact, cojoin

precisely at the point where maternal care is the most
formative factor in childhood acculturation.

.

.

.Reason

comes to the child primarily through the care, support,
attention,

and instruction provided by the mother ." 78

long period of biological dependency which allows the
"mental plasticity" of the young human the ability to

acquire knowledge also allows the development of strong
social bonds with "parents,

rudimentary community." 7 ^

siblings,

and some kind of

It is curious that here
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The

emphasizes socializing agents
beyond the mother,
as he does in an example
of the socialization
of Hopi
children, but he continues
to use the term "maternal''
to
plain the origins of liberatory
reason.

He does

superficially address this
potential threat to the idea
of
a liberatory maternal
reason by noting the
"mother-infant
relationship is the initial step
in the socialization
process the cradle in which the
need for consociation is
created ." 80 But this still begs
the question of whether
it is specifically a female who
must be
the care giver,

and it also begs the question of
how much the physiology
of the baby requires physical
contact with concrete
objects and with other humans, regardless
of sex or

gender.

At issue is how much of the development
of reason
is a tactile experience and exactly
the relationship this
has to "the mother."

Bookchin paints

a

picture of maternal care as one of

utopian "mutual support, concern, and love"
opposed by
civilization" which is "a massive enterprise to undo
the
impact of maternal care, nurture, and modes of thought
on
the character structure of the offspring."®-'-

Civilization

changes this caring, nurturing character into one that is
"shapeless, unfeeling, and harsh" so that humanity will be

accepting of "war, exploitation, political obedience, and
rule."

This warping of human character is an undoing of

the human's animal first nature as well as its human

second nature acquired as

a child.
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It is a violation of

the atmosphere of
"dependency and protective
custody" the
child experiences "in the
arms of its mother. "82
The liberatory reason
formed under the mother's
care,
and repressed by civilization,
has the characteristics
of
an ecological reason, a
specific liberatory rationality,
it is not only love that
the mother ordinarily
gives
her child, but a rationality
of 'otherness' that stands
sharply at odds with its modern
arrogant counterpart.
This earlier rationality is

unabashedly svmh^n,-

..83

In

this sentimental idealization of
the mother-child

relationship, Bookchin also claims the
mother's love is "a
spontaneous, unconditional sentiment of
caring, free from
any reciprocating obligations by the
child," but even more
importantly it results in a "rationality
of

deobjectification" or

a

"resubj ectivizing of experience"

in which the other is in a "logical
nexus of mutuality." 84

Contrary to scientism, or to Marxism, claims
Bookchin,
this leads to a view of the other not as alien
or

alienated but as "the active component that it always has
been in natural and social history."

These observations

on mother love then lead Bookchin to characterize

libertarian rationality as involving the observation of
the other in an "ethical context,

"

representing an

ecologized notion of self-detachment that emphasizes
"wholeness,

completeness, and fullness."

Finally,

connecting this idealization of the mother-child
relationship to the needs of the philosophy of social
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£

"°

ecology, Bookchin indicates
the essential features
of
reason,

A libertarian rationality
raises natural
f
nitY in diversit y to the
level of°reason
itself it
ke
giC ° f UlUty ^tween
the"??
and tte "othIr" thaV°
5 nd
integrative function of diversity
?
t
t can be comprehended
and integrated
^ f
symbolically.
Diversity and unity do not
contradict
eac other as logical antinomies.
To the contrary
f ddversitY
the
that
gives it intelligibility
g
intellfSi
and meaning, and hence a
PrinC1Ple n0t ° nlY ° f ecol °gy bub
of reason
i tsel f ?^
i

—

1

'

'

1

.

,

Bookchin believes the "formal structure"
of
dialectical and analytical reason would
need

to change

little to be able to accommodate this
ecological and
libertarian rationality. He acknowledges
the presence of
an "other" to libertarian reason that
is "antagonistic and

oppositional,"

a

"parasitic" rationality as opposed to the

"mutualism" of libertarian reason.

He asserts "symbiotic"

reason is composed of both the mutualistic and the
parasitic.

At this point in his analysis of

a

more

complex understanding of reason, one approaching that of
critical theory,

instead of offering the needed analysis

of a dialectic between mutualism and parasitism,

"symbiotic reason" then is collapsed into an identity with
"mutualism.

ob

Bookchin associates mutualism with "an

ethical context of virtue" against the parasitism of

"value-free context of utility and efficiency."

a

This is a

simple exclusion or marginalization of "parasitic" reason.
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In the now one-sided
characterization of reason,

the

mutualism of libertarian reason
"objectively validates"
social ecology's concept
of the good,

that is, the ability
to form concepts of the
good comes from the
"natural
history of subj ectivity
"
Humanity is an expression
of
.

natural history, subjectivity
developed to the point of
rational self-awareness, and
this capacity for selfawareness generates another human
potential, "As a unique
agent of consciousness, humanity
can provide the voice of
nature's internal rationality in
the form
of thought and

self-reflective action.

Libertarian reason seeks to

consciously mitigate ecological
destruction, in the realms
of both social ecology and natural
ecology ." 87
This justification of libertarian
rationality, which
contains the potential to produce a "third"
or "free"
nature, is open to criticism from several
directions.
It
is openly one-sided in its emphasis
on subjectivity viewed

in a

mutualistic" sense.

Bookchin acknowledges this bias

but indicates it is preferable to what he views
as the

only alternative,

a

bias in favor of a rationality based

on control, manipulation, domination,

and estrangement;

Libertarian reason would advance a contrasting view
in its orientation toward ecological symbiosis, but
doubtless this can be regarded as a bias that is
neither more nor less justifiable than the bias of
authoritarian rationalism. But biases are not formed
from mere air. Not only do they always exist in
every orientation we hold, but their impact upon
thought is all the more insidious when their
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X
a

"

value- free^epi st emology ?^

6 °f

"° bjeCtivit

^

and

But this dichotomization
of choices does not
exhaust
possible wa ys of thinking about
reason.
The limitations
of a one-sided philosophy
of social ecology may
have

significant consequences for

a

politics of ecology.

Bookchin's characterization of
the principles of
ecology and evolution are also
questionable, and should
they not hold up to a critical
examination based on
physical or empirical evidence the
fundamental basis of
the philosophy of social ecology
would be destablized.
The questionable assertions about
the status of physical
evidence includes his representation
of early human life
utopian, or golden age, images, nearly
free of conflict
or struggle among humans and between
humans and

m

nature.

His reliance on questionable anthropology
makes his

position vulnerable to

a

fundamentally damaging critique

should additional contradictory anthropological
evidence
appear,

thus placing him at the mercy of the sort of

ob j ectivi zing science he opposes.

Finally, his representation of motherhood in idyllic

terms has been challenged by recent feminist

investigations, as well as more than

psychoanalytics.

a

century of

The development of rationality in the

child has probably never been as Bookchin indicates, but

certainly the development of subjectivity differs between
the male and the female child,
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a

problem not addressed by

Bookchm.

This is but one indication
of the reduction of
subjectivity into a uniform essence
in the philosophy of
social ecology, a more detailed
examination of the
specific relations of subjectivity
and motherhood is

necessary to understand the consequences
and potentials of
maternal care.
This is also necessary in
examining
alternative forms of early child care
not dependent on the
natural mother, and to confront what
seems to be a bias

toward traditionalistic family structure
in Bookchin's
analysis.
These issues of motherhood and
female

subjectivity, how they have been addressed in
feminism,
and their consequences for radical ecology,
will be

examined in the final section of this work.

But before

turning to the relationship of ecofeminism to radical

ecology and critical theory, an examination of the impact
of the philosophical limitations of social ecology on

radical ecological politics is in order.
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me more accurate

j

to say that mutualism is composed of
symbiosis and

parasitism, but again this would disrupt
Bookchin'
reliance on the concept of symbiosis as the
fundamental thrust of evolution. Also, the
function
of parasites in evolution, as well as in
diversification of species, is more complex and less
one-sided than Bookchin indicates. See Lynn
Margulis and Dorion Sagan, Origins of Spy; Thrpp
Bl llxon Years of Genetic Recom b ination (New Haven:
Yale, 1986), especially Chapter 6; also Stephen Jay
Gould E ver Since Da rw i n Reflections in Natural
History (New York: Norton, 1977), especially
Chapter 14.
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CHAPTER

8

SOCIAL ECOLOGY AND POLITICS

The philosophy of social
ecology attempts to combine
the insights of ecology with
a social analysis to
produce
a vision of a future
liberated, ecological society.
Any

philosophy of radical ecology must
address the connections
between ecology and social institutions
including the

problem of the "naturalistic fallacy,"
the relationship of
"ought" to "is." Bookchin claims
dialectical naturalism
overcomes this problem and provides an
objective ethical
basis for policy decision-making and
fundamental choices
about the institutional structure of society.

A critical

exploration of this "objective" basis for politics
must
begin with social ecology's claim about the
relationship

between its theory of evolution and its vision of
democratic institutions, particularly as developed in
the
ideas of municipalism and confederalism.

Fundamental

relationships requiring close scrutiny are those between
Bookchin'

s

understanding of the evolution of subjectivity

and the other basic concepts of social ecology,

including

complexity, diversity (sometimes discussed in the terms of

"unity in diversity,

"

or differentiation)

,

mutualism (or

complementarity, or symbiosis), and spontaneity (or
participation)

,

and how they are transposed into

"objective values" for political and social institution
building.

Earlier critiques of Bookchin'
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s

theories on the

relationship between evolution
and subjectivity
questioned
whether the arguments linking
ecology and liberatory
institutions were anything
other than personal
preference,
rather than logical or
rational relationships.
Of

specific concern has been
Bookchin's assertions about
the
directionality of evolution, and
his understanding
of the

application of ecological principles
to the political
sphere of human activities.
If Bookchin's understanding
of evolution is fundamentally
flawed,
and if his

characterization of the relationship
between reason and
subjectivity is also flawed, then
how does this change the
"objective" status of the liberatory
and democratic
institutions he advocates? The reverse

can also be asked;

if the political and social
institutions he advocates

fulfill fundamental requirements of
freedom and justice in
the human community, do they provide
an acceptable means
of addressing ecological problems?
In other
words,

although Bookchin's vision of

a

municipalist and

confederalist institutional structure for
ecological society may not be

a

a future

simple extension of the

evolution of nature's subjectivity, it may still be true
that these ideas presently represent the most adequate

means for addressing ecological and social problems from

a

radical ecological perspective.

Another way of looking at this problem is as
relationship of means and ends.
government,

a

Does the means of self-

in the form of municipalism and confederalism,
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cohere with the end of
ecologically viable relationships
between the human species
and the rest of nature
with
which it is inextricably
intertwined? All
of radical

ecology fundamentally agrees
that the nature-culture
conceptual duality has a real
effect on the human species'
attempt to dominate nature. This
domination has extended
itself to the point of ecological
catastrophe
for other

species, and to

questioning of the ultimate viability
of
the human species on this planet.
The problem for a
a

philosophy of radical ecology is to
first produce an
analysis of the relationship of
ecological problems to
society that goes to the root of the
problem, and
secondly, to provide the basis for a
vision
of an

ecological society that can resolve ecological
problems
while still promoting human aspirations for
freedom

and

happiness

1
.

This must be said because, as many authors

have pointed out,

it is perfectly possible to envision an

authoritarian or totalitarian society that could establish
long-term relationships of ecological sustainability.
Part of the reason for Bookchin's emphasis on the "idea"
of the domination of nature as the ideological

underpinning of a society was to avoid the deterministic
reading of social ecology which interprets it as claiming
that only hierarchical societies produce ecological

destruction, or that the absence of hierarchy necessarily
will result in the elimination of the domination of
nature.

Rather,

it seems that the elimination of social
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ln B00kchin '^ view,

is a necessary step
toward

the elimination of the
domination of external
nature,
although not a suffrcient
one.
By definition the
elimination of hierarchy is
a necessary step in
the
removal of domination of
human by human, one form
of the
domination of nature.
Consideration of domination
of
humans by humans, viewed as
one expression of the
"development" of nature, must
be included in any radical
ecological critique of the
domination of nature. This
seems to be one of Bookchin's
principle disagreements with
those deep ecologists who tend
toward the misanthropic;
they reenact the nature-culture
dualism by simply

condemning the human species, arguing
for the simple
preservation of other species until
humans annihilate
themselves. A consistent radical
ecological philosophy
must include the human species among
the

natural species

that are to be freed from domination
by human culture.

Municipalism and conf ederalism are the basic
institutional structures for

a

future ecological society

according to social ecology and should be explored
from
several perspectives.
First, the relationship of
the

philosophy oi social ecology to the institutions of

municipalism and conf ederalism should be unraveled and
evaluated on the basis of their philosophical coherence
and consistency.

Second, municipalism and confederalism

should be examined on the basis of their claims to be the
most adequate democratic institutional forms capable of
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resolving the problems of
hierarchy and the domination
of
human by human.
Finally, the implications
of social
ecology for the resolution
of actual ecological
questions
must be addressed. After
completing thrs investigation
of
the political implications
of the philosophy
of social

ecology as it now stands, it
will be shown to be
inadequate to the tasks it has
set itself, partrcularly
its ability to: a) integrate
social and political
institutions into ecological requirements;
b) demonstrate
the internal consistency of
the relationship of

municipalism and confederalism to the
ideas of freedom and
democracy; and c) show that social
ecology does not
continue to dominate non-human nature in
favor of human
sub j ect ivity

Municipalism, Confederalism and Ecology
Independent of its relationship to the issues of
ecology, Bookchin's examinations of the democratic

forms

of organization of municipalism and confederalism,
as

alternatives to authoritarian and representative

republican forms of government, are significant
contributions to the development of anarchist political
theory.

O

The historical evidence and examples Bookchin

has amassed are

a

direct challenge to fatalistic and

reformist arguments that view the nation-state and liberal

representative institutions as essentially
unchallengeable.

Much of the appeal of social ecology to
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activists comes from its
ability to offer concrete
historical examples of
alternative democratic
institutional arrangements
that do not degenerate
into
appendages of economic reduction!™.
but

at the same time

emphasize a connection to
populist or grass roots
democratic efforts, and without
resorting to vanguardism.
The relationship of these
institutions to Bookchin's
understanding of evolution is
the starting
point for an

examination which will then open
onto the issues of
democracy and its relationship
to a truly ecological and
free society.
One of the frequently leveled
charges against

Bookchm

is that he opportunistically
connects his

libertarian anarchist political ideology
to the cause of
ecology, that there is a great deal
of shear opportunism
involved in social ecology. At one level
this

seems to be

totally misplaced.

Bookchin was, as he frequently

indicates, one of the first leftist radicals
on the

contemporary scene to place ecological concerns
within

philosophy of radical social change

3
.

a

His sensitivity to

ecological concerns dates back to his earliest efforts
to
express the need to address societal problems within an

ecological context, and in

a

philosophically coherent

manner,

The critical edge of ecology is due not so much to
the power of human reason. .. .but to a still higher
power, the sovereignty of nature... but ecology
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if the criticism
of Bookchin as
philosophical

pportunist is meant to indicate
that he is simply riding
the wave of new social
movement activities and
successes,
the criticism is misplaced.
It is much closer
to the
truth to say that Bookchin
may have had a significant
influence in aiding the
development of the new social
movements, especially the radical
ecology
movement.

However,

criticisms of Bookchin's philosophy
of social
ecology which focus on the emphasis
he gives
to some

ecological insights while ignoring
or suppressing others,
and the convenient way these
ecological insights coincide
with his social and political
analysis, are closer to the
mark.
In an effort to illuminate
this issue it will be

useful to first examine Bookchin's
vision of future
liberatory politics, then compare the
resulting

institutional arrangements to the demands of
the
ecological crisis, thus enabling us to evaluate
whether
the institutions actually provide an adequate
solution.

The two issues of primary importance then are
the

adequacies of Bookchin's understanding of ecology, and his
emphasis on the resolution of social problems as the basis
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for then resolving the
problems of the domination
of

nature

Bookchin has charged many
of his critics with
misrepresenting his position on
libertarian municipalism,
its relationship to the
political sphere of human
activity, and its impact on
bringing about an ecological
society. 5 Any summary runs
the risk of oversimplifying
or
reducing the argument to its
inessential
components, an

empty shell,

in comparison to its full
development in its
original form.
The following explication will
attempt to

avoid these pitfalls, but at the
same time indicate the
areas that have become problematic
from

a

radical

ecological perspective.

Bookchin has developed the ideas of
municipalism and
confederal ism
many articles and other publications

m

a

over

number of years, but his arguments have
remained

fundamentally consistent throughout.

6

What should be

emphasized about this body of work are the
envisioned
institutional arrangements and their philosophical,

political and ecological justifications.

Bookchin argues

that libertarian municipalism is fundamentally different
in structure than other proposals which seek to
radically

alter social and political relations.

In Bookchin'

s

view,

other proposals for transforming politics are merely

additional techniques for holding power within
"representative" government institutions or "parliamentary
party" structures, not "a moral calling based on
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traditionally, community,
and freedom ." 7
Bookchin
statements about

Many of

the basis of politics
rely on

hrs interpretation of
classical Greek forms,
and have led
many critics to reduce
his position to a
simple romantic
idealist longing for a
mythic golden age of
politics.
Some statements do leave
an impression of this
tendency,
for example, libertarian
municipalism, "Involves a

redefinition of politics, a
return to the word's
original
Greek meaning as the management
of the conmunity or
by means of direct face-to-face
assemblies
of the people

m

the formulation of public
policy and based on an ethics
of complementarity and
solidarity ." 8 As can already
be
seen by comparing the two
preceding quotes, the basis for
his alternative politics varies
with the statement; from
tradition, community and freedom,
to complementarity and
solidarity, to still other terms
elsewhere, all

representing the desired principles of
social and
political structure.
The relationship

of these varying

political bases of action are not directly
linked to the
analysis of ecological problems, but flow from

the general

relations between hierarchy and subjectivity.
The basic structure of the social ecological
society

would consist of politics at the "municipal" level,
at the
level of what are now labeled cities and counties
or

townships.

Higher level political structure basically

would be merely coordinating levels of policy
administration.

Policy itself would be decided at the
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municipal or local level.

Loral v^-i
P litics would consist
of
•

+.

•

direct face-to-face
democracy with an emphasis
on
developing a public sphere
of discussion or
dialogue.
This public sphere,
Bookchin argues, was
typical in
earlier places and times
when parks, sidewalks,

cafes and

other meeting places served
as arenas for
discussion of
common interests and public
concerns.
This he contrasts
to "representative"
systems where individuals
scarcely
take part in government
except as constituent

or consumer,
thus lacking any meaningful
participation in policy
decisions. Bookchin is at pains
to distinguish policymaking from the "administration
of policy" as it would
take place in a liberated
society, "Eoli<ty is made by
a
community or neighborhood assembly
of free citizens;
administration is performed by confederal
councils

composed of mandated, recallable
deputies of wards, towns,
and villages ." 9 The delegates to
higher level

coordinating bodies would be mandated to
carry-out only
the policies expressed by the true
policy-making

bodies at

the municipal or local level,

and would be subject to

recall at any time.

Although the general tendency would be for the
local
community to move toward a self-reliant political and
economic structure there are important reasons not to

carry this goal to extremes.

The confederation of

municipalities would make possible the exploitation of
certain economic advantages due to the uneven distribution
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resources.

it makes no sense
for a community to
pursue

self-reliance to the point of
actual hardship and
immiserating labor merely
because local situations
certain products difficult to
acquire.

make

The confederation

of municipalities would
offer the opportunity to

distribute goods according to
need.

In fact,

Bookchin
frequently cites Marx's maxim as
the basis for economic
decision-making. Bookchin rejects
capitalism as an
adequate economic structure; he
claims its profit
motivated imperative of "grow or die"
destroys ecosystems
and disempowers individuals from
controlling their
own

lives.

that

However, Bookchin also rejects the
Marxist notion

particular class can represent the general
interests of society, and he therefore
a

rejects such ideas

as "workplace democracy" or "syndicalism"
as anything

other than complicity with the basic imperatives
of
capitalism.

The general interest of humanity cannot
be

found in the strictly economic sphere, however,
It would seem to me that the need to repair
our
relationship with the natural world is certainly a
general interest" that is beyond dispute--and,
indeed, it remains the "general interest" advanced by
social ecology.
It may be possible to coopt many
dissatisfied elements in the present society, but
nature is not cooptable.
Indeed, the only politics
that remains for the left is one based on the premise
that there i_s. a "general interest" in democratizing
society and preserving the planet 10
.

Besides the economic necessity for confederation of

municipalities, there also is

a
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political necessity

involving the aims of
democracy and the protection
of
individual rights. The danger
of local control over
Policy is the temptation
of "parochialism," which
may
degenerate into abuse of
minorities and individuals.
The
enforcement of basic human
rights is not a violation
of
local autonomy, according
to Bookchin, rather,
it is the

recognition of the larger
confederated community as

a

whole,

If par ti c ui ar communities
or neighborhoods— or
minority grouping of them— choose
to go their
own way to a point where human
rights 'are
violated or where ecological mayhem
is
permitted the majority in a local
or regional
confederation has every right to
prevent such
malfeasances through its confederal
council.
This is not a denial of democracy
but the
assertion of a shared agreement by all
to
recognize civil rights and maintain the
ecological integrity of a region. These
rights
and needs are not asserted so much by
a
confederal council as by the majority of
the
popular assemblies conceived as one large
community that expresses its wishes through
its
confederal deputies.
This policy-making still
remains local, but its administration is vested
in the confederal network as a whole.
The
confederation in effect is a Community of
communities based on distinct human rights and
ecological imperatives 11

<

.

The model of libertarian municipalism is incompatible

with strategies to "nationalize" an economy, and

incompatible with the continued existence of the nationstate.

The libertarian municipalist strategy raises

economics to the level of public concern and public policy
making.

In this,

Bookchin feels comfortable in
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acknowledging Marx's contribution
to the analysis of
capitalism, "Marx, to his
credit, clearly demonstrated
that the 'free market’
inevitably yields the
oligarchic
and monopolistic corporate
market with entrepreneurial
manipulations that in every way
parallel and ultimately
converge with state controls.”^
He goes on to indicate
that the concentrations of
power produced by capitalism
and the nation-state limit
the possibilities for
reducing
pollution, recycling wastes and
making sound use of
regional raw materials 13 But more
to the point, the
.

present economic and political
structures make it
impossible to develop a "truly ecological
sensibility" as
opposed to merely acting in an "ecologically
responsible"
manner, "We should not, I believe, lose
sight of what it

means to live an ecological way of life,
not merely follow
sound ecological practices.
The multitude of handbooks
that teach us how to conserve, invest, eat,
and buy in an

ecologically responsible' manner are a travesty of
the
more basic need to reflect on what it means to think

— yes,

to reason

and to live ecologically in the full meaning of

the term." 1 ^

The result of living in a society that was

"radically veering toward decentralized, participatory
democracy, guided by communitarian and ecological

principles" would be individuals who would not consider it
in any way reasonable to pollute the air or water in a

manner that would damage others, and who would not
consider legitimate any violation of another human being's
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basic rights.

The confederalist society
would be

fundamentally different from the
present one premised as
it is on self-interest,
profit, and an exchange

mentality,

would like to think that a
confederal ecological
society would be a sharing one,
one based on the pleasure
"I

that is felt in distributing among
communities according
to their needs, not one in which
'cooperative'

capitalistic communities mire themselves
in the quid pro
quo of exchange relationships ." 15
Few democratic theorists have attempted
to present

such a complex vision of alternative
social, economic, and
political structures supported by historical
examples of
actual,

although limited, alternative societal

arrangements.

For this reason if for no other, Bookchin

deserves to be taken seriously by the radical ecology
movement.

What must be more closely examined though are

the long-standing objections to these proposals.

One

general tendency of the objections to social ecology is to
focus on a perceived impracticality of the suggestions.
This pragmatist approach itself generally relies on

reformist alternatives, including the retention of

representative or parliamentary systems while converting
to some form of economic "market socialism."

The most

prominent example of the use of this strategy has been the
German Greens, who Bookchin repeatedly cites as an example
of the strategy's failure.

The realist

(Realo)

faction

ar gued for pragmatic approaches to German politics which
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has resulted in exactly
the consequences the
more
fundamentalist greens (fundis)
warned against. Besides
the cooptation of green
issues in parliament
through a
tradeoffs, the individuals
who come to hold the
seats themselves begin to
make arguments for the
retention
Of their own personal
16
power
.

There are other questions
about strategies of
political transformation and
democratic requirements that
will be taken up in the next
section of
this chapter, but

there remains the lingering
question of the fit between
the arguments for libertarian
municipalism and the more

strictly ecological basis of the
philosophy of social
ecology.
Besides the pragmatist
objections,

there have

been other criticisms, and these
have been based on
Bookchin's assertions about the directionality
of

evolution and the place of human subjectivity
in nature as
a whole.
The pragmatist arguments have to
a

great extent

been dismissed by Bookchin simply by claiming
against them
that simply because something has not happened
before
does

not mean it could not happen in the future.

Bookchin

dismisses the pragmatists by attacking their fatalism,
but
he also relies on the historical evidence of an ongoing

tension between the centralizing tendencies of the nationstate,

on the one hand,

and the decentralizing and

democratic tendencies that have broken out in some of the
most revolutionary periods of human history, on the other.
It is only in examining competing strategies in
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relationship to the ultimate
goals of an ecological
society that a decision can
be made as to which is
the
most philosophically coherent,
and which offers the
best
long-term prospects for resolving
the problems of the
domination of nature.

Bookchin has attempted to
condense the discussion of
the fundamental principles
and the political implications
of libertarian municipalism
in several
short essays

including "Theses on Libertarian
Municipalism ." 17 He
presents libertarian municipalism
as performing a
transforming role aimed at reaching
the "anarchist ideals"
of decentralized, stateless,
collectively
managed,

directly democratic communities.

and

These confederated

municipalities or "communes" form the framework
for
liberated society "rooted in the nonhierarchical

a

ethics of

a

unity of diversity, self-formation and
seif-management,

complementarity, and mutual aid ." 18
interest in this and most of Bookchin

What is of special
'

s

other formulations

of libertarian municipalism is the lack of direct

reference to the principles and assumptions of his

interpretation of ecological/evolutionary principles.

If

the criticisms of his interpretation of evolution and

ecological principles are valid, what impact will that
have on the transformative role of libertarian

municipalism?
The strength of Bookchin'

s

argument for municipalism

and conf ederalism derives from its coherence relative to
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democratic theory, and on
his unrelenting criticism
of
capitalism, which he presents
as a system which is
fundamentally antagonistic to
the full development of
human beings. Bookchin views
the municipality

or city,

or

Commune, as historically the
location not only of economic
functions, but, more importantly,
as the location of the

transformation of the quasi-tribal
"folk" united by bloodties and custom into a "body
politic" of citizens united
by ethical values based on
reason 19 He continually
emphasizes the role of reason for any
meaningful politics
which would replace the repressive
system of
.

parliamentarism and representation found in
the nationstate,

"Politics,

as distinguished from the social
and

statist,

involves the re-embodiment of masses into
richly
articulated assemblies, the formation of a body
politic in
an arena of discourse,

expression,

making.
It

shared rationality, free

and radically democratic modes of decision-

The process is interactive and self-formative

." 20

would seem that the self-forming activity of politics

provides the link to his understanding of ecological

principles because it is tied to the fundamental
"evolution of subjectivity" that expresses the basic
striving" of nature.

In this way the interactions at the

level of face-to-face democracy become an extension of the

development of natural subjectivity.
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Since the striving of nature
is toward ever more
complex forms of subjectivity,
society should develop
institutions which further this process.
Bookchin is
arguing that the institutions which
result in the fullest
development of human reason contribute
positively
to the

development of natural subjectivity.

Developed human

subjectivity would allow the human species
to become the
"voice of nature" as a whole.
The only means of determining the
implications of

Bookchin'

s

ecology,

for future policies in a free society,

"social" emphasis in the philosophy of social
and for

determining in what language the "voice of nature"
speaks,
is to examine the positions he and his followers
have

actually taken in the struggle within the green movement.
There have been many issues on which to base this
examination, but there are several that suggest themselves
for closer viewing.

The first are those concerning the

relationship between feminism and social ecology,
P ar ticularly the relationship of women to democracy and

the "public sphere."

The particular issues involved have

included; the role of an "ethic of care" in radical
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ecology ,so frequently
offered as

a

basis for politics
by

ecofemmists and other feminists);
the politics of

abortion and "reproductive
freedom"; and the role
of
majority voting procedures
relative to the process
consensus-seeking.

m

of

addition to the more strictly

(eco) feminist issues,

social ecology has also
had to
engage with two central
concerns of deep ecology;
wilderness preservation and
over-population. Before
looking at these specific
instances of application

of the

principles of social ecology to
policy problems and
decision-making, it is fitting to
note what Bookchin sees
as the relationship of the
intellectual to revolutionary
social movements, which may be an
indication

of the status

of his own comments within the
relationship between theory
and practice.

Bookchin believes the libertarian body
politic, and
by implication the libertarian ecological
society,

cannot

be achieved without a "well-organized,
programmatically

coherent, highly-conscious libertarian movement."

these requirements there must be

a

To meet

radical

intelligentsia " that participates in "its own vibrant

community life,

"

individuals who are not to be confused

with "the assortment of anemic intellectuals who staff
the
academies and institutes of western society."

The danger

of not developing an anarchist "stratum of thinkers" to

provide vital new ideas for the movement is the

stultification of thought into mere dogma.
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The

.

justification for the
development of an
intelligentsia
within the movement,
besides the development
of ideas,

is

provided by the history of
revolutionary change, "For
all
its shortcomings and
failings,
it was this radical

intelligentsia that provided
the cutting edge of
every
revolutionary project in
history-and, in fact, literally
the very ideas of social
change from which the
people drew their social
insights ." 22

Women, Democracy and Social
Ecology
Janet Biehl has written on
ecofeminism from the
social ecology perspective and
examined its relationship
to many of the issues already
mentioned 23 she closely
follows Bookchin's arguments from
Iha _,Ecoloav of
.

and elsewhere in developing
positions that more directly
touch on the concerns of feminists and
ecof eminists
Because of the consistency of her
perspective with that of

Bookchin it is reasonable to believe her
positions on
these issues reflect, or are consistent
with,
the

philosophy of social ecology presented elsewhere.

There

are three issues which especially may
illuminate the

strengths and weaknesses of the philosophy of social

ecology on policy issues; abortion, consensus decisionmaking,

and an "ethic of care."

The position of social ecology on abortion and

reproductive freedoms is intimately linked to the
questions of ecological subjectivity.
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Biehl unreservedly

rejects one type of
ecofeminist ethic, which P.
j. MiUs
has labeled the "abstract
pro-nature stance," „hi ch
obliges all human beings
to oppose abortion
that it rs destructive
to "life. "24
Biehl argues
this (abstract pro-life,
ethic is taken from an
interpretation of "first nature"
that does not appreciate
the difference between
the potentials of human
and nonhuman nature, specifically
with regard to human
subjectivity.
Biehl follows Bookchin in
asserting that
human "second nature" has
emerged from first nature
as the
expression of the potential for
the development of
subjectivity which occurs with the
evolution of life.
In
addition, the distinctiveness of
human beings includes
their ability to create institutions
that are "highly
mutable" and therefore able to provide
for radical or
revolutionary changes in human behavior,
unlike animals
which are merely "genetically programmed"
to react to
their environment 25 Although humanity
has not fulfilled

^

^

^

.

its potential in the history of civilization
so far,

the

direction of fulfillment can be "educed"
dialectically by
examining the logic of development to determine
"what

society s hould be
an ^-'- -eco 0 9ical
-^-

,

." 26

Present society is irrational and

but should become both rational and

ecological by fulfilling its potential,

"This

potentiality, the 'should be,' becomes in the ethics of
social ecology, the overarching standard of actualization
and wholeness

." 27

Social ecology is "critical" because of
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this standard which
establishes "the true
actualization of
humanity's potential." The
dialectical critique indicates
the direction society
should take, which Biehl
describes
in Hegelian terms as an
"Aufhebung" of first and
second
nature into "free nature," a
"synthesis" of the two into
the "form of a harmonious,
conscious, and ecological"
free
nature where both "human and
non-human nature come rnto
their own as a rational,
self-conscious, and purposeful
unity ." 28 Human consciousness,
as an expression or

product of natural evolution, is
put into service of first
nature "by diminishing the impact of
natural catastrophes,
and promoting the thrust of natural
evolution toward
diversity and ending needless suffering,
thereby fueling
the creativity of natural evolution
through
its technics,

science,

and rationality."

The relationship between human

and non-human nature would be (should be)
governed by an

ethics of complementarity" in which "human needs
and the
needs of nonhuman life-forms would be joined in
a

complementary way so that there is

a

beneficial,

reciprocal relationship between the two."

mutualistic free nature would result in

a

This

human society

both nonhierarchical and cooperative in which, "Society's
'completeness' would be based on the 'completeness' of

humans in their self-fulfillment as rational, free, and

self-conscious beings

." 29

It is on the basis of this fulfillment of human

subjectivity through the ability to make conscious ethical
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decisions that abortion and
reproductive freedom would
be
guaranteed, "In social ecology's
ethics, in which first
nature is a realm of increasing
sub : ectivity out of which
society emerges, women would
have a right to reproductive
freedom that is grounded in
the emergence of society
and
natural evolution. As human
beings uniquely capable
of
making ethical choices that
increase their freedom in the
context of an ecological whole,
women’s reproductive
freedom would be a given. "30 what
Biehl
does not address

IS the impact of the potential
of the fetus to be a full

functioning human being capable of
its own ethical
decision-making. This possibility appears

at first to

take the same form in the justification
against abortion
as she offers lot it.
It would seem that a resolution
of
this seeming contradiction would depend
on an argument
very much like that offered by the U.S.
Supreme Court in
Roe v. Wade that

a

"compelling point of viability" is

reached by the fetus at which time the community's
interest in the "potential" for

a

meaningful life shifts,

so that the "right" to an abortion is not absolute,
but

Biehl does not examine the issue that extensively.

To

simply assert that, on the basis of the fulfillment of

human subjectivity, the right to "reproductive freedom,"
including abortion, is simply "given," is not to fully
consider the implications of social ecology's emphasis on
the development of the potential of subjectivity in

nature.

al

1

As part of nature the fetus too possesses some
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of

"

potential for subjectivitv
activity, Kbut it is important
to ask
when that potential is
actualized to the point
of
requiring consideration
of the meaningful
rights, or
potential exercise of
freedom, of the fetus
along with
that of the mother.
This criticism does not
necessarily
imply the alternative
is true, that the
potential at
conception becomes the standard
for decision, only that,
as stated by the social
ecologists, there is no
clear way
Of distinguishing between
these choices.
1n +-

+.

The differences between
women and men enter into
other policy choices also.
Biehl rejects "essentialist

interpretations of women's knowledge
and social status
asserting that women and men share
a common natural
history, with common abilities
to create institutions,
invent written language, and
engage in rational thought,
including self-conscious reflection.
Women are not the

ontological difference" of men, rather
they are
"differentiations" of humanity's potential
to achieve a
"rich variegated wholeness." Biehl
argues men and women
have the potential to choose "different
social roles"
making possible a transcendence of the
biologically

determined sexual differences of nonhuman beings.

3

-*-

This

interchangeability of roles is possible without humans
losing their sexual distinctiveness"
means)

.

It is in the

(whatever that

evolution of society beyond

tribalistic "blood-ties" with their traditions, rituals,
and incantations,

and their contemporary reinvigoration as
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advocated by some ecofeminists,
that social ecology
attempts to establish an
"ecological ethics" grounded
in
"the potentiality of human
beings to consciously
and

rationally create

a

fee ecological society." 32

This analysis and
interpretation of ecofeminism
is
used by Biehl in also attacking
many proposals by
ecofeminists and feminists alike
who have attempted to
develop an "ethic of care."
The context for this
critique
is Biehl 's discussion of
the relationship of women
to the
democratic tradition. 33 Biehl
defends the democratic
tradition and its origins in ancient
Athens against
feminists who advocate an ethic of
care against the "cold,
abstract, individualistic and
rationalistic" democratic
ideal.
Although Biehl interestingly narrates
the origins
of democracy in Athens, her critique
of the ecofeminist
and feminist arguments on the relationship
of the ethic of
care to democracy tend to reduce those
positions to

caricatures, resulting in an unsatisfying
engagement with
the issues at stake.
The feminist position which supports the value
of an

ethic of care is reduced in Biehl'

advocacy of

a

s

analysis to the mere

return to the private realm of "female

virtues" connected to the "moral" values of "mothering,
family life and feelings of caring (as well as sometimes
the intuitions of mysticism) ."34

Biehl

's

interpretation

reduces the expanding discourse on caring to

a

simplistic

call for private life to replace the public sphere in
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order therefore to replace
the 'potentials of
reason" with
emotron and irrationality,
"By emphasizing the
private
realm and family over
the polrtical realm,
it potentially
enervates important aims
of reinvigorating
and

reconstructing local political
institutions along
grassroots-democratic or libertarian
municipalist
lines
The threat from the ethic
of
care,

for Biehl

Dust as it has been for the
dominant tradition of Western
Philosophy since at least the
Greeks, is the threat of
irrationality invading the
rationality of politics, of the
logic of the household overwhelming
the logic of the
community.
Biehl 's critique is valuable
in so far as it

does address the limitations of
those ecofeminist and
feminist positions that tend to
essentialize female
subjectivity into a biologically
determined knowledge
about the world, not taking into
account the effects of
socialization, particularly identity
formation in a

patriarchal world.

To the extent this criticism is
aimed

solely at those who attempt to attribute

biological

,

a

"quasi-

even innate 'moral' sensibility" to women

alone, Biehl is correct in asserting that
it is a

fundamentally questionable basis for grounding
political
theory and political movements.

However,

theories which

present essentialized female knowledge as the basis of
an
ethic of care are not the most developed form of this
position,

and do not contain the potentials for
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application to social and
political theory that
many find
so promising.
For instance, Biehl,

at least by the
location of

quotations,

links Sara Ruddick with
this position. 36
Precisely what is at issue
for Ruddick is both
the
relationship of abstract
conceptualization and rationality
to the activity of
"mothers," and how this
"private
sphere" is dismissed as
the sphere of emotions
and
irrationality in the Western
philosophical tradition,
when, in fact, "maternal
thinking" involves a great
deal
of very complex reasoning.
Further, the problems

encountered in caring for the
other, especially when the
care-giver is at a great advantage
in power and
reason,

may have implications for
transformation of the public
sphere, in ways not reducible
to a mere reflection of

the

private.

This ethic is developed in
order to address the
disjunction in liberal moral theory
between "the general
and the concrete other. ”37 RuddicJt
attempts to address
the dismissive attitude which
asserts mother's are merely
reacting naturally" in the process of
caring for others.
She resists the characterization of
the "private sphere"
as merely the sphere of emotions.

Hers is an attempt to

connect the activities of mothers with the
complex
theories of non-violence in the tradition of
Gandhi and
King,

where,

"The aim of nonviolent battle is responsible

reconciliation in which crimes are named and

responsibility for them is assigned."
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Ruddick is

explicitly looking for
ways to theorize mothering
that do
not essentialize women
into naturalistic
protectors of
latent subjectivity, but
who actively engage
in conscious
efforts to. reduce injustice
and bring about
peace,

certainly goals not only
compatible with, but central
to
any future ecological
society.
Ruddick explains the
connection between maternal
thinking
and nonviolence,

In examining maternal
practice

thrmmh

+-n

i

°f
nonviolence, I look fo?
evince
ongo
ng
ng*
attempt to renounce and resist
violent H
opponents and to keep a peace
that
ble from assau ltive injustice. is as
That is
I ask
if ?^
there are principles in the
practices
of
enng
that coincide with the four
ideals of
e"
alm t0 identif Y Principles
of
mate^narnnonviolence
d
maternal
that I believe could contribute
C
PU llC understandin 9s °f peacemaking.
tor
For my
my^ purpose,
purpose itr is sufficient that
there arp snmo
1068 actua11 * governed by the
idLfff
articulate

oHn

:

!^

She is not claiming all mothers
follow a path of

nonviolence with those they care for,
and neither is she
claiming that those who do follow this
path actually
achieve their aims at all times, what she
is claiming is
that maternal thinking cannot be as easily
dismissed as
Biehl and others indicate with the labels
"irrational,

emotional,

and mystical."

It is especially curious that Biehl basically

dismisses the ethic of care discourse considering the
claims Bookchin made in Th e Ecology of Freedom such as,
For it is not only love that the mother ordinarily
gives

her child, but

a

rationality of 'otherness' that stands
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s

sharply at odds with its
modern arrogant counterpart ." 39
It would have been a
much more progressive strategy
to
address Bookchin's philosophical
dependence, even
uncritical reliance, on an almost
idealized notion of
mother-infant relationships, by
addressing how
this

position is challenged by the work
of feminists on the
ethic of care and the development
of identity,

rather than

to simply repeat an attack on
those early ecofeminist

theories that were admittedly also
essentialist
idealizations calling for atavistic
retribalizations
This progressive understanding of
the ethic of care is

nowhere implied by Biehl, not even in
the ritualistic
repetition at the end of her critique of
a call

for the

inclusion of the values of caring, nurturing
and community
into the "democratic tradition" in order
to
"enrich" that

tradition.

The crucial point to be made is the dualism

invoked when an ethic of care is placed in the
category of
the irrational or emotional,

of the public sphere,

and opposed to the "reason"

"The feminist challenge is to seek

this infusion without rejecting the democratic tradition
in favor of an atavistic return to tribal society,

to

fulfill the inclusive and egalitarian promise of poli

.

and to expand and reinvigorate the grassroots democratic

tradition--with values of caring and community as well as
with women's rationality ."^ 9

The incoherence of the

social ecology critique is made evident here as the "value
of caring" is set in opposition to "women's rationality."
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Biehl

critique also aims at the
work of Nancy
Hartsock, especially as
Hartsock represents the
relationship between the
democracy of Athens and
the
psychology of the warrior-hero 41
Hartsock makes limited
claims for her analysis of
the relationship between
Greek
masculine eros and democratic
conduct, -'The point I have
attempted to make is that prpp
and power are deeply
connected, and when erpp takes
negative, masculine forms
that point toward death rather
than life, the community
as
a whole will be structured
by those dynamics "42 instead
of a further examination, in
the light of social
s

.

.

ecology,

of the relationship between the
erotic and the rational in

democratic decision-making, this
connection is simply
dismissed as a wish to return to the
"ethics of the bloodfeud, " the social circumstance which,
Bookchin
argued,

initially motivated the progressive escape
toward new,
universal is tic, forms of justice. 43 Biehl
dismisses
Hartsock s argument as both psychoanalytic

reductionism,

'

and as incorrectly based on a masculine ideal
taken from

Homer and Greek myths.
code,

The newly emerging democratic

argues Biehl, represented

qualitative social

a

evolutionary advance over the earlier warrior-hero
ideal. 44

Hartsock

Biehl'
s

s

criticism hits home to the extent

characterizations of masculine eros tends to be

typically one-sided.

However,

insight contained in Hartsock'

there is an important
s

functioning of democracy retains
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conclusion that the actual
a

large element of

.

domination,

frequently remaining
unconscious or
subterranean in more current
forms.
For example,

evidence
of the continuing
influence of domination
in democratic
theory can be found in
social ecology itself
with regard
to its position on the
procedure of consensus-seeking
in

decision-making
Biehl rejects both the
ethic of care and the
feminist
charges that democracy is
entangled with domination,
on
the basis of the fundamentally
Aristotelian and Hegelian
argument that the household is
the sphere of
the

particular while the truly political
or public sphere is
representative of universal human
concerns.

in this

understanding any call for inclusion
of "private sphere"
concerns risks regression to the norms
of kinship

relations and its grounding of justice
in the blood-feud.
Likewise the inclusion of considerations
about the

influence of eros and its association with
the body
threatens to undermine social ecology's
understanding of
democracy as it is linked to the development
of reason and
human subjectivity.
This rationalist, modernist stance is

fundamentally at odds with even the early feminist
insight
that the "personal is political."

In addition,

the

refusal to seriously include the influence of the erotic
and non-rational as an aspect of policy formation forces
social ecology into

democratic process.

a

contradictory position in regard to
For example, Biehl attacks Judith

Plant's and others' promotion of consensus decision-making
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as potentially and
historically a "tyranny of
moral
persuasion.
The central concern is
about the

relationship of consensus to
the preservation of
diversity
in the context of
addressing the needs of the
community
and the goal of "unity."
Which decision-making process,
consensus-seeking or
simple majority vote, more
adequately resists tendencies
toward political domination?
Social ecologists have
claimed that the consensus-seeking
process has the effect
of stifling dissent and that
the goals of "unity"
and

"integration" are given "almost
metaphysical, if not
quasi-religious qualities that smother
personal
independence and disagreement." But
what is majority rule
but the most blatant expression of
domination
,

in

democratic form.
exchange,

Its underlying premise is that
of

that each person is equal,

so that the simple

quantitative summation of votes results in
the most
efficient form of decision-making.
This reliance on the
latent threat of force (the majority can
"enforce" the
decision)

also results in the necessity of strong

protection of individual "rights,

"

as Bookchin had

explicitly recognized in earlier works, because the

majority is by definition likely to exclude significant
numbers of others who do not agree on the policy decisions
that are made.

Biehl also attempts to dismiss consensus decision-

making by again linking it to the particularistic morality
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Of the kinship group,

"Consensus is a form of decisionmaking most appropriate for small,
intimate

groups— for

families and friends

But we encounter problems in

larger, more heterogeneous, public
spheres, where

conflicts of opinion are not only
inevitable but even
desirable ." 46 in this view consensus is
a process that
leads to homogenization and the demand
for conformity
rather than to the productive results of
"conflict" of
opinion.
Claims that consensus-seeking attempts
to
achieve "collective wisdom" are simply dismissed
as

a

mystification of what are actually tendencies toward
collective suppression of the individual, of
installation
of fear into those who think critically,

or originally.

merely

idiosyncratically

Consensus-seeking, in other words, is

ploy for the demand to conform to conventional

a

thinking 47
.

Admittedly some claims by Plant and others for the
benefits of consensus are overstated, and the "fanatical"
forms of this procedure do have a certain totalitarian

aspect to them, but to reduce consensus-seeking to the

instances of its abuse is certainly no less problematic
than the reduction of the idea of democracy to the form of

destructive eroticism.

As John Rensenbrink has explained

in his discussion of the development of the U.S. green

movement there are important differences between the
"pure" form of consensus and the generally practiced

procedure of "consensus-seeking" that does not allow the
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by the community.
what ls not examined

:

^

an

decisions

^ ^

fay

-st

of the discussion
of this issue in
the sociai ecology
tterature, are the
advantages of consensus-seeking.
By
rearing an attempt for consensus
by the community,
or,
if consensus cannot
be attained,

an extraordinary
majority

to agree before action
is taken or policy
established,

the

community dialogue gives
increased power to the
individual
relative to the group.
it offers the possibility
that the
individual or the minority
can potentially persuade
the
majority of the inadequacy
in their reasoning,
and in this

way the consensus-seeking
serves the development of
human
subjectivity in a very rationally
designed procedure.
Simple majority rule, especially
for major policy
decisions, not only tends to
eliminate the possibility of
inclusion of minority views within
the final

decision, but

threatens the long-term legitimacy
of the decision-making
process itself since small changes
in a few opinions can
have enormous impacts on fundamental
agreements about the
conduct of society. Additionally, as
mentioned before,
when majority rule is used other
measures must be taken to
protect individuals as well as community
stability.
This
is the reason for the necessity of
a "bill of rights" or

"declaration of human rights" and for the necessity
of
inclusion of extraordinary majority procedures
even within

representative democracies, such as in constitutional
amendment and debating processes
422

(for example,

cloture in

"

the U.S. senate,.

^^

These addltlonal

undamental changes in
rufes on laws, and
the regurrements
f ratl ° nal deb3te
“« perceived as fegitimate
by the
People involved.
To assert the primacv
P imacy of majority
rule,
and the centrality
of "conflict"
'

of opinions,

is to

validate the charges
that democracy is
fundamentally a
t0 ° lin the arSSnal
° f the ideology of
domination, when
the individual simply
represents a
"vote,

and

quantitative superiority
supersedes extended
dialogue, and
when conflict takes
presence over common
agreement,

democracy has degenerated
from

a

process of honoring the

individual to the reduction
of decision-making to
the
force of the stronger.
Per all the social ecology
railing
against representative democracy,
the endorsement of
magority voting procedures
should be a priori suspect,
if
only because representative
systems are all too willing
to
abide by "majority rule ." 49

Wild Ecology, Social Politics
Besides questionable adherence to
some procedural
rules, social ecology's emphasis
on the social roots of
the ecological crisis have brought
it into sharp conflict

with deep ecology on the issues of
overpopulation and
wilderness preservation. Although social
ecology provides
some telling criticisms of the cruder
arguments
of some

deep ecology activists, it reveals its own
one-sidedness
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in the justification
of its position on
these most

concrete political and
ecological issues.

Bookchm has addressed the
"neo-Malthusian" arguments
of deep ecology about
overpopulation by fundamentally

adopting

a

dismissive attitude toward
these concerns.
He
rightly criticizes the
overly simplified restatement
of
Mai thus that population
grows geometrically while
food
supplies grow arithmetically
or additively, which
deep
ecologists frequently rely on
to imply or assert that
civilization is doomed. As
Bookchin documents, the
history of this argument has
consisted of repeated
assertions of the imminent
destruction of society by
massive increase in numbers of
people, usually the
,

poor,
or those of ethnic and racial
backgrounds other than those
of the wealthy and powerful,
who are supposedly

reproducing at an unacceptable rate.

Bookchin rightly

argues that population questions
cannot be separated from
their link to issues of wealth distribution
and

technological development, but in the form
Bookchin
presents them these caveats are overstated.

He is correct

m

emphasizing the non-comparability of human
to other
life-form populations with regard to population
growth
issues, because of the human potential to
consciously

change behavior 50
.

Bookchin also rightly links much of

the problem of hunger to the "grow-or-die"
necessities of
a

capitalist social and economic system which destroys

traditional sustainable economies, substituting cash crops
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needed for national deficit
financing for native
cropping
that insures the long-term
health
of the land and the

people

However, Boohchin goes
beyond criticism of the
inadequate deep ecologist
arguments, which reduces
the

population problem to just another
example of an
ecosystem’s "carrying capacity,"
to a justification for
ignoring the potential of
overpopulation on

the grounds of

technological optimism.

Although it is true that
some

formerly fertile regions of
agriculture were plundered for
profit by European colonialists,
it does not follow,

as is

implied by Bookchin, that with the
withdrawal of
capitalism, these regions, such as
the Horn

of Africa,

simply resume their previous
productivity.

can

The soil

itself may have been depleted to
such an extent that it
will take generations of intensive
care for anything like
previous fertility to return. The
agricultural capacity
of despoiled regions is not simply
present as unused
potential to be recovered with the change of
social and

political institutions.
forests,

Some regions,

like the rain

can never be recovered, not only because of
the

losses of "fertility" but also because of the
extinction
of species that were integral parts of the
ecosystems as a

whole.

Recovery of other areas cannot occur on

a

time

scale that would have a significant impact on the food

needs and other resource needs of the growing populations
in these areas.
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More disturbing though are
yet other forms of
Bookchin's technological optimism
which lead to additional
disagreements with the deep ecological
perspective.
He
cites statistics on the growth
of food production in
the
post-World War II period as if this
trend could be
extrapolated indefinitely into the
future.
In fact, many
of the increases in food production
in the period Bookchin
cites, mostly 1950 to the early
1980s, were one-time only
increases (such as those involving
deforestation for

agribusiness purposes), or involved
agricultural
techniques which have since been called
into question,
such as the increased use of pesticides
and herbicides as
well as genetic engineering.
These technologies
cause

environmental damage which results in the long-term
decline in the marginal increases in food production
relative to their costs 53

Bookchin is correct in

criticizing deep ecology's often simplistic analysis of
the problems of overpopulation, but he is also guilty
of

oversimplification.

Without massive changes in human

behavior in the next two generations the world population
will double,

and there is no one who has the technological

optimism to assert that food production will be able to
keep up with that level of increase. 53

The other issue of central concern to deep ecologists
has been wilderness,

and it is on this issue that the deep

ecologists have viewed themselves most distant from
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Bookchin

social ecology.

Dave Foreman and
others

^

wilderness preservation
concerns which they
believed were
being increasingly
subordinated to other more
"social"
ecological problems. 54 other
"ecocentrists" have
increasingly acknowledged the
interconnection of various
ecological problems, like
acid rain and global
warming,
with the need for wilderness
preservation. Even Foreman
now explicitly makes the
social connections, including
concerns for the disproportionate
impact of ecological
degradation on women, and the
influence of racism on
current environmental policy
decisions by corporations and
government. 55 Robyn Eckersley has
most closely examined
the various positions on
wilderness preservation
and calls

it and population growth the
two issues that act as a

'litmus test" in distinguishing the
ecocentric from the

human centered forms of radical ecology,

"The ecocentric

stream is also noted for its greater
readiness to advocate
the setting aside of large tracts of
wilderness,
regardless of whether such preservation can
be shown to be
useful in some way to humankind.
The anthropocentric
stream,

in contrast,

tends to be more preoccupied with the

urban and agricultural human environment.

Large scale

wilderness preservation tends not to be supported unless
strong human-centered justification can be

demonstrated." 56

Beyond

a

simple

ecocentric/ anthropocentric distinction radical ecologists
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a

are concerned with the
impact an ecological
ethics will
have on policy decisions.
The primary assertion
made in
social ecology rs that its
interpretation of the process
of evolution, specifically
the tendency for ever
more
complex stages of subjectivity
to evolve, provides
an
"objective ethics" on which to
make political judgments.
However, for ecocentrists like
Eckersley the issues of
ecological ethics go beyond any
human centered value
system,

Ecocentric environmentalism may
be seen as a more
wi e ranging and more
ecologically informed variant

bUUdS

°n

^

the lns hts ° f the
orner streams
other'
streamsTP”
of environmentalism thus far
considered.
Whereas the early preservationists
were
ncerned
to Protect wilderness as
^°
sublime
scenerv
cenery aand were motivated mainly by
aesthetic and
spiritual considerations, ecocentric
environmentalists are also concerned to
protect
threatened populations, species, habitats,
and
ecosystems wherever situated and irrespective
of
their use value or importance to humans
In
particular, ecocentric environmentalists
strongly
support the preservation of large tracts of
wilderness as the best means of enabling the
flourishing of a diverse nonhuman world.

The question of the relation of subjectivity
to

diversity then is at the heart of the differences between
deep ecology and social ecology, and it is with regard
to
the issue of wilderness that the two approaches have

battled philosophically.

Some of the difference has

resulted from Bookchin's idiosyncratic use of certain
terms,

as well as from the wide differences in

philosophical backgrounds or orientations of those on
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But be

^

d these interpretative
disagreements there do seem
to be substantive
differences
which could result in
very different policy
-

emphasis.

Bookchin claims the
ecocentrists and deep
ecologists
have misrepresented and
misinterpreted his positions
both
on wilderness, and on
his understanding of
the
advisability and degree of
human intervention into
natural
ecological processes. 58 itL is
true thatt?
u
that Eckersley
and
others have exaggerated Bookchin'
s claims
i

on some

accounts, but it is also true
that Bookchin's "polemical
zeal gets a bit out of control"
in his own responses and
characterization of the opposing view. 59
The statements
he makes concerning the capacity
of humans to alter "first
nature" are frequently very subtly
qualified
so it is

usually not clear what the full
implications of his
statements are, making it quite
understandable

that his

arguments about the limits to human
intervention might be
misunderstood or misinterpreted by others.
For example,

m

denying that he advocates that humans "seize
the helm
of evolution" Bookchin does use terminology
that
raises

disturbing implications,
Free nature represents the "synthesis" of first
and second nature in a gualitatively new
evolutionary dimension in which "first and
second nature are melded into a free, rational,
and ethical nature" that retains the
"specificity" of first and second nature
divested of all notions of "centricity" (read:
hierarchy) as such.
The concept of free nature
is meant to express precisely the "ethics of
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complementarity, "...in which
human conceptual
thought, placed not "over"
first nature but in
the service of both natural
and
evo ut ion, forms a new .symbiotic social
relationship
between human communities and
the nonhuman ecocommunities in which they are
located 60
.

Concerns arise over what is meant
by "qualitatively
new evolution" and about what
counts as a symbiotic
relationship in the "ethic of
complementarity." By

emphasizing rationality and subjectivity
there is an
implication that human reason and human
subjectivity
become the standard toward which the

rest of nature should

be urged to evolve.

This is the source of the charges

against social ecology that it is "humanistic"
or
anthropocentric, " since it is feared that making

subjectivity the center of the theory of
evolution, and
human subjectivity representative of the most
developed
form of natural subjectivity, will have the
consequence of
putting human needs and interests ahead of those of
other

species and the general evolutionary needs of ecosystems
and biosphere.

The fear is that human interests will be

identified as those of the evolution of the planet as
whole,

instead of recognizing that human interests are

simply

a

a

partial interest in relationship to those of all

forms of life.

The fear is that human subjectivity will

become the standard for the planet's biospheric evolution,
and that consequently, some species or regions will be

"ecologically" expendable because they fail to meet the
needs of

a

developing "rational" subjectivity.
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Part of the difficulty
in interpreting
Bookchin,
besides his infamous lack
of citations, especially
rn some
of bis most provocative
accusations, is his tendency
to
state his positions in terms
that are highly ambiguous.
In responding to the
charges of deep ecologists,
he
claims, "What is more troubling
to me, however, is how
so
many of my deep ecology critics
have themselves pushed
the
absurd idea that I oppose the
wilderness preservation
goals of Earth First!, or that
I think Earth
First!
activists are eco-fascists "'61
y et it is very easy to
get these impressions from his
writings.
Bookchin
’

.

frequently juxtaposes deep ecology
views to those of
fascism, and his statements on
wilderness seem
contradictory depending on where one looks. 62
in

explaining the inevitability of human
intervention into
nature, Bookchin claims humanity is the
"embodiment
of

nature rendered self-conscious and self-reflexive,"

necessitating human "stewardship" of the planet,
"In
advocating human stewardship of the earth, I do not
believe it has to consist of such accommodating
measures
as James Lovelock’s establishment of ecological
wilderness

zones or patching up environmental dislocations with half

measures." 63

It is unclear what the difference is between

Lovelock's wilderness zones and those of deep ecology, but
in another context Bookchin is all for wilderness

he?),

(Or is

"My own anarchist proclivities have fostered in my

thinking

a

love of spontaneity, be it in human behavior or
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in natural development.

Natural evolution
cannot be
denied its own spontaneity
and fecundity.
That is why one
Part of our struggle
should always be to
protect and
expand Wilderness areas. "64
But what status
qualifier "cannot be denied"
have? is the
preservation of
wilderness simply capitulation
to natural "spontaneity"
or
ntegral to a future ecological
society? can the
call for spontaneity be
reconciled with other
statements
which resonate with the
sounds of domination within
reason
itself, "That humanity was
expelled from the Garden of
Eden does not mean that we
must turn an antagonistic
face
toward nature; rather, it is
a metaphor for a new,
eminently ecological function:
the need to create more
fecund gardens than Eden itself
.. .Certain biotic and
cultural imperatives cannot be
ignored if our concept of
an ecological society is to
have integrative meaning and
self-conscious direction." 65 The
question is, how do we
determine what those "biotic and
cultural imperatives"

^^

are?

Bookchin attempts to distinguish between
the
capacities and desirability of intervention
in nature
under the presently unfavorable circumstances

of either

state or corporate capitalism, and the more
favorable

interventions possible in
I

a

future ecological society,

have repeatedly emphasized, only in an ecological

society can we hope that human ingenuity and technology
will play an ecologically creative role
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it

66

"As

Again, what makes
Bookchin so difficult
to fully
understand is not an inherent
difficulty of the concepts
he uses but the
problematic ambiguity of
the way they are
stated.
The differences between
deep ecology and
social
ecology revolve around
the theorized relation
between
human subjectivity, or
identity, and non-human
forms of
these.
in one of Bookchin's
more extended discussions
of
wilderness he traces the idea
back through its American

proponents to Rousseau and the
ambiguities of his
understanding of nature.
In this discussion,
Bookchin
again emphasizes the misanthropic
consequences of a
"retreat" into remote locations,
by contrasting the
ecologists' tendency to shun human
contact, with the
aacial function of tribal peoples'
"vision quests." Deep
ecologists are portrayed as captives
of a "crude

biologism,

"

misanthropes who set the human in
stark

opposition to the natural.
or over-emphasizes,

Although Bookchin emphasizes,

the misanthropic dangers of wilderness

advocacy, he occasionally, briefly, will
cite what are

apparently acceptable, to social ecology,
attributes of
wilderness experience, "Wilderness, or what
is

left of it

today,

can give one a sense of freedom,

of nature's fecundity,
a

a

a

heightened sense

love of nonhuman life-forms, and

richer aesthetic outlook and appreciation of the
natural

order."

But even this ambiguous acknowledgment does not

address the concerns of the deep ecologists since Bookchin
seems to view wilderness only in terms of its benefits to
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human beings and only
indirectly, through human
intervention, considers
the needs of the
life-forms
themselves wrthrn the
wilderness.
Bookchin' s insistence
that wilderness is a
human designation and
simply further
evidence of human intervention
is a trivial point
since rt
us obvious that the
designation "wilderness" is
socral

a

construction. What is of real
concern is the place of
human beings relative to the
rest of earthly l ife
Does
human subjectivity represent
the fullest development
of
natural evolutionary tendencies,
or is it merely one form
of the evolution of life
which cannot be reduced to
.

stages,

grades,

or phases?

What happens to the nature

that is non-identical to
subjectivity-which must exist
for the concept of subjectivity
to have any meaning— if „
e
do not accept Bookchin’s
quasi-Hegelian solution which
reduces all of existence to an
expression of subjectivity?
Perhaps this is the central question
to pose to social

ecology

A clue to the correct interpretation of
the
fundamental ambiguities in the philosophy of
social
ecology is an analogy that Bookchin repeatedly

uses,

borrowed from Hegel, left intact and defended
against
criticism.
tree,

The analogy is that of the acorn and the oak

the acorn representing latent potentiality that
is

actualized in the development of the fully grown oak.

Bookchin has used the analogy in several works and always
to make the same basic point,

but in close examination it
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becomes clear that the
analogy, as others have
Indicated,
too pointedly confirms
the correct interpretation
of
social ecology. 68 In
Bookchin s description
pf
s
analogy the emphasis is
on the development of
potential,
and the directionality
of development toward
wholeness or
fullness, "An acorn, for
example, may become food
for a
squirrel or wither on a
concrete sidewalk, rather
than
'develop' into what it is
potentially constituted to
become notably,
an oak
aK tree
y
trpp "69 Bookchm
R
rejects Hegel's
emphasis on the antagonistic
character of this

^

,

,

,

,

.

‘

process,
the antagonism that generates
the tension necessary to
impel the process forward in
time.
Tellingly, Bookchin
also extends the analogy to the
birth process, "A thing or
phenomenon in dialectical causality
remains unsettled,
unstable, in tension--much as a fetus
ripening toward

birth strains to be born because of
the way it is

constituted— until
be'

it develops itself into what it

in all its wholeness or fullness."

acorn-birth connection elsewhere also,

m

'should

Bookchin makes the
"What is potential

an acorn that yields an oak tree or in
a human embryo

that yields a mature,

creative adult is equivalent to what

is potential in nature that yields society
and what is

potential in society that yields freedom, selfhood and
consciousness

.

it is this development toward what it

"should be" that provides the "objective grounding" for
the ethics of social ecology.

This is why Bookchin must

so vehemently defend the analogy against alternative
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interpretations of potentiality
and possrbility.
The
Problematic nature of
that ethics extends
beyond the
obvious difficulty of
defending the abortion
and
reproductive freedom stance
developed by Biehl.
Rob yn
Eckersley has pointedly
questioned the
analogy,

specifically its extension
from the plant world
to both
the ontogenetic and
phylogenetic developments
of human
beings.
Concerning the individual
human being and its
ontogenetic development,

between In'L'n^nd'a
confined to the growth

h™a°

ince the

9y

Parities

£

^
C
Ciousne - »r
about what 'humans 'may
properly ^ue °^
-^t^hiract^irFv^11
psychologically,
1

pattern^rthe^phys^cai

31

S

^

intellectu^'lly^ethicany

At the societal or
phylogenetic level,

species development,

^^

the level of

the limits of the analogy
of the

acorn are the limits of its
similarity to society and the
human species as a whole.
Eckersley asks the appropriate
questions of social ecology, "How
can it be said that
there exists some objective standard
of fulfillment latent
Within human society itself, urging
it toward mind
and

truth?

Why are not ail of the myriad
potential paths of
human development also objective and
desirable
ones in

Bookchin's sense?

What is it about Bookchin's

evolutionary path of mutuality, diversity,
and 'advancing
subjectivity' that makes it the good and true
path...?" 7 ^
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In response to this
criticism Bookchin attempts
to

explain the limits and
advantages of the analogy,
with
varying degrees of success.
The basic disagreement
is
about the appropriate
conceptualization of the
"myriad
potential paths" of development.
As Bookchin

indicates,

That an acorn was constituted
over

Iona

a

b

*
maple dSes^ot’ mnn%Sat
K
tree. It may become food n°aLays°becomls
for a scmirroi
?
or land on a concrete
16
sidewalk.
But
to'
place^h^
8
md of tree that an acorn was constituted
tn h

ToT

SSsSVS “
C

:

1

cs

o

>*

^“
»«*»

'

*-

But this understanding of
directionality sacrifices the
advances which have been made in
our understanding of the

evolution of nature to an abstract
isolation of natural
beings, to a bourgeois notion of
the development of the
individual (being)
The analogy of the oak developing
from potential in the acorn does not
allow for
.

its non-

identity with the fully developed oak,
also inheres in the acorn.

a

non-identity that

The non-identity of its

development toward the oak is the identity of
its
development with the ecosystem as
a part,

a whole,

of which it is

the ecosystem which includes the squirrel.

One

aspect of the acorn's potentiality, as constituted
through

natural evolution, is as food for the other life-forms
that interact with the oaks, which are merely one among

many species in the complex interaction of the ecosystem.
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It is not

beside the point to ask how
the acorn relates to
the other "myriad pathways
of evolutron" when the
oak rs
considered in relation to the
rest of the ecocommunity,
rather than in analytic
isolation as is so important
for
the functioning of idealist
dialectics.

The limits of the

analogy are the limits of its
idealist origins, with
consequences that go beyond the
trivial and threaten to
undermine the "objective ethics"
of social ecology.
The analogy and what it represents
structure the
relationship of the potentiality and
directionality of the
development of human subjectivity.
it is this

directionality of subjectivity which
social ecology relies
on to justify intervention into
nonhuman nature. Bookchin
claims he rejects Hegel's dialectic
because of its attempt
to embody the "idealistic universal
Geist or Spirit," just
as he rejects Marxist dialectic because
of its "tilt

toward

a

wooden mechanism ." 74

Instead he offers

dialectical naturalism as an alternative understanding
of
natural development that does not revert to a
"cosmic

subject" or to "mechanical forces."

But this does not

answer ecological questions about directionality of

development and about the relationship of human

subjectivity to the non-identical.

Bookchin'

s

attempt at

clarification is inadequate,
Dialectical naturalism retains the entelechial
notions of dialectical philosophy, but modifies
Hegel s concept of wholeness such that development
'
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retainf th^noUon
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Even though not terminating
in an Absolute,
subjectivity remains the
standard of social ecology's
ethics, and the inadequacy
of Bookchin's analogy
is
inseparable from the idea of
wholeness on which the
ethic
of complementarity
depends, an idea of wholeness
that is

based in the idealist
tendency of social ecology
that
views the oak as complete
and closed.
Current
understandings of ecology will
not allow for this
understanding of closure in the
individual being, nor does
it allow for a sense
of completeness in the
processes of
evolution.
To substitute the idea of
"approximation
to

wholeness" for full closure, or
complete wholeness, is
still to operate within the
framework of
idealism,

to the

detriment of the non-identical in
nature.
To reduce the
process of evolution simply to an
expression of the

development of subjectivity is to reduce
nature to a
reflection of an essentialized notion
of human beings.
Further,

the lack of differentiation within
the idea of

subjectivity inadequately takes into
consideration the
non-identical nature of subjectivity itself,
a problem
which has become of enormous concern for
feminism.

The

possibilities of evolution that cannot be collapsed
into
439

ex Pr e sslons of
subjectlvlty are better
expressed
eory of non-identity
than through

dialectical

naturalism.
fruitful or

A theory of non-identity
also opens more
..fecund.,

possibilities for the
development of
liberatory forms of
subjectivity than does a
philosophy
that expands subjectivity
into universal
explanation
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tic gratification,
s association of the
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contemplation,
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and reenacting,
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subject's
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theorists subscribed to, and they explicitly
rejected
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SECTION III.
CRITIQUE OF ECOFEMINISM
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CHAPTER

9

ECOFEMINISM AND METHODOLOGY

Ecofeminism is problematically
related to both the
ecology movement and to
feminist theory. Attempts
at a
categorization or typology of
positions relating

ecology,

feminism and ecofeminism will
yield various results
depending on whose definition
of these terms is
used.
For
example, the self-identification
of "ecofeminists"
stoncally began after the early
development of both the
ecology and feminist or women’s
movements.
However, with
continuing attempts to develop
categories to clarify
various conceptual and political
relationships the
question has been raised as to whether
ecofeminism should
more properly be viewed as an
attempt to "synthesize"
ecological and feminist insights, or
whether it is best
understood as a subfield or form of either
radical ecology
or feminist theory.
This becomes a crucial guestion

because of the different analytical
categories used by the
different theoretical frameworks. Both deep
ecology and
social ecology have had to address the
implications of
ecofeminist positions for their respective selfunderstandings, and, more recently, ecofeminists
have come
under criticism for not fully confronting feminism's
own

internal divisions and the resulting implications intra-

feminist tensions have for

ecofeminist

a

more specifically

theory and practice.
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These concerns will be

addressed here by first
examining some of the
strands of
ecofeminism which have developed
out of what have been

called "radical" and "cultural"
feminism 1 Also, a
critical examination of current
theory and practice of
self-identified ecofeminists will
help reveal the problems
with many of these positions,
and indicate the importance
of pursuing more fully the
links between feminism and
the
ecology movement. Second, a
closer examination of the
"subject" of ecofeminism is only
possible by venturing
into the increasingly complex
conversation within feminism
itself concerning the entertwined
issues of methodology,
subjectivity, and political possibility.
Finally, more
specific issues which have concerned
ecofeminists,
.

such as
animal rights and an "ethic of care,"
raise political
questions about which any adequate theory
of radical
ecology must provide some guidance. The
possibilities for

societal transformation of the liberal welfare-state,
or
late capitalism, " through participatory democracy
must be

more directly related to ecofeminist politics
than it has

been so far if radical ecology is to avoid the charges
of

impracticality and idealist utopianism.

Ecofeminist Emergence
The most problematic version of ecofeminism can be

traced to its emergence from "radical feminism,

"

that

understanding of the women's movement which accepts the
"essentialist " identification of women with nature, best
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exemplified in women's mothering
and nurturing roles, but
which then attempts to reverse
the androcentric evaluation
of those qualities.
This position accepts the
claim that
women are "naturally" better
nurturers than men and that
men are naturally driven to be
aggressive and therefore
solely responsible for the current
culture
of domination.

In its most essentialist form
this ecofeminism accepts the
claim that the ecology crisis can only
be adequately

addressed by the ascendancy of women's
values to the
status of social and political norms.
To accomplish this
these ecof eminists support an attempt
to recapture

what is

believed to be the original form of human
society,
matriarchy, which supposedly emphasized the

values of

relationship, nurturance, and an ethic of care and

mothering.

Included in most versions of this matriarchal

myth is the worship of an "original Mother Goddess."

This

version of ecofeminism is frequently associated with "New
Age

philosophies that emphasize mysticism, recovery of

ritual,

female shamanism, and various "occult" practices.

This ecofeminism is obviously open to philosophical attack

because of its irrationalism, essentialism, and regressive

political implications.
This radical,

essentialist ecofeminism has also been

linked most closely with deep ecology and with various

interpretations of the "spiritual" or "sacred" aspects of
the ecology movement

2
.

Any attempt to reduce the

different self-understandings of these ecofeminis t/m)
(
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s

necessarily will collapse what
is non-identical about
them
mto a category of identity, but
to develop the concept
of
ecofeminism so it can be
comprehended in relation to
radical ecology and any future
ecological consciousness it
is necessary to indicate
some common tendencies
and their

accompanying limitations and
potentials.
mystical, irrational, and spiritual

in its most

form this ecofeminism

results in fundamentally reactionary
political
implications.
For example, Gloria Feman Orenstein
has
attempted to develop an "Ecofeminism
Ethic of Shamanism
and the Sacred" which however lacks
sufficient reflection
about its political consequences 3
Orenstein recounts her
experiences as she was introduced to shamanism
.

in the

world of the Sami of northern Norway.

Orenstein goes into

some detail about the relationship of her
teacher,

female Shaman with

a

a

long family heritage of Shamanism,

and the teacher's relationship to her own culture's

stories and legends about the behavior and importance
of
spirits.

The details of Orenstein'

s

training,

including

spiritual and shamanistic experiences, are not of central

importance here.

The "truth" or "objectivity" of the

experiences are not being questioned, however, the

translation of those experiences into

a

basis for

political action, and the specifics of the political
process used and its relationship to authority, are
problematic.

The relationships established by the student

of shamanism with "ancestors," local culture and
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traditions, and especially
with the land, through
observdncGs of cvr
po
es of nature (equinox
y
and solstice, the
m °° n
the tidSS) and b
*
-d drinking from the
avarlable native sources
of nourishment are
unquestionably
lmP ° rtant
SStablish -g a truly ecological
relationship
with that specific space
and place of nature.
However,
when the principles of
shamanism are translated
into
politics the consequences are
much less benign than
Orenstein implies. Orenstein
criticizes the usual
presentation of shamanism in the
U.S. and its tendency
to
"universalize and essentialize"
the various teachings.
She claims this results in
an ignorance of the
"practical
and political use to which
shamanic powers can also be
put ." 4 she then gives an example
in which women from
Samiland practiced civil disobedience
through a sit-in
against the building of a hydroelectric
power plant.
The
shaman leader of the women used
"visions" to guide the
action, and when the new Prime Minister,
Gro Bruntland,
did not speak with the women as promised,
the shaman asked
the women to tell her what they had
been dreaming.
The
various dreams were interpreted by the shaman
and these
1

,

^

^

interpretations served as the basis for further
actions
which included a request for an audience with
the Pope,

and a visit to the United Nations in New York.

The dreams

served in this shamanistic world as legitimate bases
for

guiding political action.

Although not resulting from the

same analytical framework, critical theorists would have
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no difficulty in
accepting dreams as part
of the
repertoire of information
available for interpretation
of
any political situation,
especially considering the
early
critical theorists' heavy
reliance on psychoanalytics 5
.

What is problematic is
Orenstein's further
observation that the shaman,
"Took the visions of the
women to be as relevant as
those of a Shaman,
she did noi
establish a hierarchy among women
as visionaries in
action
Here is ecofeminism in action ." 6
what
Orenstein does not critically
address is the

fact that it
was the shaman who was doing
the interpreting and who
then
provided the recommendations for
further political action.
The collapse of the two leadership
roles, the "spiritual"
and "political," into a single
site of power results in a
form of political authority not
based in any democratic
participation, but constitutes authority
as a result of a

combination of heredity, spiritual privilege,
and
particular or individual perspective. To

a

assert that

there is no hierarchy because all the
participants' dreams
were equally available for interpretation,
fails to

address the fact of hierarchy resulting from

interpretation by
a

a

blatant example of

single "spiritual" authority.
a

This is

regression to an historical period

where political authority was derivative from spiritual
authority,

resulting in

modern political agency.

a

pre-modern rather than
In fact,

a

post-

it is a collapse of the

political back into the spiritual or religious, and is
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fundamentally hierarchical and
anti-democratic, reducing
the political consciousness
of the individual

subject and

making her subservient to
This is

m

a

higher interpretive authority.

reenactment of a "masculine"
assertion of power
the guise of feminine sensitivity
and spirituality.
a

Many analyses of ecofeminism center
on the
distinction between two fundamental
tendencies or
historical origins of the movement and

its theory;

the

spiritual on the one hand, and the rational
or conceptual
on the other.
The spiritual strand, as exemplified
by
Orenstein, has been most fully developed
by those such as
Starhawk and Charlene Spretnak who claim
ecofeminism

develops out of the spirituality found in what
has been
most commonly called "cultural feminism." This

spiritually guided cultural feminism emphasizes the
differences in the experiences of women and men and the
concomitant potentials for developing values which differ
from those of the male dominated and dominant culture of
the present.

The defenders of spiritual ecofeminism trace

the problems of domination of women and nature to the

ascendancy of patriarchy.

This story of patriarchal

ascension requires acceptance of

a

questionable

anthropological assertion that in some period before the

patriarchal history of (male) civilization there was an
extended period of matriarchy

7
.

During this period not

only was society supposedly arranged on the principles of
the central figure of the mother, but the
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spiritual/religious beliefs of
these people revolved
around Goddess worship.
The political implication
drawn
from these assumptions and
beliefs is that the overthrow
or transformation of the
existing relatrons of
domination
must be generated through a
reemergence of the
values of

women and of the "feminine,"
which is then theorized in
various ways.
The specifics of the different
ecof eminists positions of course
vary

significantly, but

much of their politics seems to
be very compatible if not
identical.
it is the political implications
of the
assumptions of "spiritual ecofeminism"
which have come
under sustained attack.
Janet Biehl, one of the most
persistent critics, along with Bookchin
and other

social

ecologists have condemned the spiritual
ecofeminists as
opening the door to a politics of mysticism
with

reactionary tendencies nearly indistinguishable
from
fascism 8 To this extent the social ecology
.

critique of

spiritual ecofeminism overlaps and reinforces its

critiques of deep ecology and the influence of "New
Age"

occultism on the ecology movement and society generally.
The criticisms of spiritual ecofeminism are well

founded although there is

a

tendency to fail to

acknowledge the real importance of this activity as part
of women’s lives.
a

Spiritual ecofeminism often gives women

coherence and validation to their experiences otherwise

overwhelmingly lacking in their everyday life.

The great

danger though is the extent to which these beliefs have
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the effect of reinforcing
patriarchal mythoiogies
and
acceptance of a kind of
fundamental ontological

difference
between women and men which
then has a direct bearing
on
the structure of society
and the potentials of
women to
act politically.
if wome n are viewed as
having a unique
access to certain values such
as "caring" and "empathy"
simply as a result of their
physiology,
then this is the

most troubling of essentialisms
because the implication is
that there are unchangeable or
fated roles for

each sex to

Play in society.

In this form of essentialist
ecofeminism

the call for elevation of women's
values does little to
challenge the existing practices of
men, and reinforces
the division of the sexes into
"spheres," the very problem
that generated the feminist movement
in the first place.
This implicitly undermines claims
contained in the early
feminist insight that the "personal is
political." it

must be generally acknowledged then that the
criticisms
against spiritual ecofeminism have

a

large element of

truth in them, especially as they highlight the
potential
for undemocratic politics based on a hierarchy
of

spirituality.
a

At its worst spiritual ecofeminism invites

politics of cultism whose basis of authority is the

charismatic personality,

a

conseguence not unforeseen by

theorists of modern society and politics.^
However,

and only after full recognition of the

reactionary implications of any politics based in
spiritual authority, other elements of spiritual
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ecofeminism provide important
alternative understandings
and potentials for movements
of political resistance

which
wish to abolish domination
as a social organizing
principle.
The authentic insights of
spiritual
ecofeminism, such as the recognition
of the importance of
myth in the formation of a social
order, and the reality
of the difference in perception
between most women and
most men, touch upon themes of the
early critical
theorists and call for further development.
This has been
attempted by some who identify themselves
with spiritual
ecofeminism, but also, in significantly
different ways, by
others who identify themselves as
deconstructionists,

post-structuralists, post-modernists, or simply
feminists
who wish to avoid the implications of the
claims deriving
from essentialist assumptions and mystical
authority.

Rational Ecofeminism
The term "rational ecofeminism" is used by Stephanie

Lahar to distinguish other ecofeminist theorists' projects
from those of the spiritual ecof eminists

.

^

^

Rationalist

ecofeminists and other feminist theorists provide
theoretical resources which may help address gaps in the

philosophies of radical ecology and in the work of the
critical theorists.

Ynestra King was one of the first

individuals to attempt to pull together aspects of
critical theory, radical ecology and feminism into an
"ecofeminism.

"
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In her early ecofeminist
articles King attempted to

connect the feminist movement
with the ecology movement
on
a basis that was theoretically
more intimately and
coherently structured than simply
as an "alliance of
convenience." Observing that all
human beings are natural
beings and that western culture is
founded on the

"repudiation and domination of nature"
she pointed out
that the ecology movement was not
necessarily

feminist and

that ecologists should understand
that any attempt to
address the crisis of nonhuman nature
would only succeed
if it connected the domination of
nature with the

domination of women.

She asserted that a primary reason

for "woman's" oppression is the association
of woman with

nature and that the hatred of both could be shown
to be

intimately connected and mutually reinforcing.

King

attempted to indicate why feminism and radical ecology
need each other and how they can be brought together in

a

theory of ecological feminism or ecofeminism.
King borrows heavily from Bookchin's social ecology

with its understandings of domination and hierarchy,
however,

without
feminism

she contends that social ecology is incomplete

fuller inclusion of the issues addressed by

a
.

She asserts that the concerns of ecofeminism

center around Western industrial civilization's opposition
to nature and the "dialectical" interaction by which it

reinforces the subjugation of women.

She argues

ecofeminism should reject hierarchy because no hierarchy
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exists in nature and instead
there should be an attempt
to
reestablish healthy, balanced
ecosystems" which will
provide "ecological diversity"
instead of the biological
simplification processes which typify
consumer market
society.
This re-establishment of
balanced ecosystems
should be by means of, and result
in, a decentralization
of political power; a politics
that is "founded on common
interests yet celebrates diversity."
For the human
species to survive it must achieve a
new understanding of
the relationship between humans and
nature, and of the
nature of the human body, by rejecting
the "nature-culture
dualism" which now dominates conceptualization.
King
states the unifying moment of the ecology
and feminist

movements when she claims,

"The ecology movement,

in

theory and practice, attempts to speak for
nature--the
other

that has no voice and is not conceived

subjectively in our civilization.

Feminism represents the

refusal of the original 'other' in patriarchal human

society to remain silent or to be the 'other' any
longer

"-*-2
.

King gives an account of the development of "Western

industrial civilization" that is partly based on Carolyn

Merchant's work.

In King's interpretation,

a

"dualistic

Christianity" overthrew an earlier belief system that

included goddess religions, paganism and animism.

With

the subsequent "disenchantment" of nature the conditions

were present for "unchecked scientific exploration and
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technological exploitation."

Increasingly, nature became

"other" to be dominated,
objectified and subordinated.
Women also had previously
been objectified and
subordinated in patriarchal society,
as well as having
been identified with nature,
thus both women and nature
were "original others." King
relies on Simone
de

Beauvoir

work as an explanation of the
process of
linking women and nature and to
show how the work of
civilization itself can be shown to
represent a movement
away from nature, Woman, and Mother 13
According
?

s

.

to

Beauvoir's account, the oppression of
nature and woman is
an attempt by males to forget their
mortality—

all that is

limiting, bodily, earthy.

One response to this nature-

culture dualism is for feminists to struggle
for equality
with men, to also make civilization. King
rightly
indicates the limits of this type of feminism
whether in
its liberal or socialist forms.

This type of feminism

does not question the nature-culture dualism,
retaining
the fundamental opposition of the human and the
natural as
it attempts to severe the connection between women
and

nature.

This acceptance of the masculine nature-culture

dualism results in

a

feminism that also tends to accept

masculine identified goals as the only legitimate goals of
culture.

This has now been recognized by feminism as

a

fundamentally flawed conception of women's liberation, and
is often referred to as "equality feminism."

A mirror

opposite feminism, the simple inversion of equality
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feminism,

also fails to challenge
nature-culture feminism.
This feminism simply seeks
to reinforce women's

identification with nature in an
attempt to revalue that
identification and retain its
opposition to the male
values of patriarchal rationality.
This corresponds to
those radical and cultural feminisms,
including
the

spiritual feminisms emphasized by
many self-identified
ecofeminists, who view males and
females as essentially
different in their consciousness as
a result of
their

physical-biological differences.

This is the most common

form of the feminist version of
biological essentialism.
King claims this position also does not
question the

nature-culture dualism and fails to recognize
that
"women's ecological sensitivity and life
orientation" is
socialized perspective which could be eliminated
through

a

alternative socialization, including the restructuring
of
women's "day-to-day lives ." 14 Thus, King would choose
a

direction for ecofeminism which would recognize natureculture dualism as

a

cultural construction, allowing for

the conscious adoption of some aspects of the woman-nature

connection but without accepting masculine definitions of
the purposes and values of civilization.

Therefore,

embracing aspects of the woman-nature connection is seen
as an initial step which might eventually provide the

grounds for envisioning and ultimately creating

ecological society.
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a

free,

King believes ecofeminism
should include a selfconsciously ecological perspective
which would inform
feminist analysis the way class
and race have increasingly
come to inform feminism. 15
Likewise, she claims ecology
must become more self-conscious
of feminist perspectives
its analyses.
Of course this raises the
question of
which feminist analyses provide
the appropriate
perspectives for radical ecology and
vice versa.
The

m

intersection of feminism, ecological
science, and radical
ecology is a much more complex and
ambiguous space than
King indicates.
For example, her claims
about the

findings of ecological science as well
as her claims about
"the ecology movement" are largely filtered
through social
ecology.

One such claim is that ecological science

indicates there is no inherent hierarchy in nature
but
that instead it is hierarchy in human society
which is

projected onto nature.

She also claims that

a

"basic

principle of ecological science" is "unity in diversity,"
and that diversity in nature is both necessary and

enriching.
ecology,

These claims are the same as those of social

as is King's use of the term "harmony" to

describe the most desirable relationship between humans
and nature,

and among humans.

It is questionable whether the term harmony or its

correlate "balance" are actually appropriate terms for the
findings of ecological science.

It should be recognized

that it is necessary to allow some "slippage" between the
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terminology and categories
of ecological science
and their
translation rnto the language
of social and political
theory, but in this case
there are certain
philosophic
resonances that should inspire
caution rather than
unref lective adoption. Even
if the terms are used
in
ecological studies it must also
be recognized

that these

sciences are subject to the same
problematics of masculine
conceptualization as all other sciences.

^

The terms

"harmony" and "balance" have the
unmistakable ring of
politics most closely associated
with the tradition of
idealism, especially its Platonic
version.
if women are
to self-consciously choose to
be identified with nature it
should be with the fullest possible
knowledge
of the

ambiguity of these concepts, the actuality
of the
ecological relations to which they refer,
and with some
awareness of their implication in the "logic

of identity"

and identification.

These observations imply there are

several considerations which must be further
explored

before the claims of feminism and radical ecology
can be
said to intersect,

and even more importantly, whether they

can continue on the road of resistance together or
whether

there will remain theoretical and political conflicts

which cannot be resolved with current resources.

Some of

these considerations will include: an appropriate

understanding of the limits of the concepts and emphases
of ecological science; the relation of the belief in

scientific objectivity to "women's knowledge," especially
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as it has been
theorized in "standpoint
theory";

and the

relationship of alternative
forms of knowledge
to science
(which may also challenge
Habermas- critrgne of
Adorno).
First,

brief comment on the terms
used by those who
identify with the philosophy
of social ecology
a

and who
tend to use these terms in
Bookchin's idiosyncratic
manner.
Such terms as harmony,
balance, diversity, and
mutuality lack the specificity
needed to describe
the

processes found in "ecosystems"
or ecological complexes,
and moreover have been severely
restricted in Bookchin's
writings by setting them in
opposition to other terms like
conflict,

competition, parasitism and so on.

This is not
to dismiss the importance of
these terms in offering an

alternative to the social Darwinist
and social biologistic
interpretations of natural processes that
have dominated
political ideology and rhetoric for at
least
the last

century or two, but it is to call attention
to the
frequently one-sidedness of these terms as

they have

entered into the discussions of radical ecology.

An

example of an alternative terminology which
is more

ecologically accurate and provides for

a

perhaps less

philosophically loaded potential can be found in William
Ophuls' and A. Stephen Boyan's Ecology and the Pol tics of
i

S carcity Revisited

.

Ophuls' original publication in the

late 1970s needed to be updated to indicate the continuing

and worsening ecological conditions of the earth, but also
to correct some of the serious misreadings of his early
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attempt to relate the
ecological crisis to
political
Philosophy.
The revised version
includes additional
confirmation of the ecological
trends toward crisis,
but
it also provides
clarification of the connections
between
politics and ecology, and
suggests some helpful
categories
of analysis borrowed from
the rapidly expanding
field of

ecological science

17
.

One particular concept
seems

especially important in the
present context, that of the
"climax” condition of ecosystems.
As the authors explain,
the climax ecosystem is a
result of the process of natural
succession, which is a consequence
of the biosphere's
status as a "dynamic and open
steady-state
system."

There

is now a standard narrative of
ecological succession.

Over long periods of time essentially
bare rock becomes
covered with lichens and mosses, then
other microorganisms
and insects gradually break down the
rock into minerals
and other compounds which become available
for larger
plants, even trees, and eventually animals,
which then

inhabit the once "barren" landscape.

Gradually, early

life-forms are replaced by others with habits more
suited
to the new conditions.

The transformations of habitat is

called ecological succession.
takes place,

As the "orderly succession"

simpler ecosystems tend to be replaced by

those which are increasingly complex, and in the "final"
stage there is

a

temporary though frequently long-lasting

condition called the climax ecosystem.

Although this

climax condition may last for many thousands of years it
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Will be eventually disturbed
by stresses such as fire,
earthquake, climate shifts,
or-and of increasing

importance— human beings.

Humans have become expert at

breaking climax communities and
reaping the benefits of
the stored energy potentials
these communities represent.
Humans have also become expert at
harnessing the lifeforms of the early succession
processes,

the pioneer

species which rapidly convert sunlight
through

photosynthesis into more humanly usable forms.

It is the

consequences of these activities that are so
devastating
for the biosphere,

"The dilemma is clear.

Humans must

have productive ecosystems in order to survive,
but high

productivity requires simple and even dangerously
fragile
ecosystems.
Further, since the biosphere is highly
integrated, other ecosystems are also simplified, natural

cycles disrupted, materials lost, and the whole system of
the biosphere rendered less stable

of this human activity,

." 18

The general trend

the "maximization of productivity

as narrowly defined by economists,

"

leads to the

inevitable conclusion that the ecosystem as
collapse.

a

whole will

Of course, maximization of productivity is the

corollary of capitalism’s maximization of profit, but

productivity maximization is also the intent of those
socialist philosophies that attempt to simply
efficiently, rationally, or "equitably"

capitalism does.

— do

— more

what

Humans break or simplify climax

ecosystems and thereby endanger their own survival.
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The

authors go on to explain
that there is no single
climax
condition, but a variety
of climax states whose
specific
characteristics are dependent on
variations of
microclimate, distribution of
species, soil composition,
and so forth.
Some areas never reach full
climax,
sometimes because of natural
conditions like frequent
hurricanes, but especially because
of human intervention.
There are even areas which have
been in a state of

"anthropogenic subclimax" for thousands
of years, probably
including the North American great
plains and areas of
Australia where indigenous peoples
have used fire to alter
succession patterns thereby inducing
more humanly
beneficial plants and animals. Anthropogenic
subclimax
can exist
even more intensely productive

m

in Asia,

a

such as

"Paddy land, which has been cultivated
for

millennia,

mimics

forms,

is another human-made subclimax,

natural marsh ." 19

one that

There are other examples of

long-term or sustainable anthropogenic subclimaxes
but
they are now the exception.

In most cases humans have

simply reduced local ecosystems to
sus tainabli ty and moved on,

a

level below human

frequently leaving behind

conditions of desertification that cannot return to
conditions similar to the earlier climax conditions for
tens of thousands of years.

These events are not limited

to "Western industrial society" but were also typical of

many ancient peoples, including the Greeks who have been
so often held up by philosophers of various stripes,
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including some ecofeminists,
as providing insight
into how
to live "harmoniously"
with nature. 2° The point
of this
example is to show that the
implications
of the findings

of ecological science,

even when it is not limited
by
reductionist, idealistic or
masculine controlled concepts
and explanations, provides
complex and somewhat ambiguous
political potentials.
Since climax conditions
are the

"end" toward which ecosystems
trend,

if we want to

maximize the "naturalness" of our
relations with nonhuman
nature there seems to be strong
support from ecological

science for the deep ecology emphasis
on wilderness
preservation and expansion.
It is exactly on the basis
of
these "climax" observations and there
relationships
to

biodiversity, biospheric survivability, and
evolutionary
continuity, that many Earth First! activists
make their
claims.
But any human civilization beyond the
neo-

neolithic will require some simplification of
ecosystems

below full climax conditions.

This does not mean however

that we must sacrifice other species or the general

vitality of the biosphere.

The long-term sustainability

of the anthropogenic subclimax systems characteristic of

Asian paddy iand, the Australian outback, and perhaps the
English countryside until recently, provide examples of
ecological and human sustainability which can be viewed as
a

starting point on which to improve.

approach is related to
Boyan describe,

a

The general

concept of mimesis, as Ophuls and

"The basic strategy of all these
469

compromise systems is to study
the nature of the climax
and then, instead of breaking
it completely, to
mimrc it
closely or to insert humans
into the process as careful
parasites that preserve the host
while siphoning off as
much food as possible." 2 ! And,
the authors warn, this
mimetic process is only appropriate

for some parts of the

Planet, many others are too fragile
for any cultivation,
since they provide too little
surplus "production" for
human cultivation, and should be
set aside as a "source of
biological capital ." 22

Related to the problems of the
appropriateness of the
use of the terms of harmony and balance
and their
resonances with philosophical idealism, are
concerns
Patricia J. Mills has raised about Ynestra
King's
"abstract pro-nature stand ." 23

King uses the language of

Bookchin's social ecology in claiming that the
"systematic

denigration" of women, people of color, working-class

people and animals is based on

Western civilization ." 24

hierarchy

a

"dualism" at the "root of

King claims this "mind-set

originates in human society with the domination

of human by human and more specifically by men over women.

She claims the various movements against domination or for

liberation are "internally related" and can be resolved by
a

"world-wide, pro-life, movement

." 25

It is this language

of "pro-life" that has troubled Mills and resulted in her

critique of King's "abstract pro-nature stand."
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s

argument is

critical appropriation
of the

a

^

work of the early Frankfurt
theorists, especially
Qf
Marcuse and Adorno. Her
examination of ecofeminism
is
relies on the relationship
of the domination of
nature to
the domination of woman
which appeared in the early
theorists' works.

However, her criticisms have
been
rejected in a recent comprehensive
work by Val Plumwood.26
At issue is the attempt to
"synthesize" feminism and
radical ecology into a more adequate
theoretical basis for

resistance to domination,

a

more theoretically and

politically developed position King
called ecofeminism.
What Mills questions is the manner
in which this

synthesis

is achieved in King's work.

It is claimed there are two

basic problems with King's ecofeminism.

First is the

problem of the abstraction of "good" parts
of various
theories and their subsequent fusion without
adequate
examination of the contradictions and tensions
between the
theories from which the various concepts are
abstracted.
Secondly,
the

there is not adequate attention given by King to

regressive" or violent aspects of nature: nature "red

in tooth and claw."

The absence of consideration of the

violence and conflict within nature results in

a

"harmonistic" view of nature such as when King makes
claims about the possibilities or potential for

reconciling humans with non-human nature.
emphasizes this point with respect to
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a

Mills

key issue of

feminism,

reproductive freedom, especially
as this has
appeared in the context of
decisions about
abortion.

Val Plum »°°d has subsequently
criticized Mills, but
13 n0t Cl6ar that Plumwood
has rightly understood
the
critique of King.
Plumwood's arguments are
indicative of

“

general tendency in her work
which has opened her own
position to the criticism that
it remains one-sidedly
"cultural" without adequate
attention to the material
aspects of society and life 27
As Mary Mellor
a

.

has

indicated,

the author Camwood]
clearW
. r
clearly sets
out^ the material basis of
male-female
culture nature dualisms, she sees
their centrality
Y as
based upon a cultural rather than a
material
domination Consequently, the political
challenge
offered by the end of the book is a
cultural one; we
are to reject the "master's story"
of conquest and
control, capture and use, destruction
and
incorporation.
Instead we are to create a new story
drawn from the subordinated and ignored
parts of
Western culture such as "women's stories of
care."
The " we " here are new social formations
built on
^.
„
radical democracy, co-operation and mutuality".
However,
what the material basis of those formations
are supposed to be is unclear.
This is unfortunate
because the basis of a material analysis and a more
material, political conclusion permeate Plumwood's

^

.

book.

The problem of the "materiality" of critique is also

important in Plumwood's defense of Ynestra King.

In

summarizing Mills's critique of King, Plumwood states,
"Mills has argued that those ecological feminists who

reject the negative value that western culture has

attributed to the sphere of nature (which
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I

have argued

above is the core assumption
of all ecological
feminrsms)
have adopted an 'abstract
pro-nature stance. '"29 H ow
is

the "rejection of the
negative value" of the sphere
of
nature to be understood here?
Plumwood believes that
Mills's proposal to "take
account of the regressive
moment
of nature" in order to retain
a basis for defending

women's reproductive freedom,
especially that of abortion,
will result in a failure of the
ecofeminist project.
Plumwood’ s emphasis is on rejecting
the "western
construction of nature as an inferior
sphere of
exclusion." In rejecting "abstractly
pro-nature
ecofeminism, " Plumwood claims Mills's
argument would
result in the abandonment of oneself
to "necessity."
This
"necessity" would include acceptance of
whatever may
happen, without resistance, or, to follow
Barry Commoner's
maxim, accepting that "nature knows best."
Plumwood
asserts that it is not

treating 'nature

master."
Plumwood

1

matter of choosing between

a

as our slave or treating it as our

But is this what Mills is arguing,
s

attempt to address the problem

a

and is
true

resolution of the difficulty?
What seems to be involved here is an apparent

misreading of Mills's argument resulting from

a

lack of

understanding of the developments in the critical theory
of the early Frankfurt School.

criticizing Mills for

a

Plumwood seems to be

one-sidedness no one "influenced

by the Frankfurt School" would be likely to make, at least
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not in the simplistic,
unnuanced manner Plumwood
charges,
"In short, What is
involved is not, as assumed
in Mills's
argument, a simple reversal
of the value of nature
which
embraces the category of
nature without further

deconstruction.

At issue is the specifics
of the use of
the category of nature and
how it must be theorized
in any
attempt to bring together the
insights of feminism and
the
radical ecology movement. As
Plumwood says, "We do not
have to assume that nature is
a sphere of harmony and
peace, with which we as humans
will never be in conflict.
A rejection of the western treatment
of nature implies a
careful, critical and political
look at the category of

nature

.

"

30

Plumwood rightly states that the
"assignment of
women's reproductive activity to the
sphere of nature" has
been used to enforce the inferior status
of
women,

and

that this is one of the issues at the
heart of

nature/culture dualism."
argument, however,

What is problematic about her

is the inadequate analysis of the

categories used in the critical theory inspired argument
including: the status of "negative dialectics"; the

treatment of the category of nature in this tradition; and
how these relate to Plumwood'

dualism and hierarchy.

s

own use of the concepts of

It is a fundamental error of

analysis to assert that Frankfurt School influenced
critical theory would be guilty in any simple sense of

accepting any treatment of these issues from within
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s

.

"dualising framework which creates
an opposition between
the body and free subjectivity. "31
Piumwood makes counter
recommendations about the appropriate
direction
for

ecof emmism (as if these were
absent from Mills's
argument)
Her recommendations include
the assertion that
a critical ecological
feminist position would conceive
human identity in "less dualistic
and oppositional ways,"
and that "both women and men are
part of both nature and
culture," and so forth.
This indicates a fundamental
.

misunderstanding of Mills's critique and of
the early
Frankfurt critical theory. 32 of particular

concern is the

lack of an indication of an adequate
appreciation of the
role of the concepts of "identity" and
"non-identity"

in

the works of critical theory.

Piumwood'

s

This is revealed in

evaluation of the Dialectic of En

simply being about

a

1

i

ahfpnn^ni as

masculine and instrumental

rationality and its relation to the treatment of nature,
without indicating the problematic status of all these
terms 33
This apparent misreading by Piumwood and the status
of her alternative,

can only be fully established and

adequately evaluated by reexamining Mills's original
critique of Ynestra King.

If Piumwood'

s

reading is shown

to be inadequate it will still then be incumbent on

Frankfurt School influenced critical theory to develop
radical ecological or ecofeminist theory in the areas

which also remain inadequately developed in Piumwood'
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alternative.

In other words,

can the potential
of

Pluinwood

concepts of "radical
democracy, co-operation
and mutuality, " or
something like them, be
more adequately
developed by means of the
categories of early critical
theory and their subsequent
transformations?
In reexamining Mills's
argument it is important
to
first clarify the object
of her critique,
she was not

criticizing ecofeminism in
general, which is implied
by
Plumwood's comments, but instead
had restricted her
remarks to the works of only
two individuals who made
early attempts to combine the
insights of both feminism
and the ecology movement, one
of whom was Ynestra
King.

Mills's critique begins with

a

review of the work of Isaac

Balbus and focuses on his recommendations
for attempting
to provide a "neo-Hegelian"
theoretical basis for the

"reconciliation" of humanity with nature,
of culture and
nature.
Mills argues against Balbus s assertion
1

work of Horkheimer and Adorno is simply
Hegel.

that the

a

footnote to

She alternatively proposes that the
"problem of

the domination of nature" is "most
powerfully" articulated

by these two and especially by Adorno in his
later

individual writings 34
.

The relationship between humans

and nature is complex and the overcoming of the
domination
of nature in its various forms will be correspondingly

complex,

"Within their critique of the domination of

nature Horkheimer and Adorno distinguish the rational

mastery of nature from its irrational forms, and they
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contend that

new and qualitatively
different relation
between humanity and nature
is possrble.
However, they
also retain a tension
between the liberatory
and
repressive aspects of nature. "35
it is the absence
of
recognition of the "tension"
between different aspects
of
nature, and the subsequent
claims of any philosophy
or
theory which relies on some
notion of a "nature in-itself"
that is fundamentally good
or positive, which
produces a
problematic "abstract pro-nature
stance," according to
Mills.
Advocates of a "naive” reconciliation
of humanity
with nature fail to consider the
extent to which nature,
its various forms (non-human
nature,
a

m

society,

individual psyche)

,

the

because of previous domination,
also

can be dangerous, distorting and
compulsive.

The

domination of nature is an irrational
extension of
tendency of nature which humans share as

a

part of nature.

It is in the extension of domination
in the form of the

mstrumentalization of reason that reason

is reduced to

functioning merely as means and thereby loses
its aspect
of self-reflection.

The domination of nature as the "lack

of self-reflection" can only be overcome,

argue the

critical theorists, by the "remembrance" of nature,
While these theorists search for a new relation to
nature in terms of the historical possibilities of
nature, they also analyze the regressive moments of
nature that led to the rise of fascism.
For
Horkheimer and Adorno, German fascism, with its cry
for a return to "blood and soil, " was a form of
nature's revenge on history: the "revolt of nature"
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against domination was
transformed under fascism
n expression of the
into
return of repressed
d nature in
P
distorted and savage form 36
.

Nature "itself" does not then
hold out the promise of
emancipation or freedom, only the
"memory" of nature can
provide the alternative vision
that opens onto a future
free of domination.
This aspect of self-reflection,
the
self-reflection of humans as nature,
will include the
tensions and complexity of the
relationship between
"freedom and barbarism," but, even
so, an emancipatory
promise remains as one aspect of the
dialectic
of

enlightenment.

As the critical theorists explained,

"By

virtue of this remembrance of nature in
the subject, in
whose fulfillment the unacknowledged truth
of all culture
lies hidden, enlightenment is universally
opposed to

domination ." 37

it is the acknowledgment of this

complexity in Bookchin's philosophy of social
ecology
which Mills finds better developed than in Balbus's
neoHegelianism.

However, Bookchin comes to rely on

that is a subject "in-itself,

"

a

nature

Mills argues, which fails

to retain a "conceptual distinction between human self-

consciousness and nature" as the critical theorists do.

Mills asserts that this point of disagreement between
social ecology and critical theory is the point of "the

most fundamental issue raised by critiques of the

domination of nature: the question of the relation between
human self-consciousness and nature ." 38
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To the extent Ynestra
King's argument relies
on this

social ecological assumption
it too is subject to
criticism, but Mills's crrtique
goes beyond this
similarity. Mills argues that
King appropriates aspects
of social ecology and
critical theory without
confronting
the contradictions which
result. Mills's charge that
King's position is an example of
the abstract pro-nature
stance can be examined in light
of this further

understanding of the relationship
between social ecology
and critical theory. Mills argues
that King's endorsement
of the identification of women with
nature, because of
women's historical position and in an
attempt
to combat

the domination of both women and
nature, has at least one

unfortunate implication in that it tends
to make women
uniquely responsible for the liberation of
all life.

Mills makes

a

distinction between the early and later

essays of King, but the problems remain unresolved
even in
the later attempts.
In the early essay King says,
for

example,

The ecology movement, in theory and practice,
attempts to speak for nature--the "other" that has no
voice and is not conceived of subjectively in our
civilization.
Feminism represents the refusal of the
original "other" in patriarchal human society to
remain silent or to be the "other" any longer. Its
challenge of social domination extends beyond sex to
social domination of all kinds, because the
domination of sex, race, and class and the domination
of nature are mutually reinforcing.^^
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What women should say for
nature or others and how
they should say it is not
addressed by King except that
she claims ecofeminism is
a "vantage point" from
which to
speak 40 The similarity of this
ecofeminist vantage point
to the complexity of "feminist
standpoint theory" will be
discussed shortly, but King's additional
claims must first
be further emphasized.
In regard to the use
.

of the idea

of harmony as metaphor for reconciled
nature, King states,
"The goals of harmonizing humanity
and nonhuman nature, at

both the experiential and theoretical
levels, cannot be
attained without the radical vision and
understanding

available from feminism."

King also asserts that the

domination of women by men is at the root of
all social
domination, as is argued by social ecologists,

Ecofeminism draws on feminist theory which asserts that
the domination of woman was the original domination
in

human society,
class,

from which all other hierarchies--of rank,

and political power

— flow."

This seems to be an

overstatement about feminist theory, although until
recently an accurate generalization of the assumption of
most feminist argument.

The political and theoretical

position that feminism is based on the assertion or
recognition that male domination was the original or
founding form of all domination is now receiving

criticisms from within feminist theory itself, and is not
implied in the work of the early Frankfurt theorists.
King does indicate that the identification of women and
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nature by radical and cultural
feminists has in many cases
resulted in the "romanticization
of women as good,"
which
she says fails to recognize
the complexity of women's
implication in domination 4
.

0n e of Mills's primary
objections to King's later
essays is that in her attempt
to rectify earlier
problems
King identifies what needs to
be accomplished in combining
radical ecology and feminism, but
then never provides the
concepts and theoretical mediations
necessary.
For

example. King identifies the need
for

ecof emmist theory,

a

dialectical

"An ecological feminism calls
for a

dynamic, developmental theory of the
person— male and
female— who emerges out of nonhuman nature,
where

difference is neither reified nor ignored
and the
dialectical relationship between human and
nonhuman nature
is understood." 42
And again King calls for theory
but

does not provide it,

"An analysis of the interrelated

dominations of nature

— psyche

oppression and nonhuman nature

and sexuality, human

— and

the historic position

of women in relation to those forms of domination is
the

starting point of ecofeminist theory." 43

In detailing the

list of philosophical and political problems which must be

addressed, King also highlights the issues of science and
knowledge,

"A related critical area for a genuinely

dialectical practice is

a

reconstruction of science,

taking into account the critique of science advanced by
radical ecology and feminism." 44
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But again there is no

attempt to offer the concepts
required except in general
reference to various and
contradictory theoretical and
political practices.
This lack of theoretical or
conceptual mediations to
address the philosophical and
political problems King
recognizes has the effect of putting
the problem of saving
the world on the backs of women
without the support of a
coherent theory of ecofeminism.
It is this combination
of
unique responsibility with a vague
and general endorsement
of "nature" which results in
Mills's concern with the
"abstract pro-nature stand" of this
version of

ecofeminism.

Mills's concern with King's tendency
to
place the whole burden of resolving
ecological

and social

domination on the backs of women can be
supported simply
by citing King's unambiguous assertions,
"Practice does
not wait for theory

history.

it comes out of the imperatives of

Women are the revolutionary bearers of this

antidualistic potential in the world today."

If there is

any doubt as to how strongly to interpret this
statement
she later adds,

We thoughtful human beings must use the fullness of
our sensibility and intelligence to push ourselves
intentionally to another stage of evolution. One
where we will fuse a new way of being human on this
planet with a sense of the sacred, informed by all
ways of knowing--intuitive and scientific, mystical
illici rational.
It is the moment where women recognize
ourselves as agents of history yes, even as unigue
agents--and knowingly bridge the classic dualisms
between spirit and matter, art and politics, reason
and intuition.
This is the potentiality of a

—
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This is the project of

Plumwood

characterization of Frankfurt
School
critical theory as simply
concerning itself with
'

s

instrumental reason, and as endorsing

a

nature-culture
dualism (which she finds in evidence
in Mills's critique
of King),

is a gross oversimplification
of critical

theory's understanding of the
"dialectic of enlightenment"
and a misreading of Mills's critique.
As was previously
indicated, Plumwood' s own work is open
to the criticism
that it one-sidedly emphasizes the
cultural aspects of an
ecofeminist politics of transformation.
With these

criticisms of both King and Plumwood in mind
an attempt
can now be made to address the problems
of dualistic
thinking by developing concepts capable of
adequately

representing the cultural and material possibilities
of
radical ecological change.
Before turning to

feminists'

and critical theorists' attempts to use the "concept"
of

mimesis to resolve some of these problems we need to first
take a brief diversion to the issues surrounding the

concept of "feminist standpoint theory" and its

relationship to women's experiences and the related

possibilities for an "objective" science, and an
efficacious social theory.
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Feminist Standpoint Theory
The concept of a feminist
standpoint theory was first
developed in the early 1980s,
initially by Nancy Hartsock.
The concept has evolved over
time but many of its most

characteristic features remain.

Feminist standpoint

theory is based on an analogy to
Marx’s theory of a
proletarian standpoint which provides
privileged access to
a more adequate understanding
of the workings of

capitalism than is possible from the
perspective of the
capitalist.
The claim is that there are
systematic
distortions, misrepresentations, and "perversity"

in the

view of the world from the position of those
who dominate
others, and that the experience of the dominated
and

oppressed provide

a

perspective from which can be

developed

a

economy.

Feminist standpoint theory's attempt to

more adequate theory of society and the

transform these insights for feminist purposes has come
under attack for alleged problems of "naturalism" and
"essentialism,

"

and more recently for its inadequate

psychological/psychoanalytical grounding.
I

want to first present

of the theory,

a

In what follows

brief summary of the main claims

followed by some of the criticisms and

responses to these claims, and finally look at some

implications for "objectivity" and

a

feminist science,

which has so far been most fully developed by Sandra

Harding
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"

Hartsock initiated the
development of feminist
standpoint theory in response
to a
call for a

specifically feminist historical
materialism ." 46
Hartsock viewed the feminist
standpoint

as "an important
epistemological tool for understanding
and opposing all
forms of domination 47 if
this claim is accurate then
feminist standpoint theory should
have something important
to say about the difficulties
radical ecologists have had
developing their own adequate basis
for knowledge
.

m

(however unacknowledged this has
been in much of their own
literature)
Hartsock explains that she is expanding
on
the fundamentally Marxian argument
that the "socially
.

mediated interaction with nature in the
process of
production shapes both human beings and

theories of

knowledge."

To achieve this she relies on the
category of

labor" but in an appropriately expanded form,
which she
believes will aid in overcoming the omnipresent
dichotomy
of nature and culture.

She claims traditional Marxism

does not adequately addressed the situation of women's

oppression because it tends to collapse women's
experiences into
experience.

a

mere extension of proletarian

Alternatively,

a

feminist reevaluation of

these claims will take Marx's critique in new and fuller

directions,
I will explore some of the epistemological
consequences of claiming that women's lives differ
structurally from those of men.
In particular, I
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Hartsock provides clarification
of the meaning of a
"standpoint," emphasizing the ways
the relations between
humans and their understandings of
the natural world
become systematically different when
derived from the
respective views of those who dominate
and those

who are

dominated.

One way the mystification of reality
occurs in

the descriptions of the world by the
dominant class or

group is through the categories used to
explain the world.
For example, the description of capitalism
becomes

mystified when presented in categories of "exchange,"
but
the mists and mystery of capitalism become
increasingly
clarified when beginning from categories developed
out of
the workers'

level of production.

After appropriate

quotes from Marx, Hartsock summarizes.

Only by following the two into the realm of
production and adopting the point of view available
to the worker could Marx uncover what is really
involved in the purchase and sale of labor power,
i.e.
uncover the process by which surplus value was
produced and appropriated by the capitalist, and the
means by which the worker is systematically
disadvantaged.

—

By fully comprehending that "material life structures

understanding" it can be shown how the perspective of the
capitalist and his exchange mentality results in
of hierarchically structured dualisms.
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In addition,

this

.

perspective inverts the real world and
makes it "perverse"
in its pursuit of profits for
profits' sake.
The

perversity of the telos of profits is
seen from the
alternative perspective, "The real point of
the production
of goods and services is, after all,
the continuation of
the species,

a

possibility dependent on their use."^

standpoint thus provides

a

A

way of recognizing the workings

of various ideological productions which both
attempt to

legitimize the position of the dominant class and make
it
"real" by actually controlling the "means of mental and

physical production."

A standpoint

is an achievement

which reveals the inner workings of this process in its
distortions and perversity, but it is importantly an
"achievement,

"

not simply an unmediated given which is

obviously present for purposes of resistance: "The
standpoint of the oppressed represents an achievement both
of science

(analysis)

and of political struggle on the

basis of which this analysis can be conducted ." 51
Therefore,

there is no simple access to the proletarian or

the feminist standpoint;

they require conceptual

mediations developed within the process of political
struggle

Objectivity and Standpoints
One of the most able defenders of standpoint theory

over the last decade or so has been Sandra Harding.

Criticism of standpoint theory has come from two or three
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principle directions.

Non-feminist,

traditional science,

critics have made charges that
feminist standpoint theory
falls into the traditional
problems of relativism.
Harding has answered these objections
with the concept of
"strong objectivity" which uses the
fact that
all

"knowledge" is historically or socially
situated as a
resource
scientific methodology rather than as a
problem to be eliminated through ever more
vigilant
policing, and neutralizing of subjectivity.
Traditional
science claims to achieve "knowledge" rather
than mere
opinion by becoming more "value-neutral," and
understands

m

the

subject of knowledge" as universal, that is,

no fixed historical or social position.

it has

Feminists

understand this as the "disembodied" subject of
traditional science and positivism.

Feminist and other

histories of science have disclosed that instead of being
value-neutral, traditional science tends to reflect or

represent certain class, gender and race assumptions found
in the dominant class or groups in society.

Typically,

traditional science reflects desires, values and interests
of capital,

argues,

and of white males.

Alternatively, Harding

in an extension of Hartsock’s earlier work,

beginning thought from the lives of the marginalized
produces knowledge that is less partial and distorted than
when begun from the activities of the dominant class or
groups.

The value or interest in "liberation from

domination" then serves as

a

guide for the development of
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standpoint methodology.

This means that standpoint
theory

takes the traditional
scientific methods of problem
selection, research program
design, concept construction,
development of hypotheses, and
so on, and puts them in
the
service of liberation movements.
For Harding this means
our understanding of scientific
method and of objectivity
must be transformed.
For example, by starting
thought
from the experiences or activities
of the marginalized a

different set of problems to be
explained presents itself
when compared to the problems resulting
from those who
have an interest in continuing
domination,
oppression,

and

exploitation.

Harding claims dominant groups are
unable
to generate what are the most critical
questions about
their received beliefs because the very
pervasiveness of

assumptions of racist and sexist systems, for
example,
make the beneficiaries blind to those assumptions.

For

traditional science, to start from overtly socially

situated or

political" positions is to introduce bias

into the method of science.

For traditional scientists,

it is politics and history that science attempts to

escape.

Harding responds that it is precisely this belief

in the value-neutrality of science that is one of those

blinding assumptions which can be brought to light with
standpoint theory.

By making these socially-historically

situated assumptions visible, more consciously part of
science,

less partial and distorted knowledge can be

developed.

Harding importantly adds that this also
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implies that the greater
number of marginalized
positions
which can be represented in
the scientific
coimaunity the

more accurate will be the
picture of "reality" which
can
be developed.
This places feminist
standpoint theory in
coalition with other standpoint
theories and therefore
with democratic politics.
It is only by providing
access
to these structures of knowledge
generation that the most
objective (the least partial and
distorted) knowledge can
be systematically developed.
This implies there would be
more than one feminist standpoint in
this research program
as well, since the experiences
and activities vary for
women depending on many factors in
addition to gender,
class and race,
so forth.

such as place, age,

This is not relativist,

sexual preference, and

argues Harding, because

some "situations" are scientifically better
as starting

points; they make it possible to systematically
question
the process of concept formation and assumptions
about the

subject of knowledge.

Some situations, those of the

marginalized, allow more critical questions which in turn
shape the selection of scientific problems and research

agendas

.

Traditional science relegates these areas to the

pre-rational and outside scientific investigation,
claiming they are properly understood as consisting merely
of competing opinions rather than as a resource for

knowledge development.

Traditional science believes

starting from marginalized lives does not produce more

value-neutral knowledge, that

is,
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it does not produce

.

"objective" knowledge in the
traditional sense-but again,
this is impossible.
Traditional science itself did
not
and does not produce this
objective knowledge.
Standpoint
theory produces a more self-reflexive
form of

knowledge,
less partial and less distorted
and therefore more
objective: strongly objective, rather
than the weak

objectivity of the un-self-reflective
traditional science.
Harding recognizes that this means making
the

"subject of knowledge" an object of study
just as all
other objects are studied scientifically.
This subjectobject of study will produce conflicting accounts
of the

objective world because the positions from which
they
start are frequently in conflict.
is what

What is involved here

Harding calls the "logic of multiple subjects.

This means women do not have any unique ability to

generate knowledge, but rather knowledge is generated from
the "position" which begins from the lives of the

marginalized.

So,

men also can generate feminist

insights
In summary,

for standpoint theory,

subjects of

knowledge are always already also objects of knowledge.
To achieve maximally critical study of objects, begin from

the perspective of the marginalized position.

This means

standpoint theory aligns itself necessarily with democracy

advancing projects; epistemologically, scientifically,
morally,

and politically 53
.

The strong objectivity of

standpoint theory makes it possible to systematically
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identify desires, interests
and values affecting the
choices and methods of science.
Standpoint theory demands
self-reflexion on the values and
interests which enter
into problem identification and
concept construction.

Value-neutrality is

a

myth and

a

mystifying illusion, and,

alternatively, values and interests
do not necessarily
have "bad" scientific effects.
While some values and
interests aid domination and oppression,
others may serve
democracy and liberation.

Questions have been raised about this
formulation of
standpoint theory and have been elaborated
elsewhere 54
.

The remainder of Section III will note some
of these

concerns and at least one new one.
include,

first,

These concerns

how the subject investigating the lives of

those in marginalized positions can put herself in that

position sufficiently to generate the appropriately
critical questions, to be able to "see" the problems.
Second, what is the practical content of the normative

values of terms like "democracy" and "liberation"?

Certainly they will differ from the liberal and
traditional socialist understandings, but what are some

present visions of the transformed meanings of these
political concepts?

Finally, how can standpoint theory

and other insights from the lives of those not in the

dominant class or groups be applied specifically to the
concerns of radical ecology?

To borrow from the title of
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a well

known Native American story,

"Who Speaks for

Wolf "? 55
Before turning to these final
concerns in the next
two chapters, an example of
the alternative science
which
might develop from this understanding
of science and
objectivity is appropriate.

Practicing Science
Evelyn Fox Keller also has examined
the relationships
between gender and science and has generated
insights and
proposals into the possibilities of a new and
more

objective" understanding of science.

In her early work

as a mathematical biophysicist she
encountered an

upsetting fact; science as it was then being practiced
was
"bound up with the idea of masculinity ." 56
other scientists

,

Like many

the work of Thomas Kuhn challenged her

previous understanding of science and put the socially

constructed character of science in the forefront of
considerations about what good science is.

5^

Kuhn and

other historians of science had shown that extrascientif ic
factors influenced such aspects of science as choice of

problem and theory, concept formation, acceptable
evidence,

and so on.

This meant that the proposition that

science is ethically neutral or lacks any specific
"interest" was in fact
ideology.

a

reflection of

a

particular

Feminist historians and sociologists of science

have since used the category of gender to investigate the
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partiality and distortions
introduced in the prevailing
concept of science. Keller has
also attempted to find a
way between the two most common
feminist critiques of
science.
The first, as Harding pointed
out, simply sees
the need to include gender in
what is otherwise
an

unchanged science, but this alternative
has no systematic
way of addressing gender influences
on the practice of
science.

The other is the radical critique
of science

which, however,

science ." 58

"fails to account for the effectiveness
of

Rather than radically separating the concepts

of science and gender, Keller attempts
to examine what she

calls the "science-gender system."

Traditional

understandings of science discount the influence of
gender
on the actual practice of science, while many
radical

"social-constructionist" critiques of science cannot

adequately account for the "success" of science.

"The

fact that Boyle's law is not wrong must, however, not be

forgotten.

Any effective critique of science needs to

take due account of the undeniable successes of science as

well as of the commitments that have made such successes
.

possible."

c:

Q

The interests of the scientific community

are those of the individuals who make up that community,

which has largely meant white, middle-class males.

But

one interest this group shares with most other humans is
the "shared commitment to the possibility of reliable

knowledge of nature."

In order to obtain that reliable

knowledge some adherence to certain procedures such as
494

.

"experimental replicability and logical
coherence
necessary if the "scientific venture"

are

is to succeed.

To

uncover how gender impacts science and
how it may more
consciously be used to transform science
is the task

Keller sets for herself.

in examining these questions

Keller seeks to reveal how social, political
and

especially emotional commitments of individuals
manifest
themselves in the "social and linguistic practices
that

help determine, within the scientific community,
the

priority of interests and the criteria of success."^
Keller embraces the pursuit of scientific knowledge as

reclaimed

a

universal goal, but only to the extent that

claims about the characteristics of science which are

labeled "constant and indispensable" are subjected to

thorough examination and when found to be particular,
limited, historically situated and contingent, to be

recognized as such.
a

This,

Keller believes, must result in

changed science, one reflecting different interests and

goals,

and which will be presented in

a

different

language

Keller's examination of the relation of gender and
science begins from some basic observations.

Although

most cultures have attempted to seek "reliable knowledge
of the natural world,

varied,

nature.

"

how they have gone about that has

as has their very understandings of knowledge and

Across cultures, one of the most common metaphors

of knowledge is that of sexual relations.
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Keller's

analyses of various historical
examples of the use of
sexuality as a metaphor for
correct procedures of gaining
knowledge are important and
insightful and deserve
inclusion in any extended examination
of the possibilities
for alternative understandings
of the limits and

potentials of

a

new science.

However,

this is not the

primary focus here and it must be
regrettably passed over
to get at the more immediate
concerns.
In addition to the historical
examination of

metaphors of gender and science, Keller
also examines the
psychological underpinnings of the idea of
objectivity in
science.
She begins by noting that the desire
for

objectivity in science has traditionally meant the
attempt
to separate out from the object those
projections of
subjects involved in scientific investigation.

It is the

inclusion of these subjective projections which
constitutes the unwanted "cultural bias" into what should

otherwise be the "objective" characteristics of the thing
under study.

The modern scientist recognizes that earlier

attempts to attain reliable knowledge of nature, including
magic,

astrology, and alchemy, as having in fact consisted

in large part of projections of human "hopes,

fears onto the natural world.

desires and

What Keller is proposing

is that modern science continues this practice of

pro j ection,

496

moderr^science °f lona'wUh"
carries within it^its ”c£\
project 1
of disinterest, of

ide ° logy of

£ ^^i““?“”'

^

"

autonomy

of

“»
of a completely
bUt that 11 contains precisely
what it
reiects^the'
H
3065
3 reflected self image,
The
ne or)
]e ct nst; illusion reflects
obiectiviirn
°l
back an imaqe of
f
aatonomous an ^ objectified: an
image of
?ni
ndividuais unto themselves, severed
from
the outside
world of other objects (animate
as well as inanimate?
and simultaneously from their
own subjectivity 62

L^rL^if

'

1

.

Keller then examines aspects of
subjectivity
including the ways that particular
concepts are developed-self and other, subject and object,
femininity
and

masculinity

and how these are socially mediated,

especially "first and most critically" by the
family.
Keller relies especially on the psychoanalytically
inspired "object relations theory" as it has
been

developed in the interests of feminism by such
individuals
as Nancy Chodorow,

and Jane Flax 62
.

Dorothy Dinnerstein, Jessica Benjamin,
One aspect of Keller’s examination of

the relationship between concept formation and

psychological development is the differences in

understanding of objectivity which can be related to the
processes of acquisition of gender identity.

Keller

analyzes "objectivity" as it takes place in two forms

which parallel gendered understandings of psychological
"autonomy."

The two forms she labels "dynamic" and

"static" objectivity.

She understands static objectivity

as the pursuit of knowledge that begins with the splitting

or severing of subject from object.
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This splitting has

the disadvantage of not involving
any complex process of

"disentangling" of the subject and
object.
objectivity she understands,

By dynamic

form of knowledge that grants to the
world around
us its independent integrity but
does so in a way
(A)

that remains cognizant of, indeed relies
on, our
connectivity with that world.
In this, dynamic
objectivity is not unlike empathy, a form of
knowledge of other persons that draws explicitly
on
the commonality of feelings and experience
in order
to enrich one's understanding of another
in his or
her own right.

Keller claims that dynamic objectivity, although

based on 'continuity,

"

also recognizes difference between

self and other, allowing the possibility for insight
into
the "nature of self and other" when trying to

disentangle

them.

She claims the state of awareness or

perception necessary to achieve this disentangling of self
and other is most closely related to the "state of being
in love."

the object,

The subject must achieve an intense interest in
so that self-interest recedes to the point of

"total absorption in the object before one,"

a

state of

awareness not only common to those who are in love but
also one "very familiar to young children."

But this

awareness of the object is not simply an infantile

fascination with the other, rather it retains the self and
other distinction in the service of the pursuit of
"objective knowledge of the world.

Keller compares the

focused awareness necessary for "perception of an object
in its own right" in science with that of poetry and other
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.

arts.

The difference in the
relations of subject and
object in this common
perceptual mode is a result of
the
goals for which the observations
are made and knowledge
is
gained.
In present practice,

science typically pursues
purely

instrumental goals, the "ob j ectfor-use

.

"

Rampant

instrumental! zat ion of thought can
be seen it the
pathological uses of this focused
perception and are
easily identifiable, but it goes
beyond this to more
"normal" behavior,
e need not look as far as the
pathology of sadism
for evidence of the cognitive use
of perception in
the interests of domination or, more
generally, for
defensive or offensive purposes.
Such evidence is
suggested by the manner in which many quite
normal
individuals approach the new and unknown, as
well as
by the language they use to describe these
encounters.
In particular, I have in mind the
aggression expressed in the common rhetoric of
bb

science

Keller then highlights some of the metaphors of

aggression used in science and documented extensively in
the feminist literature

science as

a

.

The further point is made that

social institution then tends to select those

individuals whose emotional needs are met by this rhetoric
of domination and aggression.

This produces certain types

of knowledge and power relative to the objects of

knowledge and to the new and unknown.
It is Keller’s contention that science does not have

to put itself in the service of instrumentalism,
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understood as power to dominate

There is an alternative

understanding of the methods of
science which still
produces reliable knowledge about
the world

but does so by

respecting the integrity of that
which it studies.
The
structure of knowledge based in the
will to dominate is
particular and ideological understanding
of

a

knowledge,

which derives from social relations,
The need to dominate nature is, in
this view, a
projection of the need to dominate other human
beings; it arises not so much out of
empowerment as
out of anxiety about impotence.
The feelings of
power such domination brings are not only like
the
sense of power that can be derived from
subjecting
others to one's will; they are the very same
feelings.
In this sense, then, the dream of dominion
over nature, shared by so many scientists, echoes
the
dream that the stereotypic son hopes to realize by
identifying with the authority of his father .^ 0

Alternatively, there is another basis for reliable
knowledge,

While some scientists see their endeavor in

predominantly adversarial terms, as contests, battles,
exercises in domination, others see it as
erotic activity ." 69

a

primarily

Keller cites several scientists, both

male and female, who attribute loving and erotic attitudes
to their work as scientists.

One of the larger points

being made is that the community of scientists who
determine what is "good science" tend to self select in

becoming members of the community, and this selection is
tied together with certain emotional and cognitive styles.
The emotional and cognitive styles then also result in the

selection of "compatible scientific styles of work,
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methodologies, and even theories

." 70

Keller then asks

what the consequences for science
and for the content of
knowledge would be if the scientific
community had other
emotional needs and cognitive styles,
that is, a
"discourse predicated on different

norms-on an ideal of

dynamic rather that static objectivity."

Keller then

examines specific examples where "erotic
rather that
adversarial terms" have been used in the
pursuit of

scientific knowledge.

Exemplary of the alternative understanding
and
possibilities of science is Barbara McClintock
(about whom
Keller has written extensively)
who received
the Nobel

,

Prize for her work in plant genetics 71
.

Her discovery of

genetic transposition" established that genetic elements
can move in large organisms

(greater than single cell)

in

an apparently coordinated way from one part of a

chromosome to another, thus challenging the orthodoxy of

modern genetics.

What Keller finds most interesting about

McClintock, besides that she does not view herself as

fighting for a feminist science, is the alternative vision
of science she holds and how this translates into

differences in methodology, concepts, and theory
development.

Keller views this alternative vision of

science as being based in

a

"respect for difference." 71

-

This alternative view of science, claims Keller, can best
be explained using gender as the fundamental category of

analysis
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McClintock criticizes mainstream
science for an
inadequate humility as it fails
to appreciate the "a
priori complexity that vastly
exceeds the capacities of
the human imagination."
Nature has a vast resourcefulness
which is capable of addressing
and exceeding
almost any

questions humans can ask of it.

This presently results,

according to McClintock, in an
inadequate scientific
methodology.
Traditional, mainstream science seeks
confirming evidence for what researchers
believe is an
answer they already have.
The consequence
of this

approach is that disconf irming evidence is
treated most
often as a mistake or error rather that as
the possibility
of discovering something unique and new.

that McClintock'

s

Keller argues

preferred approach results in

a

demand

of scientific observers that they pay special
attention to

the

exceptional case.”

This means a "respect for

individual difference" inhabits the heart of this

alternative vision of an adequate science.
McClintock'

s

In

case it meant focusing attention on an

"aberrant pattern of pigmentation on

a

few kernels of a

single corn plant" and the subsequent six years of

research to explain the observation 73
.

In this

understanding of science the unique or exceptional is not
seen simply as an example that proves or disproves a

general law, but as an opportunity to make those

exceptions or differences meaningful "in and of
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themselves."

This is

a

fundamentally different

understanding of the purposes of science
In this respect difference
constitutes a principle

or ordering the world radically
unlike the principle
i8
r dlchotomization (subject-object,
mind‘atter, feeling reason, disorder-law)
Whereas these
oppositions are directed toward a cosmic unity
typically excluding or devouring one of the
pair,
toward a unified, all-encompassing law,
respect for
difference remains content with multiplicity
as an
end in itself. /4

™%£: i°V

.

In this understanding of science there is
a larger

system of order but one not reducible in principle
to
single law.

a

Keller argues that the uniqueness of each

organism indicates that the order of nature transcends
human capacities of ordering.
individual into

a

Instead of collapsing the

mere example of a general law,

preservation of the individual and recognition of their
uniqueness become equally important aspects of the

activity of science.

Keller claims McClintock's

description of her activities of observation can be best

understood as

a

respect for difference that requires the

highest form of empathy, that of love,

"Love that allows

for intimacy without the annihilation of difference.

I

use the word love neither loosely nor sentimentally, but
out of fidelity to the language McClintock herself uses to

describe

a

form of attention,

indeed a form of thought." 77,

Keller claims this is all linked to the aims and
goals of science.

Change the aims and goals, and the

methods, concepts and theories will also change.
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The

challenge then is to rename
nature, to begin at the
starting point of science.
Barbara McClintock, as an
example of a "successful"
scientist, allows Keller to
claim that an alternative
understanding of science can
still yield scientific results,
"To McClintock, science
has a different goal: not prediction
per
se;

but

understanding; not the power to manipulate,
but
empowerment --the kind of power that results
from an
understanding of the world around us, that
simultaneously
reflects and affirms our connection to that
world.

Finally,

Keller reemphasizes the point that

McClintock denies her work is "woman's work," but
rather
views it as an alternative theory within the basic
framework of good science.

may be more

The point here is that science

pluralistic" and open to alternative theory

construction than is usually represented by the "ideology"
of science which currently prevails in theories of its

legitimacy,

if not in its actual practice.

Keller goes further, beyond McClintock'

s

However,

self-

understanding, to assert that the increased inclusion of
those who have a different relationship to the object of

their study will have

a

transforming effect on the

institution of science and what it considers legitimate,
successful and "good" science.

The consequence of

inclusion of more women and others who relate to nature in
this alternative way will be something other than merely

"complementary" understanding to the existing
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a

.

ideologically masculine science,
what will happen is more
than the mere addition
of women's vision to
that of men.
Keller believes there will
be a "thoroughgoing
transformation of the very
possibilities of creative
vrsion, for everyone.
It implies that the kind
of change
we might hope for is not
a direct or readily
apparent one
but rather an indirect and
subterranean one ." 78
,

she

believes a fundamental ally in
this transformation is
nature, which constantly challenges
any terms used

to name

it.

What is required in

a

new science, she believes,

is

the focusing of perception on the
unique responses nature

provides to our questions,
responses

"Paying attention to those

'listening to the material --may help
us to
'

reconstruct our understanding of science in
terms born out
of the diverse spectrum of human experience
rather
than

out of the narrow spectrum that our culture
has labeled

masculine
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CHAPTER 10

ECOFEMINISM AND SUBJECTIVITY

Although the call to develop
scientific theory and
political thought from the position
of the marginalized
may sound straightforward, and
there are examples
of

important insights from these positions,
it is not at all
clear how adequate social and political
theory can be
consistently developed from the standpoint
of women or
others who are marginalized. How are we
to write or speak
or act from the position of the other,
and what

considerations— linguistic, political, sexual, racial,
class,

species,

attempt?

and so

on— must

be included in any such

In this chapter the term/concept of mimes

i

s

will

provide the focus around which both critical theory
and
feminism can be examined for useful insights to be applied
to the development of a radical ecological,

consciousness.

ecofeminist

Adorno, among the critical theorists, went

the furthest in developing the idea of mimesis in relation
to critical consciousness.

Not only in Dialectic of

Enl i ghtenment but also in later works the idea of mimesis
is a crucial element in the constellation of negative

dialectics

1
.

Within feminism there has been

a

growing

interest in the use of mimesis to help illuminate the

problems of women's domination by men.

Among those

feminist theorists the one who most self-ref lexively uses

mimesis in her work is Luce Irigaray.
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Several critics

have examined the role of
mimesis in Irigaray's wort
and
see it as central to an
adequate understanding of what
she
is attempting to achieve.

Mimesis and Political Philosophy
In one of the earliest,

if not the earliest,

works of

political philosophy, Plato's Republic,
mimesis plays a
central role in the constitution of
the just political
system. Although there are technical
arguments over how
many types of mimesis exist in Plato,
it is unarguable
that Plato does use mimesis as a principle
2
of
exclusion.

As Socrates argues, the leaders of the
just polity must
only behave in ways that reflect the goodness,
courage,
honesty, and so on. appropriate to their position
in
society, making it unacceptable for them to represent

themselves otherwise, whether in daily life or even

dramatically on stage, in comedy or tragedy.
Plato prohibits,

in the ideal republic,

the role of inferior sorts,

childbirth. (395e)

the taking on of

such as women,

appearance, whether young or old,

Therefore

in love,

in whatever

sickness or

The man of good character will

impersonate only others of good character, even if these
others have temporarily succumbed to the misfortunes of
illness,

love or drink,

irrational. (396d)
one role,

thereby appearing,

for the moment,

The good man basically will play only

that of he who is of good character, and will

not play a "multiplicity of roles."
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Story-tellers and

poets who promote development of
the good character will
be allowed to stay while the
others, especially the

tragedians— those who represent the
less than most noble
and rational of characters-must
leave.
Mimesis, or what
is usually translated as
"representation," appears then at

the heart of the education of the
guardian class, and only
a

proper mimesis will be allowed.

Representations of

inferior characters, such as women, slaves
and beasts,
will be excluded. 3
In Book 10 of the Republic,

Plato explains why

mimesis by painters and poets must be rejected, why
the
painting of a bed is misleading and a distraction

from the

desired focus on the true form of the bed.
and poet,

The painter

the artist generally, makes only the appearance

of the thing,

not the true,

real object.

So the art of

mimesis or representation is far distant from truth, and
deals with mere appearance. (598b)

The poets and similar

artists must be excluded from the just state because their

representations excite the emotions and encourage
irrationality, thus undermining the basis of the just
state: Reason.

The poet, painter,

emotional response set

a

and others who evoke an

bad example for the lover's of

truth who must rely solely on reason to gain access to the
true knowledge necessary for the properly run polis.

The

poet also frequently encourages the memories of suffering,
which,

says Socrates,

leads to a kind of embracing of

victimization, the wallowing in irrationality, laziness
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)

and cowardice. (604d)

So the poets must be banned,

not for

mimesis itself, but for specifically
what is represented:
suffering, irrationality and the
instinctual desires which
lead those of good character away
from knowledge and
truth.
Plato and Socrates leave open
the possibility of
the return of the poets, but their
return may only occur
if it is adequately justified,
in prose form,
and these

purveyors of mimesis will find themselves
confined to
restricted style .( 606-608 4

a

Critical theory and feminist attempts to
resurrect
the idea of mimesis from its political
banishment

can be

seen as challenging the exclusionary moves
made repeatedly

since the earliest of political philosophy.

Although

similar in their concerns, the attempts to redeem the
idea
of mimesis by critical theory and feminism are different

both in their analysis and in their specific applications.
It will be helpful to look at these treatments of mimesis

by different writers, since the idea of mimesis and the

alternative notions of subjectivity which flow from them
speak to new and different political possibilities.

The

influence of Walter Benjamin on early critical theory

provides an initial basis for examining this constellation
of mimesis,

subjectivity and alternative politics.

Additionally,

feminist understandings of the concept will

more fully round out the concept's potential. Finally, and
still further developed in the next chapter, Adorno's

Aesthetic Theory and its central category of mimesis may
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.

—

provide some leads for

a

future radical ecological
or

ecofeminist politics.

Benjamin and Mimesis
Adorno appropriated Walter
Benjamin's understanding
of mimesis and transformed
it from a largely mystical
or
theological notion into one of the
central elements of
negative dialectics. As has been
noted by
several

commentators and critics of critical theory,
even though
the concept of mimesis has been most
closely
linked to

aesthetic philosophy, beginning with Plato
and Aristotle,
the critical theorists used the concept
to travel a much
more anthropological and socio-historical
path.^ As

discussed earlier, Horkheimer and Adorno used the
idea of
mimesis as a route into understanding the "dialectic
of

enlightenment

with its beginnings in the magic of the

shaman's imitation of nature.

The discussion of mimesis

Dialectic—o_f Enlighten m ent was prefigured in Benjamin's
work but developed much further,

first by the two critical

theorists and then by Adorno alone.

However, Benjamin's

early presentation of the idea helps illuminate its later

manifestations
In his short essay "On the Mimetic Faculty" Benjamin

begins not with an appeal to Greek discussions of

literature but to Nature: nature itself produces
similarities.

For Benjamin the mimetic faculty is a

subterranean force within even the most developed forms of
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human activity, including
language.

The very ability to

perceive similarities or
resemblances is
of "the powerful compulsion
in former

a

manifestation

times to become and

behave like something else. "6
to be like the other,

This compulsion to imitate,

is exhibited in the earliest
of

human behavior, including child’s
play, where the child
not only imitates adults, in
language

and in social roles

such as doctor or teacher, but even
as objects like a
train or windmill.
The mimetic faculty is one of the
most
basic of human activities, and is present
generally in
nature.

According to Benjamin, this "gift" of
recognizing
and producing similarities has changed
historically,
from

early forms of dance and magic to modern forms
of language
and technological reproduction. After this brief

examination of the history of mimesis, Benjamin asks what
has become of the mimetic faculty and what remains
of its

potentials.

Has it increasingly decayed from its

ubiquitous place in the magic and enchantment of ancient
peoples, or has the mimetic faculty merely been

transformed?

Benjamin addresses the question by discussing the
historical transformation of the mimetic faculty, and its

ability to recognize and produce "nonsensuous similarity."
For ancient peoples even the sky provided opportunities to

exercise this ability, as is seen in the various forms of

astrology and in magico-religious ritual which was
supposed to influence the powers of the heavens.
517

Language, both spoken and written,
says Benjamin, is
connected to the mimetic faculty.
From the recognition of
the onomatopoeic character of
some spoken words, to the

representational quality of hieroglyphs,
ideographs, and
ultimately poetry, "nonsensuous
similarities" are in
evidence

7
.

In summary,

Benjamin argues that this

faculty" leads from mimetic magic to
the flash of
recognition of our similarity to the "other"
which
manifests itself through language.
It seems fair to suppose that these
were the stages
by which the mimetic gift, which was once the
foundation of occult practices, gained admittance
to
writing and language.
In this way language may be
seen as the highest level of mimetic behavior and
the
most complete archive of nonsensuous similarity: a
medium into which the earlier powers of mimetic
production and comprehension have passed without
residue, to the point where they have liquidated
those of magic.

The question for critical theory and radical ecology is

whether mimesis has indeed passed into language without
residue,

and,

if not,

whether the mimetic faculty can be

resurrected and be put to use in

a

manner which overturns

the culture of domination.

Michael Taussig has attempted to use Benjamin's and
the early critical theorists'

ideas about "the mimetic

faculty" to explore the relationship between colonizer and
colonized, of Western/European "civilization" and the

others it has attempted to dominate.

Taussig

characterizes the mimetic faculty as "the nature that
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culture uses to create second
nature, the faculty to copy,
imitate, make models, explore
difference, yield into and
become Other." This capacity should
be understood
as a

form of "sympathetic magic" when
speaking of practices
where "the wonder of mimesis lies in
the copy drawing on
the character and power of the
original to the point

whereby the representation may even assume
that character
9
and that power ."
One of the central questions for
Taussig originates in the discourse of
postmodernism's
concerns with the issues of "essentialism and

constructionism."

in his "anthropological" investigations

Taussig primarily concerns himself with the "social

constructions

of sex,

race,

nationality, and identity.

He probes the history of mimesis and the "mimesis of

history," the telling of the story of history as it is

reflected back by those who have become its "objects."
For Taussig then the investigation of mimesis is an

investigation into the possibility of social
transformation,
If I am correct in invoking a certain magic of the
signifier and what Walter Benjamin took the mimetic
faculty to be--namely, the compulsion to become the
Other--and if, thanks to new social conditions and
new techniques of reproduction (such as cinema and
mass production of imagery)
modernity has ushered in
a veritable rebirth, a recharging and retooling (of)
the mimetic faculty, then it seems to me that we are
forthwith invited if not forced into the inner
sanctum of mimetic mysteries where, in imitating, we
will find distance from the imitated and hence gain
some release from the suffocating hold of
,
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S

U

v?ew of nature

S

^

upholds.

^

the dreadfully passive

This is an invitation to
get past the dualism of
essentialism and constructionism,
and much of the empty
debate of contemporary social
and political theory.
(This

invitation to release through
imitative distance is also a
theme of Irigaray's work, as will
become clear later.)
Taussig borrows from both Adorno and
Benjamin in this
attempt at theoretical transformations.
Taussig examines
modern technological reproduction as
well as the magic of
contemporary shamen to understand the mimetic
faculty,

"My

concern is to reinstate in and against the
myth of
Enlightenment, with its universal, context-free

reason,

not merely the resistance of the concrete
particular to

abstraction, but what

I

and moves us--namely,

its sensuousness,

deem crucial to thought that moves
its mimeticity

.

"H

Taussig quotes Adorno on Benjamin's writing style, the

question of style existing at the heart of Adorno's own
concerns with the form of presentation of philosophy,
(Benjamin's) thoughts press close to its object, seek
to touch it, smell it, taste it and so thereby
transform itself.
Through this secondary
sensuousness, they hope to penetrate down to the
veins of gold which no classif icatory procedure can
reach, and at the same time avoid succumbing to the
contingency of blind intuition. The radical
reduction of the distance of the object also
establishes the relation to potential praxis which
later guided Benjamin's thinking.
In addition to addressing the potential to transform

thought through mimetic representation, Adorno also, in
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the quoted essay,

is critiquing the classificatory
thought

that is positivist science
just as he would do

persistently throughout his life.

Here is where the idea

of the mimetic provides both
a critique of the positivist

understanding of knowledge and the
potential for
philosophic writing that will have
implications for
political practice.
Again,

Taussig's concerns were also the concerns
of

the critical theorists as is evident in
his attempts to

draw out the theoretical underpinnings which
motivate his
work.
Indicating the close relation of Adorno
to Hegel,

Taussig emphasizes Adorno's reversals of the relationship
of universal and particular,

and how mimesis becomes a key

element in Adorno's critique,
Hegel

"For Adorno and,

(with different consequences),

I

think

the sensuous moment

of knowing includes a yielding and mirroring of the knower
in the unknown,

of thought in its object.

This is clearly

what Adorno often has in mind with his many references to
mimesis,

the obscure operator,

entire system ." 13
involves

a

so it seems to me,

of his

This "dialectical" way of knowing

"yielding" to the other, the immersion of the

self in the other,

a

As Taussig indicates,

loosening of boundaries of identity.
"This strange mixture of activity

and passivity involved in yielding-knowing, this bodily

mirroring of otherness and even ideas, is in the center of
much of Horkheimer and Adorno's elusive discussion of
mimesis,

and precisely in the activist possibilities
521

within such yielding lie serious
issues of mimesis and
science, mimesis as an alternative
science ." 14
But

mimesis is no simple path to correcting
domination, rather
it has also been used to
install and intensify
domination.

The most often cited demonstration
of the repressive power
of mimesis is that of anti-Semitism
as Horkheimer and

Adorno repeatedly emphasized in the early
work of critical
theory.
Racism is also infused with the mimetic,
where
stereotypic imitation becomes a means of domination
and

repression,

an indispensable element in the formation
of

the racist consciousness.

Anti-Semitism and racism share

with fascism the use of mimesis to direct the mimetic
faculty,

as the critical theorists analyzed it under the

idea of the "organized control of mimesis."

As nature

rebels against its repression it is channeled in ever new,
ever old directions useful for domination.

Taussig

identifies the uniqueness in the early critical theorists'
analysis.

What makes Horkheimer and Adorno's thesis distinctive
is that far from being side effectual, racism is seen
as a manifestation of what is essential to modern
civilization's cultural apparatus, namely continuous
mimetic repression--understanding mimesis as both the
faculty of imitation and the deployment of that
faculty in sensuous knowing, sensuous Othering. A
question then arises in this version of the history
of the senses--from mimesis to the organized control
of mimesis--as to whether the mimetic faculty can
escape this fate of being used against itself,
whether it could be used against being used against
itself? 15
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Can mimesis escape its fate
in the "administered
society of late capitalism
where commodity fetishism
takes on ever greater dimension,
becoming truly global,
threatening the existence of complex
life on the planet,
as the heat of exchange "warms"
the earth?
is it possible
to develop a new science, an
alternative symbolic order,
an other subjectivity which does
not succumb to the

alienation" and "objectification" Marx
spoke of? Does a
new or old mimesis offer access to an
alternative to the
various forms of identity thinking,
manifested as racism,
sexism,

class conflict,

and ecological destruction?

Mimesis and Psychology
Before going on to some feminist encounters with
the
idea of mimesis in addressing the problem of domination

and patriarchy,

it is important to note a problem in

recent attempts to develop

a

"post-Freudian" and "post-

Lacanian" theory of psychoanalysis, and therefore

a

problem in developing alternative theories and practices
of women's subjectivity or consciousness.

An important

reason for the turn to Lacanian psychoanalysis by many
feminists and deconstructionists has been Lacan's

development of an understanding of subjectivity that
addresses problems he saw with Freud's notion of the
Ego 10
.

Lacan develops the idea of the "mirror stage"

(or

mirror phase) of development to help explain/understand
the formation of the Ego or the "I".
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One important

interpreter of Lacan has even
concluded, "Some critics
have called the concept of
the mirror stage Lacan's
myth
(just as the instinct was
Freud's, or the collective
unconscious was Carl Jung’s),
other commentators
have

described the mirror stage as
Lacan's only piece of
'empirical' data. " 17

it is in the relation between

empirical" data and the idea of
mimesis that a
fundamental problem may exist. As
Elizabeth Grosz has
demonstrated, Lacan’s understanding of
the mirror

stage is

indebted to an article on mimicry and
psychology written
by Roger Caillois.
In Lacan’s "Mirror Stage" article
he
develops his idea of the organization of an
I by the
infant,

an organization which occurs even before
it has

the ability to use language.
the

I

is based on the image

itself,

This "primordial form" of
(or i mago

)

the infant forms of

an image that is "fictional" but which will have

enduring effects on the subsequent "social determination"
of the agency of the ego.

Lacan's claim that this pre-

linguistic self-image has determinate effects on the human

organism is supported by reference to effects of visual
identification in other species, specifically female
pigeons and migratory locusts.

This observation about the

effects of psychic organization reverses the usual

understanding which asserts that organismic development
precedes psychological.

Lacan mentions that the female

pigeon must see another member of its species at the
appropriate time as "a necessary condition for the
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maturation of the gonad of the
female pigeon
The
same effect may be induced,
he notes, by simply
placing
the pigeon before a mirror.
Lacan generalizes
from this

empirical observation to make larger
claims for the
phenomenon, "Such facts are inscribed
in an order of
homeomorphic identification that would
itself fall within
the larger question of the meaning
of beauty as both
formative and erogenic." 19 When this
observation
is

broadened furthered to include identifications
in a larger
field it raises other issues and questions
circulating
around the ideas of self and other, "But the
facts of

mimicry are no less instructive when conceived
as cases of
heteromorphic identification, in as much as they

raise the

problem of the signification of space for the living
organism--psychological concepts hardly seem less
appropriate for shedding light on these matters than
ridiculous attempts to reduce them to the supposedly
supreme law of adaptation."^ 0

Lacan seems to be saying

that the whole representation of the not-I, of all of

space and its occupants,

process.

is bound up in this mimetic

This may have important implications for the

radical ecological understanding of "self-identification"

especially as it has been articulated by deep ecologists.
(See above Chapters 3-5 on deep ecology.)

Grosz'

further observations seem to uncritically

follow Lacan's subsequent citation of Caillois on mimicry
and psychology.

The statements by all three analysts
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which follow from the observations
of Caillois on mimesis
then become, at least, unsettled
if Caillois's claims are
taken at face value. As Grosz
interprets it, Caillois's

exploration of the relationship of
mimicry and spatiality
was a "powerful influence on Lacan's
notions of the mirror
stage, the order of the imaginary,
and psychosis ." 21
i

n

the original essay, Caillois examined
the behavior of
insects, specifically the way they
"mimic" other insects
and their natural environment.
This exploration of

mimesis then provided

a

model or "analogue" for the

understanding of forms of psychosis.

The analysis results

from what he claims mimesis reveals about the
relationship
of an organism to the space it occupies,

"Mimesis is

particularly significant in outlining the ways in which
the relations between an organism and its environment are

blurred and confused

the way in which its environment is

not distinct from the organism but is an active internal

component of its identity ." 22

This seems like a very

promising observation, especially with respect to the deep
ecology concerns with identification, and in fact is at
the basis of insightful observations by Caillois,

and Grosz 23
.

However,

Lacan

it is the additional claims by

Caillois which are problematic and which Grosz does not
challenge.

As Grosz explains,

Caillois claims that mimicry does not serve any
adaptive function.
Its purpose is not to ensure the
survival of the species through disguising the
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)

insect, hiding it from its
predators. Mimicry does
not have survival value, for
most predators rely on
the sense of smell rather
than of vision. Mimicry
the dark
Calllois insiders mimicry
a "luKurv^o/e
excess over natural survival,
3 ° f self -P r °tection or
species
survival.
survival
He abandons naturalistic
explanations to
P^ology! The miLsL
characteristic °°ff certain species of
insects has to
h! 1
istinctions it establishes between itself
and its
environment, including other species.
lmicry is a consequence not of space
but of the
represent at. on of and captivation by space.
'

.

h/VT

^

^

“T? ^

i

(Here we have the beginnings of a
"constructionist"

argument about the relationships between
identity and
difference
.

Grosz cites in a footnote the basis for Caillois's

determination that mimesis has no adaptive value, that
the
to camouflage itself does not further the survival

of the individual and the species.

The passage from the

article on mimicry and psychosis provides empirical

observations as evidence for its conclusions.

Caillois is

quoted directly,

Generally speaking, one finds many remains of mimetic
insects in the stomachs of predators.
So it should
come as no surprise that such insects sometimes have
other and more effective ways to protect themselves.
And conversely, some species that are inedible and
would thus have nothing to fear, are also mimetic.
It therefore seems that one ought to conclude with
Cunot that this is an "epiphenomenon" whose
"defensive utility appears to be nul ." 25
However,

the conclusions derived from these empirical

observations are illogical and are better explained by

modern ecological understandings of mimesis and its
relation to evolution.
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There are

variety of ways to understand
mimesis and
its role in adaptation
for both individual and
species
survival.
One form of mimesis is
Batesian
a

mimicry,

involving false warning coloration
of species which works
to its advantage against
predators. A distasteful or
poisonous model is mimicked by a
species that a predator
would otherwise find edible and
therefore seek
out.

Examples include viceroy butterflies
which mimic
distasteful monarch butterflies; clearwing
moth mimics of
bees and wasps, and so on.
The mimic gains advantage as
the predator learns to avoid the
distasteful or poisonous
model, however, the model is disadvantaged
because the
predators’ encounters with the edible and
harmless mimics
increases the time required for the predator
to learn of

the model's potential harmfulness,

thus resulting in the

consumption of the less than desirable model.

The

learning time for predators depends largely on the ratio
of mimics to models,
a

indeed if mimics outnumber models at

specific time predators may not learn to avoid the

models.

This explains why the mimics are usually less

numerous than the inedible model.

It also helps explain

why mimics frequently mimic several model species.

Another type of adaptive mimicry, called "Mullerian
mimicry,

"

occurs when two species which are both

distasteful or dangerous mimic one another, such as bees
and wasps, which both have characteristic black and yellow

banding.

Predators will encounter both species more
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frequently than they would one
species alone, therefore
reducing the learning time
necessary for the predator to
avoid harm.

A third type of mimesis,
"molecular mimicry," occurs
with some parasites which disguise
themselves as part of
their hosts, "In this phenomenon,
antigenic determinants
of parasitic origin (known as
eclipsed antigens) resemble
host antigens to such an extent that
they do not elicit
the formation of host antibodies.
This, of course, allows
the parasite to dwell safely inside
the host’s
tissues in

more or less uncontested fashion, protected
from the
host's immune response ." 26
a

The presence of mimetic insects in the
stomachs of

predators is not scientific proof or even

a

reasonable

argument against the adaptive function of mimesis.

Contrary to viewing it as an epiphenomenon with
defensive utility," mimesis has
power in species evolution.

a

a

"nul

very broad explanatory

The question for Lacanian

psychoanalysts and those who develop

a

metapsychology from

his observations then is, how does this change the status
of mimesis and "identification" in "the mirror stage,

order of the imaginary and in psychosis?"

the

How does an

alternative understanding of mimesis, one which recognizes
its "natural" adaptive function,

affect the possibilities

of new subjectivities and a new relationship to nature?

Additionally, it should be noted, the focus by

Caillois on the visual as the site of mimesis fails to
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adequately account for other mimetic
adaptations such as
the calls of birds and other
auditory imitative behavior
such as bullsnakes mimicry of the
rattler.
Vision and
image are only one, although important,
aspect of mimesis
in evolutionary adaptation 27
'

.

Feminist Mimesis
The use of the idea or category of mimesis
by women
in the development of feminist theory has
varied greatly,

but it may be helpful to examine two basic ways
it has

been of use.

The first consists of those who retain the

largely aesthetic understanding of mimesis, the second
goes beyond this to link the body or materiality to

mimetic behavior and so comes closer to the strategy of

Adorno who tends to combine the aesthetic with the
material," natural, or "anthropological" understandings
of the term.

Even when the category remains largely

aesthetic it still has considerable critical power to
reveal the usually hidden or unconscious processes of
exclusion, marginalizing, or "othering" characteristic of

patriarchal and dominating society.

For example,

Julia

Kristeva achieves significant insights into the workings
of language and the possibility of the "speaking subject"

by examining "mimesis and the poetic language inseparable
from it

.

28

Other women have also focused on the traditional

notions of mimesis to provide critical analyses of
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literary works and their relationship
to politics and
gender.
Marjorie Graber has produced an
excellent study
on the idea of the hero, where
she claims that "greatness"
is an effect of mimesis.
She combines analyses
of the

Wizard Qf Qz
.

examples

,

baseball, Charlot te's Web

,

and other

(including references to the Qdvsspy

^

.

to show

how the idea of the hero is related to the
attempt to "go
home again, " with the resulting play of
phallic
and

maternal figures.
there is

a

As the hero attempts to return home,

deep ambiguity which arises in relation to the

longing for origins.
a

This is exemplified in the story of

certain hero and his relationship to the female spider's

web (the web eventually raising "Wilbur the pig" to the
status of cultural icon),

"It is clear that the spider's

transgressive and sexualized power, and, indeed, her
relationship to the psychoanalytic figure of the phallic
woman,

renders her potentially threatening, as well as

nurturant

.

29

Graber concludes that imitation of

greatness has become

a

staple of politics, whereby

greatness is now "manufactured" by "spin-doctors," the
politicians'

image consultants.

Greatness and the

manufactured hero of politics are about the "fantasy of
wholeness" which is also

a

"fantasy of control" through

a

powerful all-knowing agency or subject, divine or
otherwise.
political,

Graber links the literary fantasies to the
"It seems clear that anxieties about greatness

in literature are closely tied to anxieties about
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national, political, and
cultural greatness, and that
the
more anxious the government,
the more pressure is placed
upon the humanities to textualize
and naturalize the
category of the 'great .'" 30

An even more radical challenge
to existing political
arrangements, beyond deconstruction of
the images and

texts of the phal logocentric order,

come from analyses

which use the category of mimesis to
examine the idea of
subjectivity how it is constituted, possible
alternatives, and how they might be brought
into being.
This can be seen in the work of those who
challenge the
idea of mimesis as imitation,

that is, of mimesis as a

problem of representation of the truth.

Plato's concerns

were those surrounding the deceptive quality of mimesis,

mimesis as imitative representation.

Those who assumed

the position of others risked losing their true selves
to
the irrationality which essentially marked those in

inferior social roles, such as women.

Beyond the danger

of becoming too much like inferior beings,

there was also

the danger of accepting the poet's or artist's version of

the truth. Poetic truth did not come through knowledge but

was merely a belief which happened to be true.

This

presented the danger that those educated for political
power might come to believe truth can be arrived at

through deceptive means as well as through the light which
reason sheds
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The relationship of truth
to representation goes
to
the heart of the so-called
"postmodern" concerns of recent
social and political theory,
especially as they have

appeared within feminism.

One version of the challenge
to

received understandings of subjectivity,
and to
subjectivity's relationship to mimesis,

can be found in

Ruth Leys'

s

essay on gender and the "subject of

imitation ." 31

Leys draws on psychoanalysis to
achieve

insights she believes are not available
to those who rely
on 'object relations theory," or those
who simply reject
the work of Freud,

Lacan and others 32

Leys claims an

.

adequate psychoanalysis takes seriously the idea
of the
unconscious.
She believes that without a strong

understanding of the unconscious, feminist theories tend
to relapse into dichotomous structures of analysis,

such

as those of Catherine MacKinnon and others who

fundamentally see violence as

a

the internal and the external,

simple relation between
of victim and victimizer,

"a point of view that inevitably reinforces a politically

retrograde stereotype of the female as

victim ." 33

Leys

'

s

a

purely passive

own analysis focuses on the problem of

dissociation or multiple personality disorder, and
specifically on the role of hypnosis or "suggestion" in
the history of identification of the "disorder" and in its

place in the history of psychoanalysis.

Her analysis

relies on the work of psychoanalytic philosopher Mikkel

Borch- Jacobsen and the central role he attributes to the
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process of mimesis in the coming
into being of the
"sub j ect "34
.

As Leys presents her study of
the role of hypnosis in
the treatment of dissociation,
she aims at uncovering an
alternative understanding of the concept
of

identification.

She believes the question of how
the

process of identification takes place runs
through recent
feminist discussions of sexual identity
and difference.
What she attempts to do is bring the
categories of

psychoanalysis into that discussion, but this is
not the
same analysis as that of either Freud or Lacan.
She

borrows from Borch- Jacobsen

'

asserts that before there is
some object there is

a

critique of Freud where he

s

a

subject who has desire for

process of mimetic identification.

He claims it is not the "primordial" process of desire

which is at work in creating the desiring subject,
What comes first is a tendency toward identification,
a primordial tendency which then gives rise to a
desire; and this desire is, from the outset, a
(mimetic, rivalrous) desire to oust the incommodious
other from the place the pseudo-subject already
occupies in fantasy .... If desire is satisfied in and
through identification, it is not in the sense in
which a desire somehow precedes its "gratification, "
since no desiring subject (no "I," no ego) precedes
the mimetic identification: identification brings the
desiring subject into being, and not the other way
around 33
.

A compelling reanalysis of

a

central scene of Freud's

development of psychoanalysis best demonstrates what
Borch- Jacobsen means.

The example is Freud's observations
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on his grandson's game of
"fort-da" played with a wooden
spool tied to a string.
The child throws the spool
out of
sight ("Fort") and then expresses
pleasure when the spool
is retrieved and is once again
present before him (da)
The child repeats the action over
and over, delighting
each time in the reappearance of the
toy.
Freud is
.

perplexed that the child would cause his
own discomfort
only to be able to then achieve pleasure.
Freud

interprets the spool as

a

desired object,

the primary desired object of the mother.

a

substitute for
Freud accepts

as explanation that the child is achieving
mastery or

control over the pain it experiences when its desires
are
unmet.

The child masters the object rather than be forced

to passively submit to it.

As Borch- Jacobsen

parenthetically summarizes Freud's position, "By
sacrificing myself freely to the law or the destiny that
determines me from the outside,

I

make it mine and thus

I

determine myself: this well-known schema of speculative

dialectics no doubt counts for something in the
fascination that this text has held for certain French

psychoanalysts
Borch- Jacobsen has an alternative, at least as
plausible,

interpretation of the scene.

Rather than see

the act as that of moving within a paradigm of domination,

from the passive to the active pole, does it not make more
sense to see the game as a process of identification?

child identifies with the position of the mother,
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"It

The

t0 bS obvious

9

his toys

mdeed, that when the child
abandons

'

(what he 'has'),

mother treats him.

m

he is treating them the
way his
this sense, by throwing
his toys

away he is not so much
sacrrficing the mother as
hrmself:
he himself is drawing away
from himself by playing
the
mother's role (the 'active
role'). "37 This understanding
of identification and the
place of the subject disrupts
accounts of desire in psychoanalysis
in both its Freudian
and Lacanian forms.
This is an alternative
understanding
of subject formation beyond
an economy of pleasure, "There
is no goal orientation here,
no calculation,
no economy,

at least not at first:
it is

desire is not oriented by pleasure,

(dis) oriented by mimesis--and
thus it lies beyond

the pleasure principle ." 38

Qr i ent s desire
'

.

Mimetic identification is what

This also means that the subject is an

effect of the process of mimetic identification.

Preceding all phases of development as theorized
by Freud
is a period of "transitivist indistinction
of self and

other,

"

the period of mimetic identification before

a

subject, before the distinction between self and other,

mimic and model.

This mimetic identification cannot be

remembered because there was no "specular distance" from
which the subject might observe the action which could
later be represented,

"The representation involved (or

that does that involving)
the specular,

the visible,

does not belong to the order of
the theoretico-theatrical
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(it

s

"

IS not mimesis as mimesis
has been understood since
Plato
39
and Aristotle
.

)

The point of Leys

'

s

examination of multiple

personality disorder in the context of
Borch- Jacobsen
critique of traditional psychoanalysis

'

is to illuminate

the relationship of "violence and
female subjectivity ." 40
Leys makes several summary observations.
First, she

believes too much reliance is placed on

a

notion "of the

already-constituted female subject" in which
violence
comes in from the outside to split apart
what
was a

"functional plurality of component parts."
a

sexual coding" of gender,

in her opinion,

female subject is represented as
victim.

a

This involves
in which the

passive or innocent

Alternatively understood, the effect of mimetic

identification for victims of violence is seen in an
inability to represent the violent act because there may
be no "subject" who was standing outside the act, no

spectator who could represent it like an unfolding drama.
Like Freud’s patients who come to the deepest point in

analysis where they cannot represent the critical scene of
trauma, but can only repeat the experience,

the victim

"experiences the suffering again ." 41
Additionally, and more generally, Leys is arguing for

recognition of
subjectivity,

a

deep ambiguity at the beginnings of

"Thus one major implication of my argument

is that identification,

including identification with the
537

mother,

IS never a matter of pure
pleasure: negativity and

ambivalence are constitutive of
subjectivity or
This means for Leys that she cannot
accept

Julia Kristeva

'

s

analysis of the pre-Oedipal, mother-child

relationship as governed, in

heavily Lacanian influenced

a

fashion, by the "Imaginary Father."

Leys explains her

reservations which result from the alternative
theory of
mimetic identification, "another way of expressing
my

distance from Kristeva is to say that on the
mimetic

paradigm love and hate

conflict

— emerge

prior to the

point where we are used to locating them, not between
subject and subject, or subject and object,

..

.but at the

very moment of the mimetic installation of the subject on
a

constituitively abyssal ground ." 43

Leys further

believes that the theory of mimetic identification leads
to a "Foucauldian" understanding of power relations and of

potentials for production of female subjectivity.
is,

That

the "gendered subject" can best be viewed as the

effect of "paranoid identifications with mimetic rivals"

whose status itself is determined by "a ’subjugating' law
in the Foucauldian sense

." 44

This implies for Leys that

there is no possibility of any naive return to

a

utopian

politics that existed before the "Law" or any which would

immediately emerge with "revolutionary overthrow."

How

exactly this psychoanalytic interpretation of mimetic

identification jibes with Foucault's social theory is not
explained,

as it must be if it is to retain coherence.
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This may be difficult
considering Foucault's antagonism
to
the psychoanalytic project. 4 ^

Irigaray and Mimesis
Finally,

mimesis"

m

Luce Irigaray has followed

"strategy of

a

the attempt to begin a challenge
to the

current order,

challenge which might make possible
"her
aim to effect a shift in the position
of the subject
a

of

enunciation ." 46

in other words,

Irigaray'

s

project is to

help make it possible for women to speak
for themselves as
themselves, when throughout social, political
and

philosophical history they have been silenced,
spoken for
and spoken about.
Central to the conceptual apparatus
Irigaray uses and opposes is Lacanian psychoanalytics.

Irigaray is notorious for the difficulty involved in

unpacking her language and style.
a too

Instead of making this

simple suimnary of her concerns,

for our present

needs we can focus on her understanding of mimesis in

relationship to the possibility of female subjectivity and
do this through the elaborations of her writings by both

sympathetic and critical commentators.

Without going into an endless analysis of Irigaray'

relationship to Lacanian psychoanalytics and Derridean
deconstruction, the place of mimesis can be

unsystematically viewed for resemblances to the other
perspectives of mimesis already examined and yet to be

developed 47
.

Without explicating the debate within
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feminism over psychoanalytics
generally and the
reappropriation of Lacanian psychoanalytics
specifically
it is still helpful to establish
some basic understandings
of the categories and contexts
which lead to the adoption
of a strategy of mimesis.
Rosi Braidotti has provided

many helpful insights in her interpretations
of Irigaray
and helps to establish some basic
outlines
of the

discussion,

"For Irigaray,

as for most poststructuralists,

the subject is not a substance but rather
a process of

negotiation between material and semiotic conditions
that
affect one’s embodied, situated self.
In this perspective
'subjectivity' names the process that consists in

stringing together--under the fictional unity of
grammatical

I

a

different forms of active and reactive

interaction with and resistance to these conditions

." 48

Several points should probably be made about this

observation.

The subject is a process,

or better yet,

this understanding of subjectivity is concerned with the

"process of becoming-subject."

The subject mediates

between the "materiality" of the embodied being and the
structures of language, and it does this in time, that

is,

the subject is fundamentally historical and material.

The

representation of the subject in language is through
reference to an "I" which is fictional, that

is,

established through the fantasies produced by desire.
Braidotti interprets this, the process involves

a

As

constant

shifting and negotiating of willful choice and unconscious
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drives,

"It implies that what
sustains the enti
entire process

of becoming-subject is
the will to know,
say, the desire to speak,
as a founding,

the desire to

primary, vital,

necessary, and therefore original
desire to become ." 49
Leaving aside for the moment the
possible conflict or

compatibilities between this understanding
of the founding
moments of subjectivity and those
implied or expressed by
Borch- Jacobsen, the strategy of
mimesis still does not

self-evidently follow from Braidotti's
observations.
However,

the necessity for the mimetic strategy
can be

seen as the consequence of the Lacanian
understanding of
the place of the subject in language and
the resulting

impossibility for "woman" to speak at all.
Derrida)

Irigaray (like

interrogates the history of philosophy and the

philosophy of history to show what has been excluded or
marginalized.

The excluded other is found to have the

uncanny function of serving as the pivot or hinge of the
philosophies, that is, the philosophy's "coherence"

depends on that which it excludes.

Irigaray seems to take

this practice of following the trail of the marginalized

and excluded further than Derrida by refusing to stop at
the recognition of the aporetic gaps in philosophical and

literary texts, refusing to accept the silences and
exclusions as

a

functioning of the "feminine," as the mark

of the possibility of masculine or phallic philosophy.

Irigaray attempts to further interrogate this abyssal
center of philosophy seeking to liberate the excluded
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other from its servitude.

Irigaray's project does not

stop with the recognition of
the functioning of the
feminine, of "woman" and women
in philosophy, literature,
and politics, but attempts to
establish the possibilities
for a truly female subject who
can speak for herself.
she
recognizes that subjects are formed in
a complex system of
"structuring effects" through "variables"
such as, "sexual
morphology," cultural identity, age,
religion, and so on.
However, for Irigaray as for most feminists,
sexuality has

privileged place in the history of these structuring
effects. As Braidotti indicates,
a

Irigaray also acknowledges the privileged position
granted to sexuality in Western practices of
subjectivity.
Sexuality is site of resistance and
contradiction, and because the implications of the
phal logocentric institutionalization of sexuality are
so much more negative for women, feminists cannot
afford to merely cast off their sexed identity: they
to critically and thoroughly repossess
DU
it

.

Feminist analyses of western civilization, and

especially society under capitalism and continuing
Patriarchy, have shown how women have been systematically

denied

a

voice in their own self-becoming.

In the

analyses which rely on the structural linguistics

influenced understanding of Lacanian psychoanalytics,
"woman" has been found to serve as the condition of

possibility of language itself, and cannot itself be truly
represented.

For Irigaray then the mimetic strategy

involves occupying the masculine position in order to
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disrupt its claims and open
unrepresentable,

a

space for what is supposedly

the female subject.

It is an attempt to

raise a voice for those who cannot
speak for themselves—
not yet.
This is a strategy of an alternative
structure
of representation,

as Braidotti has explained,

In my reading of Irigaray's strategy
I have argued
at her
notion of "mimesis" amounts to a collective
repossession by women of the images and
representations of "Woman" as they have been
coded in

language, culture, science, knowledge, and
discourse
and consequently internalized in the heart,
mind,
body, and lived experience of women. Mimetic
repetition as a textual and political strategy
is the
active subversion of established modes of the
representation and expression of women's experience.
In this respect the redefinition of the
subject
Woman/women as both representation and experience
amounts to no less than a change of civilization, of
genealogy, of a sense of history. Feminist
countergenealogies are the inroads to a new symbolic
system by women. ^
The strategy of mimetic repetition is rooted in the

psychoanalytic understanding of how to treat

disturbance

a

of the patient or analysand which has resulted in the

inability of the individual to fully experience what life
has to offer.

Freud's "talking cure" is the attempt to

raise to consciousness what has been repressed into the

unconscious but which still manifests itself in

a

symptomology that makes it impossible for the patient to

adequately function.

^

For the analyst then the process

of relieving the patient from the burden expressed by

dysfunctional symptoms is centered around allowing the

repressed contents of the unconscious to resurface to the
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level of language.

Margaret Whitford has argued
that a
psychoanalytic interpretation
helps explain Irigaray’s
strategy of mimesis,
n the individual psyche,
unconscious phantasy is
determining to the extent that
it remains
unconscious. When in the
psychoanalytic process it
achieves an access to consciousness
via
w a
ngaray refers to as symbolizationlanguage'
or "the
l
S bll ati ° n "
beC ° meS P° ss ikle to
e?fect rLift
ft o
h
change
the phantasy which
ti
enabies
the analysand to change and
brings about real
transformations
the personality in the direction
fleXibilit
d creativity, and less
^ !§
rtallllT
j
rigidity
)

m

^

'

m

or repression.

The current symbolic order is based
on the male's

acquisition of language which occurs with
the development
of the individual male Ego.
This process is fundamentally
dependent on the child's relationship to its
parents.

Without going into the details of the psychoanalytic
account of the process, and without simultaneously
noting

additional or counter-tendencies resulting from Borch-

Jacobsen's account of this process, it can still be said
that under existing socio— historical conditions the

process of identity formation for the male child involves
the exclusion and separation of the mother from his

"imagined" or fantasized identity.

Whitford concludes

that this is at the root of current social and political

problems,

"The scission of epistemology from its sources

is linked to a model rationality

(symbolized as male)

in

which the symbolic female is dominated or repressed, and
'transcended'.

Irigaray suggests that this has led to the
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.

apotheosis of rationality-modern
technology-and to
apparently unstoppable
processes of destruction "54
.

rationality Whitford speaks
of is

a

The

specific model based

on the process of exclusion,

??

C US
S 9° verne d by the
male imaginary
e
identitv
r
not B), another way of
putting it is to sav thxt if

a

6 imaginary deals with
sexual
difference
rrerence.
What is important is thstY 13
categorized by Irigara/as male'
not in order to
oppose it, which would be
self-defeating, but in
S
m ° r adequate conceptualization,
9 St
in which,
which in n
h
?
psychoanalytic
terms, the male does not
repress or split off the
female/unconscious, but
acknowledges or integrates it.^

^WhT

+-

m

The strategy of mimesis then
involves occupying the

male position in order to disrupt it
thus making
for possible other,

female subjects.

is necessary in another sense,

a

space

This strategy also

implied in Whitford'

observation that simple opposition to the male
form of
rationality would be dangerous and ultimately
counterproductive.

Simple opposition would merely amount

to women returning to their place in the male
order of

exclusion.

To simply proclaim a female rationality

incommensurable to male rationality would be to reenact
the dominant symbolic order based on the process of

exclusion

As Whitford mentions, mimesis also serves an

"ecological" function,
We might note also that of the terms Irigaray uses:
mimesis, mimetisme, masque, etc., one of them,
mimetisme, usually translated mimeticism, comes from
the domain of animal ethology and means 'camouflage'
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or

protective colourina'
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y
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more clearly, Whitford
believes Irigaray understands
the feminine as receptacle
for the natural world,
the male
psyche's attempt to distance itself
from nature,
t is significant that
Irigaray stresses that nature
(the natural world) is not

respected.
This is not
y a VerS1 ° n ° f ecof eminism (though it
is that
h
too
but.
part Of her argument about the
symbolic
distribution, and the allocation of
the "lower
unctions" to women.
The symbolic distribution is
lerarchical
What is being disrespected is
those

fmf

t-

,

.

parts of himself that the male imaginary
has split
off and projected— into the world,
on to women 57
At the risk of repeating the same point
.

again,

another observer of Irigaray'

s

mimetic style, Judith

Butler, has clearly and concisely presented
the core of

Irigaray'

s

observations on the operations of Plato's

philosophy of exclusion.

Butler begins the exposition by

observing the similarities between Irigaray and Derrida
regarding the role of exclusion in philosophy and
language,

For both Derrida and Irigaray, it seems, what is
excluded from this binary is also produced by it in
the mode of exclusion and has no separable or fully
independent existence as an absolute outside. A
constitutive or relative outside is, of course,
composed of a set of exclusions that are nevertheless
internal to that system as its own nonthematizable
necessity.
It emerges within the system as
incoherence, disruption, a threat to its own

systematicity 58
.
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Butler's analysis concentrates
on Plato's Timaen, and
a passage, "which is about
the very problem of passage:
namely, that passage by which
a form can be said to
generate its own sensible representation." 59
As Butler
translates Plato’s passage, there are
three "nature's"
involved in the reproduction, or the
representation, of a
Form,

"The first, which is the process
of generation; the
second, that in which the generation
takes place; and the
third, that of which the thing
generated is a resemblance

naturally produced."

Plato then asserts as example that

we may "liken the receiving principle to
a mother,

source or spring to
to a child

.

"

(

u

50d)

a

father,

and the

and the intermediate nature

What becomes disruptive for Plato's

explanation of reproductive mimesis, what becomes
central
to Irigaray's mimetic strategy,

is the proclaimed

unrepresentability of the mother/receptacle

.

Butler

summarizes
In effect, the receiving principle potentially
includes all bodies, and so applies universally, but
its universal applicability must not resemble at all,
ever those eternal realities eidos that in the
Timaeus prefigure universal forms, and that pass into
the receptacle.
There is here a prohibition on
resemblance mimeta
which is to say that this
nature cannot be said to be like either the eternal
Forms or their material, sensible, or imaginary
copies
(

(

)

)

,

But this "unrepresentable" cannot be identified with the

mother,

the womb,

or any other "thing" which can be seen,

anything which is "specular."
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So the "feminine" is not

representable at all.

(Butler observes that
Kristeva does

in fact "conflate" the
unrepresentable or "unthematizable"
feminine or receptacle with
maternal/nurse figures .) 62
Butler then asks how language
attempts to capture that

unrepresentable feminine "outside"
of linguistic
representation, "Is it not the case

that there is within

any discourse, and thus within
Irigaray's as well, a set
of constitutive exclusions that
are inevitably produced by
the circumscription of the feminine
as that which
monopolizes the sphere of exclusion ?" 62
in Plato's
attempt to exclude the feminine/female
from the field of
representability he initiates a tradition
of western
philosophy where the male subject is viewed
as self

producing,

(Irigaray's) reading establishes the cosmogony
of the
Forms in the Timaeus as a phallic fantasy of
a fully
self-constituted patrilineality, and this fantasy of
auto genesis or self-constitution is effected
through
a denial and cooptation of the female
capacity for
reproduction.
Of course, the "she" who is the
"receptacle" is neither a universal nor a particular,
and because for Plato anything that can be named is
either a universal or a particular, the receptacle
cannot be named. 4

But this is the aim of Irigaray's strategy of mimesis, to

name the unnameable, or at least the unnameable within
this all pervasive "phallic" order.

As Butler indicates,

Plato is himself forced to name the unnameable under the

threat that

a

multiplicity of names may be assigned to it.

Just prior to Plato's exclusion of the receptacle of
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representation from the order
of the representable,
he
indicates that a man must
control his passions or
appetites.
If he is unable to
control this "evrdence
of
the soul's materiality"
he risks succumbing
to the

irrationality of the material,
and therefore he will
increasingly resemble women and
even "beasts." The male
serves as the model which is
only inferiority represented
in women and animals.
But an inferior copy still
has some
resemblance to the original and
so invites some naming.
The "feminine" invites
philosophical contradiction.
claims the nature which supports
the process of

Plato

representation has no form, no ontological
status, and so
cannot properly be represented in
language,
yet he names

this "receptacle" or space.

If no name were provided then

the system of representation would
be threatened.

Precisely because this receptacle can only
occasion a
radically improper speech, that is, a speech
in which
a -Ll ontological claims are suspended,
the terms by
which it is named must be consistently applied,
not
in order to make the name fit the thing
named but
precisely because that which is to be named can have
no proper name, bounds and threatens the sphere
of
linguistic propriety, and, therefore, must be
controlled by a forcibly imposed set of nominative
rules
.

Irigaray's strategy then is to inhabit the language
of the philosopher in order to reveal what remains as the

condition of its own possibility even as it is excluded
from representation.

The strategy is to mime the passages

which operate to exclude the feminine and present woman as
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an inferior copy.

The point is to show how
what is

excluded as unrepresentable is
already within the system
of representation.
Mimetic representation
will be

repeated,

reproduced, copied until "this
emergence of the
outside within the system calls
into question
its

systematic closure and its pretension
to be self"66
grounding.
In miming the philosophers
and

psychoanalysts Irigaray both violates the
"prohibition
against resemblance" and the "notion of
resemblance
as

copy.

The system of representation is
shown to be an

effect of power,

"Insofar as the Platonic account of the

origin is itself

a

displacement of

a

maternal origin,

Irigaray merely mimes that very act of displacement,

displacing the displacement, showing that origin
to be an
effect of a certain ruse of phallogocentric power. 66
Irigaray is playing with representation, using mimesis
to
disrupt the prevailing order and to make

a

space for an

alternative representation from which women are not
excluded,

To play with mimesis is thus,

for a woman,

to

try to recover the place of her exploitation by discourse,

without allowing herself to be simply reduced to it... so
as to make

’visible,

'

by an effect of playful repetition,

what was supposed to remain invisible: the cover up of

a

possible operation of the feminine in language." 69
However, Butler is not satisfied with the strategy,
for it seems in its miming to reenact the logic of

identity it seeks to challenge.
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Why should the "feminine"

be identified with the space
of unrepresentability?

Butler insistently recalls the
consequences of Plato's
exclusions which go beyond the feminine,
C
graPhY
intelli Si*ility depends on the
exc^usion
exclusion of
n?° women, slaves, children,
and animals,
where slaves are characterized as those
who do not
speak his language, and who, in not
speaking his
language, are considered diminished in
their capacity
or reason.
This xeno phobic exclusion operates
through the production of racialized Others,
and
those whose "natures" are considered less
rational by
virtue of their appointed task in the process
of
laboring to reproduce the conditions of private
life.
This domain of the less rational human bounds
the
figure of human reason, producing that "man"
as one
who is without a childhood; is not a primate,
and so
relieved of the necessity of eating, defecating,
living and dying; one who is not a slave, but always
a property holder; one whose language remains
snd untranslatable.
This is a figure of
bi s embodiment
but one that is nevertheless a figure
of a body, a bodying forth of a masculinized
rationality, the figure of a male that is not a body,
a figure in crisis, a figure that enacts a crisis it
cannot fully control 70
,

.

Butler wonders if Irigaray's strategy, which tends to
keep in place a heterosexual economy, might present the

possibility of not only the feminine "penetrating" the
masculine order of representation, but also the feminine
the feminine,

and the masculine the masculine,

to the

point where the status of the terms of feminine and

masculine begins to destabilize.

The destabilization of

reason's claim to represent itself would then come from

a

variety of directions,
To the extent that a set of reverse mimes emerge from
those quarters, they will not be the same as each
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other, if there is an
occupation and
“
reversal ot
^versai
nf the
master's discoursp6/ it will „
come
from
many
quarters
pnH
ttnc
and those resignifying
practices will converge in
the self- r epncati ng
0 ns
reason s mastery.
For if the copies speak p nr if
what is merely material begins
to signify^ the
stenography of reason is rocked by the
crisis on
which it was always built 71

K
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Mimetic Possibilities
The question now is, how do these
observations by
feminist theorists of representation
and female

subjectivity along with those feminist
challenges to the
dominant ideology of science come together
in a way which
addresses the concerns and claims of ecofeminism?
Further,

how might Adorno's development and transformation

of Benjamin's understanding of mimesis
stimulate new

possibilities for radical ecology?

How can the complex

critique of male domination be articulated with radical

ecology
nature?

s

central concerns about the destruction of
Can the idea/ term/concept/process of mimesis

enlighten us about the process of the domination of
nature,

especially those conjunctions of dominations which

include women?

Can the nature that is used by culture to

create second nature be transformed once more to become
the "culture used by nature to restore nature,

"

to end its

unnecessary destruction, and pointless suffering?
The strength of feminism has been its ability, based

on its recognition of the unfreedom and suffering of

actual women in their day-to-day lives, to generate
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a

variety of analyses which
have revealed the depth
and
breadth of the domination of
women under social systems
controlled by and for the benefit
of men.
Further, women
with feminist commitments
have been able to show an
adequate answer to the problem
does not consist in a
"liberal" solution of equal
inclusion in the existing
system.
The problem of domination
goes to the very
structure of language and beyond
to the unconscious
imaginings of both men and women,
to how we become
gendered subjects capable of speech,
and to the question
of how the images, concepts and
practices of society can
be changed.
Central to this desired change
is the

impossible image of the new world of the
future to be
formed in the present. What image (s) will
spark the

imaginations, open the unconscious, and provide
the energy
to motivate other individuals and new
generations to

continue hoping and struggling for

a

changed world,

a

world where suffering recedes and the ideas of freedom
and
happiness can truly fulfill themselves in concrete
reality?
To ask these questions might seem to have already

surrendered to an optimism contradicting so many
representations of critical theory as the "Melancholy
Science ." 72

What

I

want to examine here is the similarity

of Adorno's concerns to many of those voiced by feminism

and ecofeminism.

This is not an attempt to claim that the

concerns or the concepts and terms used are the same, that
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there is an identity between
them, but it does seem
correct to claim that the
similarities are not fortuitous
but result instead from the
fact that they are related
through the objects of their
studies.
This would be
perfectly in keeping with Adorno's
temperament and his
belief that "Truth is objective,
not plausible ." 73 As
Susan Buck-Morss has indicated,
The uniquely individual experiences
of critical
subjectivity ran parallel because they
focused on
particulars which reflected the same
objective
reality, and it followed that
collaboration was
possible among intellectuals even when they
worked
alone.
Nothing pleased Adorno more than when a
riend came to similar insights independently,
for
considered it a validation of their correctness. 74 he

What needs to be examined here is Adorno’s

understanding of how the idea of mimesis helps illuminate
an understanding of aesthetic phenomenon,

including the

relationship of aesthetics to: the domination of nature,
subjectivity, and new possibilities

(the not-yet)

Often mimesis seems to be equated with aesthetic
behavior,

as when the mimetic is represented as

representation in poetry, painting, or music themselves.

Adorno does not collapse mimesis into aesthetics,

Aesthetic behaviour is neither mimesis pure and
simple nor the repression of mimesis.
It is a
process set in motion by mimesis, a process also in
which mimesis itself survives through adaptation.
This process shapes both the relation of the
individual to art and the historical macrocosm.
It
congeals in works of art in so far as they represent
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ns ion and the Possibility
of

Mimesis "survives" in the form
of aesthetic behavior,
but it is not unchanged, and
this raises the question of
the possibility of recuperation
of the mimetic impulse,
and of what forms a recovered
mimesis might take in
relation to a world freed of domination.
Negatively,

triumph of one transformation of
mimesis,

the

"instrumental

rationality," is the death of reason
more broadly
understood,

Thinking begins to turn around in circles
when it
shrinks back from the task of sublimating
mimetic
behaviour.
The deadly dichotomization of emotion
and
thought is a historical result that can be
undone.
Rfiiio devoid of mimesis negates itself.
(Ends, the
r aison d'etre of raison
are qualitative and the
mimetic faculty is a qualitative faculty.)
This
self-negation of reason, it should be added, is
historically necessary: as the world objectively
loses its openness, it tends to have less and less
need for spirit, which is defined by its openness;
indeed, the world has become quite intolerant of
spirit b
,

.

The intolerance for openness to otherness or the non-

identical is

a

manifestation of "reified consciousness."

Fredric Jameson has helpfully located within negative

dialectics the place of the critique of capitalism Adorno
borrows from Marx, and shown that it is intimately

connected to

a

certain understanding of the psychology of

the individual and to the figure of mimesis.' 7

Capitalism

as it consolidated itself especially from 1945 to the

1960s was also gaining increased control over

555

subjectivity,

As Jameson argues, Adorno's
writing moves
between figure s of private
property and personal identity,

The figures of the tendential
restriction of the
increasin 9 Penetration by
the'Iocial divisS;
labor re 3 oln the language
of
capiuai itself,
Capital
itself and
h Adorno can
speak of an "ora^nic
composition of capital" within the
psychic
nat is to say, an increasingly
higher Dercentanp n-F
mental machinery and instrumental
opposed to living human labor, to operations as
the free
subjectivity whose role is ever more
diminished
Now
human creativity shrinks to
machine-minding and
reason to a fitful organic impulse. 7 ^

Tj ^
m

'

sub”

Reification for Adorno however, again,
should not be
viewed as identical to the crude or
orthodox Marxist
understanding of "alienated objectification
of

subjectivity" exemplified in the factory setting
alone,
although it is that too. Martin Jay makes clear
that

Adorno

understanding of reification owes as much to

s

Nietzsche as Marx in that reification is better understand
throughout Adorno's writings as "the suppression of

heterogeneity in the name of identity." 79

Mimesis

provides an avenue of resistance to reification,
resistance to the near total suppression of otherness

which still assumes the name of reason, but which has
become
means.

reason turned against itself, reduced to mere

a

How can mimesis resist the logic of identity, the

collapse of the unique characteristics of the particular
or the individual into a positivistically manipulable

variable?
of the new,

As Adorno explains, mimesis must become an ally
"At the same time thrill is mimetic behaviour:
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it responds to
abstractness in mimetic ways.

Now,

it is

only through the new that
mimesis can be so firmly
wedded
to rationality that it
will not
regress,

for ratio itself

becomes mimetic through the
thrill of the new ." 80 Of
course "the new" has also
become an integral part of
capitalism, especially "late
capitalism" with its
increasing reliance on f ashion--change
of style;

In its original economic
setting, novelty
characteristic of consumer goods through is that
which they
supposed to set themselves off from
aggregate supply, stimulating consumer the self-same
decisions
subject to the needs of capital ...
.Art has
appropriated this economic category. The
new in art
is the aesthetic counterpart to
the expanding
reproduction of capital in society. Both
hold out
the promise of undiminished plenitude 81
.

The ever recurring image of the
advertiser is the

appearance of the new product which in its
fantastic

representation quenches the ideal consumer's never
ending
thirst for more.
Capitalism portrays the answer
to the

end of suffering as the latest consumer item, art
offers
an alternative reality.

Of course nothing would ever be

so simple for Adorno as to say that the realization of
the

new would be Utopia, for "The new is the longing for the
new,

new.

not the new itself.

Being

a

This is the curse of everything

negative of the old, the new is subservient

to the old while considering itself to be Utopian ." 82
is the time after suffering to be represented?

How

Here is

the problem of representing the unrepresentable again, but

this is an unrepresentable future not the unrepresentable
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"

before the (male) subject.

What light is shed by mimesis

on the problem of the
unrepresentability of the Utopian
future?
The utopia of undiminished
plenitude is the image art
offers against the repetition of
the same and suffering

within the logic of identity and the
domination of nature,
but mimesis, as Adorno presents it, is
at the core of

art's mission,

"Mimesis is the ideal of art, not some

practical method or subjective attitude aimed
at
expressive values.

What the artist contributes to

expression is his ability to mimic, which sets free
in him
the expressed substance

.

8

Adorno attempts to explain

this freeing of the substance of the artist

(which is not

the same as subjective expression as usually understood
in

aesthetic philosophy)

,

and he does this through discussion

of the "linguistic character of art"

(which should not be

confused with language as one medium of aesthetic
expression)

.

The "linguistic construction" in art

including writing such as by James Joyce, may develop to
the point where discursive language is "subordinated" to

"attempts to move from communicative to mimetic

language

." 84

The "speechless" language of art is a moment

in art that has "priority" over even the "significative"
in poetry,

music,

sculpting,

for example Etruscan vases,

an individual form,

for example.

In art work,

this key element is present in

"As for those vases,

their similarity

to language seems to say something like 'this is me' or
558

'here

I

come',

asserting

a

selfhood which is not carved

out of the interdependent
totality of being by identifying
thought but stands on its own.
In the same way, a

speechless animal, say a rhinoceros,
seems to be saying
"’*5
am a rhino.
This declaration on the part of

'I

the art

work like that of the individual
animal is an assertion of
Its uniqueness and of its
participation in
"spirit," as

Adorno explains,

S
rt w °rks were re-enacting the
process
f*
f
through
which
the subject comes painfully into being.
They do so by adapting themselves to
the subject by
means of the structural properties they
acquire. Art
possesses expression not when it conveys
subjectivity, but when it reverberates with
the
primal history of subjectivity and ensoulment.
Any
kind of emotional t remolo that wants to capture
this
is a pale surrogate of this primary trembling. 86

What is being imitated is the process which brings
into being the unique and therefore inimitable.

addition,

In

in Adorno's theory of aesthetics, mimesis has an

ambivalent relationship within art, it is the basis for
the critical subjectivity made possible by "authentic"
art,

but it also participates in that adapting function

imposed by society's domination of the individual,
This modification of mimesis is the constitutive act
of spiritualization in art, prior to any reflection
upon spirit which develops spiritualization further.
Spirit is already posited in this modified mimesis by
the work; perhaps spirit even occurs in the original
form of mimesis itself, which would make mimesis the
physiological progenitor, as it were, of spirit. On
the other hand, modified mimesis has to bear some of
the blame for art's affirmative essence because it
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” akln 3 it; controllable
within a
spiritual
tual total
P
totality without really
changing it 87
1

.

For Adorno then,

art remains within the
sphere of

"universal alienation" but it
is at least partially
less
alienated to the extent that
"in art everything passes
through spirit" so that it is
"humanized in a
non-

repressive, non-violent way."

Art is forced to use the

means of domination of nature to
some extent in order to
express the possibility of an
alternative existence
without domination, alienation or
suffering.

Expression
art then is part of the attempt
to create a new
subjectivity, "The emancipation of
society from the

m

predominance of material, economic conditions
aims at
creating a true subject which has been
stymied so far.
Seen from this point of view, expression
reflects not only
the subject's hubris but also its just
complaint about the

failure of subjectivity, expression being the
cipher for
the possibility of that subjectivity ." 88 This
cipher or

hieroglyph of subjectivity is an image of

a future

possibility, where suffering is absent and pleasure and

happiness reign.

The moment of joy in art has a certain

playfulness to it which, although it does not indicate art
can be reduced to a form of play,

implies for Adorno that

freedom from repression will have certain childlike and
"clownish" aspects,
The attraction clowns have for children is the same
as the attraction art has for them.
Both kinds of
attraction are rooted out by the world of adults,
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What can be taken from these
observations by Adorno
and feminists who are trying
to find alternatives
to the
present order of dominating
subjectivity? First, mimesis
Plays a fundamental role in the
emergence of subjectivity.
When combined with the discussion
of mimesis
in Di a i»rH r

Qf Enlightenment

,

passages on mimesis in Aesthetic

T h „„ r ..

and elsewhere reveal a consistent
concern with mimesis as
a primordial influence on if
not foundation
for

subjectivity.

Mimesis has evolved through human
history,
and also natural history, in various
directions from magic
to science, art and elsewhere.
In its metamorphoses

however it retains

a

moment which challenges the

overwhelmingly repressive uses to which it has
been put.
Examples of this moment can be found in areas
of
life

which resist assimilation into the logic of identity
and

domination
Adorno focused on art and critical philosophy as two
of these areas in mutual need of each other.

Critical

philosophy and art formed the basis of his understanding
of negative dialectics, which retains the hope of an

alternative future, one freed of unnecessary suffering and
open to the possibility of true happiness.

Feminist women

have focused their concerns on similar areas but even more
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persistently on the problem
of the domination of
women and
the practices of
resistance which remain and
which retain
potentials for further
development.
Therefore, it is now
time to turn to some
feminist concerns which have
more
immediate ethical and political
implications.
Some of

these observations about

a

possible alternative ethical

basis for political action
have been well developed,
some
have only been vaguely outlined
or suggested.
However,
two areas which have been of
consistent or recurring
importance have been the issue of
"animal rights" and that
of the mother-child relationship.
A guiding question for
examining these issues is, "How can
the above observations
on mimesis and subjectivity aid in
addressing these two
concerns?" Finally, what are the more
politically

specific ramifications of "mimetic subjectivity"
for
radical ecology and its place in democracy?
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CHAPTER 11

ECOFEMINISM AND POLITICS

Ma] °r diff iculties have
developed for ecofeminism
around the attempt to derive
political guidance from the
combination of radical ecological
and feminist insights.

These difficulties in relation
to some of the more
specifically political implications
of ecofeminism will be
emphasized in this chapter. An obvious
connection between
feminism and radical ecology has been
women’s involvement
the "animal rights" movement.
Many ecofeminists now
reject the arguments put forth by the
earlier defenders of
animal rights and have turned to alternatives
which

m

circulate around the idea of an "ethic of care."

A second

area of concern has been the politics of
motherhood or the

mother-child relationship, which has been central to
feminist and especially psychoanalytically inclined
feminists

theoretical development.^

-

However,

the

analysis of motherhood takes on an added level of

complexity when ecofeminists' concerns about the longstanding association of women with nature are included,

especially as these impact issues of reproduction.

The

obvious problematic metaphor frequently used in connection
to this complex of issues is "Mother Earth."

Finally,

although there has been increasing attention paid to

practical political considerations, the "tactics" of
ecofeminism, this now must be more directly related back
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to the insights derived
elsewhe re,

especially from

cultural or radical feminism,
if ecofeminism is to retain
its philosophical and political
coherence.
To that end,

new theories of radical democracy
may provide important
clues to the formation of a
coherent and effective radical
democratic ecological/ecof eminist
politics.

Women and Animals
There has been widespread rejection
by ecofeminists
of the major theories based in either
utilitarianism or

Kantian ethics which defend "animal rights."

For example,

Deborah Slicer has shown how two of the most
influential
of these theorists,

Peter Singer and Tom Regan, have

failed to adequately take into account the context
of

moral decisions about animals, as well as not being
able
to include the specificity of concrete individuals in

their reasoning.
® quent ly

These utilitarian and rights arguments

narrow to questions about choices between

certain classes of animals versus the human benefits from

sacrificing the animal, such as whether medical research
should be done on animals in order to save or prolong
single human life.

As Slicer puts it, they demand

a

a

response to the question "Your daughter or your dog ?" 2
Slicer associates these arguments with the "justice

tradition" or the "ethic of justice,

"

which relies on some

essential, or "lowest common denominator" criterion by

which to make the judgment about which animals deserve
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moral or ethical consideration.

The animal rights

defenders are then criticized
for the ethical
inconsistencies associated with
essentialism, "Singer and
Regan, like their mentors
the utilitarians and
Kant,

respectively, have an

•

essentialist

'

view of the moral

worth of both human beings and
animals.
This means that
they propose a single capacity—
the possession of

interests— for being owed moral consideration ." 3

The

problem of essentialism in these cases,
argues Slicer, is
related to the lack of context and

individual specificity.

Certain relationships between the individual
and others
are bracketed out of consideration,
such as
those of

family and friendship.

The individual being under

consideration is also abstracted from any specific
history
either of the situation or their identity,
"Specifically,

animal rights theories reduce individuals to that

atomistic bundle of interests that the justice tradition
recognizes as the basis for moral considerableness.
effect,

In

animals are represented as beings with the kind of

capacity that human beings most fully possess and deem
valuable for living

a

full human life."^

Slicer notes how

these arguments retain features of a "masculine" sense of
self which attempts a radical separation from all that is
"other,

"

a

self which is unable to "recognize and respect"

the other if it differs from what is deemed essential to
the "human."

This moral tendency has been shown to go

beyond animal rights theorists to include many who
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.

identify themselves as deep
ecologists in their claims to
seek to protect what they
identify as part of themselves.
In this form of deep ecology,

the masculine self simply

expands to include certain other
beings, but which remain
morally defensible only in terms
of the extent they are
5
like the self
Generally, this involves
.

the

"assimilation of the other into the
sameness of the self"
where specific differences are erased.
Alternatively,
Slicer argues that difference rather
than sameness can be
the basis of a more adequate ethic,
"There is no reason
why animals’ differences, independence,
indifference
cannot be grounds for caring,

for relationships

characterized by such ethically significant
attitudes as
respect,

gratitude, compassion,

feeling,

and wonder ." 5

fellow or sisterly

This is an attitude she also

associates with competent scientific practice, including
some forms of animal research such as that done by Jane

Goodall
The justice tradition influenced arguments have

further characteristics of masculine self-identity.

Animal rights defenders tend to extract the moral
situations from specific contexts in an attempt to

establish ever more general, abstract and universal

principles for decision making.

Many details of the

supposedly representative moral situations they examine,
such as the "historical, social, economic, familial," and
so on,

are simply omitted

7
.

This is purposely done to
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eliminate consideration
of specific differences
in order
to be able to acknowledge
the criterion that is
necessary
for an appropriate
moral decision.
That quality which is
the .'same" in relation
to principies of
morality achieves
a higher status than
the other non-essential
or different
aspects of the situation.
This has the intended
result of
establishing that there are
some beings worth greater
moral consideration than
others.
Slicer believes any
feminist or ecofeminist ethic
must not succumb
to the

"logic of domination" which
she believes characterizes
this form of argumentation,
one which ultimately seeks
a
justification of some "subordination."
Slicer draws on
Karen Warren's explanation of this
logic of domination and
how it is based on dualistic and
hierarchical thinking.
Slicer believes that despite the
beneficial effects which
have been achieved by the animal rights
theories, they
have been shown to be too limited for the
needs of

ecofeminism,

"Singer and Regan retain an unfortunate

logic of domination' in their respective
theories.

Their

atemporal, abstract, and acontextual characterizations
of
issues,

of the values at stake,

and of appropriate

resolutions grossly oversimplify some of these highly
complex issues, including the research one ." 8

However,

Slicer leaves undeveloped her call for an ecofeminist

ethic which can integrate "affective responses" into its

considerations.

She does not deny that general principles

are needed to guide moral decisions, but she insists that
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.

affective responses" also
are appropriate and
helpful in
resolving moral and ethical
dilenrtas in everyday
life
where specific individual
identities and context
are
important.
Without developing her
argument further she
still asserts that, "An
ecofeminist ethic will emerge
out
of individuals' concrete
relationships and experiences
and
will recognize a variety
of affective responses
along with
formal and abstract principles,
all in their appropriate
contexts. "9 slicer then calls
for other "feminist voices"
to articulate the grounds
for this ecofeminist
ethic,

which she believes can be developed
in response to her
"gut feeling" of antipathy toward
the
animal rights

arguments
As clues to this future ecofeminist
ethic, in
addition to work by Karen Warren and
Marti Kheel, Slicer

also mentions Sara Ruddick's writing
on "maternal
thinking." Before taking up the ethical
possibilities of
maternal thinking" it may be illuminating
to discuss

another feminist's analysis of the animal
rights issues,
one which makes explicit reference to Horkheimer
and

Adorno's critical theory.
Josephine Donovan also includes in her examination of
the animal rights theorists the ecofeminist critiques

which reject the masculinist rationalism of the justice
tradition in favor of some reliance on "sentiment or
emotion."

(Already obvious from these two examples is the

tendency of the arguments between ecofeminists and animal
574

rights theorists to
dichotomize.)

After noting the
validity of criticisms of
the ecofeminist positions
which
tend to essentialize
women's ways of knowing,
Donovan
concludes, "One cannot simply
turn uncritically to women
as a group or to a female
value system as a source
for a

humane relationship ethic with
animals. "1° Donovan like
Slicer finds Regan's extension
of natural rights theory
inadequate for addressing moral
dilemmas.
However, she

emphasizes that Regan actually argues
against Kant who
claimed "animals ... are there merely
as a means to an end.
That end is man.-H Kant argued
this position as a result
of attributing to rational beings
an "absolute worth":
rational beings are an end in themselves.
Rationality was
deemed the basic criteria for treatment;
the possession of
reason determines "inherent value.” If
a being possesses
rationality it is a moral agent and should not
be treated
as a means.
Regan, argues Donovan, rejects Kant's
and

nearly all of the Enlightenment thinkers' exclusive
identification of rationality with human beings, and
instead replaces the criteria of rationality with that of
"complex awareness."

However,

this is in effect, claims

Donovan, a way of reinvoking the rationality criteria by

merely extending its applications to some other beings.
She believes this does not provide an adequate basis for

resolving some common moral or ethical dilemmas, "This
criterion leaves open the question of severely retarded
humans, humans in irreversible comas,
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fetuses,

even human

infants.

Regan's criterion in fact
privileges those with
complex awareness over
those without ." 12

Donovan argues that Peter
Singer's utilitarian
position actually provides
alternatives which "cultural
feminism" may be able to
"reformulate" to establish a
viable ecofeminist ethic.
The key concept of the
utilitarian argument is not a
reliance on rationality or
complex consciousness, but "on
the capacity
to

feel— or

the capacity to suffer-as the
criterion by which to
determine those who are entitled to
be treated as ends
The acknowledgment of the capacity
to suffer as the

." 13

primary criterion for judgment of
ethical or moral value
is traced back to Jeremy Bentham 14
singer has elaborated
this position which fundamentally claims
that what
.

applies

to both humans and animals with respect
to moral

consideration is what they have in common, which
is
sensibility" or "the capacity to feel pain and
experience

pleasure."

In Donovan’s summary of the utilitarian

argument for animal rights the essence of the position is
that

pain and suffering are bad and should be prevented

or minimized,

irrespective of the race, sex, or species of

the being that suffers

this position,

." 15

she counters,

The fundamental problem with
is that Singer assumes that

similar suffering must be valued egually.

"Equal

valuation" would require the adding-up of suffering on the
various sides of the moral situation and coming down on
the side which "suffers most."
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This requires a

"

.

"quantification of suffering"

(suffering's

"mathematization") which, claims
Donovan, also leads to
the "scientific modality"
or consciousness which
"legitimates animal sacrifice. "16
Donovan therefore
rejects Singer's utilitarian
theory of animal rights as
simply another form of the
"mode of manipulative mastery"
and instead turns to "cultural
feminism" for ethical
insights

Donovan summarizes what she believes
to be the
essence of cultural feminism's
contribution to
ecof eminism,

"From the cultural feminist viewpoint,
the

domination of nature, rooted in
postmedieval. Western,
male psychology, is the underlying cause
of
the

mistreatment of animals as well as of the
exploitation of
women and the environment." 17 Donovan notes
that
there

has been a long-standing tradition of critique
of "the

logical fallacies inherent in the scientific

epistemology,

"

but indicates it was Horkheimer and Adorno

in Dialectic of Enlightenment who "first made
the

connection between what Husserl called the
ma thema t i s a t ion of the world' and the derogation of women
and animals. ±8

theorists,

Donovan's attention to the critical

in the present context, must be emphasized and

expanded upon.
In Dialecti c of Enlightenment it is pointed out that

"In the impartiality of scientific language,

that which is

powerless has wholly lost any means of expression." 1 ^
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Among the powerless are
women and animals whose
subjectivities and experiences
ces are
aro according to
P
Donovan,
erased or converted into
manipulable
'

objects. "20

This

conceptual model then views
all individuals, whether
human,

animal, or other,

as mere examples in
a

"repeatable, replaceable
process. "21

Donovan's quotes of
the critical theorists show
how scientific epistemology
is
part of the "material
conditions of social domination"

Where scientists in physiological
laboratories force now
defenseless animals to give up
information
from their

mutilated bodies.

The authority to inflict this
pain

comes from the power of Reason
which belongs to "man"
alone.
Those who do not meet the standards
of Reason are
inferior and only capable of knowing
"irrational terror."
The emotional consequence of this
was that
the

(male)

scientist was not to feel compassion for
the irrational,
no empathy for his victims.
The responsibility
for

compassion and empathy, made necessary by the
division of
labor required for social domination, was
placed with
women.

The process of consolidating the division of
labor

included the gendered division of social labor whose
long

history has been punctuated by especially significant
moments of domination.

One important moment is emphasized

both by early cultural feminists and by the critical

theorists--the witchhunts.
control of "witches" was

a

As Donovan indicates,

the

symptom of the early modern

period of history when there developed "the new need to
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^
erase and subdue anomalous,
disorderly (and thus feminine)
nature. "22 As Horkheimer
and Adorno also argued,
these
actions served to consolidate
certain social powers and
to
abolish surviving forms of
alternative social

possibilities,

"The witchcraft trials
which the associated
feudal racketeers used to
terrorize the masses when they
felt themselves threatened,
served at once to celebrate
and to confirm the triumph
of male society over

prehistoric matriarchal and mimetic
stages of
development. "23 Donovan connects
these observations with
cultural feminism's additional
critique of the "Cartesian
masculinization of thought." However,
we can concentrate
here on the additional meditations
of the critical
theorists on the connections made between
the "dialectic
of enlightenment" and women, animals,
and the domination
of nature.
The critical theorists claim the
"truths"

achieved in laboratories of animal research are
frequently
applicable to humans, but to humans who have been

distorted as much as the animals sacrificed.

The facts

and figures.
The behaviorists ... force from defenseless animals in
their nauseating physiological laboratories stresses
the contrast quite adroitly.
The conclusion they
draw from mutilated bodies applies not to animals in
the free state but to man as he is today.
It shows
that because he does injury to animals, he and he
alone in all creation voluntarily functions as
mechanically, as blindly and automatically as the
twitching limbs of the victim.
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Just as the animal subjected
to laboratory research
becomes an object for the
repetition of acts of domination
and a sign confirming that
power, so too "woman" signifies
the triumph of male domination.
She became the embodiment of
the biological function
the image of nature, the subjugation
of which
constituted that civilization's title
to fame.
For
millennia men dreamed of acquiring
absolute mastery
over nature, of converting the cosmos
into one
immense hunting-ground.
It was to this that the idea
of man was geared in a male-dominated
society
This
was the significance of reason, his
proudest boast 25
.

After the witch trials and with the consolidation
of
capitalism and the bourgeois class, women's culture
becomes even more clearly

signifier of the domination of

a

nature,

The bourgeoisie profited from female chastity and
propriety--the defense mechanisms left by matriarchal
revolt.
Woman herself, on behalf of all exploited
nature, gained admission to a male-dominated world,
but only in a broken form.
In her spontaneous
submission she reflects for her vanquisher the glory
of his victory, substituting devotion for defeat,
nobility of soul for despair, and a loving breast for
a ravished heart 25
.

Therefore any turn to women "as they are," or as they

occupy the space of "woman,

"

for ethical guidance is

problematic, as their "subjectivity" is infused with the

practice of domination.

Even notions of the female

traditionally associated with art and beauty are

manifestations of the domination of nature, "Woman has
been made the caretaker of all things beautiful.
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The

modern female puritan eagerly
took up the office.
She
identified herself fully with
the status quo, with
nature
domesticated, not red in tooth
and claw. "27 Too easily
women have identified not
with the wildness of
nature,

its

independent moment of resistance
to domination by men,
but
instead with the nature men have
mastered, a nature
"harmonized and beautified" to
reflect the needs of the
dominating class. However, even
in these "harmonized"
forms nature retains a moment
of resistance to domination.
Although art, beauty, and women do
not immediately reflect
a truth outside the structures
of domination, they retain
a double message which still
might be heard, "Art,
custom,

and sublime love are masks in which
nature reappears
transformed into her own antithesis. Through
these masks
she acquires the gift of speech; out
of her distortion

emerges her essence ." 28

Even though there are the

distortions of domination which appear in all

manifestations of culture there remains the independent
moment of nature, the irreducibility of the object.
However, even as they seem to be opening to theoretical

possibilities of escape, the critical theorists

(in an

expression which lends credence to charges of extreme

pessimism and hopelessness made so frequently against the
founders of critical theory) lament the extent to which

nature has been processed through the machines of
domination,

"The earth, now rational, no longer feels the

need of an aesthetic reflection.
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The demonic element is

wiped out by directly applying
the desired imprint on
mankind.
Domination no longer needs
numinous images; it
produces them itself on an
industrial

scale and uses them

as a more reliable means
of winning over the masses ." 29
In these reflections, the

critical theorists link

together women, animals and the
working class as objects
of the domination of nature,
each manifesting
in a

particular way what they have in
common.
Beyond any
simple economistic reduction, all
of society operates
under the same principle of the

"logic of identity" whose

"progress" consists of the elimination
of the unique and
the individual, attempting to establish
a world where
every object, every animal and human being,
becomes
another example of the general truth of
domination.
The

process becomes ever more efficient, and ever
more

effective at colonizing any deviation.

The critical

theorists presented the culture industry (now probably

more readily understood by its self-label as the

entertainment industry")
The culture industry,

,

as one example of this process,

like science,

work to outside itself... in facts.

seeks a standard to

Film stars are

experts; their performances are protocols of natural

behavior, a guide to approved responses.

Producers and

script writers produce models for proficiently adjusted

conduct ." 30

If the logic of identity results in a

"totally administered society,

"

for an alternative future come?
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from where will the models

Nature perhaps?

No,

at

least not the nature "red
in tooth and claw" which
is
beyond good and evil,

Everything, it appears, depends
on society and
the most precise thinking
must throw Jn Us ?ot wi?h
th
the dominant social trends
!
if it„
f
r
mSre fad
S reali ^tion binds
?oge?her an
the° champions
h
the
of reality; it accepts human
society as
wholesale racket in nature. The
voice that does
not pursue the aims of one of
the branches of that
C
thrOW ® lfc s members into an
ungovernable rage
9
It is a
that onl y that ***<* exists to
be
broken stm^as
h
voice— namely, nature, from which
f
the lies of nationalists
and folklorists issue in
streams.
Whenever the voice is heard, even
Momentarily, above the clamor of their
chorus of
yells, it is accompanied by the
fearful
V b( ratl0nS ™ hich as in every
animal, sound even
'.
?n one f s own rationalized
and broken heart.
The
tendencies revealed by such a voice are blind,
yet
ubiquitous. Nature herself is neither good,
as the
ancients believed, nor noble, as the latterday
Romantics would have it. As a model and goal
it
implies the spirit of opposition, deceit, and
bestiality. Ji
'

™

i

.

_

m^

However (in

a

negative or negating moment always

hovering just beyond their most pessimistic claims),
nature may be able to serve as
remembered.

a

model to the extent it is

Only when seen for what it

is,

does nature

become existence's craving for peace, that consciousness
which from the very beginning has inspired an unshakable
resistance to Fuhrer and collective alike.

Dominant

practice and its inescapable alternatives are not

threatened by nature, which tends rather to coincide with
them, but by the fact that nature is remembered ." 32

remembering of nature is expressed, for example, by

remembering those who have suffered from oppression
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This

throughout history, "One of the
basic human rights
possessed by those who pick up
the tab for the progress
of
civilization is the right to be
remembered. .. This
right

demands that the marks of
humiliation be committed to
remembrance in the form of imagine. "33
The imagined
image is a reminder, a reminder
of "past historical
34
suffering."
The images of the future will
be negatively
permeated by past suffering; the not-yet
of nature
continues to be indebted to the effects
of past
domination. Even images of natural beauty,
or aspects of

nature appreciated as beautiful, involve
history which
makes remembrance possible,
There is no beauty without historical remembrance...
Although nature here appears untamed and removed
from
history, this appearance belongs squarely to our
own
historical epoch, arising in critical opposition to
social trends at a time when the network of social
relations is so tightly woven that the individual
rightly fears it may suffocate. By the same token,
there is no room for natural beauty in periods when
nature has an overpowering presence for man, as seems
to be the case with peasant populations which are
known to be insensitive to the aesthetic qualities of
natural scenery because to them nature is merely an
immediate object to be acted upon. 35

Perhaps the dream of

a

time when wilderness will be so

pervasive that its name is unnecessary will never come, at
least if we have the courage to never forget the current

state of the planet.
This discussion of natural beauty and its historical

relation to the domination of nature prompts the question-how then can the alternative to domination be
584

”

'

represented 7

Thic;

is +-u^
the reason for Adorno’s
turn to
-i

<-.

aesthetics: to art and the
critical evaluation of
art
Adorno argues that a
critical philosophy attempts
to put
into concepts the process
by which works of art
attempt to
speak of an alternative
world.

SUbjaCtiVe intention^,
articulately
articulatelv°ddoes it imitate the
conceptual and non-signif icative model of a nonlanguage.
This
9 m
the Same aS that in Which
the
Book of
NS?SSS
ature is written,
whSL rto use a threadbare but beautiful
entlmental a ge. On and through
?
the
traitor!
3
y ° S rat ionality, mankind becomes
aware
through art of what rationality has
erased from
rY
SeC ° nd reflection ^rves to
remind us of
th?s
,
this. *Th
The vanishing
point of this development is the
lg
1
rated 35 a partial aspect in modern
art
tLi- ?h°T
art—
that
the beauty of nature cannot be
copied 36
Beauty in nature becomes a point for
"second
reflection" about the direction of reason.
Although a
moment in the process of self-reflection,
the beautiful in
nature does not then become the principle of
,

.

aesthetics,

"The beautiful in nature is different from
both the notion
of a ruling principle and the denial of any
principle

whatsoever.

It is like a state of reconciliation." 3 ^

For

Adorno the "essence of natural beauty" is the "anamnesis"
of "something that is more than just for-other

.

33

What

natural beauty suggests is an independent moment of nature

irreducible to an object for human use or conceptual
captivation.

Neither does it mean that critical

reflection on art and its relationship to the beautiful in
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nature involves some
"pointing" to
transcendence of material
life.

a

metaphysical

Ra t her

art may provide
glimpse of a possibility
which also appears in the
beautiful in nature. It is
a glimpse of the
possibility of
being more than just
for-other. Art provides an
image
which is denied in a society
reduced to instrumental
rationality, to a world become
means,

^

,

^

°f
kln ^ in art
an
articutaf
ticuiate what ls not makeable, endless endeavour to
namely spirit
This
6 fUnCti ° n 0f art aS a
restore?
of
historian
llY repressed nature becomes
important.
S
0
yet exist
To the degree to which
ar^ Dines^fi
afk ® r an lma ^ e of nature, it
represents the
truth Tf
of non being.
Art becomes conscious of it in
a
on identical 1 other (which
instrumental, identityeaS ° n reduces to a material and
which is
canp^nnature)
J
called
This other is not some unifying
concept but a manifold, for truth
content in art is a
manifold and not an abstract or generic
concept. .. .This corresponds to the
plurality of
things in general: they too defy
identification 39

^

*

.

.

.

.

But then how does art function to provide
images for

imitation, what is the process of mimesis
released in this

understanding of aesthetics?

What is the relationship

between mimetic acts in the present and the future
utopia?

Adorno argues against any aesthetics which

attempts to assert that art should function to represent
the world as it is,

(Art works) transcend longing because they relate to
real historical being into which are etched the
outlines of want or neediness. By retracing these
outlines, art goes beyond mere being, passing over
into objective truth, for want implies the overcoming
of want.
That which is--as an in-itself rather than
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slightly, and thus be brought
into new
constellations.
Far from imitating reality,
works of
art actually show reality how
this kind of
displacement is effected— which points
to the
a
We mUSt reverse th e copy theory
of
!?
!:.
ealist aesthetics:
a subtle sense reality ought
to imitate art works, not the
other way around. 4 °
Art works are constellations of existing
elements,
but not simple reproductions of existing
relationships.
The mimetic moment in the new constellation
of elements is

m

not an act of simply copying or mirroring
of reality but

results in

a

displacement of current relationships.

Art

works are indicators of possibility, of the not-yet,
By their presence art works signal the possibility
of
the non-existent; their reality testifies to the
feasibility of the unreal, the possible. More
specifically, in art longing, which posits the
actuality of the non-existent, takes the form of
remembrance.
Remembrance joins the present to the
past.
Ever since the Platonic doctrine of anamnesis,
the yet-to-come, the potential, has taken on the form
of a recollective dream.
Remembrance alone is able
to give flesh and blood to the notion of Utopia,
without betraying it to empirical life. All this, by
the way, does not mean that illusion is absent: what
is being dreamt does not exist: indeed, it never did
exist.
Still, spontaneous recollection brings to
life empirical existence when it is harnessed to the
imagery of art. 4 ^

Art illuminates the possibility of

a

nature which

does not yet exist nor has it ever existed,

a

nature made

possible through the mediation of subjectivity.

However,

this subjectivity is also not of the present, at least not
in its dominant forms,

not in any form which can be simply
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copied. The transformation
of subjectivity will
involve a
complex relationship of creation
and destruction, of life
and death, just as works of
art destroy as they create.
Works of art succeed to the
extent they betray mimesis,
"They kill what they objectify,
tearing it away from its
context of immediacy and real life.
They survive because
they bring death.
This is particularly true of
modern
art, where we notice a general
mimetic abandonment to

reification, which is the principle of
death.

Illusion in

art is the attempt to escape from this
principle

"escape" from the principle of death,

." 42

The

from reification,

that reduction of life into a mere object,
a thing, the

reduction of the other into yet another example,
depends
on some possibility of humans acting otherwise.

This is

what is meant when Adorno speaks of the possibility of

reconciliation.
Spirit tones down its antagonistic essence and
becomes conciliatory.
This differs from what
classicism meant by reconciliation. Reconciliation
here refers to the mode of conduct of works of art in
so far as they become conscious of the non-identical
in their midst.
By following the dynamic of selfsameness to the end, art works assimilate themselves
to the non-identical.
This is the stage of
development mimesis has reached today.
Reconciliation as method or mode of conduct is
discernible at the present time in those works which
have abandoned the traditional idea of
reconciliation, works where the form prescribes
intransigence .... The utopia anticipated by artistic
form is the idea that things at long last ought to
come into their own. Another way of putting this is
to call for the abolition of the spell of selfhood
hitherto promoted by the subject 44
.
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The overcoming of the spell
of selfhood as it appears
in
the present dominant subject
will require delving deep
into subjectivity's self-understanding
and touching it
where mind and body meet/
C
t
SO
frees itself from the
T^ lled
blind
b?ind feIr
fear of the horrible
but it is also its
continuation
The subject is lifeless except
when it
is abie to shudder
response to the total spell
And oniy the subject’s shudder can
transcend that'
spell.
Without shudder, consciousness is
trapped in
reification.
Shudder is a kind of premonition of
subjectivity, a sense of being touched
by the other
e ae
hetlC mode of behav iour assimilates
itself to
Iv! .
that other rather than trying to subdue
it.
It is
this constitutive orientation of the
subject towards
objectivity which joins eros to knowledge 44
'

m

^

.

The possibility of an other subjectivity
will make the

cells of the organism tremble.
If it is a not-yet subjectivity which the
existing

subject shudders to encounter, then the question for

feminism and ecofeminism is whether the alternative
knowledge and ethics which they offer can serve as models
of a mode of behavior which is mimetic without reverting
to mere repetition of the existing system of domination,

the mere continuation of instrumental rationality and

reification behind

a

new mask.

(Earth) Mothers’ Standpoint

Sara Ruddick has attempted to build on the insights
of Hartsock, Harding and others who have elaborated

a

feminist standpoint theory of knowledge and politics.
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"

Ruddick has specifically
looked at the possibilities
generated in the relationship
of "maternal thinking"
to
feminist standpoint theory 45
Ruddick relates her own
biography and tells of how she
began to encounter deeply
politically committed feminist texts
which forced her to
begin to abandon what she calls her
earlier
.

"pluralist-

beliefs,

the "idea that there were many
perspectives and
hence many truths ." 46 Becoming active
in a women's peace
group, she began to see how the "defense"
establishment
and much of society were dedicated to
"organized,

deliberate violence."

It was in this context she

encountered feminist standpoint theory and
attempted to
apply it to her previous understandings of maternal
thinking.

Hartsock's claims for feminist standpoint

theory were related to the epistemic advantages of

starting from "women's work" especially as it has been

conceptualized as

caring labor."

Ruddick'

s

own concerns

with motherhood and especially the mother-child

relationship prompts her to inform the reader that
"maternal work" does not exhaust the category of caring
labor, but that it is a "central part of caring labor" and

therefore "maternal thinking" should be considered

a

"constituent element of the standpoint that Hartsock
envisions

." 47

In bolstering the claim that motherhood

involves caring labor,

Ruddick explains that care workers

are "immersed in the materials of the physical world,

including human and other bodies.
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To provide care these,

—
usually female, workers
depend on "practical knowledge
of
the qualities of the
material world." In explaining
the
relationship of care giving to
gendered thinking, Ruddick
repeats Hartsock's object relations
theory inspired

description of the "abstract
masculinity" which
"characterizes dominant views ." 48
Ruddick emphasizes the
need to recognize the difficulty
of articulating
an

alternative to the dominant, masculine,
worldview,
"Maternal thinkers know that they have
learned to speak in
the dominant languages, as do all
members of
a culture.

To articulate maternal thinking they
have had to cling to

realities that they were in danger of forgetting
and at
the same time forge a way of thinking that
is new ." 49

Maternal thinkers, as care workers, join with other
standpoint theorists to "articulate an engaged vision"

which must be "struggled for and represents an
achievement ." 50

The possibility of a new way of thinking

therefore can be linked to caring work,

Caretakers work with subjects; they give birth to and
tend self-generating, autonomously willing lives. A
defining task of their work is to maintain mutually
helpful connections with another person or animal
whose separateness they create and respect. Hence
they are continuously involved with issues of
connection, separation, development, change, and the
limits of control .... Their task, as they have learned
from the work of training children, is to articulate
conditions of respect for unpredictable and as yet
unimagined difference and variety among and within
people 51

—

.
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It would be all too easy
to see this as another case

of "complementary" spheres
of activity, but Ruddick
does
not see this way of acting and
thinking as simply the

polar opposite of masculine thought,

"The values of care

do not stand to dominant values
of abstract masculinity as
the one reality stands to
appearance; standpoint theorists
know this, of course, but any
dualistic formulations tend
to reduce the richness and
unpredictability both of the
world and of the ways in which we think
about it. "52

Ruddick then has the task of developing the
ethical
implications of this maternal thinking, and she
does this
by linking it with the emerging discourse on

the ethic of

care.

^

Criticism of the ethic of care as it has been

developed by ecofeminists has centered on the problematic
relationship of the ethic to "context" or "contextual
detail."

As Tom Regan has complained.

Thus it is that a feminist ethic that is limited to
an ethic of care will, I think, be unable to
illuminate the moral significance of the idea that we
(human) animals are not superior to all other
animals... For where the care is unequal, and the
vocabulary of duties and rights has no voice, one's
ethical options seem to be exhausted. 5 ^

There is substantial truth to the criticisms of the
care ethic as this ethic has so far been presented,

especially within ecofeminism.
to be insensitive,

the argument.

However,

or uncomprehending,

The basic complaint,

presented by those who support
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a

the critics seem

of some aspects of

as it is almost always

moralist argument of

rights,

is that the lack of
moral rules invites the

disaster of moral relativism
"a radical relativism of
values, where concepts of
good and bad, right and wrong,
admit only of individual
interpretations-becoming,
in

fact,

mere registering of preferences—
neither a
person
feelings nor beliefs can provide
ultimate answers
to moral questions. "55 whether
a "radical relativism" of
values is inherent in the ethic of
care does indeed need
to be addressed, but the demand
for "ultimate answers,"
a

whether moral or otherwise, merely echoes
the abstract,
ahistorical thought feminists have so
convincingly

critiqued in so many contexts, and misses the
point about
the inadequacy of abstract or universal
rules for deciding
what is always an infinitely complex actual
situation
where moral choices are made.

An additional complaint

lodged against some versions of the ethic of care
argument
is that if it is interpreted primarily as calling for
a

"preservation of

a

web of relationships" then it will have

the politically conservative tendency of preserving

relationships of domination out of

a

tendency of the

"caregiver" to prefer those closest and most familiar.

An

ecofeminist ethic then must answer to the charges of moral

relativism and its implicit, and sometimes
unselfconscious, acceptance of relationships of domination
and oppression.

Additionally, Dennis and Kathleen Johnson have

objected to the dualistic thinking which continues to
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exist when the advocates
of an ethic of care cite
a
concern for difference in
opposition to an alleged concern
for sameness by the "rights"
supporters. As the Johnsons
have indicated, "Here we find
an ostensible defense of
non-dualistic thinking based on an
untenable dualism
between identity (or 'sameness')
and difference ." 56 The
claim to moral superiority by
the rights supporters then
is based on these inadequacies
of the care
ethic,

"Our

focus on the morally relevant
features of disparate
individuals is designed not as a reductive
analysis of
their essential natures but simply
as a means of avoiding
the vacuous proposals of 'life-based
ethics'
or the

conservatism of an ethic of care ." 57

Any alternative to

the moral rights position which addresses
the problem of

"moral relativism" must also avoid the
"intellectual trap"
of condemning the dualistic logic of sameness
and

difference while affirming this dualism by its simple
reversal.

To uncritically accept difference,

or

diversity, as the criterion for moral decisions creates

ethical dilemmas which simply mirror those which result
from the valuing of sameness.

Although not advocating an ethic of care, Adorno's
own ethical concerns may provide

a

depth of insight which

may be lacking in the rights versus care argument as it
has thus far been developed in the ecofeminist literature.
The ethical dimension of Adorno's work has been most

persuasively developed by Drucilla Cornell
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.

Cornell

.

examines the implications of
Adorno's critiques of Kant
and Hegel by first
distinguishing between morality
and
ethics.

u oses
"morality" designates any attempt
f'°T“ Y P
speHout
how one determines a right way
to behave
6

p

>

^

translated
3
relation
elation, a term which
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° nCS d «ermlnad, can
° f rules
The ethical

bf

to
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contrast with morality
ad
kind ° f person one must become
i^order^o
to H velop a nonviolative
r
relationship to
hp Other
the
The concern of the ethical
relation, in
ther words, is a way of being in
the world that
s p ans divergent value
systems and allows us to
the repressive aspects of competing
moral
systems!^9

^

^ T

^
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Cornell's subsequent interpretation of
Adorno’s
"ethical message" then can also be read
as an implicit
critique of those animal rights theories based
in

categories taken from Kant and Utilitarianism.

Adorno begins with but goes beyond Hegel's critique
of Kant.

He focuses on the repressive aspects of the

Kantian subject, as Cornell explains,
The Kantian subject, as a being of the flesh, falls
prey to the endless striving to subjugate his own
impulses and thus to secure the possibility of moral
action.
Reason is geared solely to the preservation
of the subject, equated here with consciousness;
because of Kant's separation of consciousness from
the flesh, the subject is pitted against the object,
which includes that aspect of the subject conceived
empirically.
Conceived in this way, the subjectobject relationship necessarily gives rise to the
master-slave dialectic. The master-slave dialectic
is played out in our relations to nature, taken here
to mean both against the external world of things,
and against our internal "nature" as physical, sexual

beings 60
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s

Hegel

"system" was an attempt to
address these
Kantian "repressions" and the
consequences
’

of

Enlightenment thought more generally
which had produced "a
radical divide between subject
and object, mind and
nature, and body and soul ." 61
in Hegel's works the
resolution of this division would then
be a "state of

reconciliation" or "Absolute Knowledge"
which would
consist of "self-recognition in absolute
otherness."
Adorno however understands reconciliation

differently,

"The idea of reconcilement forbids the
positing of

reconcilement as

concept

a

." 62

The nonviolative

relationship to the other cannot be reduced to
or transcendent concept,

a static,

"The ideal of reconciliation can

be shown or disclosed but not conceptualized ." 63

This

understanding of reconciliation is useful in addressing
the moral rights defenders’ concerns about the tendency
for those who endorse difference as the basis for ethics
to be caught up in dualistic

This is also,

(and hierarchical)

thinking.

simultaneously, an even more direct

challenge to the search for "sameness" as the criteria for
judgment.

Cornell summarizes this ethical difference

Adorno represents, "Reconciliation is the art of disunion
that allows things to exist in their difference and in

their affinity.

reconciliation in

Adorno,
a

then,

is a philosopher of

very specific sense.

His defense of a

reconciled state is presented in the name of the plural
and of the different." 6 ^

In order to "decode" Adorno's
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"ethical message" Cornell
elaborates on different elements
of his work which he does
not systematically separate,
but
which might be understood as
the "constellation of ethics"
his writing.
The three elements Cornell
examines are
the "unleashing of difference
in identity," the "dialectic
of natural history," and Adorno's
concerns with
65
reconciliation

m

.

Adorno’s understanding of the non-identity
of subject
and object was discussed previously,
but some of Cornell's
observations on this aspect of negative
dialectics may
help put the ecofeminist rights versus ethics
debate in
another perspective. Cornell interprets Adorno's
negative

dialectics as developing further the insights from
Hegel's
dialectics, or as she describes negative dialectics,
identity,
down.

in other words,

"Non-

is dialectics taken all the way

Hegel's "reified Geist" or "deified subjectivity"

fails to achieve the "reconcilement" at which his

philosophical system aimed, "The attempt to achieve pure

self-recognition in absolute otherness, in other words,
violates the Other by denying its otherness to the
Concept.

Without the closure of the circle, the Concept

can no longer fully incorporate objectivity as its own

expression.

The object,

in other words,

in its nonidentity with the Concept

." 66

escapes ownership
There is then

a

"constitutive outside" to any concept, or conceptual
system,

a

"nonidentity" which disrupts the system.

nonidentity or negativity "is the escaped otherness"
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This

”

inherent in the logic of
identity, "The object can
neither
be grasped in its entirety
by the Concept nor can it
be
known in its immediacy.
This understanding of
nonidentity and negativity
includes negative dialectics
itself, "For Adorno, then,
negative dialectics is not a
method; nor is it simply
material reality, as if material
reality in its contradictoriness
could be presented to us
without mediation through concepts.
Negative dialectics
IS instead the 'truth' of an
unreconciled
reality, or

antagonistic entirety."

As Adorno stated, reconciliation

would be the overcoming of both
negativity and the need
for negative dialectics, "Regarding
the concrete utopian
possibility, dialectics is the ontology of
the wrong state
of things.
The right state of things would be
free of

it

.
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The "paradox" of negative dialectics then is
that

representation of negativity, of the non-identical, cannot
be accomplished by simply presenting it as concept.

Likewise,

the

truth" of nature cannot be experienced

immediately, or at least it is not available for simple

translation into language, into concepts.

However, the

idea of constructing a "constellations of elements" to

illuminate a specific "image" of the non-identical
resurfaces at this point, this time as an aspect of

mimesis as it manifests itself in the writing of

philosophy and political philosophy.

Cornell understands

the "constellation" as a metaphor for the process of
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decoding the "relational object"
one wishes to understand.
The object can only be known
in its "context," which
however should not be understood as
simply external to the
object. Adorno makes the point,
"Becoming
aware of the

constellation in which

a

thing stands is tantamount to

deciphering the constellation which having
come to be, it
69
bears within it ."
Whether we are attempting
to

interpret fascism, advertising, animals as
food,

endangered species, or whatever, the interpretation
must
be sensitive to the "context" in which it is
found,

that

constellation which is "relational" and historical to
its
core,

and which is never simply "outside" the interpreted

object.

The interpretation or deciphering of the object

involves the "mimetic capacity" which includes "modes of

behavior" capable of being "receptive, expressive and

communicative in

a

sensuous fashion ." 70

These modes of

behavior, which are the exercise of the mimetic abilities
of humans,

are the keys to overcoming the "spell" of a

rationality which has turned on itself, threatening the
survival of the self for which it evolved.

The only

escape from the total instrumentalization of the world is
to redevelop what has been repressed in the "logic of

domination"--mimetic capacity.

This specific

understanding of the relationship of mimesis to
rationality is the key to understanding Adorno's critical
theory,

and may provide a possibility for radical ecology

to overcome basic blocks to the achievement of ecological
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consciousness and an ecological society.

Cornell

summarizes the role mimesis plays in
Adorno's critical
theory,

Mimesis,

m

other words, is the capacity to
identify
th 1
and in appreciation, rather than
?'
^i
v.
the ability
to identify as, as is characteristic
of
instrumental logic.
In this sense, knowledge through
constellation does not privilege the subject's
purpose over the object's "right" to be
what it has
become.
In Adorno, mimesis is connected with
the
attitude toward the other he associates with
utopia
Mimesis lets the object be. By so doing,
mimetic
capacity foreshadows the nonviolative relationship
to
the other, beyond the heterogeneous and beyond
what
is one's own, that can only be fulfilled in
a
redeemed world. /J
'

-

Cornell adds that this "identification with"

(I

identify with the wolf) as opposed to "identification as"
(I

identify it as

a wolf)

should not be understood as a

"return to intuition or immediacy."

All identification

and interpretation is mediated, and constellations can

only be understood as

a

certain "misrecognition" that is

inherent in "identity-logical thinking."

There is no

exhaustive or final interpretation of the object or its
context,

"For Adorno,

the re-experiencing of the object as

nonidentical is the experience of misrecognition, in which
the subject literally runs up against the limits of

conceptualization and is opened to the Other as other, the
unassimilated.

We can only know the object as it is in

its different contexts, never immediately or as it is in
its true reality." 7 ^

This is not a recipe for relativism,

because relativism relies on

a
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"philosophy of

consciousness" position which privileges
the subject over
the object and understands the
"object as a mere
derivative of the subject ." 73 What
is achieved in the
mimetic construction of constellations
is not merely the
expression of a particular subject, but is
a release of
the "substance" or content of the
object.

Remember, there

is no radical separation of subject
and object in

(negative)

dialectics, nor should the "interrelatedness
of

all things" be forgotten 74
.

This way of understanding the

ethical implications of negative dialectics even
appears
to echo the self- justification of some "animal
rights"

defenders who object to the charge of abstractness and
decontextualization.

Evolutionary theory leads us to expect continuities,
not sharp breaks.
It implies that, if we examine
nature with an unbiased eye, we will find a complex
pattern of resemblances as well as differences. We
will find in humans, traces of their evolutionary
past, and in other species ... traces of
characteristics that may be more or less well
developed in us. This is true of those
characteristics that make us "rational," no less than
the others 75
.

(However,

again note the animal rights defender's focus on

rationality as the principle criterion of concern.)

The

negative dialectical self-reflection required to interpret
"objects" in their constellations has the effect not only
of releasing the "substance" of the object, but of making
us aware of our fundamental infusion with the rest of the

world,

"Cogitative self-reflection yields
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a

knowledge of

oneself as other, nonidentical,
which in turn opens the
self to the nearly
suppressed mimetic
capacity, the

ability to identify with
others through access to
the
other in oneself ." 76
In a world of domination
and repression the substance
released in the self-reflective
interpretation of

constellations will reveal the moment
of suffering.
it is
this realization which forms the
basis for the "ethical
message" of Adorno's negative
dialectics, and which has
implications for social and political
practice,

"The

physical moment tells our knowledge
that the suffering is
not to be, that things should be
different. Woe speaks,
’go.’

Hence the convergence of specific
materialism with
criticism, with social change in practice ." 77
And
contrary to the charges of pessimism against
Adorno in
particular, unhappiness at the suffering of
others should
not be the basis of despair but of hope.
It indicates we
still retain some of that capacity to feel for
others and
to long for a change,

"Conscious unhappiness is not

a

delusion of the mind's vanity, but something inherent in
the end

the one authentic dignity it has received in its

separation from the body.

This dignity is the mind's

negative reminder of its physical aspect: its capability
of that aspect is the only source of whatever hope the

mind can have."^^

The question which has dogged those

sympathetic to critical theory is how Adorno's

interpretation of "negativity" can be turned into
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a

politics which is not simply
philosophical interpretation
or aesthetic esotericism.
The same old point
needs

repeating every so often, "The
philosophers have only
interpreted the world, in various
ways; the point,

however,

is to changp it."^°

Cornell repeats the charges
against Adorno.
In
examining the "ethical, legal, and
political significance
of liberal and deconstructionist
accounts of justice and
right" she concludes that Adorno
is left with "only
negative dialectics" and no possibility
of a "positive"
representation of politics,

pretend that in this fallen world we could
give an
affirmative account of the conditions of truth
or of
justice would only further perpetuate the
violence of
idealism.
Even in art, the possibility of redemption
can only be shown negatively.
To try to abstractly
portray the conditions of redemption, to give form
to
the hope of reconciliation as if it existed now,
only
promotes accommodation to a fallen world. As a
result, Adorno does not reflect on the conditions
of
justice and the relation of these conditions to
positive law, either through a quasi-transcendental
inquiry or through empirical analysis. Such a
reflection is foreclosed by his negative dialectics.
Even if his negative dialectics carries within it an
ethical message that can be decoded, this message
cannot be translated into an account of justice and
its relation to law 80
T°

.

Cornell's understanding of the meaning of "justice"
here is important,

justice as being,

for she defines a "positive" account of

"the elaboration of justice as a given

set of descriptive conditions."

Abandoning negative

dialectics, Cornell then turns to Derridean deconstruction
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and its emphasis on the
necessity of judgment in any
interpretation of laws to argue
that "justice" can never
be
reduced to merely following the
rules ." 81 she also
emphasizes her concern with
maintaining the "divide
between law, established norms,
and Justice" so that given
laws are not equated with
justice as such 82
.

It then must be asked,

of mimesis

m

do the analyses of the roles

critical theory, ecofeminist, and
radical

ecological interpretations of nature
provide any comfort
for the hope of creating a new
politics? Can a new
politics be imagined which could provide
direction to the
social practices of radical ecological
consciousness and
its hope for the end of suffering and the
beginning of

happiness?

(Eco) Feminist Politics

Before examining recent attempts to retheorize
politics, by individuals sympathetic to feminism, it must
be reemphasized that any attempt to begin to locate a

radical ecological politics which might begin to address
the multiple crises of nature that now confronts the

planet will run up against the limits of conceptuality,
and invite the danger of cooptation by the logic of

identity and domination.

Cornell also emphasizes this

problem in her criticism of those who cling to the
Habermasian inspired critical theory and who fail to
absorb the claims by Irigaray and other philosophers
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concerned with the place of
"the feminine" in any
symbolic/conceptual representations,
"No one emphasized
the limit of traditional
philosophical discourse
in the

expression of political critique
more militantly than
Theodor Adorno.
Feminism is radical because it
demands
that we re-think the ’origins'
and the ’limit’ of

philosophical discourse, even as we are
challenged to do
so philosophically. "83
In what follows it should be
kept
mind that
the attempt to glimpse
what-has-never-been
and what-is-yet-to-be existing concepts
and

m

m

logics fail

us.

This understanding of politics then is
not to be

viewed as

a

utopian vision of the end times but as

a

humble suggestion about where to begin again.
With the collapse of socialism worldwide and
the

remaining "communist" countries exhibiting all the

characteristics of brutal repressions, radical social and
political theorists have increasingly turned to an

examination of the potential of some liberal democratic
and civic republican ideas in the hope that these retain
some transformative or "revolutionary" possibilities.

Chantal Mouffe,

need for

a

for example, has attempted to address "the

new form of identification around which to

organize the forces struggling for
democracy."

a

radicalization of

The need for new forms of political

identification is a result of the fact that the old
arguments developed out of "class politics" have become
problematic, especially for feminists, ecologists and
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others who do not fit neatly
into the categories of
economism.
Crucial to establishing any
radicalization of
democracy is a redefinition of
citizenship which
recognizes its "intimate link" to
any preferred future
social, political, cultural, and
economic community.
Mouffe argues that any adequate
understanding
of

citizenship must go beyond those offered
by either the
liberal or civic republican traditions
even in their more
recent neo-liberal and communitarian forms 84
Without
fully restaging Mouffe' s explication and
criticism
.

of

liberal and communitarian arguments about
the relationship
of citizenship to the political community
some basic

points need repeating.

As Mouffe summarizes the argument

of John Rawls and other liberals,

their idea of

citizenship "is the capacity for each person to form,
revise and rationally pursue his/her definition of the
good."

Citizens then pursue their self-interest while

respecting the "rights" of others to do the same.

Communitarians criticize this understanding as paying to
little attention to the "constitutive community" which is

central to establishing the identities from which the

beliefs about self-interest and the good are generated.
The critique asserts that the liberal self enters into an

"instrumental community" of previously defined interests
and identity.

However,

as Mouffe indicates,

the approach

the communitarians endorse as an alternative to the

liberal community of instrumentalism,
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"is the revival of

the civic republican view
of politics that puts a
strong
emphasis on the notion of a
public good, prior to and
independent of individual desires
and interests ." 85

Mouffe believes the fundamental
problem with the
communitarian perspective is the
threat to "individual
liberty which a "substantive"
conception of the public
good would entail. Mouffe sees a
great danger in those
critiques of liberalism which tend to
degenerate into an
endorsement of a "pre-modern" politics,
and in their

failure to acknowledge the "crucial
contributions of
liberalism" including, "the defence of
pluralism, the idea
of individual liberty, the separation
of church
and state,

the development of civil society," all of
which help to

constitute modern democracy.

This "controversy" can

perhaps then be understood as yet another form of
the

recurring dilemma between "individual liberty" and
"political participation ." 86

in searching for a radical

intersection between the concerns of liberty and democracy

Mouffe surprisingly turns to an argument which usually is
seen as reinforcing conservative values.

After examining

Michael Oakeshott's discussion of the modern state, Mouffe
concludes that his idea of the
recovering,
fiflci-etas

"

respublica " is worth

"Oakeshott insists that the participants in

a

or cives are not associated for a common

enterprise nor with

a

view to facilitating the attainment

of each person's individual prosperity; what links them is
the recognition of the authority of the conditions
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specifying their common or
-public' concern, a -practice
of civility.- "87 A description
of this resoubl ra or
public concern therefore must be
elaborated,
i

"It is a

practice of civility specifying not
performances, but
conditions to be subscribed to in
choosing performances.
These consist in a complex of rules
or rule-like
prescriptions, which do not prescribe
satisfactions to be
sought or actions to be performed but
'moral

considerations specifying conditions to be
subscribed to
in choosing performances.'" 88 What
holds the community
together then is not a "substantive common
good" but a

"common bond" which is elaborated as "moral
considerations
of public concern."

These considerations then become the

"conditions" within which public or political discourse
takes place.

The "rules of civil intercourse" form the

common concern and bring the citizens together, "The

identification with those rules of civil intercourse
creates a common political identity among persons

otherwise engaged in many different enterprises." 8 ^
Politics then is not seen as something done to express
interests of those with pre-political identities, but
rather it is about the formation of identities themselves,
Politics is to a great extent about the rules of the
respublica and its many possible interpretations, it
is about the constitution of the political community,
not something that takes place inside the political
community as some communitarians would have it.
Political life concerns collective, public action; it
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s

"

aims at the construction
diversity and conflict 90 of

a

"we

ff

ln a context of

.

However,

Mouf fe

'

identity as

a

citizen has

a privileged status
in
new understanding of
politics.
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The citizen of the radical
democracy would experience
a constant conditioning
tension between their identity
as
a citizen and their
other identities, such as
feminist,
ecologist, mother, artist, and
so forth.
In addition,
"identity as citizen" itself will
be multiple as there
will not be any single authoritative
interpretation of the
"respublica
.

Therefore, what Mouffe offers for
consideration is an
understanding of politics and citizenship
which is deeply
implicated in processes of identification.
She also

insists the construction of the identities in
community as
citizens is not to be viewed as a form of "alliance,"

"For

it is not a matter of establishing a mere
alliance between

interests but of actually modifying the very

identity of these forces."

Furthermore, this politics

will affect the identities and interests of all citizens,
"The creation of political identities as radical

democratic citizens depends therefore on
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a

collective form

Of identification among
the democratic demands
found in
variety of movements: women,
workers, black, gay,
ecological, as well as in
several other 'new social

a

movements.

This "radical democratic
conception of
citizenship" then must be
articulated with a "radical

democratic interpretation" of
the ideas of liberty and
equality which when transformed
could take into account,
"the different social relations
and subject positions in
which they are relevant: gender,
class, race, ethnicity,
sexual orientation, etc
"93
The tenslons between the
principles of liberty and equality, on
the one hand, and
citizen and other individual identities,
on the other,

also imply there is no "true democracy"
which can ever
come into existence, "This is why a
project of radical and
plural democracy recognizes the impossibility
of the

complete realization of democracy and the final

achievement of the political community.

Its aim is to use

the symbolic resources of the liberal democratic
tradition
to struggle for the deepening of the democratic

revolution,

knowing that it is

a

never-ending process.

Kirstie McClure has taken up these ideas from Mouffe
(and from Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau’s earlier work)

and

used them to address the history of "pluralism" and how
these new theoretical tools can be used to radicalize

pluralist democracy, particularly as it is constituted in
relation to the public/private split in liberalism. 95
argues that understandings of liberal democracy as
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a

She

pluralistic process of
j
interestterest adjudication
have changed
and have had the
consequence

of challenging,
sometimes explicitly
often unselfconsciously,
the
beral
theory of the "subject
of rights" in
relation to state
authority
The classic Uberal
subject retains rights
against which the state
must not impinge; the
identity of
this subject exists
prior to the state and
prior to any
political participation.
This liberal subject
is

U

known

characteristically as the
"autonomous self" or "unitary
subject."
her examination of the
radical potential of
the idea of pluralism,
McClure is attempting to

m

address
the criticism of defenders
of feminism who believe
the
"autonomous individual is a
necessary requisite to
political agency. "96 This is
true, she argues, only
to
the extent that the relationships
of public to private and
state to citizen accepted by
liberal ideology remain in
Place.
The radicalization of our
understanding of these
relationships will be an element in
the simultaneous

transformation of the categories of
politics and the
identities of the political actors. As
McClure indicates.
Today's erasure of the boundaries between
public and
private is accomplished not through the
incursion of
public authority into a pre-existing private
realm, but
through a 'proliferation of new political
'"91
spaces.

The

new political spaces make "cultural representation
and
social practices" the multiple sites of political
struggle.

This understanding of political struggle means
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"

that

claims

by the "pluralist social
subject" should be
addressed not to the authority
of the state but
at

multiple sites, which include
not only traditional
political spaces but also the

"social" and the "cultural,"

for example.

This new, radically democratic
struggle

"opens the possibility of

a

quotidian politics-a politics

which extends the terrain of
political contestation to the
everyday enactment of social
practices and
the routine

reiteration of cultural representations

." 98

The

politically transformative possibilities
thus envisioned
are not simply another form of
"interest group

politics,"
but are expressed in a language close
to that of the
theorists of mimesis, "It suggests the
possibility of a

politics that begins not with the object of
constructing
similarities to address rights claims to the
state, but

opens rather with the object of addressing such
claims to

each other, and to each 'other', whoever and wherever
they

may be

.

99

McClure elaborates on the implications of her

position for addressing concerns about political agency.
This radical democratic politics does not restrict the

understanding of political "agency" but rather extends it
in all directions,

Not only is its agency affirmed by recasting "the
social" as a terrain of political contestation; it is
extended further by insisting that its multiple
identities are themselves not given as "natural
kinds" but contingently constructed and reconstructed
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these codes are enacted
in daily life,100°
These political identities
then are not given but
are
"What one enact*' and which
are enacted by "strategies
of
subversive repetition." The
social codes are varied
through the "performative
reconfiguring (of) such
constructions" which thereby
increases the "political"
participation of these radical
democratic subjects, "In
short, by recasting their
production and reproduction of
their own 'identities' as political
investments, it
constitutes their participation in
culture itself as a
political commitment."
The formation and re-formation of
identities is a

political act and helps constitute the
political as such.
In a slightly different context,
and with reference
to

both Adorno and Irigaray, Cornell also seems
to indicate
where the politics of mimesis intersects a new
practice of
radical democracy,
But this understanding of the subject does not mean
that we have to choose between the politics of
identity or the politics of difference. This other
subject returns us, instead, to the theatricality of
the enactment of a mimetic identification as the
basis for feminist politics, an enactment which is
always toward the future, because it enacts as
constituted what has yet to be. 101

What will become important then for the practice of
radical ecological politics which is critically self-

reflexive is the taking up of the challenge of radical

democracy and of feminist theory to self-consciously
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a

transform ourselves with
new identities, These
new
identities, and the new
agents of politics they
constitute, must include
that openness

to the other which
Adorno calls for in his
hope for the not-yet.
Although
not immune from stereotypic
representation and self
projection, attempts have been
made by radical ecologists
to develop a sensitivity
to others in the world,
and to
practices representing the interests

of those others who

speak in other languages and
muted voices.
In the
collaboration IHinklng Like a
Mountain, the rituals and
procedures for participation in a
"Council of All Beings"
are offered.

In the "Guidelines for a
Council of All

Beings Workshop" within the section
entitled "Identifying
with Another Life-Form" the initial
phases of the process
are summarized, "Through mourning
and remembering,
the

workshop participants have opened to the
universality of
the life within them.
They are ready to shake off
their

solely human identification and for

a

while imaginatively

enter the experience of another life-form."

The people

involved then are urged to go out and "let themselves
be
chosen

by another being, an activity the participants

often call

a

"Vision Quest" in which,

"The participants

are finding an ally to speak for in the Council

." 102

A

description of how participants might be guided in their
identifications is included,

"Ask them to request this

being's permission to enter it, so they can imaginatively
sense its body from within.

Finally,
614

let them ask the

being how it wishes to be
represented and what symbolic
form can be made as a mask
to be worn in the Council."
Then masks are made,
meditation is encouraged, and the
participants practice "speaking
for" the being which has
opened to them.
"The Council of All Beings"
is then held.
There are alternations between
humans and others, taking
turns speaking and listening,
until the council finally
dissolves, sometimes in laughter,
other times in sorrow or
silence, or in some complex combination
of emotions.
The

people then release the adopted life-forms
and thank them
for allowing the identifications.
Then
comes a time to

reflect on the experience and to make plans
for future
actions and subsequent meetings.
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CONCLUSION
THE ECOLOGICAL SUBJECT AND THE SPIRIT OF REVOLUTION

Radical ecological thought and the tradition of

critical theory can be fruitfully articulated together by

exposing the works of the philosophers of the ecology

movement to critique and conversely by supplementing the
work of the tradition of critical theory with the insights
of radical ecologists.

A critical theoretical approach

to

the philosophies of radical ecology reveals the extent to

which they have failed to adequately develop the concepts
of an "ecological society" and an "ecological subject"

which might bring it about.
theory supplies
regressive,
ecology,

a

The tradition of critical

needed corrective to the sometimes

sometimes anthropocentric, positions of deep

social ecology and ecofeminism.

But if the

tradition of critical theory is to be true to itself it

must open onto the truth of the ecology movement also. The
"truth" of the movement can be located in two areas.
First,

the ecology movement has developed genuine insights

into the possibilities of a "mimetic" relationship with

nature that do not simply regress behind the categories of

modern science nor simply assimilate themselves to an
affirmation of the present culture of domination.
there exists the possibility for constructing
a

a

Second,

vision of

concrete historical subj ect/agent of social

transformation which does not merely collapse the concept
624

Of the revolutionary subject
into the category of

currently given empirical individuals,
or succumb to the
conception of a meta-subject "above"
the everyday
struggles of actual living human beings.
By examining the aspects of the
various philosophies
of ecology through the categories
of methodology,

subjectivity, and politics, the various aspects
of the
constellation which is presently called "radical
ecology"
or the green" movement can be shown to
be in a fruitful
tension.

This movement contains potentials and

possibilities for both transformation toward
ecological community

a.nd

a

future

regression to further barbarism,

to use the words of the early critical theorists,

and it

is only by becoming more self aware of these tensions
and

possibilities that radical ecologists can make appropriate
theoretical and political choices.

Deep Ecology

Within the philosophy of deep ecology there is both
deep insight into the possibilities of

relationship to nature as well as
toward misanthropy.

a

a

a

non-dominating

disturbing tendency

This tendency extends beyond its

merely polemical use to an unfortunate essential blindness
towards the categories of its own analysis.

The work of

Arne Naess serves as the philosophical foundation of much
of the "deep ecology" element of the radical ecology

movement.

Naess's work reveals both the power and
625

limitation of the deep ecological approach.

However, the

methodology and subsequent claims of deep ecology
has not
enabled it to escape from traditional philosophical
procedures and their limitations.

The "deep questioning

method" is little more than philosophy as traditionally
conceived.

It does not of necessity lead to foundational

truth, but rather tends to return to long-standing,

fundamental problems of ontology and epistemology.

The

deep ecology concept of identification with nature is also
problematic, and remains unresolved even in the work of
those who follow Warwick Fox in his attempt to develop

"transpersonal ecology."

a

The concept of identification

must be rearticulated to distinguish between

a

"projective" identification which, against the intentions
of the radical ecologist,

simply maps the prevailing

categories of nature onto the world, and what may be

called "mimetic identification" which understands nature

differently from what is possible in current scientific or
romantic concepts of nature.

Mimetic identification has

already been adopted as the basis for some innovative
remedial and reconstructive ecological work, and while not

achieving the ecological equivalent of the theological
terms of "resurrection" or "reconciliation,

"

at least this

approach does not reduce nature to the categories of an
instrumental rationality.

Mimetic identification attempts

to overcome the present conceptual system which has

resulted in the domination of nature, which advances the
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goal of simplification or reduction of nature
solely for
the purposes of human production and consumption.

The deep ecological subject attempts to deeply

identify with the ecocommunity of which it is
often this is achieved at the price of

a

a part,

but

mystical or

metaphysical regression, leaving the ecological subject no
rational basis for making moral or ethical distinctions

between forms of life.

Life as a whole is given absolute

value and in this way devalues all individual life and the

uniqueness of particular beings.

The insights gained by

seeing the world through categories of ecosystem and
species may at the same time reduce the capacity to

recognize the uniqueness of each member of the
ecocommunity, especially the individual human beings who
are collapsed into a single essential category, the human

species, whose members are posited as having a universal

character,

typically represented as fundamentally selfish,

destructive, and self-destructive.

In failing to

distinguish analytically the internal differences between
human beings, especially with respect to the institutions
and systems they have created, the deep ecologist does not

provide a systematic analysis of the different effects

which result from decisions by different individuals
within human society.
worker at

a

The CEO and the assembly line

chemical company do not share equal

responsibility for the decisions about polluting the
environment.

Although as

a

practical matter the deep
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.

ecologists of Earth First! do know
who is responsible for
decisions such as clear cutting,
as is clear in their
Journal, they have not made a
coherent theoretical link
between their ecological and their
political
claims, or

when they have, it has appeared in
an all too reactionary
and even racist form.
For many who identify as deep
ecologists, human reason is perceived as
essentially the
same as instrumental rationality leaving
as the only
apparent alternative for understanding the "truth"
of

nature

a

reversion to mythic explanations and mythic

solutions
Deep ecological politics has prided itself on

development of mythologies of the eco-warrior, eco-heroes
and eco-martyrs, thus opening the possibility of achieving
the same paradoxical impact on the environment that the

early critical theorists attributed to the dialectic of
Enlightenment.

The deep ecologists’ overriding practical

goal is to attempt ecosystem preservation based on an

approach to political action which tends to repeat the

patterns of domination lying at the source of the
ecological crisis.

In their analysis of ecosystems,

the

deep ecologists have a complex, advanced, empirical

understanding of the intimate interdependence of human and
non-human nature, but in their analysis of society they
tend to simply project the categories of first nature onto

society (second nature) and so dishonor what should be
their fundamental insight: the irreducible uniqueness of
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each species and each individual within the
species,

including those belonging to the human species.

Deep

ecologists frequently fail to honor the unique otherness
of the individual human being.

Recognition of individual

human value should be compatible with their concern for
the individual members of other species and for nature
as
a

whole.

Deep ecology must develop a social analysis that

is able to generate social insights which attain the same

advanced level of its insights into the appropriate
ecological relationship to "non-human nature."

For this

reason deep ecology must turn more self-consciously and

self-ref lexively toward the insights of feminist theories.

Social Ecology
Social ecology continues to be burdened by its

lingering anthropocentrism,

a

manifestation of the

Humanism present in the tradition of anarchism from which
it has evolved.

categories.

Bookchin's categories are social

The natural world is interpreted through

these social categories and thereby reduced to the social,
the social categories themselves ultimately reflecting a

particular and perhaps idiosyncratic understanding of
Reason.

The collapse of nature into categories of reason

is the recurring problem of identity thinking,

the

conceptual domination of the other. This tendency

manifests itself in Bookchin's work centrally in his

understanding of the relationship of subjectivity to
629

evolution where "subjectivity"
is found to exis t
everywhere in nature.
In this way human reason
becomes
the standard for the
future ecological society.
His
program of social transformation
can be viewed as an
updated version of an idealized
notion of the Greek polis.
Lrke nearly all socialist
projections, it is a vision of
efficiency and rational domination
in the service of a
material abundance which then
becomes the basis of human
emancipation.
it seeks an indirect
resolution
of the

conflict between human and nature
by attempting to resolve
social injustice first. Bookchin's
ecologically aware,
libertarian anarchist is to achieve
freedom and justice
through the rational dissolution of
"hierarchy," and after
this has occurred ecological
remediation will be possible.
The social ecologist's assumption
that subjectivity
is the telos of nature is simply
an expression
of the

hubris of human reason.

It fails to recognize the

uniqueness of each member of the ecocommunity
and the nonteleological aspects of natural evolution. Man
again

becomes the measure of all things, and the development
of
"subjectivity" the highest goal of nature.

The ecological

aspect of libertarian anarchism is an honest and explicit

acknowledgment of the constitutive precedence of non-human
nature,

and distinguishes it from early forms of

philosophical idealism.

However,

for evolution to be read

teleologically, biological and other physical sciences

must be forced into

a

narrowed interpretation that, rather
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than adequately integrating empirical knowledge of

evolution into

a

general theory of human development,

converts biological categories into indicators of moral
necessity.

Social ecology's analytic category that most

obviously conflates biology and sociology is "symbiosis."
The biological category "symbiosis" takes on social

characteristics as "mutual aid."
following Kropotkin.

Here Bookchin is

This philosophic strategy reduces

the real conflicts and antagonisms of the natural and

social worlds to matters of redefinition,

it displaces

natural or ecological struggles, shifting their meaning to
questions of "social justice."
Bookchin'

s

concept of municipalism is provocative and

well supported by a counter-history of the development and

destruction of civilizing tendencies.

The fundamental

difficulties emerge (besides in the inadequate response to
the deep ecologists'

insights into the necessity of the

expansion of "wilderness") in social ecology's inadequate

conception of technology and technological development.
What criteria exist for technological development which do
not simply repeat the criteria of rational domination?

How is the teleological development of subjectivity to be

viewed as anything other than human instrumental reason
intensified,

taking the form of the rational domination of

social processes?

Simply appealing to democratic

procedures does not assure that nature will be viewed as
anything other than the mere object of human purposes.
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Is

the teleology of nature simply an extension of
the idea of

self-preservation, thus inviting an intensification of

instrumental reason, which would merely constitute the

perfection of the practice of the domination of nature?

E cofeminism

Ecofeminists do not have

a

common unified position

and methodology, or even a common analysis of the ecology
crisis.

There are not even the commonalities that might

be found between deep and social ecology.

Ecofeminism is

an element not only of the constellation "radical ecology"

but also of feminism.

When brought within the

interpretive framework of critical theory, ecofeminism

becomes an exceedingly complex web of structures and

potentials difficult to disentangle theoretically.
However, much of ecofeminist thought still revolves around
the central radical ecological categories of nature and

subjectivity, but which then attempt to include the

concept of gender in their analyses.

An examination of

the concept of "the feminine" by feminists and

ecofeminists has revealed the historical association of

women with nature, and the historical devaluation of
women's subjectivity with respect to male subjectivity.

Much of the discussion of "women's experience" involves an
attempt to establish the implications of the relation of
that experience to the (masculine/patriarchal)

subjectivity.

idea of

One "goal" of feminism has become the
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redefinition or resymbolization of the
relation of women's
experience to the concept of subjectivity.
Becoming a
subject is a fundamentally problematic
process for those
of the human species identified/classified
as women and as
"other" in the androcentric or "phallocentric"
world.

Those who attempt to recover a prior or
pre-his-toric

subjectivity frequently turn to cultural anthropology
for
empirical and philosophic support. This ecofeminism

hypothesizes

a

pre-patriarchal culture that honored women,

included goddess worship, and was organized through
matriarchal, or at least matrilineal, relationships.

One

of the most problematic developments in this area is
that
of spiritual ecofeminism which has failed to address the

problems of hierarchy which result from political

interpretation by
results in

a

a

single "spiritual" authority.

This

political authority that is derived from

spiritual authority, and

modern political agency.

a

pre-modern rather than

a

post-

This understanding of the

relationship of politics to spirituality collapses the
political back into the spiritual or religious.
produces
politics,

a

This

fundamentally hierarchical and anti-democratic
reducing the political consciousness of the

individual subject and making her subservient to

interpretive authority.

a

higher

Instead of representing feminine

sensitivity and spirituality it reproduces the typical
structures of power only in disguise.
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However, when traditional categories and concepts are

retained,

ecological and political practices tend to be

guided by Enlightenment or rationalist impulses.

Rationalist ecofeminism attempts to provide enlightened
guidance of social development.

This ecofeminism

parallels very closely mainstream feminism which insists
that women's reason is equally human reason and therefore

entitles women to equal access to all rational democratic

institutions and the legitimate exercise of power.

Unfortunately this form of feminism seems to be largely
content with acquiring for women the same powers of

domination of nature which have for so long been uniformly

controlled by men.

Much of recent feminism's concerns with subjectivity
and identity revolves around the status of "the feminine"
and its critical potential for restructuring symbolic and

political orders.

Efforts in this area attempt to

transform the relations of women to society and politics
by transforming the categories and concepts of Western

philosophy and political thought.

One especially

significant effort along these lines has been that of Luce

Irigaray and her interpreters and critics.

This radical

alternative form of feminism includes post-structural,

deconstructive treatment of the concepts and categories of

philosophy and political thought.

However,

the approaches

to feminism and ecofeminism that challenge the entire
634

framework of philosophy and political thought have
yet to
establish other than a negating practice.
In addition,
radical forms of feminism and ecofeminism are forced to
face the same charges Habermas makes against Adorno

concerning the relation of philosophy to itself and
political practice, that is, does the negativity of the
critique preclude political action other than that based
on some mystical or metaphysical notions of peace,

reconciliation, or freedom.
One interpretation of this critical or "negative"

thought asserts that participation in politics in the

present liberal, parliamentary framework only serves to

strengthen the bindings of oppression and domination.
Those who oppose the atomistic individualism typical of
this form of politics contend that political practice

should instead be conceived as an attempt to construct

alternative subjectivities and identities.
efforts at

(re)

However,

constructing identities have also had

unexpected consequences, as feminism generally has found,
when attempts to analyze women’s experiences begin to
include other categories such as race and class.

It has

become apparent that "women's experience" cannot be

collapsed into a single descriptive category, but can only
be adequately approached through the recognition of the

uniqueness of individuals' experiences, while recognizing
that this does not lead to the production of

a

philosophical or political "nominalism" because of the
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necessary inclusion of social and
historical context in
the analysis.
Interpretation of these experiences is
further complicated by the frequent
occupation by women of
multiple categories of oppression and
domination.
Radical
ecological insights force these analyses to
recognize

that

under conditions of unfreedom "subject positions"
of

individuals or groups are established through

a

symbolic

order in which social identities are at least
partially

constructed from categories of nature.

The presently

dominant or "hegemonic" symbolic order has been

interrogated by "postmodern or poststructural" critics who
have exposed the workings of these constructions of

subjectivity.

Adorno developed

a

very similar questioning

of the dominant conceptual process and its relationship to

subjectivity.

He critically examined the conceptual

operations by which the non-identical is reduced to the
identical,

incorporating it into the system of domination,

and thus extending instrumental rationality to the point
of its culmination in a "false totality."

In efforts

which echo many of the critical theorists' insights,
feminists and ecofeminists have attempted, both in their

philosophic examinations and political actions, to
challenge imposed identities.
One area in particular where ecofeminism has begun to

challenge earlier environmental values is that of animal
rights.

The challenge has been made through attempts to

elaborate on the idea of an ethic of care, first discussed
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by Carol Gilligan in her work on the differences
in moral

reasoning between women and men.

The animal rights debate

is a manifestation of the larger challenge
in philosophy

and politics to the "justice tradition" which seeks
to

define universal moral principles rather than develop an

understanding of ethical obligations traditionally
associated with

a

theory of "the good life."

Ecofeminists

have rejected the moralist animal rights claims for being
abstract,

ahistorical, and decontextualized, and thus

offering little effective guidance for the many moral
dilemmas faced in everyday life.

Alternatively, by

focusing on the everyday ethical decisions women

frequently make, exemplified in Ruddick's understanding of
"maternal thinking,

"

a

truly practical guide to moral

principles may potentially be developed.
The attempts at redefinition or revaluing of women's

differences from men and among themselves has been

a

very

hazardous process, particularly when confronting the

category of "nature."

Feminist critique of Western

philosophy fundamentally challenges its analytic
categories, and therefore what has historically been much
of feminism's own epistemological status.

Few have pushed

this critique as far as Luce Irigaray with her strategy of

mimesis with its attempt to resymbolize the "feminine" and
so create new possibilities for women's subjectivity.

Others,

such as Judith Butler, question why women should

solely occupy the space of the "other" in this analysis,
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.

suggesting that other others, including nonhuman
others,
must also be resymbolized creating multiple
strategies of

mimesis which might disrupt the current system of

domination

Although outside the discussion within ecofeminism,
Drucilla Cornell has attempted to draw out the ethical
implications of Adorno's negative dialectics.

Cornell

concludes that Adorno's negative dialectics fails to

provide guidance for the crucial political questions
concerning law and justice.

The problem for feminists,

ecofeminists and radical ecologists generally is to find
the links both theoretically and practically which can tie
the ethical insights which are generated when examining
the idea of mimesis to the politics of radical democracy.

An extension of the works of Mouffe and McClure, by
combining them with the insights of Cornell on Adorno's
ethics and Irigaray on the strategy of mimesis, may

provide some of those mediating links between "mimetic
ethics" and radically participatory democracy.

Critical Theory and Radical Ecology
Critical theory offers both

a

framework and

a

tradition of critique which help illuminate what otherwise
remains opaque in the often contradictory elements of
radical ecology examined in this work.
part,

However,

for its

radical ecology does provide empirical information

and practical orientation lacking in the tradition of
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critical theory.

Radical ecology is an historical
and
empirical corrective, or developmental
supplement,

to the

insights of early critical theory.
lacks unity,
of Marcuse,

Critical theory itself

as can be seen in the conflicting
positions

Habermas and Adorno.

Marcuse foresaw the

potential of the women's and ecology movements,
but
remained largely in the rationalist and
humanist
conceptual framework with its tendency to
elitism and
anthropocentrism.
in Marcuse's work the position

of the

proletariat is simply, somewhat too expediently,
replaced
by the most advanced form of resistant consciousness
existing at any given historical moment.

In this way what

is fundamentally an orthodox Leninist Marxism is
retained

although in

a

slightly altered form. Vanguardism remains,

in Marcuse's critical theory,

now in the privileged

location of the contemporary intellectual strata.

Habermas's critique of Marcuse's call for
Science and New Technology as the basis of

liberated society must be reconsidered.

a

a

New

truly

Critical

theorists from Horkheimer through Habermas have agreed on
the basic social and economic influences on the actual

practice of science and technology, that

is,

social and

economic structures are fundamental determinants of the
objects and purposes of science and technology.

Habermas's assertions about evolution and "technological
progress" cannot sustain his critique of Marcuse and early
critical theory.

Natural evolution has not come to an
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end,

but takes on new forms in the dialectic
of history

and nature.

A clearer understanding of our present

predicament comes from understanding that evolution
has
become primarily devolution, through the
destruction of
species and the potential destruction of entire
ecosystems,

including the irrevocable disintegration of

planetary ecology.

it is possible this devolution may

result in a final catastrophic global ecological collapse,

destroying human "civilization" if not the species itself.
Habermas's critical theory and its assumption of

technologically productive "progress" is fundamentally
challenged by the empirical evidence of ecological
destruction.

The understanding of science which Habermas

relies on is also challenged by the critique of dominant

views of science offered by those feminists, including
Hartsock, Harding, and Keller, who have developed

alternative understandings of objectivity, and who have
shown that "reliable knowledge of nature" can be produced

without limiting science to the role of shop foreman in
the full extension of the domination of nature through

instrumental rationality.

Other more "erotic" methods and

theories of science also produce reliable knowledge of

nature and could be encouraged with

a

fundamental change

of society.

From an ecological perspective, technological

development must be viewed within

a

framework much more

closely approximating Adorno's view of history.
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Modern

.

ecological history is the history
of catastrophe.
Habermas’s position, viewed from the
perspective of
radical ecology and ecofeminism,
appears both

anthropocentric and androcentric.
tradition of Western philosophy,

It is fully within the
a

tradition extensively

and importantly critiqued and deconstructed
by feminism
over the last few decades

When ecological remediation and reclamation
take
place, not primarily for purposes of human
aesthetic

appreciation or simple human self-preservation, but
in
response to the needs of an ecosystem as
its individual members,

a

whole and of

then a fundamentally different

approach to nature is taking place.

Remediation and

reclamation are not reducible to functions of the human
system of production or commodity consumption.

The human

needs of self-preservation or aesthetic pleasure in these

new ecological orientations are not central motivations
for the interventions and non-interventions into

ecosystems.

These ecological activities demonstrate

a

perspective which views humans as only one element of the
ecological community.

This ecological perspective

attempts to recognize the fundamental contiguity of humans
and nature rather than attempting to find the definitive

point of their separation. Human interests are preserved

only to the extent they are part of the interests of the

ecocommunity as a whole.

Nature is not viewed as

a

collection of objects for manipulation and control, but as
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a

profound process that develops in not entirely

predictable directions, and which exceeds conceptual
possibility.

Ecosystems tend to approach climax

conditions, only interrupted by extraordinary and

cataclysmic events of various kinds, and the movement
toward climax conditions can be encouraged by human
actions in reversal of our historical relationship to

nature so far. The categories and concepts which guide the
radical ecologists' interaction with nature tend to

develop differently than those of

a

science and technology

harnessed to the ideology of industrial production and
continuous growth.

If science shifts from a positivist

acceptance of facts as given, toward

a self-

reflectiveness; if interventions into natural processes
take place with the intent of reversing the destructive

effects of industrial production; if scientist as well as

non-scientists view themselves as unique parts of nature

becoming aware of itself, rather than as superior beings
with only the interests of their own self-preservation to
limit their powers of domination and suppression of

everything "other"--then, is this not
new technology, based,
gratification,

"

then on

a

new science and

if not on a Marcusean "logic of
a

self-reflexive eco-logic?

However justified or unjustified Habermas's
theological reading of the early critical theorists, the
actions of radical and not so radical ecologists, who

attempt to repair, recover and reconstitute natural
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ecosystems, da approximate a
redemption of the claims of
the concept of "reconciliation"
as Adorno interpreted it.
The reading of Adorno which
understands him as calling for
a mystical or metaphysical
resurrection of nature is
unfortunate at best and a cynical
distortion at worst. To
analytically reduce an entire body
of work to metaphysics
and theology on the basis of the
use of the concept of
reconciliation is a destruction of thought
no less
complicit with the forces of domination
than one that
reduces all thought to instrumental
rationality. Adorno
was neither mystic nor theologian.
It is too easy to pull
isolated quotes from a work, "reconstruct"
it along

reductionist lines, then attribute to it

a

set of

paradoxes or aporias which find their sole solution
in
"paradigm shift."

a

But regardless of the unwarranted attack on Adorno,
the theory of communicative action seems increasingly

problematic itself.

If the limitations,

which Habermas

acknowledges, are taken seriously, the best that can be

hoped from his change of paradigm is

a

gradual increase in

the uncoerced mutual understanding of those involved in

expert discourses.
is "true,

"

If the theory of communicative action

consensus understandings reached within

"expert" discourses should trickle down to the level of

everyday life, thus reducing social injustice.

However,

it is still unclear how this trickle down ethics alone can

have

a

significant impact on the ecology crisis.
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Only if

enough people were to recognize their self-interest
in

preserving at least

a

minimally viable global ecosystem,

would democratic institutions begin to contain the
economic and political systems responsible for the

destruction of the environment. At any rate, this hope of
communicative rationality would seem to be unable by
itself to provide the motivation for individuals to act

within the limited time available to combat ecological
catastrophe, an event some analyses view as imminent.

However difficult it is to comprehend the concepts

contained within the work of the early critical theorists,

especially those of Adorno, they seem to offer more
fertile ground for the development of radical ecological

thought than does the framework of communicative action
alone.

The non-concept of mimesis may be of crucial

importance in the development of an adequate philosophical
and practical approach to the problems of ecological

destruction and catastrophe.

Development of

a non-

destructive mode of ecological interaction with nature can
only be fully achieved by human beings who are capable of

individually interpreting their everyday life activities
from the perspective of ecological subjects and then

representing them in

a

radically democratic manner.

the planet and the social system residing on it have

achieved

a

new ecological equilibrium, the truly

ecological subject remains imaginary or utopian, but

utopian in the sense of an "exact fantasy."
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Until

What is now needed is an "exact fantasy" as Adorno

used the term and Buck-Morss has explained it

1
.

What is

needed is the translation of the facts of ecology, of
nature,

into words which themselves provide an image, but

this image is that of

a

future possibility, one where the

"reconciliation" of humans with nature will have taken
place.

This exact fantasy is accomplished through

mimetic transformation, not to be understood as

a

a

mere

copying of the given, but as its metamorphosis,

accomplished through the translation of existing elements
into the image of the desired future.

ecologist,

For the radical

the imagined future of a planetary ecological

climax becomes the model for mimetic self-transformation.
The idea of an ecological society is an anticipation
of a situation of reconciliation,

an anticipation of the

development of possibilities and potentials existing
latently in the present damaged life, an anticipation of
the elimination of reification and the flowering of

otherness.

The ecological subject will not be an absolute

subject,

for it recognizes what is non-identical to

itself.

It will not attempt to reduce the other to its

own concepts, or to the needs of a production apparatus.
The ecological subject's attitude toward the other is a

willingness to let it be.

The future ecological society

assists the development of the other which occurs through
its own impulses,

in its own time.
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This will bring into

being

a

different world, one where the blossoming of what-

we-are-not will reveal who we truly are.
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